SUMMARY OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN LONG AN PROVINCE DURING DECEMBER 1967 - 1968/01/31

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06753748
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable
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IN MIZI'UUCII
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STATE/INR DI A NmCC/mC (SECOEF JCS ARMY NAVY
AIR I CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SOO ONE CRS
CER FOIS OCS IRS AID USIA
This material contains InfondntiOn affecting the National Defenae Of the United Stateil within the Meaning of the Ehpionage Laws. Title 18. U.8.c.
Sees. 793 and 794. the traitentission or revelation of which In any' manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOTreINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
CON IAL
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI
2Z 05.Z
3.3(h)(2)
CITE
DIST 31 JANUARY 1968 '
/70 V()-97
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SWUM' SUMMARY OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN LONG AN PROVINCE
ACO
SOURCE
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DURING DECEMBER 1967
a
SUMMARY.... ACCORDING TO A PRISONER INTERROGATION THE VIET
CONG /VC/ IN LONG AN PROVINCE ARE ATTEMPTING TO FORM VILLAGE-LEVEL
LIBERATION COMMITTEES IN ORDER TO GAIN WIDER SUPPORT AMONG THE
PEOPLE AND TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBtE COALITION GOVERNMENT. IF A
COALITION FAILS ZO MATERIALIZE THE LIBERATION COMMUTEES CAN BE
USED TO SPEARHEAD A GENERAL UPRISING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF
4 , VIETNAM. THE VC HAVE REPORTEDLY DIVIDED SOUTH VIETINAM INTO TWO
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3.5(c)
AREAS AND WILL CONDUCT A SEPARATE MILITARY PROGRAM IN EACH AREA.
THE VC CONTINUE TO SUFFER FOOD MEDICAL AND MANPOWER SHORTAGES,
BUT THESE SHORTAGES DO NOT YET APPEAR TO HAVE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED
MORALE. THE LOW RAMER RATE MAY BE PARTIALLY EXPLAINED BY THE
CURRENT RICE HARVEST AND THE PROMISED HWLT IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
IN LONG AN AFTER TET. END SUMMARY.
POLICY
1.
3.3(h)(2)
ACCORDING TO INFORMATION, OBTAINED FROM THE INTERROGATION OF
PEOPLES' REVOLUTIONARY PARTY
MEMBER THE VC ARE ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH VILLAGE LIBERATION 3.3(h)(2)
COMMITTEES DURING THE FIRST PHASE OF THE 196.7��63 WINTER-SPRING
CAMPAIGN.
THE VC FEEL THAT THEY LACK SUFFICIENT
CONTROL AT THE VILLAGE AND HAMLET LEVELS AND, IN ORDER TO COMPETE
WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAOGVN/, THEY NEED TO ESTABLISH THEIR
OWN GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LIBERATION
COMMITTEES WILL HAVE TWO ADVANTAGES FOR THE VC-- IT WILL FACILITATE
THE FORMATION OF LOCAL VC GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
EVENT A COALITION GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED AND, IF NEGOTIATIONS FAIL,
THE COMMITTEES CAN BE CALLED UPON TO INSTIGATE A GENERAL UPRISING
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AGAINST THEAVN. THE SOURCE STATED THAT DISTRICT,PROVINCIAL AND
CENTRAL�LEVEf. LIBERATION COMMITTEES WILL BE FORMED DURING THE
SECOND PHASE OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN, COMPETENT AMERICAN
CONF IDE I A L NO F.SNAION-D11524
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3.5(c)
OBSERVERS IN THE PROVINCE BELIEVE THAT THE VC ARE ATTEMPTING TO
DE-EMPHASIZE THE COMMUNIST OVERTONES OF THE "LIBERATION"
MOVEMENT AND , BY CREATING A NEW GOVERNMENTAL FRONT, PRESENT A
NON-COmMUNIST OR NEUTRALIST FACE. THIS NEW FACE WOULD ALLOW
NEGOTIATIONS TO BE STARTED WHILE THE VC CONTINUE THE REVOLUTION
THROUGH POLITICAL ACTION INSTEAD OF GUERRILLA WARFARE. EXTENSIVE
DEBRIEFINGS OF RALCIERS AND PRISONER INTERROGATIONS DURING THE
PAST SEVERAL MONTHS INDICATED A FEELING AMONG THE VC THAT THE
WAR WILL NOT BE WON ON THE BATTLEFIELD, BUT WILL BE WON BY POLITICAL
MEANS. THAO STATED THAT THE VC. HAVE-DIVIDED.SOUTH VIETNAM INTO 3.3(h)(2)
TWO AREAS, AND THAT A DIFFERENT MILITARY PLAN WILL BE FOLLOWED IN
EACH AREA.
THE AREA NORTH OF AN IMAGINARY LINE
DRAWN ACROSS THE NORTHERN PROVINCES OF III CORPS WILL BE THE SCENE
OF THE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. THE AREA TO THE SOUTH OF THIS LINE
WILL FOLLOW A PROGRAM OF TYING DOWN U.S. AND GVN FORCES.
OPERATIONS
2. DURING DECEMBER THE VC ATTEMPTED TO ISOLATE GVN-CONTROLLED
AREAS AND DESTROY OR CUT LINES OF COMMUNICATION /LOC/. THE MAJORITY
OF VC MILITARY ACTIVITIES WERE DIRECTED AT NATIONAL ROUTE 4, WHICH
5 RUNS THROUGH LONG AN PROVINCE AND SERVES AS THE MAIN TRAFFIC LINK
4 '���
3 BETWEEN SAIG:ORAND THEiMEKONG *TA. AMERICAN OBSERVERS IN LONG AN
2
1 BELIEVE VC MILITARY ACTIVITIES WERE INTENDED NOT ONLY TO CUT THE
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3.5(c)
LOCS, BUT WERE ALSO DESIGNED TO,..PPESENT A SHOW OF VC STRENGTH TO
THE POPULACE IN CONTESTED AREAS AND TO APPLY PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
ECONOMIC PRESSURE AS A MEANS OF ENCOURAGING A CONDITION WHERE
3.3(h)(2)
FAVORABLE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE INITIATED.
3.
VC EFFORTS TO RECRUIT YOUTHS AND FEMALES INTO THEIR RANYS.
ACCORDING TO AN ALLEGED DISTRICT-LEVEL VC DOCUMENT
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THE VC LONG AN PROVINCE 3.3(h)(2)
CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. ISSUED AN ORDER ON 9 DECEMBER CALLING FOR
RECRUITMENT OF ABOUT 1500 VILLAGE HAMLET GUERRILLAS BY 10
JANUARY 1968. ACCORDING TO THE DOCUMENT EACH DISTRICT WAS REDUIRED
TO RECRUIT 400 GUERRILLAS AND EACH VILLAGE WAS TO RECRUIT 100
GUERRILLAS. THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION THAT THE VC HAVE HAD ANY
OUTSTANDING SUCCESS IN THIS RECRUITMENT DRIVE. AMERICAN OBSERVERS
IN LONG AN BELIEVE THAT IN VC-CONTROLLED AREAS OF THE PROVINCE SOME
SUCCESS WILL BE MET, BUT THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE VC CAN RECRUIT
1500 USEFUL GUERRILLAS WITHIN THE ONE MONTH TIME FRAME.
PROBLEMS
4. FOOD SUPPLY CONTINUES TO BE A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR THE VC.
NGUYEN VAN THAO STATED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE VC HAVE SUFFICIENT RICE,
OTHER STAPLES. SUCH AS MEAT FISH AND VEGETABLES ARE BECOMING SCARCE.
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HE STRESSED THAT1 VC REAR SERVICE ELEMENTS AND MAIN FORCE UNITS HAVE A
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3.5(c)
GREATER PROBLEM OF FOOD SUPPLY THAN DO LOCAL UNITS BECAUSE THE GVN
HAS DIRECTED ITS MILITARY ACTIVITY MORE TOWARD THESE TARGETS. THIS
GVN MILITARY ACTIVITY ALSO HAS FORCED MANY PEOPLE TO MOVE TO MORE
SECURE AREAS.
5. THE LACK OF MEDICAL FACILITIES AND SUPPLIES IS A CONTINUING
PROBLEM FOR THE VC. GVN MILITARY AND POLICE CHECK POINTS ON MAJOR
LOCS HAVE EFFECTIVELY REDUCED THE, AMOUNT OF MEDICINE BEING
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TRANSPORTED TO THE VC BY SUPPLIERS FROM SAIGON.
3.3(h)(2)
THE VC HAVE SOUGHT
TO REPLACE A PORTION OF THEIR SUPPLY LOSSES, CAUSED BY THE GVN
RESOURCES CONTROL PROGRAM, BY DIRECTING LEGAL RESIDENT VC AND FEMALE
CADRES WITH FRIENDS IN GVN-CONTROLLED AREAS TO HAVE THEIR FRIENDS
PURCHASE ANTIBIOTICS AND MEDICINES FOR THE VC.
6. THE ACQUISITION OF SUFFICIENT MANPOWER TO SUPPORT THE VC
3.3(h)(2)
MOVEMENT CONTINUES TO BE A CHRONIc VC PROBLEM. ACCORDING TO RALLIER
GVN AND ALLIED SWEEPS AND PACIFICATION OPERATIONS
HAVE FORCED PEOPLE TO FLEE TO GVN-CONTROLLED AREAS, THEREBY REDUCING
THE SIZE OF THE MANPOWER POOL AVAILABLE TO THE VC. THAT THE VC ARE
SHORT OF PERSONNEL IS SUGGESTED THAT IN PAST 3.3(h)(2)
YEARS THE VC COULD CONSCRIPT LABOR FORCES TO ASSIST IN MINING ROADS
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4 AND IN REMOVING WOUNDED AND DEAD FROM THE BATTLEFIELD, BUT THAT NOW
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THE MINING: OPERATIONS AND VC TROOPS SOMETIMES .
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3.5(c)
iLEAVE THEIR DEAD BEHIND AFTER AN OPERATION.
7. VC REACTIONS TO THEIR PROBLEMS ARE DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN.
RALLIER FIGURES CONTINUE T0 BELOW AS THEY HAVE BEEN IN LONG AN
FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. THESE LOW FIGURES SUGGEST THAT THE
PROBLEMS FACED BY THE VC ARE NOT AS SERIOUS AS HAS BEEN BELIEVED
AND THAT CADRES ARE WAITING TO SEE WHAT DEVELOPS FROM THE CURRENT
THEME BEING EXPRESSED IN THE PROVINCE THAT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
WILL CEASE AFTER THE TET HOLIDAYS. THE CURRENT RICE HARVEST IN
LONG AN PROVINCE MAY ALSO HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE LOW DECEMBER
FIGURES OF TWO INFRASTRUCTURE RALLIERS. OTHER VC INFRASTRUCTURE
LOSSES WERE 9 KILLED AND 12 CAPTURED.
3.5(c) 8.
DIS EM-- STATE USMACV CORDS 7TH AF USARV COMNAVFORV
USAID DIR/JUSPAO
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