INTELLIGENCE REPORT SOVIET FLEET LOGISTICS: CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005532898
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: August 1, 1976

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Intelligence Report
Soviet Fleet Logistics: Capabilities and Limitations
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Soviet Fleet Logistics:
Capabilities and Limitations
Key Findings
The Soviet concept for providing supplies to naval forces differs markedly from
that of Western navies. The Soviet replenishment force is structured primarily to
support the peacetime operations of the fleet, which it does effectively, rather than
to support extended combat operations as in the West
Enough naval logistic ships and naval-subordinated merchant ships are available
to sustain large-scale noncombat operations. During exercises and crisis situations,
the Soviets have demonstrated the capability to provide supplies for large numbers
of warships for periods of up to 45 days. A model developed to analyze Soviet
logistic capabilities indicates that Soviet naval oilers would have enough fuel to
support for at least 60 days 40 warships deployed to the Norwegian Sea during a
period of rising tensions. Submarines can operate largely without support for at least
two months.
The fleet logistic system would be largely ineffective, however, if the USSR
were engaged in sustained combat operations. Most support ships are unarmed and
are too slow to keep up with Soviet warships, which in any event have only a limited
capability to protect them from air and submarine attacks. Almost all resupply
operations would have to be performed in protected anchorages or ports outside the
immediate combat area. Furthermore, the navy has virtually no capability for
underway replenishment of munitions?a serious shortcoming in a prolonged engage-
ment, because Soviet warships carry few reloads for their major weapon systems.
During the next decade the navy will try to improve its underway supply
capablities. A few modern supply ships are now under construction. It remains to be
seen, however, how many will be produced and how well they will perform the
high-speed replenishment operations necessary under combat conditions. Even if the
Soviets choose to develop a navy capable of prolonged combat at sea, they will not
have a fleet of logistic ships capable of supporting extensive combat operations for
the next five to ten years.
-T-01:r-SeCr.tt,
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
August 1976
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Soviet Fleet Logistics:
Capabilities and Limitations
Preface
This study examines the characteristics of the
Soviet system for resupply and repair of ships at sea.
It discusses such logistic procedures during peacetime
and estimates fleet logistic capabilities during com-
bat operat:tons. The study is focused primarily on
surface ships, because individual submarines are
largely self-supporting at sea for at least two months.
Soviet military doctrine in the mid-1950s had led
to the creation of what has been termed a "one-shot"
navy--a force which would be called on at the beginning
of hostilities to fight a single intense engagement in
the maritime approaches to the USSR. By the mid-1960s
the Soviets had augmented their makeshift logistic force
with seagoing supply ships which could support the fleet
in distant areas, but the emphasis still was on speed
and firepower rather than on endurance or refire capa-
bility. The military doctrine may now be evolving to en-
compass preparations for the possibility of a prolonged
conflict. Since modern naval supply ships are essential
to the success of prolonged combat operations at sea,
the structure of the fleet logistics system should
enable us to better understand Soviet concepts con-
cerning the nature of future combat operations.
Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome.
They may be directed to
Office of Strategic Research
Nommigimiomomm---
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Satellite photography of shipyards, reports of
contract arrangements, and occasional press articles
provide a reasonable basis for estimating the develop-
ment of logistic ships for three to five years. Over
the longer term, significant changes in the direction
and capabilities of the logistic force will depend on
shifts in Soviet naval strategy. Such changes are
difficult to foresee; the Soviets themselves may not
have completed plans for their navy in the 1980s.
A model of possible Soviet naval operations in the
Norwegian Sea was devised for this study to determine
whether Soviet support ships could 'deliver enough fuel
to sustain extended operations. The assumptions used
for the model and the results obtained are described
in this report.
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Contents
Characteristics of the Naval Logistics System
Organization ........ .
Needs of the Fleet ..... .
Support Facilities . 6 ? ? ? ?
Mobile Support Forces ? ? ?
Peacetime Operating Practices . .
Routine Operations . . . . ? ?
Availability of Supplies ? ? ? ? ?
Nonroutine Operations . ..... .
Estimated Wartime Capabilities ..
During Period of Rising Tensions . .
During Combat ........... . .
Prospects for the Future .......
Tables and Graphics
Major Naval Support Ship Inventory, 1955-1975 (Table
Comparison of Sizes of US and Soviet Naval
Oilers (Sketches) .......... . . .
Ship Refueling Methods (Photographs)
Selected Merchant Tankers (Table)
Disposition of Soviet Logistic Forces (Map) .
Disposition of Ships in Model Scenario (Mai)
Ships in Model Scenario (Table) ....
Endurance of Ships in Model Scenario (Table) .
Warship Fuel Consumption (Table) .
Comparison of US Wichita Class Oiler and
New Soviet Supply Ship (Sketches) . .
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Characteristics of the Naval Logistics System
Organization
The logistics system of the Soviet Navy is con-
trolled by the chief of Navy Rear Services, who is
responsible primarily to the commander in chief of the
Navy but also reports to the Deputy Minister of Defense
for Rear Services. The chain of command passes from the
chief of Navy Rear Services through the various fleet
commanders to their deputies for rear services, who
administer the supply of ships at naval bases through
regional naval base commanders. Operational control
of naval logistic ships is vested in the fleet com-
mandqr, who can delegate control to other commands
within the fleet. Ship repair, munitions, fuel, gen-
eral supply, and other associated services are pro-
vided to ships at the naval bases. Ships of frigate
size and larger have an officer who,is responsible
for maintaining supplies from stocks afloat or in port.
A career in the rear services requires specialized
training for both officers and enlisted men. Naval
officers attend special supply training schools, and
on graduation they become specialized supply officers.
Enlisted men are trained in even more narrow special-
ties, such as transportation of supplies or quality
control of fuel.
Needs of the Fleet
Any fleet logistics system is concerned with pro-
viding ships with the necessary energy and supplies to
fulfill their missions. Such supplies normally include
food, water, fuel, munitions, and spare parts. In
addition, all navies need the technical capability to
repair and maintain ships at sea and require some means
for resting crews during long periods at sea.
In the Soviet Navy, fresh water is required not only
for crews but in even greater quantities for boilers of
steam-driven ships. Ships usually have evaporators to
distill or purify sea water for shipboard requirements,
but evaporators on older ships have not worked well,
and resupply of water remains a major requirement.
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Each of the four fleets is allocated a supply.of
fuel each year, and it is important that individual'
ships not exceed planned requirements. Ship commanders
are often exhorted in the Soviet press to economize
on fuel consumption.
Soviet warships have a minimal weapons-reload
capability. For extended combat operations, they would
have to rely heavily on weapons support from shore or
shipborne sources.
The Soviets also do not appear to carry a large
stock of repair parts; they may be more willing than
the US to tolerate equipment malfunctions for extended
periods or to accept a lower state of readiness.
The Soviet Navy generally puts less emphasis on
crew rest than does the US Navy. Rest and relaxation
are most often provided to crews while on board ship
at anchor. In recent years, however, greater liberty
privileges have been granted to crews during port visits.
Support Facilities
At Home. It is assumed that there is adequate fuel
in storage to support naval operations of long duration,
but it is difficult to estimate the total amount, as
much of it is stored underground. Additional fuel could
be provided by pipeline to refill tanks. Petroleum
stored at commercial facilities presumably would also
be available to the navy in an emergency.
Munitions are stored in every major naval port, and
storage facilities seem adequate for all fleets. Each
fleet has at least one missile support facility. Nu-
clear weapons storage facilities appear adequate for
the Northern and Pacific Fleets, but none has been
identified in Baltic or Black Sea Fleet areas.
All four fleets have adequate facilities for per-
forming major repairs on submarines and surface ships
returning from distant operations. Facilities in the
Black Sea, however, are not equipped to handle major
repairs to nuclear submarines. Thus, nuclear submarines
operating in the Mediterranean must return to other fleet
bases for major repairs.
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Overseas. The USSR has access to and some control
over naval facilities in Somalia, and until recently
had similar rights in Egypt.* The Soviets use "float-
ing bases" to provide most of the replenishment and
minor repair for their ships in distant areas. A
"floating base" is a group of seagoing support ships
such as repair ships, tenders, and replenishment ships.
They can operate in open anchorages in international
waters, in sheltered harbor anchorages, or within the
territorial waters of a client state. In some areas,
such as Syria and Somalia, floating bases are stationed
in a foreign port to provide logistic services to the
fleet. Soviet naval ships also frequently take on
supplies during calls at a number of ports, such as
Conakry, Guinea, and Aden, South Yemen.
Naval ships outside home waters rely almost en-
tirely on fuel from the USSR carried in Soviet naval
oilers and merchant tankers. Water and fresh food
are often obtained during visits to foreign ports.
Although crews sometimes perform minor repairs
themselves, most warships normally return to shipyards
in the USSR for repairs. Until recently, Soviet diesel-
powered submarines and some support ships were routinely
overhauled in Egypt. Some major repairs on similar ships
have also been performed in Yugoslavia. In the Pacific
area, Soviet naval support ships and commercial vessels
are regularly overhauled at a shipyard in Singapore.
The delivery of a floating drydock to Somalia in late
1975 will enable the Soviets to make major repairs to
warships in the Indian Ocean.
Mobile Support Forces
Development of Naval Support. Prior to 1955, Soviet
naval support ships were pre-World War II units, con-
verted merchant ships, and ships acquired through lend-
lease or war reparations. In the first decade after
the war, the emphasis in rebuilding the navy was almost
completely on warships.
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In the late fifties the Soviets began to give more
attention to logistics. They started modifyingmer-
chant tankers for naval use and began constructing
small cargo ships, water carriers,and a few submarine,,
support ships.
This trend continued throughout the.:.sixtieswith
increases primarily in the numberoffliubmarinetender6
and repair ships (See table below). -During this period
the first missile-support ships were constructed. -Polandr
and Finland built many of the oilers and repair ships
for the Soviets and continue to do so. By the end of
the 1960s the Soviets had the necessary logistic forces
to support their expanding peacetime naval presence in
distant areas. In the early 1970s the navy continued
to obtain many repair ships and submarine tenders, but
inventories of such units have stabilized in the past
three years.
Major Naval Support Ship Inventory.
1955-1975
Fleet
Oilers
Repair Ships
& Sub Tenders
Cargo
Ships
Water
Carriers
Missile
Carriers
Total
1955
22
4
23
0
0
49
1956
28
10
23
1
0
62
1957
33
14
23
5
0
75
1958
37
21
29
8
0
95
1959
41
23
32
10
0
106
1960
45
29
37
13
0
124
1961
45
27
36
13
0
121
1962
47
27
38
13
0
125
1963
49
28
39
13
0
129
1964
46
32
40
15
2
135
1965
48
31
41
17
2
139
1966
47
38
35
15
3
138
1967
50
41
37
15
4
147
1968
51
39
37
15
4
146
1969
56
41
41
15
5
158
1970
51
45
42
15
6
159
1971
52
49
46
15
6
168
1972
53
53
46
15
6
173
1973
54
53
46
15
7
175
1974
55
53
46
15
7
176
1975
55
55
47
15
8
160
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Comparison of Sizes of US and Soviet Naval Oilers
New Naval Oiler
Wichita Class
Oil Replenishment Ship
M F.L.O.-38,710 MT
Sacramento
Class Oiler
242 M F.1.O.-54,458 MT
Neosho Class Oiler
195 M F.1.1).-.39.624 MT
Soviet
Probable New Oil
Replenishment Ship
F.L.D.-30,000 MT (Estimated)
1976
Chilikin
Oil Replenishment Ship
Kazbek Naval Oiler
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The Soviets have been making an effort to improve
the navy's oil and solid-stores replenishment capabil-
ity by developing three types of modern oilers. These
do not appear to be entirely satisfactory, as fewer than
a half dozen have been built and one unit has been con-
verted to a water carrier. US naval oilers have always
been two to three times larger than their Soviet counter-
parts (see illustration on page 11), but because of
economy measures new US oilers are smaller than earlier
classes. A US oiler planned for the 1980s will be only
slightly larger than the Chilikin class ship introduced
by the Soviets in 1970, and smaller than a Soviet oiler
expected to be operational this year.
Present Force. Today the Soviet Navy has an aux-
iliary fleet of some 180 logistic ships capable of
supporting warships operating in distant areas. The
ratio of ships with a surface ship support mission to
major surface combatants is approximately 7 to 10.
Methods of Refueling
There are two basic methods of refueling ships
while under way:
? The alongside method reduces refueling time
and enables ships to steam at relatively
high speeds while the fuel is being trans-
ferred. Using this method, an oiler can
refuel two ships simultaneously and may
use more than one transfer station on
each side of the ship to speed up delivery
time. The alongside method reduces the
vulnerability of ships to attack during
refueling and enables combatants to main-
tain high transit speeds over long periods.
? The astern method involves using a single
hose over the bow or stern of the receiv-
ing ships. Soviet ships usually use this
method at speeds of less than lO knots.
(See photographs on pages 14 and 15.)
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In addition to the general categories listed in
the table on page 10, other ships such as fleet tugs
and merchant ships could, if necessary, provide sup-
plies or repair assistance to naval combatants. Some
ships whose primary function is to support space vehicle
recovery have also been used in a naval support role,
particularly in the Indian Ocean.
Of the 55 oilers in the Soviet Navy, only six can
be called modern underway replenishment ships. These
six, plus about a dozen older ships, are the only ones
capable of refueling warships by the alongside method
while under way.
The six modern ships also have a limited capability
for underway transfer of solid stores. US ships can
transfer solid stores or cargo while under way either
by the alongside method or by helicopter. Soviet dry
cargo and refrigerator ships, on the other hand, are
not able to transfer stores while under way, nor do
they have helicopters for vertical replenishment.
Furthermore, none of the eight missile-support ships
can transfer missiles at sea.
Few Soviet support ships are capable of defending
themselves, and the majority lack the speed and en-
durance necessary to keep up with a modern naval task
force. Only the munitions ships, submarine tenders,
and Chilikin class oilers (less than 15 percent of the
180 support ships) have guns installed, and none has
antiship or antiaircraft missiles for self-defense.
In contrast, almost all US naval supply ships are
armed, and some have air defense missiles.
Merchant Ships. because the navy lacks a sufficient
number of oilers to carry out its refueling mission, it
must rely on merchant ships for a substantial part of
its logistic support. During 1974 the portion of naval
fuel supplied by merchant tankers rose to about 60 per-
cent. The navy regularly charters merchant tankers
to augment its own oilers for refueling. In the past
five years, over two-thirds of all'ehartered ships
have been Kazbek class tankers, which are similar to
some oilers and are readily available for naval mis-
sions.
The USSR has over 300 merchant and fishing ship
support tankers which could be put into naval service.
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Alongside Method While Under Way
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Astern Method While Under Way
Ship Refueling Methods
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Taking only the classes of merchant tankers used by
the navy in recent years, some 122 such tankers might
be used to support the fleet. The merchant tankers
listed below could contribute over 1.8 million metric
tons (1.75 million cargo tons) of oil lift capacity,
compared with some 264,000 metric tons (260,000 cargo
tons) for the naval oiler fleet.
Selected Merchant Tankers
Baltic Black
Class Sea Sea
Kazbek 3 45 9 57
Alagir 5 6 9 20
Altay 5 6 6 17
Sofiya 0 21 0 21
Pevek 4 0 3 7
Total
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78 127 122
Oil Lift Capacity
(Metric Tons) 95,500 1,540,000 180,000 1,815,500
Because of the substantial requirements of the
Mediterranean Squadron, the navy uses more tankers
from the Black Sea than from other fleet areas. No
merchant tankers operate from the Northern Fleet area.
The Soviets have taken measures which add to the
readiness of merchant ships for naval tasks.
A commissioned naval officer, often the radio officer,
usually is aboard a Soviet merchant ship even when the
ship is not under charter, and many crewmen have ex-
perience in the navy. These measures have proved use-
ful when merchant ships have come to the aid of naval
ships in distress. In 1972, a Soviet merchant tanker
was the first ship to report to Moscow the status of a
Soviet ballistic missile submarine that had had afire
while on patrol in the North Atlantic. During the ini-
tial rescue operations, the master of a merchant cargo
ship commanded a rescue force that was directed to estab-
lish a tow, transfer equipment to the submarine, and
evacuate the crew.
Not all merchant tankers would be available for
naval use at any given time. Some would be in corn-
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mercial trade far from Soviet ports with cargoes that
would require of Furthermore, tank cleaning
would take a couple of days if the tanks were fouled
with the residue of dirty cargo such as crude oil.
Most Kazbek class tankers would not experience this
delay, however, because they normally transport clean
cargo.
Tankers provide astern refueling of navy ships,
but none has the deck machinery, support posts, or
trained personnel necessary for underway replenish-
ment alongside.
Merchant cargo ships also are used in support of
naval operations, but not as regularly as tankers. In
the event of increased deployment, a large force of
merchant ships could be drawn upon to meet stepped-up
fleet requirements for dry stores.
Aircraft. If the navy is to operate effectively in
distant areas, some method is required for delivering
high-priority supplies and spare parts to units away
from home. Soviet aircraft, either civil or military,
periodically fly to airfields near foreign ports used
by Soviet ships. There are monthly and sometimes
weekly military flights to Syria and Somalia. The
Soviet commercial airline Aeroflot conducts flights
almost every day to cities near Soviet naval ports of
call, where supplies can be transferred to naval units.
Soviet long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft and
military transports frequently fly to Cuba and Guinea.
On several of these occasions Soviet naval ships were
in port in those countries. These flights almost
certainly have been used at one time or another to
transport mail and spare parts for delivery to the
ships.
Peacetime Operating Practices
Routine Operations
During the sixties the Soviet Rear Services, in
order to support expanded naval operations, developed
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a supply system centered on floating bases. Food,
fuel, stores, ammunition, and spare parts usually are
transferred while units are alongside a floating base.
Fuel is the only supply item that to any extent, is
transferred while units are under way.
Major support ships are assigned to fleet areas
in rough proportion to the fleet strength in principal
surface and submarine combat units. A greater number
of submarine support ships are in the Northern and
Pacific Fleets, where most Soviet submarines are based
(see map below).
The main exception to this combatant-to-support
ship pattern is that Pacific Fleet naval support ships
have an oil cargo capacity almost double that of any
of the other fleets. This is because the other fleets
place greater reliance on merchant ship support. It
also is in part a result of the presence in the Pacific
Fleet of the largest Soviet naval oiler, the Akhtuba,
which represents more than one-third of the total capac-
ity of Pacific Fleet oilers. Formerly a merchant tanker,
Disposition of Soviet Logistic Forces 1 July 1976
.1.??????
Northern Fleet
Oilers 17 '
,Carp Ships 14
Repair Ships 9
Submarine Tenders IS
?.
Water Carriers 4
Missilt Carriers 14
BalticF
Oilers 11
Carlo Ships 4.
tglt:11.1
Water Carriers 3
Missile Carriers 0
Black Sea Fleet
Oilers 9
Carp Ships 9
Repair Ships 6
Submarine Tenders 2
Water-Carriers 5
Missile Catriers 0
,
Pacific Fleet
Oiler* 18
Carp Ships 20
Repair Shuts.? ?
Submarine leaders
Water Carriers
Missile 8,6VIrs,
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this ship often supports long-term operations of naval
ships in the Indian Ocean.
While in their home waters, Soviet naval support
ships normally stay in port. Repair ships and submarine
tenders provide daily support to ships in the harbor.
Some small tankers deliver fuel to various ports in
coastal areas, but most oilers usually remain in port
preparing for their next cruise to distant areas.
Naval oilers and other support ships from all four
fleets regularly support naval combatants in distant
areas. Sometimes these support ships deploy in company
with the combatants, while at other times they travel
independently, rendezvousing periodically with ships in
a broad operating area such as the Mediterranean Sea.
Throughout most of the year, about 10 percent of
the logistic force is deployed in distant areas. In
recent years the navy's larger oilers have been used
far from home, with the result that they have a com-
paratively high rate of employment--about 30 percent
at any given time.
The Atlantic. The Soviets normally station two
naval oilers and one merchant tanker in the Atlantic.
These units often refuel combatant ships that are
transiting or operating in the North Atlantic or the
Norwegian Sea. One naval oiler usually supports com-
batant units which operate from the port of Conakry.
Other types of logistic support ships usually do
not provide services in the Atlantic. In an emergency,
some rescue services or minor repair work, such as
welding, probably could be provided by the Soviet
fleet tug often on station in the Atlantic, or by the
fleet tug in Cuba.* Numerous intelligence collection
and hydrographic ships that often operate in the
Atlantic also could provide some emergency support.
The Mediterranean. Soviet naval ships do not have
unrestricted access to a major support facility in the
Mediterranean. About a dozen major logistic support
ships operate with the Soviet squadron there. A sub-
marine tender, three merchant tankers, two naval
oilers, a water carrier, and two cargo ships usually
* The navy has stationed a tug in Cuba for contingency purposes
since 1970.
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service ships in anchorage areas. A repair ship
normally is present in Tartus, Syria, and the Gulf
of Sollum anchorage in the eastern Mediterranean.
The large storage barge, small ammunition ship, and
other small support ships previously in Alexandria
have relocated in Syria since President Sadat ousted
Soviet ships from Egyptian ports in April 1976. Re-
pair work on a limited number of ships can be carried
out at the Tivat shipyar( in Yugoslavia, but most
ships must return to the Soviet Union for major repairs.
The Indian Ocean. There are no major shore based
repair facilities regularly available to Soviet naval
ships in the Indian Ocean. Repairs can be performed,
however, using the repair barcie or the floating dry-
dock in Berbera, Somalia.
Soviet ships could also be supported by the
repair ship normally in the Persian Gulf or near the
Horn of Africa.
Other support ships usually include at least one
naval oiler, one merchant tanker, and a refrigerated
cargo ship. The Soviets do not keep a water carrier
in the Indian Ocean, even though most of their combat
ships there are older units with poor distilling capa-
bilities. They satisfy their needs by purchasing large
amounts of water from Aden. Oilers sometimes take on
water in Aden and later transfer it to combat ships.
The Pacific. Few support ships operate beyond
the local waters of the Pacific Fleet, unless they
are in transit to the Indian Ocean. One naval oiler
normally supports a warship stationed in the Tsushima
Strait, and on occasion an oiler operates with small
task groups conducting exercises in the Philippine
Sea or mid-Pacific area. A fleet tug is usually
stationed in the mid-Pacific to provide emergency
support to submarines. Merchant tankers seldom
support naval operations in the Pacific. Some repair
facilities, fresh food, and water are available in
Singapore to naval auxiliaries but not to Soviet
combat ships.
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Supplies
Repair ships or tenders operating from an anchorage
or a friendly port can provide most routine maintenance
requirements. A recent article in a Soviet periodical
pointed out that crews of Soviet combatant ships per-
form repairs at sea. The author also noted that some
oilers and fleet tugs have welding and repair capa-
bilities, but that there is a shortage of spare parts.
Shortages that may exist do not appear to be a critical
problem for routine operations in peacetime.
Munitions resupply is a negligible requirement for
such operations, as cruise missiles and other types of
ordnance are rarely expended by units outside home
waters. Food and water usually come from naval and
merchant support ships, but such supplies are also
obtained during port visits.
Although the Soviets have enough fuel and tanker
capacity to support routine peacetime operations, the
navy has at times been exhorted to conserve fuel. In
1972, for example, an editorial in a naval journal
noted that the crew of a certain cruiser was obligated
to save at least 7,600 rubles' worth of fuel during the
coming year. Last fall, Moscow began an overall cam-
paign to conserve fuel by reducing waste and inefficiency.
An editorial in Pravda urged that "every kilogram of
fuel be treated carefully and its loss prevented."
Thus, resupply capabilities are not a critical
factor in the conduct of routine operations in peace-
time. The primary constraint to extended operations is
likely to be budgetary.
Nonroutine Operations
Exercises. Each spring, naval ships of the four
fleets conduct exercises of one to three weeks' dura-
tion outside their local operating areas. These ex-
ercises vary in intensity from year to year and from
fleet to fleet.
The first major exercise, called Sever, occurred
in 1968 in the Norwegian Sea. Two task groups, each
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composed of three to five warships and one naval oiler,
deployed from the Northern and Baltic Fleets. An
amphibious landing group of 13 minor combatant ships
which sailed from the Baltic to the Barents Sea was
supported by six naval oilers, a cargo ship, a water
carrier, and a repair ship. Only one merchant tanker
was involved in supporting these ships during the
exercise. No logistic constraints were apparent, but
Sever was not a real test of the logistics system
because of the relatively small scope of the exercise.
In 1970, Exercise Okean provided the first realis-
tic test of resupply in a large-scale Soviet exercise.
Logistic forces including repair ships, submarine
tenders, cargo ships, water carriers, and naval and
merchant oilers supported over /5 surface combatant
ships operating as far as 2,000 nautical miles from
Soviet bases for up to three weeks. Support ships
deployed with exercise task groups. Two naval oilers
and two merchant tankers sailed from the Black Sea to
the Atlantic with a task group of five warships. Nine
additional naval oilers from the Northern and Baltic
Fleets supplied fuel for combatant ships in the North
Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea. Seven merchant tankers
and three naval oilers from the Black Sea supported
operations in the Mediterranean.
Once some support ships reached forward positions,
such as areas near the Faroe and Shetland Islands, they
remained in an anchorage and occasionally rendezvoused
with the surface combatant ships. Enough oilers were
deployed so that it was unnecessary to shuttle them to
home ports for resupply. Combatant ships interrupted
their activity every two to four days to meet supply ships
for fuel and water near the anchorages. (During routine
operations Soviet warships refuel almost every day.)
In
order to be flexible and responsive during a crisis or
combat situation, Soviet warships almost certainly would
try to maintain a larger reserve of fuel.
Resupply of food and munitions was not a factor in
Exercise Okean because of its short duration and the
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limited number of "live" firings. Repair capabilities,
however, were somewhat limited. F-
(b)(7)(d)
?
Two other major exercises in the seventies have
showed that logistic forces can support significant
increases in Soviet naval operations away from home
waters for periods of less than 30 days without serious
degradation in overall combat readiness. In the spring
of 1973, logistic forces supported more than 20 warships
operating in the Norwegian and Mediterranean Seas and
the North Atlantic. In 1975, during the second Okean
exercise, more than 75 surface combatant ships operating
worldwide were supported. Oilers provided fuel and water
in the manner demonstrated in Okean 1970.
Crisis Periods. So far in the seventies, the Soviet
logistics system has supported augmented forces of
various sizes during periods of tension in the eastern
Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the western Pacific,
and off the west African coast. These forces have
been smaller in number than those supported during the
Okean exercises, but in most cases the units have been
maintained for longer periods.
During the Jordanian crisis in the fall of 1970, the
number of major Soviet surface combatant ships in the
Mediterranean Sea more than doubled--increasing to 17
units--while the logistic force increased to 19 with
the addition of 5 support ships, mostly oilers. Three
years later, at the height of the Arab-Israeli war,
the Soviets supported an expanded naval presence of
42 surface combatant ships in the Mediterranean by
adding a cargo ship, a cruise-missile support ship, two
naval oilers, and two merchant tankers to the 25 support
ships already there. Throughout a 45-day period the
Soviets provided fuel to combatant ships by shuttling
tankers to and from Black Sea Fleet ports with no appar-
ent limitation on the operations of the combat units.
In other parts of the world, the deployment of
naval units in response to crisis situations has been
less dramatic and thus less of a burden on logistics.
Increases in naval forces in the Indian Ocean during
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the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971, in the western Pacific
during the mining of Haiphong harbor in 1972, and off
the west African coast during the Angolan civil war in
1976 were small: two to six surface combatant ships,
supported by two or three naval oilers or merchant
tankers. The combatant ships did not appear to suffer
from deficiencies in logistic support.
Major exercises and naval reactions during crises
have demonstrated that the Soviet Navy is capable of
supporting increased levels of out-of-area deployments
for up to 45 days--at least so long as combat operations
are not involved. Fuel, water, food, and other stores
can be supplied as necessary, but maintenance and re-
supply of spare parts and munitions cannot be performed
as effectively.
Estimated Wartime Capabilities
In wartime, the effectiveness of the'Soviet naval
logistics system would decrease sharply as combat
operations progressed. most support ships are unarmed
and are too slow to keep up with Soviet combatants.
Even in a limited war, supply ships would probably have
to minimize their time in combat areas. Over an ex-
tended period, fuel, food, stores, and spare parts
probably would have to be supplied in protected an-
chorages or ports outside the immediate combat area.
Once Soviet combatants expended their initial
weapons load, they would be particularly vulnerable.
Most Soviet warships carry relatively few reloads for
their major weapons systems, and most support ships
do not have the equipment for underway resupply of
munitions.
During Period of Rising Tensions
In a period of rising tensions, the Soviets could
deploy about 160 (some 75 percent) of their major sur-
face combatant ships within 30 days. It appears that
prior to an outbreak of hostilities the Soviet logistics
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system could support such a force for about 60 days.
After that period, the limited availability of supplies
would necessitate a reduction in the size of the force.
Model Scenario. In an attempt to assess Soviet
resupply capabilities during a buildup of naval forces
prior to the outbreak of a general war, a model of
likely naval activity in the Atlantic theater was devel-
oped. The Atlantic would be a primary theater of naval
combat in a general war, and is far enough from home
bases to pose a realistic test of logistic capabilities.
Activity in this area is treated apart from naval re-
quirements in other geographic areas. Inputs to the
model include estimates of fuel requirements for in-
dividual warships and fuel storage capacities of sup-
port ships.
The model assumes that a representative Soviet
naval force in the Atlantic theater--given 30 days'
warning--might include about 40 major surface com-
batant ships ranging in size from Sverdlov class
cruisers to Petya class light frigates. A likely
support force for these ships would comprise 14 naval
oilers from the Northern and Baltic Fleets. The
Soviets would still have resources to support opera-
tions within both fleet areas.
During this period the 40 combat ships would oper-
ate in three areas of the Norwegian Sea within 1,500 nm
of the USSR (see map on page 26), conducting antisub-
marine and antiship surveillance operations and pre-
paring for amphibious landings. In the southern
Norwegian Sea, 10 warships would be supported by 5
support ships. In a broad area south of Bear Island
in the northern part of the Norwegian Sea, 7 tankers
would resupply 19 warships. The third group, con-
sisting of 11 combat ships and 2 tankers, would sup-
port amphibious landings to be made on the northern
coast of Norway. (See table on page 27.)
Most of the warships would not be accompanied by sup-
port ships while performing their missions. As necessary,
the support ships would resupply the combat ships at
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Disposition of Ships in Model Scenario
Greenland
S 'a
Near Norwegian Coast
?imaideammow
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-rolT-Sectial
Southern Area
Northern Area
Ships in Model Scenario
Near Norwegian Coast
Total
Warships
Class Class of Oiler
1 Kresta I Cruiser 1 Dubna
2 Kresta II Cruisers 1 Chilikin
2 Krivak Destroyers 1 Kazbek
2 Kashin Destroyers 2 Uda
2 Kanin Destroyers
1 Kotlin Destroyer
1 Sverdlov Cruiser 1 Kazbek
1 Kresta I Cruiser 1 Uda
2 Kresta II Cruisers 2 Altay
2 Krivak Destroyers 3 Khobi
1 Kanin Destroyer
7 Petya Frigates
5 Riga Frigates
1 Sverdlov Cruiser
3 Kotlin Destroyers
5 Petya Frigates
2 Riga Frigates
2 Khobi
40 Warships 14 Naval Oilers
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rendezvous points. In the southern Norwegian Sea,
some of the more modern support ships would stay with
the naval combatants.
The following assumptions were made to facilitate
computations:
- All ships have a full load of fuel when
they arrive on station in the Norwegian Sea.
ONO
???? OEM
Supply ships in each of the three sup-
port groups operate at a speed of 10
knots and travel in a convoy together
to and from port.
Combat ships ,n..e required to keep a
50-percent reserve of fuel at all
times.
-- An unlimited supply of fuel is avail-
able in port, and supply ships can
refuel in port in less than one day.
-- Supply ships have a 15-percent fuel
reserve requirement.
A model using this Norwegian Sea scenario has been
designed to accept as inputs computations concerning
the amount of fuel consumed daily by the combat ships
at different speeds, the amount of fuel available in
the supply ships, and the time it would take for the
supply ships to transit to a port, refuel, and return
to their respective combat forces. Transit times are
based on the approximate distance of each group from
ports in the Northern and Baltic Fleets.
Computations show that the endurance of the supply
ships would not be a limitation in the conduct of most
extended operations. The results of model simulation,
using daily consumption rates and supply ship capac-
ities, indicate that during an extended period of rising
tensions, Soviet naval tankers would have enough fuel
to support warship operations in the Norwegian Sea for
at least 60 days. The logistic constraints of this
scenario reflect the worst situation for the Soviets
with regard to the availability of tankers. In most
other theaters of potential major military conflict,
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such as the eastern Mediterranean, Soviet naval and
merchant tanker lift capacities are greater.
In the model scenario, the group of ships in the
southern portion of the Norwegian Sea probably would
be spread out--some would set up antiship barriers and
others would be searching for foreign submarines. At
times, these ships might steam at speeds of over 15
knots, but it seems unlikely that the average speed
would be this high for long. Even if speeds of 15
knots were maintained, the study shows that enough
fuel would be available for at least 90 days of opera-
tion in the southern area (see table on page 30). It
would take from 10 days to two weeks for a convoy of
supply ships to reach port, refuel, and return to sta-
tion, depending on whether Baltic or Northern Fleet
ports were used. Some of the supply ships would have
to return home independently after they delivered their
fuel, or the warships would have to operate at reduced
speeds, for the warships to maintain a 50-percent re-
serve fuel capacity after 91 days.
In the northern portion of the Norwegian Sea,
similar antisubmarine operations and preparations for
antiship engagements would be carried out. Soviet
combat ships in this area would be able to operate for
at least 35 days at average speeds of up to 15 knots
before the naval tankers would have to return home for
refueling. Because these ships would be close to
Northern Fleet ports, the naval tankers would return
to station in six days or less. During this period
the combat ships would have consumed less than half of
their fuel. Thus they could stay at sea indefinitely
at average speeds of 15 knots or less.
The combat ships that would be prepared to provide
gunfire support and antisubmarine protection for land-
ing operations against Norway also would be able to
stay on station indefinitely. These ships could operate
at speeds of up to 20 knots, because their two sup-
porting naval tankers could reach home port and be back
on station in three days or less.
The total amount of fuel available for consumption
in the 14 supply ships and 40 combat ships, assuming a
50-percent reserve requirement, is approximately 115,000
metric tons (113,000 cargo tons). This would be enough
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Endurance of Ships in Model Scenario
Warships'
Average
Speed
(knots)
Northern Group
Group Off Norwegian Coast
15
20
25
5
10
15
20
25
5
10
15
20
25
Supply Ship
Transit Time
to Home
Port and Return
(days)
15
15
15
15
15
6
6
6
6
6
3
3
3
3
3
Warships'
Endurance
Before
Refueling
(days)
30
16
9
5
3
26
14
7
4
2
24
13
7
4
2
Duration of
Support
Ship
Supply
(days)
Duration of
Total Supply
Before Returning
to Port
(days)
278
151
82
44
24
308
167
91
49
27
133
159
69
83
36
43
18
22
9
11
17
41
9
22
5
12
3
7
1
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fuel to satisfy the consumption requirements of all
40 combat ships for almost 60 days at average speeds
of 15 knots (see table below). This period of time
could be expanded indefinitely if some of the supply
ships returned home independently to refuel.
Warship Fuel Consumption
(Metric Tons)
Speed
(Knots)
30
Days
45
Days
60
Days
90
Days
5
16,184
24,277
32,370
48,555
10
30,389
45,583
60,782
91,165
15
57,455
86,182
114,910
172,365
20
109,270
163,906
218,542
327,812
25
209,702
314,554
419,405
629,107
During Combat
Resupply efforts during general combat operations
would be effective only in areas within protected lines
of communication. Even if an enemy did not destroy
Soviet support forces, naval combat operations would be
restricted by long, slow-speed refuelings.
Most Soviet oilers have only one transfer station
astern or one on each side of the ship. Because they
are limited to the use of just one hose, it probably
would take from four to six hours, at speeds of less
than 10 knots, to refuel most ships that were half
full. Observed Soviet refueling times are consistent
with this estimate. This limits the ability of the
warships to conduct operations and would make them
vulnerable to attack. The support forces also would
be particularly vulnerable in a conflict.
Soviet doctrine appears to favor resupply opera-
tions in harbors or other areas where enemy forces are
not likely to be encountered. Any attempt to move
supplies over the open ocean against opposition would
require that Soviet combatant ships be diverted from
other missions to protect the virtually defenseless
support ships. It is doubtful that the Soviets could
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provide adequate air defense for supply ships beyond
range of land-based air cover.*
A
Repair ships and tenders do not carry enough spare
parts and equipment for the major repairs that would
be needed following combat. Similarly, most Soviet
combatants could not obtain missile reloads. Thus it
appears that the Soviet logistics system would be in- ,
effective if the USSR were engaged in sustained general
combat operations.
Prospects for the Future
Soviet writings reflect a certain displeasure with
the capabilities of the navy's rear services. In 1970,
one author noted that there was not enough underway
replenishment during Exercise Okean, and he criticized
theoreticians for not fully appreciating the problem of
logistics. Soviet writings indicated in 1974 that the
rear services had been reorganized to give more weight
to mobile units, including complex supply and refrig-
erator ships. The need for better quality control
over fuel also has been emphasized. Most calls for
improvement or expansion come from officers in the
rear services, but other authors as well--including
Admiral Gorshkov, commander in chief of the Soviet
Navy--have highlighted the importance of naval logis-
tics.
The Western intelligence community has long recog-
nized the Soviets' deficiencies in underway replenish-
ment. For many years, construction of new and improved
supply ships has been forecast, but only a few have
appeared and even these have not made good use of their
modern equipment. Whether the navy will be willing to
allocate the funds and training time necessary to
correct these deficiencies will depend a great deal
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on the path that Soviet military strategy will take
in the future.
The decision of the military to authorize the
construction of at least three V/STOL aircraft carriers
has already had some impact on the plans for the naval
logistic force of the future. In 1975, the largest
support ship ever constructed for the Soviet Navy was
observed fitting out at a shipyard in the Black Sea.
The ship is over 200 meters (almost 700 feet) long and
about 25 meters (82 feet) wide. It will have a heli-
copter which, for the first time in the Soviet Navy,
will permit airborne transfer of cargo. This ship
bears a remarkable resemblance to the US Wichita class
oiler, which provides rapid replenishment of petroleum
and munitions at sea and has a limited capacity for
dry stores.
The timing of this Soviet support ship's develop-
ment parallels that of the first Kiev class V/STOL
aircraft carrier; the aircraft carrier is now opera-
tional and the support ship probably will be operational
Comparison of US Wichita Class Oiler and
New Soviet Supply Ship
?
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later this year. What appears to be another naval sup-
port ship is in the early stages of construction. These
ships will add to the navy's underway replenishment capa-
bility in distant areas, but we do not yet know how many
will be produced or how well they will perform.
Other recent Soviet acquisition and construction
activity, however, reflects a more traditional, limited
investment approach to the logistic force. Modern,
light replenishment oilers are being built in Finland,
but the Soviets have ordered only two. A fourth Chilikin
class replenishment oiler has finally been launched--five
years after the first one was completed. There is no
other evidence of construction of support ships that
would be of particular utility in distant areas.
In summary, the quantity and quality of modern
oilers will increase over the next five years, but
Soviet underway replenishment deficiencies are un-
likely to be overcome within this time. Shortcomings
in repair capabilities and in the number of ammunition
transfer ships will take even longer to correct.
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