COMMENTS ON SAIGON 4956 - 1967/12/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06752131
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752131
AS& 't Vi'qrettaAVI
3.5(c)
Comments on Saigon
AMU..
2 December 1967
1. The following are some comments on Saigon Station
concerning the winter-sprthng campaign, coalition government,
and negotiations. We intend to follow up with a memorandum
on current Communist treatment of the subject of a coalition
government. Some of the documents and reports cited in Saigon
Station's cable have not yet reached Washington.
2. We question whether Communist strategy in Vietnam is in
a "state of flux" as suggested in the cable. Since at least
early 1966, Communist strategy has been to prove to the US
that it cannot achieve its objectives in Vietnam. At that
time Hanoi realized it could not achieve the military victory
it tried for earlier, and that it must wear down the US in a
protracted conflict.. As part of this modified strategy, the
Communists also began preparing the ground, as a contingency
measure, to capitalize on any situation in which negotiations
or political tactics could be employed.
3. The idea of negatiations as a device which might aid the
cause
Vietnamese Communist moue has appeared in documents regularly
during the past two years. The references suggested that an
2Fic Er
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3.5(c)
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e
effort was being made to indoctrinate cadres in the concept
and be ready to move in that direction if circumstances were
ripe. What seems to emerge in recent documents is a more
explicit forecasrof how a political settlement might come about.
4. The Saigon cable implies that the Communists may be
thinking in terms of some positive move prior to the US elections
to try a coalition strategy. This could be correct, but it
seems more likely that what the documents show is a gradual
evolution of a concept for what the Communist see as the most
likely way for the conflict to end, but without specifying
whn it will take place. The documents do not suggest that the
Communists intend to try for a coalition in the near future.
They describe this as a possibility, and one which Communist
forces should be prepared to cope with when the time comes.
5. We do not see any special significance in docu
describing the winter-spring campaign as a "decisive" phase
in the war. Similar descriptions have been used for earlier
seasonal campaigns. They do not provide reliable indications
of what the Communists-really anticipate in the near future.
Much of what is said in these documents is intended to indoc-
trinate Communit forces and prepare them for continuing battle.
Although we have not seen all the documents cited in the Saigon
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cable, those we have seen suggest that Communist strategy in
the winter-spring campaign is to maintain military pressure
on allied forces in many areas. They do not suggest that the
Communist think they can really mount a decisive campaign.
6. Re para 3: The Communists may have concluded earlier
that the US would seek to end the war through negotiations
before next year's elections, but there is little evidence
that they think this now and considerable evidence that they
they
expect the war to continue. It seems more likely timic believe
that no settlement is possible until after the elections.
7. Re para 4: The Communists have long counted on disunity
in South Vietnamese ranks to aid their cause. This is a
fundamental element in their belief that the US cannot achieve
its political and military goals in the South--at least not in
an acceptable period of time. They have been relatively inef-
fective in exploiting SVN disunity in the past, and we agree
that the Front's new program is designed to take advantage of
these vulnerabilities more effectively.
8. It seems very doubtful that the Communist really
believe they have a chance of "bringing the war to a victorious
conclusion during 1968 as stated on page 4. The objectives
listed in A, B. & C certainly cannot be achieved in the next
year; and this sugges15that D, which calls for the formation
of a coalition government, is not a near-term goay. All four
of these objectives seem to be long-range Communist plans and
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not ones they expect to achieve soon. Paragraphs 6, 7, & 8
2
present a reasonabl( accurate, though somewhat exaggerated,
description of Comm nist tactics during the winter-spring
campaign. It is, of course, absurb to
that 75 percent
of the current GVN-controlled areas are to be liberated.
9. Re a coalition government: This was part of the
original 10-point Front program of 1961. The idea appears
to have evolved considerably sine then, and it is now the
political equivalent of the military concept of a protracted
war instead of a quick military victory. Just as the Communists
understood: that a military solution to the conflict was no
longer possible, they seem to have come around to the view
that a political compromise of some kind--without abandoning
bS
their primary goal of dominating the South-- Imw the only way
that they could hope to drive the US out of the country and
eventually achieve success.
10. Documents in early 1966 dismissed eventual negotiations,
and even said they might take place soon, but the notion of a
coalition government is #ot treated in detail. Le Duan is
quoted in one document as specifically ruling out the concept
of a coalition. He said It would bring about a auick settlement,
but would cause "many difficulties in the future." The main
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emphasis in these documents was on pie paring for a continuation
of the war, and not being misled if 4gotiations of some kind
occurred.
11. A call for the formation of a broad national
coalition government composed of diverse elements was again
made in the Liberation Front's new pol*tical program drawn up.
last August and made public in September. Since then, this
topic has become an important theme in Communist propaganda
and Vietnamese Communist spokesmen have some times gone into
considerable detail in discussing a coalition. The new emphasis
is in line with other elements of the revis:g Front program and
seems to be aimed at making the concept more appealing to a
wider number of people.
12. The rash of references to a coaltion government in
documents this fall probably is not connected with the current
military campaign. More likely it reflects the need to explain
the significance of this point in the Front's program. The
documents Oplarly seek to calm the fears of any who might be
aspect
alarmed_ by this won of Communist tactics. The documents show
that efforts were being made to refine the concept and explain
exactly what the leadership has in mind. We certainly agree
that the idea of a coalition does not indicate any lowering
of Communist goals and that they fully intend to dominate any
SECRET
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coalition government. If they could not, they would refuse
to participate. This is explicit in the documents.
13. The tough and unyielding North Vietnamese stance
on negotiations is designed to support the strategy discussed
above. Communist spokesmen have taken pains to draw a clear
distinction between any US - NorthVietnamese talks, which might
follow a bombing halt, and a settlement of the conflict in the
South, which they insist must be worked out with the Liberation
Front. The greater emphasis on this distinction and on the
Front's program is designed to prepare the ground for an
eventual political settlement, and the Front's call for a coalition
government seems to have become an integral part of the Communist
concept for how this may come about. There is nothing to suggest,
however, that the Communists are counting on this taking place
in the near future.
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