WEEKLY SUMMARY - 1968/01/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172642
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

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v.w4
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1968
No. 0004/68
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3.5(c)
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SE T
CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EST, 25 January 1968)
Far East
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Page
1
VIETNAM 3
The Communists appear to have scheduled a country-
wide military campaign for late January. In Saigon,
there may be some easing of tensions between Thieu
and Ky. Hanoi has reduced its propaganda attention
to Foreign Minister Trinh's statement on talks with
the US.
LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES SUFFER SEVERE SETBACK
The loss of Nam Bac represents one of the most severe
military defeats the government has suffered in five
still no indications that the
press their advantage by a drive
areas.
years, but there are
Communists intend to
into government-held
7
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WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 Jan 68
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FAR EAST
In South Vietnam, artillery and probing attacks
against the US Marine base at Khe Sanh apparently
mark the opening round of an ambitious Communist
winter offensive. The main weight of the campaign
probably will be directed at South Vietnam's north-
ern provinces, but there are indications of plans
for coordinated assaults in other parts of the coun-
try. With a major offensive in the offing, Hanoi
has reduced its propaganda attention to its late
December statement on talks with the US and has bit-
terly denounced President Johnson's remarks on Viet-
nam in his State of the Union message.
In Saigon, President Thieu made his second ma-
jor bid in ten days for a greater voice in allied
decisions. In a speech to the National Assembly,
Thieu insisted there could be no cessation of bomb-
ing until the Communists end their guerrilla attacks,
subversion, and terrorism in the South as well as
their infiltration from the North.
SE
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SEC
VIETNAM
Communist strategists ap-
parently plan to kick off a ma-
jor country-wide military cam-
paign sometime around Tet, the
lunar new year at the end of
January. The main pressure will
probably be mounted in the north-
ern provinces.
The opening round appar-
ently occurred in Quang Tri Prov-
ince on 19 January with a series
of probes against allied posi-
tions in the Khe Sanh area, fol-
lowed up later in the week with
large-scale mortar, rocket, and
artillery bombardments. Heavy
fighting also occurred near Gio
Linh in the northeastern corner
of the province, reflecting
enemy efforts to maintain pres-
sure and tie down US forces all
along the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ). On the western end of the
DMZ, at least 16,000 North Viet-
namese regulars are in the hills
surrounding the Marine garrison
at Khe Sanh, while up to two
enemy divisions threaten allied
strongpoints in the eastern half
of the province.
A North Vietnamese
who defected at Khe
Sanh last weekend, claims that
the mission of his unit--the
North Vietnamese 325C Division--
is to overrun every US base be-
tween the Laotian border and
Con Thien before the Tet holi-
days. The defector's remarks
suggest that enemy troops are
being given an especially heavy
dose of propaganda exhortation,
which is indicative of the major
significance the Communists ap-
pear to be placing on the pres-
ent offensive.
The deserter claimed that
the Quang Tri campaign was of
such importance that it was be-
ing controlled directly by the
North Vietnamese Defense Minis-
try in Hanoi.
There are indications that
enemy operations in the northern
provinces may be coordinated with
attacks in the western highlands
and perhaps in northern III
Corps. There has been continued
maneuvering by subordinates of
the B-3 Front, both along the
Kontum-Pleiku provincial border
area and in the mountains of Kon-
tum adjacent to the Laos-Cam-
bodian border, where at least
five North Vietnamese regiments
have been identified. Several
recently captured documents
discuss plans to attack specific
targets in Pleiku--including the
province capital, possibly in
conjunction with actions in the
triborder area.
RET
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1/2F', AIMask
SE
Although fighting in north-
ern III Corps has slackened re-
cently, elements of three Com-
munist divisions--the Viet Cong
5th and 9th, and the North Viet-
namese 7th--are in a position to
threaten several key points, in-
cluding the Loc Ninh - Song Be
area.
Reinforcing the likelihood
of wide-ranging enemy offensive
operations before or soon after
Tet are the tapering off of the
northeastern monsoon in the DMZ
area and the new moon cycle it-
self, both natural factors that
are known to create conditions
favorable to enemy initiatives.
Politics in Saigon
There are tenuous indica-
tions that the strains between
President Thieu and Vice Presi-
dent Ky may be easing.
The government is continu-
ing to strengthen its position
in the Lower House. The commit-
tee chairmen elected on 18 Jan-
uary put probable government sup-
porters in charge of a majority
of the committees. This enhances
prospects of house cooperation
with the executive branch, and
results from a continued alli-
ance between deputies in the
progovernment Democratic Bloc
and those of the northern Catho-
lic-dominated Independence Bloc.
Hanoi Rejects Reciprocity
North Vietnam seems unwill-
ing at present to go any further
ET
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in publicly elaborating on its
position concerning talks with
the US. In contrast to its ef-
forts prior to President John-
son's State of the Union address
to underscore the reasonableness
of the Communist position, Hanoi
now seems bent on preventing
any exaggerated interpretations
of its intentions. After
strongly denouncing the Presi-
dent's restatement of the San
Antonio formula, North Vietnam-
Page 5
ese media generally have concen-
trated on presenting Hanoi's
usual hard-line treatment of the
war and have ignored the issue
of negotiations. On 22 January,
the DRV representative in Paris
canceled a scheduled inter-
view with a New York Times of-
ficial on the grounds that he
had said everythin
sa at this
WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 Jan 68
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Now" ET
LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES SUFFER SEVERE SETBACK
The loss of Nam Bac on
13 January represents one of the
most severe military setbacks
the Laotian Government has suf-
fered in five years, but there
are still no indications that
the Communists intend to press
their advantage by a drive into
government-held areas.
It will be some time before
total government casualties can
be determined, but losses will
probably be high. A full week
after the defensive perimeter
collapsed, less than half the
original complement of 3,500 is
accounted for. The enemy is still
harassing units as they attempt
to withdraw, and friendly guer-
rilla units and helicopters are
being moved in to help with the
evacuation. The government also
lost large stocks of heavy weap-
ons, ammunition, food, and equip-
ment.
BURMA)
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territory
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THAILAND
ET
NO REIGN DISSEM
ET
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S ET
Communist propaganda empha-
sized that the attack against
Nam Bac was a response to the gov-
ernment's "nibbling tactics," and
called on its forces to remain
resolute in "defense of liberated
areas." This line is also being
pushed by the Pathet Lao repre-
sentative in Vientiane.
Meanwhile, the Communists
are closing in on the strategic
government guerrilla base at Phou
Pha Thi, which was the target of
the unsuccessful North Vietnamese
air strike on 12 January. The
enemy has taken a number of out-
lying posts in recent days, pos-
sibly in preparation for artil-
lery attacks on the airstrip.
The loss of Phou Pha Thi, which
is only 15 miles from the North
Vietnam border, would seriously
dis:cupt government operations
in northern Houa Phan Province,
and would impair US air attacks
against North Vietnam.
In addition, the Communists
captured the government position
at Muong Hiem on 23 January, sug-
gesting that an early thrust may
be made against Na Khang, the
principal base for friendly guer-
rilla operations in northern
Xieng Khouang Province.
In southern Laos, the enemy
continues to threaten some major
government bases, although no
large-scale attacks have been
reported in several weeks. The
Communists, however, have dis-
rupted US AID development pro-
grams in this part of the coun-
try. By tying substantial num-
bers of government troops to
static defensive positions, the
Communists also have already
achieved one of their primary
objectives in their current dry-
season campaign.
3.5(c)
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SF
ET
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