MEMORANDUM FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (WHEELER) TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MCNAMARA - 1968/01/13

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• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00235974
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

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Memorandum From the ChairmanA Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense
McNamara
Washington, January 13, 1968.
CM-2908-68.
121A
1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Office of the Secretary
FRc�
of Defense Files: 73 A 1304, Cccrtary of 1968 Files,
VIET 385. Top Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates that McNamara saw it
on January 15. According to a memorandum entitled "The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh, A
Speculative Appraisal," January 8, sent by Carver to Helms, intelligence reports had
indicated that elements from four NVA divisions (the 304th, 320th, 324B, and 325C) had
been moved into the area around Ithe Sanh in preparation for an attack. The
memorandum concluded that the enemy's objectives were, at a minimum, to force
abandonment of the base and, at a maximum, "to draw substantial U.S reinforcements
from other areas in South Vietnam and tie them down in the Khe Sanh area." (Central
Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job No. 80 R 01284A, DCUER Files, ER Files -
Special Material 01 Jan � 28 Feb 1968)
2. In telegram JCS 343, January 11, Wheeler requested Westmoreland's views on
each option. The first was phrased as "the possibility of turning an attack against the Khe
Sanh to our advantage, that is, Dien Bien Phu in reverse. This view argues the possibility
of capitalizing on an attack against Khe Sanh by striking the enemy from the rear in Laos
and proceeding to attack enemy bases in the area, perhaps as far west as Tchepone, in a
relatively short campaign;" the second as "withdrawal from Khe Sanh because the enemy
is building toward a Dien Bien Phu. This argument is based upon the following premises:
A. The Road to Khe Sanh has been cut. B. We do not control the commanding hills. C.
The enemy is bringing up artillery which will be able to control the airfield. D. A
withdrawal now could be done without much public notice. E. There is an awkward
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relationship between COMUSMACV and the Marine commander which makes the
Marines reluctant to withdraw and COMUSMACV reluctant to direct them to do so."
(Johnson Library, William C Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Message File, 1 Jan -31
Jan. 1968)
3 A clearing operation involving bombing and artillery shelling of enemy positions
around Khe Sanh
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
CM-2908-68
13 January 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Khe Sanh (U)
�vo 2.1
Recently, two differing views of the situation in the Khe Sanh area
came to my attention. Briefly, these are: (1) preempting an enemy
assault in theKhe Sanh area by an offensive into Laos; (2) a complete
withdrawal from Khe Sanh. I do not personally subscribe to either of
these views, both of which overlook important factors. However,
since these two propositions have reportedly been given prominent
attention at high non-military levels, I considered that it would be
useful to have General Westmoreland's comments on them and_gn___
the Khe Sanh situation in general. 0 I have now received his comments
and I provide them to you, in the succeeding paragraphs, for your
information.
"1. I have just returned from a visit with General Cushman
during which we discussed contingency plans for reinforcing Khe
Sanh and the I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). General Cushman
has two USMC battalions in Khe Sanh now and contingency plans
for augmenting thisforce with an additiona-l-USMC battalion on eight --
hour notice, followed by a second battalion on twelve hour notice, and
by SLF forces. Additionally, and as a result of the above discussion,
I have directed him as a matter Of first priority to alert a brigade
of the Americal Division to move into the Hue/Phu Bai area. This
can be done quickly with fixed wing or rotary wing aircraft.
"2. As a second priority we are prepared to reinforce I CTZ in
the Hue/Phu Bai, Danang, or Chu Lai areas in that priority with
another brigade, either from the 101st Airborne Division or from
the 1st Cavalry Division.
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"3. Additional actions underway include the following:
"a. As the ROK Marine Brigade moves into the Danang
tactical area of responsibility (TAOR), elements of the 1st
Marine Division are being released for deployment north of
Ai-Van pass. This in turn is releasing elements of the 3d
Marine Division for movement into Quang Tri province. Two
battalions of the ROK Marine Brigade have completed their
movement and four battalions of the 1st Marine Division are
now north of Ai-Van pass. This move will be completed by
31 January with four ROK battalions in the Danang TAOR and
five 1st Marine Division battalions north of the pass.
"b. The JGS has agreed to deploy a task force of two
airborne battalions to I CTZ on or about 15 January 1968,
bringing to four the number of ARVN airborne battalions in
I CTZ. �
"c. We are developing priority targets in OperatiOP.---"
NIAGARAifor a sustained ARC LIGHT campaign, augmented by tac-
tical air, beginning not later than 18 January.; We plan to.concentrate
on targets in RVN prior to Tet with approximately 75 percent or
more of our total effort. During and following the Tet cease fire,
we will strike targets in Laos. This operation also includes a slam
type operation in the Khe Sanh area by 7th Air Force. In conjunction
with our sustained ARC LIGHT campaign, I am requesting (by
separate communication) a further step up in the B-52 accelerated
--program-now scheduled-to_begin 20 January.____
"d. We are also requesting that a carrier be alerted to be
brought in to augment tactical-air, and the prompt return of the
SLF for commitment to either the 3d or 1st Marine Division areas.
"e. Maximum number of NGF support ships will be concentrated
in the I CTZ.
"4. Regarding view (1), above, my concept for operations in Laos is
outlined-in Operation EL PASO, proposed for October 1968. Preempting
a Khe Sanh area assault by an offensive into Laos is neither logistically
nor tactically feasible at this time. Significant considerations include the
-
following:
"a. To be effective, a Laotian assault should be launched
in the near future.
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"b. With the NE monsoon upon us, launching and supporting
the magnitude of force envisioned is not within our current
capability. An air LOC is essential and flying weather is marginal.
Additionally, our airlift capabilities are inadequate to support both
this concept and an acceptable tactical posture in other RVN threat
areas at this time.
"c. We estimate sizable enemy forces to be in the Tchepone
area and to the north thereof; thus a brief successful campaign
there- may not be possible.
"5. Regarding a withdrawal from Rhe Sanh, I consider this area
critical to us from a tactical standpoint as a launch base for Special
Operations Group (SOG) teams and as flank security for the strong
point obstacle system; it is even more critical from a psychological
viewpoint. To relinquish this area would be a major propaganda
victory for the enemy. Its loss would seriously affect Vietnamese
and US morale. In short, withdrawal would be a tremendous step
backwards.
"6. Although there are some in non-military circles who favor
the concept of retreating into enclaves, I must reiterate that such a
strategy merely returns the center of violence to the midst of the
RVN people in the populated centers. On the other hand, a massive
assault into Laos is not feasible in the near time frame.
117. In view of the enemy capability to initiate a major offensive
in Quang Tri.province before Tet, I would prefer to defend with force
deployment and combat support as indicated above. I will submit
additional support requirements separately for ARC LIGHT, Carrier
and NGF support."
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EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
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ALL INDIVIDUALS HANDLING THIS INFORMATION ARE REQUIRED TO PROTECT
IT FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.
HANDLING, STORAGE, REPRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION OF THE ATTACHED
DOCUMENT WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE EXECUTIVE
ORDER(S), STATUTE(S) AND AGENCY IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS.
(This cover sheet is unclassified.)
STANDARD FORM 703 (8-85)
Prescribed by GSA/1500
32 CFR 2003
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8 January 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Enemy Threat to Kite Sanh, A Speculative Appraisal
1. Attached is a memorandum on "The Enemy Threat to Khe Sault,"
which is primarily the work of Mr. Riggin of our Related Activities Center.
It runs up a warning flag I think should be heeded. If Mr. R.J. Smith
and his colleagues concur. I would recommend that this memorandum be
published through the DDI mechanism as an Agency paper and circulated
around the community before the battle for Khe Sanh commences.
2. Mr.. Riggings memorandum was written prior to the receipt of
General Westmoreland's EYES ONLY estimate of current enemy strategy
(MAC 00277). General Westmoreland's piece, however, does notiZrovide
new data contradicting Mr. Riggings judgments or requiring any Istantial
rewrite of the attached memo.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Cy No 1- DCI w/att
Cy No 2 - DDCI w/att
Cy No 3 - DDI w/att
Cy No 4 - D/OCI what
Cy No 5 - Mr. .Moor w/att
Cy No 6 - DWOF:ft, w/att
Cy No 7 - D/ONIC w/att
Cy No. 8 - C/ONIt/FE, w/att
Cy No 9 - DDP what
Cy No 10-C/FE w/att -
Cy No ll-C/VNO w/att
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8 January 1968
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh, A Speculative Appraisal
Background
1. COMINT has revealed a major Communist buildup in the area around
Khe Sanh, the Marine outpost located on Route 9 in Quang Tri Province approxi-
mately 9 miles from the Laotian border. The buildup of Communist forces in
the area is on a scale which is unprecedented in the history of the US involvemer
in the war. COMINT has identified elements of four North Vietnamese Army
(NVA) Divisions -- the 304th, 320th, 325C and 32413 Divisions -- around Khe Sar
Two of these Divisions, the 304th and 320th, have recently moved to the south of
Khe Sanh through Laos. Both of these Divisions had been located in areas aroun
Hanoi and Vinh. The 325C Division was involved in the heavy fighting around Rh
Sanh in the spring of 1967, but subsequently deployed to the Dong Hoi area of
North Vietnam. An advanced headquarters element of the Divisio_n_has recently
relocated to a position NW of Khe Sanh. At least one regiment of the 324B "
Division, the 812th Regiment, has recently deployed from the eastern section
of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to a position north of Khe Sanh. This regiment
has not previously been noted this far west.
2. COMINT has tentatively identified six infantry regiments as being
involved in the buildup: three from the 304th and 320th Divisions, two (95C and
29th) from the 325C Division, and one (812th) from the 324B Division. It is
suspected, however, that the other three infantry regiments and the two artillery
regiments of the 304th/320th Divisions are also deploying to the Khe Sanh area.
If these units are indeed committed, this would bring the total number of
regiments to eleven. A conservative estimate of 2,000 men per regiment would
give the Communists about 22,000 men to use in a sustained offensive around
Khe Sanh. There is tenuous evidence in COMINT of battlefield preparations
being made by the 29th and 812th Regiments. Messages between subordinates of
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the 29th indicate that it is engaged in reconnaissance activities , and one
element of the 29th has moved to within five miles of Khe Sanh. There are
also tenuous indicators that the third regiment of the 325C Division, the
101D Regiment, is coordinating reconnaissance activities with the 29th Regiment.
At present the operational area of these reconnaissance elements extends from th,
vicinity of Tchepone, Laos, to the ENE of Khe Sanh and to an area south of Khe
Sanh. Communications between units of the 812th Regiment have been concerned
with transportation and supply activities.
3. Collateral information also indicates that the Communists are
preparing for an offensive around Khe Sanh. Photography on 2 December of an
area about five miles WNW of Khe Sanh (XD 7845) revealed 21 foxholes, two
fortified hilltops, and heavy trail activity. On 26 and 27 December, an unknown
force twice attempted to penetrate the defensive perimeter of friendly forces on
Hill 861. On 27 December, a friendly reconnaissance team contacted an
estimated 15 - 20 enemy 4 miles ENE of Khe Sanh. On 28 December, a friendly
listening post, located about 7 miles NW of Khe Sanh in the immediate vicinity of
Hill 86 1, heard a great deal of movement in front of the position. On 2 January,
an enemy force of about six men engaged a Marine squad at a listening post about
two miles north of Khe Sanh. The next day a patrol about 1 mile NE of Khe Sanh
was grenaded; the patrol also observed lights on a trail near Route 9. All of
these incidents point to increased enemy reconnaissance against the Khe Sanh
combat base.
Enemy Objectives
4. What does the enemy hope to achieve by an offensive against Khe Sanh")
The most obvious answer is to wipe out the US garrison at Khe Sanh and the
Civilian Irregular Defense Corps (CIDG) camp at Lang Vei, about 5 miles SE of
Khe Sanh on Route 9. As indicated by past battles in the area, the Communists
have long considered Khe Sanh, located near the infiltration corridors in Laos,
to be a thorn in their side. According to latest information, the garrison at Khe
Sanh is defended by two infantry battalions and an artillery battalion of the 26th
Marine Regiment. The CIDG camp at Lang Vei has about 320 men.
5. The Communists, however, do not need a force of upwards of 22, 000
men to take Khe Sanh and Lang Vei. The Communists' primary objective in
attacking Khe Sanh would be to draw US reinforcement into the area, tie them
down to static defensive positions, and inflict maximum casualties on US forces
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over a period of hue. By occupying the high ground around Khe Sanh and
setting up ,unbuslies along Route 9, the only overland route into the area, the
enemy could Make resupply/reinforcement a difficult and costly proposition,
especially if he h5 developed an effective anti-aircraft capability. Monsoon
rains have closed large portions of Route 9, compounding the resupply/reinforce-
ment problem and making it largely dependent on airlift.
(). A final objective of the Khe Sanh buildup would be to harass and foil
the strong point 1).1rrier system which is being implemented in the DMZ north
of Khe Sanii and iii the infiltration corridors in Laos.
7� 1.:11(!nly strategy as outlined in paragraphs 4 and 5 above fits in
neatly with Gene iit Giap's thesis of fighting the main force war from peripheral
areas adjacent horder sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. By positioning his
forces in these ,t rods, Giap seeks to lure US units away from populated areas,
disperse Ilion:), and'inflict a maximum number of casualties in the process. This
relieves I'vessure on main force units operating in populated areas and enables
them to coordinale with local force units to disrupt the pacification program and
attack Allied outposts and base camps around urban areas. Since the start of
the winter/sprin eampai,gn in October, the enemy has employed this strategy in
II Corps n ncl ITT Corps. In II Corps the enemy has concentrated his forces
operating in the Iiii!,hlands under a Front headquarters which receives orders
directly from -Ira tioi. This Front headquarters would direct battles like the recen
clashes at Dal: To from border sanctuaries in Cambodia. A similar situation
e.xists_in TTLCrp.,--where- a; rev Military Region (MR), deSignated MR. IO-and
consisting of the border provinces of Binh Long, Phuoc Long, and Quang Duc,
was established in 1967. The establishment of MR 10 was followed by a rapid
buildup of Communist forces in the area and attacks on targets near the Cambodia
border like Loc N inh, Bu Dop, and Bo Duc . It is probable, therefore, that the
buildup of Communist forces in the Khe Sanh area presages the establishment of
a new Front headquarters to conduct operations in the border areas of Tri-Thien
- Military Region (Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces).
8. In summary, the enemy's objectives for a sustained offensive in
the Khe Sanh area would be at a minimum to force the abandonment of the Khe
Sanh base and: the Lang Vel CIDG camp while at the same time inflicting heavy
casualties. T..his would give the Communists even greater freedom of movement
in Laos. At the maximum, the Communists hope to draw substantial US
reinforcements from other areas in South Vietnam and tie them down in the Khe
Sanh area. This would give the other NVA units which operate in the Tri-Thien
Military Region (the 5th, 6th, and 9th Regiments) greater mobility to operate
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against the populated areas along the coast of Quang T r i and Thua Thien
Provinces. Tt would also give the Communists greater freedom of action
along the DMZ. Whatever course of action opens to the enemy, he will strive
to obtain that often-quoted, but much-maligned, psychological victory against
one of our most vulnerable positions in Vietnam. Several seasoned observers,
with some trepidation, have likened the Communist buildup around Khe Sanh
to that which occurred prior to the battle of Dien Bien Phu. It is perhaps no
coincidence that the Communists then were also making peace overtures.
Disposition of 'Enemy Forces
9. The current locations of Communist units involved in the Khe Sanh
buildup follows:
320th Division
a. The divisional headquarters is located along the Laotian/
Quang Tri Province border about 10 miles SSE of Khe Sanh. This
location, which is near the enemy's base area 611 in Laos, contains
a concentration of elements of the 304th/320th Divisions and may
well emerge as the headquarters of the Front to direct the Khe Sanh
campaign. Way Station "Echo," which has served as an infiltration
terminal for the elements of the 304th/320th Division which have
deployed from North Vietnam, is also located in this area.
b. A suspect infantry regiment of the 320th Division is also
located near divisional headquarters in the Way Station "Echo" area.
c. The other regiments subordinate to the 320th Division
are unlocated at the present time, but are believed to be deploying
from North Vietnam to the Khe Sanh area.
304th Division
a. Divisional headquarters was last fixed on 29 December
near Route 92 in Laos about 18 miles SW of Khe Sanh. The head-
quarters is believed to be heading for the Way Station "Echo" area.
b. An unidentified regimental echelon subordinate of the
304th is located in the Way Station "Echo" area.
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c. Another unidentified regimental echelon subordinate
of the 304th was located on 12 December on Route 912 in Laos,
having deployed to this position from Ha Tinh Province in North
Vietnam.
d. A suspect artillery regiment of the 304th was located
on 15 November in Quang Binh Province, North Vietnam, near the
Laotian border. This entity was also moving southward.
e. A suspect regiment of the 304th is located in Quang
Binh Province near the Laotian bo-rder about 22 miles north of
the DMZ.
f. Another suspect regiment of the 304th, wiich was located
in the Vinh area of North Vietnam as late as 24 December, has
moved to a position in Laos about 30 miles NW of the DM.
325C Division
a. Although the divisional headquarters is believed to
remain in the Dong Hoi area, a detached headquarters element of
the division has repositioned to a point in Laos about 1S miles NW
of [(he Sanh.
b. The 95C Regiment was located in a pogiticc:i about 15
miles WSW of [(he Sanh in October and is still believed to be in
this general area.
c. Tenuous fixes on the 29th Regiment indicate that it has
recently, deployed from the Dong Hoi area, North Vietnam. The
regimental headquarters is currently unlocated, but elements of
the regiment have been fixed around [(he Sanh.
d. The 101D Regiment is believed to be located about 15
miles north of the DMZ. Recent communications be�:v een the
29th and 101D Regiments, however, may signify that the 101D is
also deploying to the [(he Sanh area.
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3!4B Division
a. The headquarters of the 324B Division and two of
its subordinate regiments, the 90th and the 803rd, remain in the
eastern DMZ area where they have operated for some time. The
812th Regiment, however, has relocated from this area to a
position across the DMZ about 15 miles north of Khe Sanh. This
move is significant because the 812th Regiment has never been
noted to operate this far west before.
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