31 JANUARY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SAIGON STATION - 1968/01/31

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05009954
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

SU ECT
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J. J. ra
-11 Jan
R The Honorable 1ait W. Rostov.
pedal Assistant to the Presid n
January Telephone Conversation with Saigon Station
At 31(0433Z I was in telephonic communication with our Saigon
e circuit was bad: I could hear Saigon but they could not understand
tion reported that the situation was generally stabilizing and the
y exaggerating the seriousness of the penetration of the Embassy.
y was not actually penetrated. though Viet Cons did get into the
There e.ere no U.S. civilian casualties In Saigon known as of that
press
The Charm
coiT..pound.
tIn C.
clues
'were
Z. After the phone conversation I transmitted the following specific
es to Mr. Lapharn through the open teletype link, exptaining that these
e points I had hoped to raise over the phone.
Whata. does the countrye Ede situation
b. lk hat do regional officers report?
c. as attempt made against TM
k Ilk ?
y or other senior OVN
d. Nd Saigon attack seem primarily aimed at American
targets 7
e. Wa. there
ttacks fin Saigon or .1
intelligence or
ere)?
I. 7 hat do you expect in Saigon
Z4-48 hours?
CO
g. Any indicationof effect attacks had On mood or ati
of Vietnamese
Latton?
SE�LSITIVE
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h. Your general preliminary coiment5 on meaning and
import current countrywide spat. of VC activity.
I. Hoe is VC surge likely to affect OVN standing and
tability?
3. At 31/o?IOZ, Mr. Lapham replied. The text of his reply is given
below. I am passing It to the recipients of this memorandum in the belief that
you may ind it useful. You will understand, of course, that these are Mr.
Laphsunis initial reactions in a very fluid situation, the full dimensions and
details of which were not known to him at that time.
* * * * C * * * � � * * � � *
R. CARVER FROM MR. LAPHAM:
1. Appreciate your need for apid coverage of events and ass
are doing everything possible to cor...iply. It haw been extremely difficult du
the morning hours to obtain any hard information on the events of the nigh
police are fully occupied in mopping up operations in various sectors of the city.
For example, the VC continued to be holed up in a house across from the Palace
and apparently in houses in the area of TIM Son Nhut. Contrary to earlier
reports. Embassy employees have been instructed not to report to work this
afternoon.
You will shortly receive dissent concerning police report we have
received. re enemy plans for this evening.
Mr. Carver's telecon just received. As you can see tro above,
announcement premature that situation was calx enough to permit return of
personnel to work. At this re, at, it is impossibie to estimate lure long it
will, take to mop up VC who are holed up around town. If intelligence referred
to above is accurate, we may have a, busy night again this evening.
4. Yu ill be filing report shortly on countrywide situation (TDCS 344/01 -68).
Regional officers are preparing sitreps for direct transmission. An FVS has
'-leen filed re Lean's comments. President Thieu was in My Tho yesterday and
requested lvIACV assistance in returning to Saigon this morning. Although
American facilities received their share of attention, other targets e.,ere Korean
and Philippine En.sessies. Palace and Saigon radio station. During the last
few days. Station ha. diligently pursued all available sources for intelligence
that kaight have given us warning of these attacks. The police had a fee, spotty
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_8590,71SE MIME
ports but nothing et,bich appeared to be very hard. They were un�stiona.bly
not prepared for this attack on the opening day of Tet, when large number* of them
'were celebrating with their families. At this point, ee anticipate that country-
wide attacks will continue tonight. However, we lacking intelligence from the
regions which would give us an accurate read-out, Your telecon questions, para
g. h, and I will be dealt with separately.
COS and EXO will spend night in Station, with a backup commo command
post in another area of the city. We are esteblishing additional commo links with
yarious police posts. Every possible precaution being taken to assure security
of personnel and classified facilities.
b. Re your telecon questions g, h and 1:
a. You will appreciate the difficulty we have in. even beginning
sower to these questions which wiU be of great importance when
security situation settles down.
b. We are not today in contact with many elements in the
Vietnamese population to discern their attitudes and moods. A
cling airplane with loudspeakers told the people to stay off the
streets and in their homes. VC have reportedly made specific
threats to persons living in certain crass to vacate homes at risk
of death. Most Saigonese have indeed stayed at home and we
assume that they will ft:41*w VC orders as well. The mood is
very tense.
c. The meaning and import of current activity can be
extracted from VC eta ad intentions regarding the inter-springv
campaign. their calls for general uprising, and their obvious
Lye toward a major victory for propaganda and morale purposes.
le we may be undergoing a major multiple harassment without
ng military significance, the ultimate iretport will depend on
degree of success on the ground and the impact on American
and South Vietnamese willingness to rebound. The boost to VC/NVA
morale is in any case certain to be substantial,
d. Regardless of what happens tonight or daring the next fev-f
days, the degree of success already achieved in Saigon and around
the country will adversely affect the image of the GVN (and its
powerful American allies as well) in the eyes of the people. Ali
Vietnamese, both those v�,.ho are sympathetic and those alto are
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critics
and the
crested a pres
any rate. Tilos
political) is paramount tfl deduce that only a tough, efficient,
no...nonsense government run by the military can meet the sheer
physical thrust of the Viet Cong. Those who cannot stomach such a
governnient will be moved further toward the temptation of negotia-
tions and coalition government.
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xpect for protection from their government
k of VC activity in Saigon during recent months
ion of GVN and police strength in this area at
IN, he believe that security situation (not the
e. id hope to be permitted to delay additional analysts
and prediction until we have provided for the necessary IlleCUr
of our installations and personnel and can begin to move about the
city to communicate with eources anis to provide authoritative
reactions and ideas. in *noontime, hope above will be helpful.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese
cc: Secretary Ruek
Secretary McNamara
General Wheeler
0/DCl/SAVA/GACarver:mee
Distribution
Orig - Mr. Rostow
lccP - cc's
1- /DCI
1 - Mr. Snslh/ Admiral Taylor/ER
1 - D/ONE
1 - ONE/FE
1 - DDI
1 - D/OCI
1 - D/OCl/IC
1 - DDP
1 - C/FE
1 - C/VNO
3.5(c)
1 - Embassy Attack wiatt
1 - W H Liaison w to att
I - GAC Chrono
1 - VAS Chrono
er /RP1VglirttiP
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