SIGNIFICANCE OF CAMBODIA TO THE ENEMY - 1967/12/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02013349
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349
Significance of Cambodia to the Enemy
Increasing allied allied pressure on the Communist military structure
in South Vietnam has caused them to depend more heavily on the
border areas. Cambodia is increasingly valuable as:
1. A sanctuary to evade allied forces;
2. A refuge for rest, training, and medical care;
3. A route of infiltration of personnel and supplies into
South Vietnam.
Our information adds up to an estimate that, since 1964, more
than 19,000 infiltrators have come into the South through Cambodia.
We base this figure primarily on PW and rallier reports.
Generally speaking, the infiltration trails (see map) continue
southward from Laos and cross the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border
before reaching the Kompong Cham "knee" (see map). Some COM2 even
farther south before crossing, however.
We also know that a portion of the military supplies moving
southward from Laos are portered through Cambodia over a network of
trails.
We also believe that an important share -- 15 to20 percent --
of the food requirement of the VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam comes
from Cambodia. This means a daily flow of about 25 to 35 tons a day,
mainly rice.
We do not believe that very much in the way of military supplies
reaches the VC/WA via either Sihanoukville or up the MeKong.
OD/OER
28 December 1967
_.-
I: ..
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349-'
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349
Ocean-craft on the Mekong
It would be difficult to off-load arms shipments to the VC from
ocean-going ships on the Mekong moving either to or from Phnom Penh
because under present GVN control regulations:
1. Communist flag ships and cargoes from communist ports can
not enter the Mekong.
2. Inspection of all cargoes is authorized.
3. Permission is required for shipment of weapons, ammunition,
and other cargoes of military significance.
4. All craft must move in convoys escorted by GVN gunboats
while in South Vietnam, both from and to Phnom Penh. Four
round trip convoys a month are permitted. � Maximum authorized
'convoy turnaround time in Phnom Penh is only 72 hours.
-
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349
Shipments of Arms to VC Through Cambodia
)
There is no *77:17:772Zae evidence of any continuing substantial shipments
of arms and ammunition to Communist forces through Sihanoukville. The
A
Communists do, however, smuggle small quantities of arms and war-related
goods from Cambodia. Some of the smuggled goods probablare-cmaaa-
unauthorized di-Akons from ,.]mzr:nr..--t arms imported by the Cambodian
government for its own forces.
Known military and military-related goods that have arrived in
Sihanoukville are not excessive to Cambodia's needs.
Recent known military goods arriving include 450 tons of identified
military cargo delivered by the Chinese ship HeDing in March, consisting of
small arms and ammunition believed contracted. for in October 1966 for the
Some military-related cargoes from China, Western Europe and Japan
have been discharged at Sihanoukville. A Chinese Communist ship delivered
150 tons of magnesium powder to Sihanoukville in May. A three-ton cargo
UV',4,#Nel carried to Sihanoukville in April on a Greek ship under charter to
1
\
Communist China included detonators and fuses. A Norwegian ship, under
\Chinese Communist charter, delivered about 6 tons of dynamite in May, and
a Greek ship, also under Chinese Communist charter, delivered 70 tons of
sodium nitrate in September. About 50 tons of explosives loaded in -
European ports were carried to Sihanoukville on French liners. Explosives
V.......�������������M1e
and related cargoes were included among the cargoes that arrived from
Japan. More than 300 tons of medicines and pharmaceut:1.--J_ from Westen
Europe and several cargoes of medicines from Communist China were delivered
to Sihanoukville during the first three-quarters of 1967.
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349
'
Supplies
Prince Sihanouk announced in November 1967 that Cambodia had a
verbal trade agreement with the Vietnamese Communists to deliver rice,
medicines, and other goods for payment in dollars. Sihanouk's state-
ment apparently covers past periods and possibly 1968.
Rice is the largest and ost important commodity the Vietnamese
Communists obtain from Cambodia. The amounts involved, including paddy
and milled rice, have been appro4 ately'20,000 tons in 1966 and 1967.
Cambodian rice amounts to about 15-2 percent of VC/NWA requirements
in South Vietnam.
Cambodian rice is delivered and of particular importance to enemy
troops located in the rice deficit areas of the South Vietnam highlands
and southern Laos. We do not believe that the enemy obtains Cambodian
rice in the delta border area (IV Corps) because he has easy access to
South Vietnamese rice. (.
) . _
I 3)
VC/NVA forces also obtain numerous other commodities from Cambodia
such as batteries, cloth, paper, medicines, salt, fish sauce, and hand
tools. Many of these purchases take place along the border of South
Vietnam's delta provinces because of the easy access to local markets
on the Cambodian side.
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349
Approved for Release: 2018707/11 CO2013349
Some chemicals which the Viet Cong use in making explosives, such
as potassium chlorate, are obtained from Cambodia. In 1963, about 23
tons were captured in small shipments on South Vietnam's delta water-
ways, particularly the Mekong River. We think this traffic has con-
tinued but we lack information as to its present tonnage.
The supplies the enemy obtains from Cambodia are relatively small
compared to that obtained in South Vietnam, and only rice appears to be
of real significance. Captured documents and interrogations indicate
that the enemy makes most of his purchases in Cambodia because of
convenience rather than absolute necessity.
Cross Border Trade
Goods and people move freely back and forth across the border be-
tween South Vietnam and Cambodia particularly in the delta. The move-
ment bf goods is quite substantial and has gone on for years.
As an example of this trade, Saigon beer has been relatively
plentiful in Phnom Penh since Cambodia restricted normal imports of
beer a few years back. Reflecting trade the other way, Chinese Commu-
nistexport. goods and other commodities from Cambodia are displayed by
vendors in Saigon.
We believe the Vietnamese Communists participate only to a small
extent in this movement of goods between Cambodia and South Vietnam,
but it often difficult with the flow of information to distinguish
tb--, in which the enemy is involved and that which is normal. Many
newspaper articles also confuse the two.
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349
�
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349
iG
j ,f, (,,, t
- ,
I) i
Patrol of Mekonp: Waterways -- Game Warden
US and GVN river patrol operations, known as Operation Game Warden,
have been underway in the Mekong Delta area since late 1965. These
surveillance and inspection operations employ upwards of 160 waterjet river
patrol boats (PBR's), 12 minesweepers, and 12 helicopters.
Although Game Warden operations take place throughout the major
tributaries of the Mekong (10 PBR's are stationed at Tan Chau, close to
the Cambodian border) the majority of enemy contacts occur on the lower
reaches of the Mekong -- the Son Hau Giang, Son Co Chien, and Song Tien'
Giang Rivers.
Patrol boats observed 58,979 rivercraft durinz daylight hours in
November 1967 and boarded and inspect6d 35,058 of these. During the same
month, 146 suspect vessels were damaged, 101 were destroyed, and 16
captured.
i
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349
PSE
NO �RN
CINCPAC
(Continued)
ki
671-%
GAME WARDEN OPERATIONS - 11-13 DECEMBER
The following is a summary of GAME WARDEN operations in
South Vietnam during the period 110701-180700 EST December:
MERCHANT
SHIPS CURFEW
DETECTED BOARDED SIGHTED VIOLATIONS
Craft - day 13,065 7,849 211 0
Craft - night 1,163 707 2 7
Percent of craft boarded: '
Day - 60.1% Night - 60.8%
Average number of ships in operation 109.4
Average number of helos in operation - 10.8
SIGNIFICANT ITEMS
(C)
Areas in red on the facing map indicate areas of enemy
contact which had the following results:
US and RVN
VC/NVN
DESTROYED DAMAGED CAPTURED
43 structures
24 sampans
1 bunker
1 junk
UH-lBs
4 PBRs
34 structures
27 sampans
CASUALTIES: US - 8 WIA
VC/NVN - 4 KIA, 8 PERSONS DETAINED
SOURCE: J-3 (C)
22 Dec 67
� NMCC OPERATIONAL Si::',-,7:4ARY
---12�0.72 S EC
N I N
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349
None
2 sampans
(C),
Page 13
617�� [ONO 1.1./L0/91.0Z :aseaia JOI panaiddV
r r,
E I
104
105
106
0
107
(-7:\
'SAIGON
�.\\\
)
r'.
10
CAN T HO
r\11!---1 tr\fl ii: fl
�./Lzs
RATMS
0 AREA OF ENEMY CONTACT
104
30
60
rv
105
11-18 December 1961
106
" � '
107
1
0
CONF1D NTIAL
�
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11
0
41).
co
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349
Market Time Operations
Operation Market Time, the US Navy and Coast Guard sea surveillance
�
of coastal waters off South Vietnam to minimize sea infiltration in
coordination with the Vietnamese Navy, was begun in March, 1965.
US forces are authorized to stop and search vessels of any nation
within South Vietnam territorial waters. Within 12 miles of the coast,
US forces may require identification and intention of vessels of any
nation. Supposedly, Naval forces form barriers at the 17th parallel
and at the South Vietnam-Cambodian border.
Market Time forces are concentrated near the 17th parallel and
along the South Vietnam coast from Vung Tau to Ca Mau peninsula, and
in the vicinity of the Cambodian border in the Gulf of Thailand.
During November, 1967136,600 vessels were observed, 8,500 were
inspected and boarded, and 17,300 were inspected but not boarded.
_
During the same period, 29 enemy vessels were reported as destroyed.,
As many as 118,000 vessels are detected each month during periods
unaffected by adverse monsoon weather.
Various cargoes -- rice, salt, and medicine -- were captured..
The official statistics for the first 10 months of 1967 do not claim
the capture of any ammunition or significant quantities of war materiel
as a result of Market Time operations.
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349
1
1040
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349
106�
-V"
108�
110�
DEMARCATION
ZONE
.�>/,..