MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR) : RECONNAISSANCE INDICATIONS OF PREPARATION FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK BY US NAVAL CARRIER STRIKE LARGE UNITS
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
0001167117
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RIPPUB
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U
Document Page Count:
18
Document Creation Date:
June 19, 2017
Document Release Date:
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Case Number:
SC-2007-00006
Publication Date:
June 3, 1977
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- ? "'"011P-SEC-1414-
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
CIA HISTORICAL RELEASE
PROGRAM
JUNE 2017
THIS DOCUMENT/NQF: BE REPRODUCED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT
AR 70-14
3 June 1977
?
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Reconnaissance
Indications of Preparation for a Surprise Attack
by US Naval Carrier Strike Large Units
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article examines the role of attack carriers and the level of ship and
aircraft development and their vulnerabilities in assessing US capabilities
for carrying out a surprise nuclear strike and Soviet capabilities and
difficulties in detecting strike preparations. The main reconnaissance
indications of such preparation are considered to be the deployment of
carrier task forces at sea, which may involve the movement of forces from
the US mainland to various parts of the globe or the activation of just the
Sixth and Seventh Fleets, as well as replenishment of supplies, increase of
combat readiness, and declaration of alerts which require the use of radio
transmissions. This article appeared in Issue No. 5 (66) for 1962_
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been
assigned the
11 lam
IT
e s
EO 13526 3.3(b)(4)>25Yrs
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Tor SECRET
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tef?-SEGREL
Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE CW
!WC). Late 1962
iuipuumnr?*?71 BE REPRODUCED
Intelligence Information Special Report
Page 3 of 18 Pages
SUBJECT
DATE
3 June 1977
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Reconnaissance Indications of Preparation for a
Surprise Attack by US Naval Carrier Strike Large Units
SOURCE Documentary
Summa :
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 5 (66) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Ivalita
Thought". The author o t is artic e is aptain irst In, t riyev.
This article examines the role of attack carriers and the level of ship and
aircraft development and their vulnerabilities in assessing US capabilities
for carrying out a surprise nuclear strike and Soviet capabilities and
difficulties in detecting strike preparations. The main reconnaissance
indications of such preparation are considered to be the deployment of
carrier task forces at sea, which may involve the movement of forces from
the US mainland to various parts of the globe under the pretext of
exercises or the activation of just the Sixth and Seventh Fleets, as well
as replenishment of supplies, increase of combat readiness, and declaration
of alerts which require the use of radio transmissions. Other,
supplemental indications include an increase in combat training,
mobilization of merchant and reserve combat ships, and an increase in air
defense and the production of naval aircraft. End of Summary
Comment:
LapLuin First Rank (Reserve) V. Anufriyev was identified as a
Candidate of Military Sciences. He retired in 1972. After 1962 the SECRET
version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was
distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased
publication at the end of 1970.
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Reconnaissance Indications of Preparation for a
Surprise Attack by US Naval Carrier Strike Large Units
by
Captain First Rank V. Anufriyev
In preparing to unleash a new world war, the American command places
particular emphasis on rapidly building up the nuclear striking power of
all the branches of the armed forces. In the US naval forces, such power
is represented primarily by the carrier strike forces. A considerable part
of these forces, equipped with nuclear weapons and a large number of
delivery aircraft, is constantly maintained within the complement of the
forward groupings of the naval forces, that is, in areas geographically
suitable for delivering surprise nuclear strikes.
As a consequence of the high mobility of the carrier strike large
units, the concealment of their actions, and their deeply echeloned
defense, the organization of combat against them at sea is a very complex
and difficult matter that obviously will require considerable effort of
forces not only from the navy but also from the other branches of our Armed
Forces. The success of combat against US carrier strike large units
deployed at sea will be determined not only by the availability of
well-prepared, appropriate forces and means, but also, in no lesser degree,
by the availability of the necessary information about these large units,
about their operational and combat capabilities, and about their probable
operating areas and methods.
It is from the sum total of precisely this kind of information that
reconnaissance indications of the immediate preparation of the carrier
strike large units for a surprise attack can be detected.
Before we begin to describe the reconnaissance indications, let us
examine the views of the American command regarding the role and
significance of the carrier strike forces in a future war, their strong and
weak points, their present status, and the long-range possibilities for
their development.
In the opinion of the American military circles, the naval forces can
effectively employ missile/nuclear weapons, since, as a result of their
high mobility, they are capable of carrying out surprise actions and of
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massing their efforts, and have law vulnerability to enemy missile/nuclear
strikes. On the other hand, stationary air and missile bases in the US can
be destroyed relatively easily by long-range ballistic missiles.
It is basically this view that explains why in recent years a greater
role in a future war has been going to the US naval forces.
In building and preparing the naval forces, the American command gives
its main attention to building up and maintaining in a high degree of
readiness all the forces and means, but primarily the carrier strike forces
and missile-carrying submarine forces, which form the basis of the entire
US nuclear strength.
Recently, in connection with the accelerated construction in the US of
nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines there have begun to appear in
the press occasional statements declaring that aircraft carriers are losing
their importance and will soon be replaced by nuclear-powered submarines.
It should be said that these are not the prevailing, much less the official
views. The American command does not contrast the missile-carrying
submarine forces with the carrier strike forces and does not believe that
the nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines can replace the strike
carriers. In spite of the enormous advantage of these submarines, they
are, as the Americans correctly assume, a single-purpose means meant to
employ ballistic missiles in striking at only the most important stationary
targets, the locations of which are known precisely beforehand. Aircraft
carriers on the other hand, are a multipurpose means; and they alone,
through Le employment of their aviation, are capable of ensuring the most
effective execution of a majority of the tasks assigned to the US naval
forces.
For this reason the American command assigns primarily to the aircraft
carriers the main general task of the naval forces, which is to gain and
maintain the supremacy at sea that they believe is necessary for the
success of any naval operation.
Among the principal advantages of the carrier large units is the
capability, particularly at the outset of a general nuclear offensive, of
delivering powerful and surprise nuclear strikes against the most important
ground targets and against groupings of enemy troops located along a large
stretch of coastline and in the depth of the territory.
Accounting for the potency of the nuclear strikes are the large
reserves of nuclear bombs and the large number of delivery aircraft which
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are on the aircraft carriers. All the strike aircraft in carrier aviation
are, for practical purposes, strategic aircraft.
The surprise element of the strikes is achieved by the high state of
combat readiness, high mobility, and concealment of actions of the carrier
large units. It is known, for example, that these large units, which are
in the forward groupings of the US naval forces, are kept in a constant
state of readiness for the immediate delivery of nuclear strikes. The high
mobility and concealment of actions are indicated by the fact that the
carrier large unit is able to cover 600 to 700 miles (1,100 to 1,300
kilometers) a day while observing practically complete radio silence over a
long period of time. Therefore, to spot it may require nmaw days of
uninterrupted scanning of a broad expanse of ocean. Not a single country,
not even the strongest militarily, now has nor will it likely have in the
future a sufficient amount of the forces and means necessary for this kind
of scanning.
Endurance and cruising range are directly dependent on mobility and
concealment. The endurance of modern carrier large units is approximately
30 days, while their cruising range is almost unlimited. This situation is
achieved mainly by including in the large units special groups of servicing
ships which make them independent of the shore bases even when they are at
sea for a long period of time. The strike large units are fully provided
with everything needed for independent actions, including ammunition,
supplies, all types of defense and protection, and even running repair of
aircraft.
All this enables the carrier large units to make a relatively sudden
appearance in the most remote places, to quickly change the areas and
theaters of operations, and to deliver strikes from comparatively short
distances and from unexpected directions.
Carrier-based aircraft have high tactical-technical specifications.
The aircraft can deliver strikes with great accuracy from various
altitudes, and almost the entire complement of aircraft from each aircraft
carrier can take off to carry out a combat mission within a brief period of
time.
Modern aircraft carriers are almost invulnerable to long-range
surface-to-ship ballistic missiles, since the majority of these ships are
constantly at sea and can maneuver secretly in widely dispersed cruising
and battle formations. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to distinguish
aircraft carriers from numerous large combat ships and auxiliary and
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merchant ships by means of long-range radar. When reconnaissance aircraft
and submarines detect aircraft carriers, they are able to determine their
position, but in such an approximate manner that it is useless to deliver
ballistic missile strikes against them.
Nor can a man-made Earth satellite with special equipment solve this
problem, since from the moment it sends a signal giving the exact
coordinates of any one aircraft carrier a certain amount of time will be
needed for the launch preparation of missiles and for their flight to the
given location. During this period the aircraft carrier will have
succeeded in moving far outside the danger zone (the largest radius of the
danger zone with an underwater missile burst equivalent to one million tons
of TNT is determined by the Americans as no greater than five miles), and
the launching of many tens of missiles will be required in order to cover
the area of the probable location of the aircraft carrier.
Consequently, only submarines and aircraft can present a basic threat
to the aircraft carriers.
Carrier strike large units also have a good number of weak points.
First of all, their actions depend to a considerable degree on the
weather and on the sea state. It must be noted, however, that this
dependence is gradually diminishing in view of the introduction on the
aircraft carriers and aircraft of the latest technical equipment and
because of the highly intensive training of aircraft crews for flights
under adverse conditions. Already from 35 to 40 percent of the
ground-attack and fighter aircraft of the carrier aviation of the US naval
forces have been equipped for poor-visibility and night operations,. In the
near future, the Americans are planning to equip their aircraft carriers
with a system for automatic deck landing of aircraft. It is more
complicated to solve the problem of employing aircraft carriers in heavy
seas. Currently it is practically possible for aircraft to take off and
land on carriers only when the sea state is not greater than six to seven.
Another weakness of the aircraft carriers when compared with airfields
on shore is their low survivability. Even relatively insignificant damage
to the flight deck, the take-off and landing systems, the aircraft
elevators, and other mechanical systems, or listing of the aircraft carrier
(for example, as a result of a hole in the underwater part of the hull) may
make it totally impossible to use the aircraft. Moreover, large reserves
of aviation fuel are conducive to an explosion or fire on the carriers if
any kind of weapon is used against them.
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The landing of aircraft on the moving and rolling deck of an aircraft
carrier is considerably more complicated than on an airfield on land and
requires exceptionally-well-trained air crews. Furthermore, it is
impossible to use aircraft having a take-off weight greater than 50 tons
from aircraft carriers (even from the largest).
Let us point out still another circumstance. Carrier strike large
units depend to a considerable degree on reserves of aviation fuel and
nuclear weapons, and there is difficulty in replacing losses incurred by
carrier aviation in the course of an operation. These situations force the
large units to move from the area of combat actions after an average of
three to four days in order to replenish reserves from servicing ships
located in a remote part of the sea. The destruction of the latter
deprives the large unit of the capability of continuing combat actions over
an extended period of time.
On the basis of the views that have taken shape with regard to the
role and place of carrier strike forces in a future war, the Americans have
developed plans for the construction and employment of strike carriers. In
conformity with these plans, it is considered necessary to have in the US
naval forces no fewer than 14 or 15 strike carriers in the course of this
decade (1961 to 1970).
As of 1 July 1962, the US naval forces already had 16 strike carriers,
each capable of taking aboard about 90 to 100 aircraft (about 50 percent of
them are nuclear weapons delivery aircraft). The most modern are the
nuclear-powered strike carrier Enterprise and two strike carriers of the
Forrestal class, put into service in 1961 (an all three, surface-to-air
guided missiles were installed in place of antiaircraft artillery for the
first time); there are also four other strike carriers of the Forrestal
class, which were built in the period from 1955 to 1959 (with conventional
antiaircraft armament). Three strike carriers of the Midway class will
meet modern requirements until about 1970. The Americans assume that the
aircraft carriers of the Oriskany class (six ships), although refitted
after the war, can be used as strike carriers only until about 1965, after
which they will become obsolete and subject to replacement.
For the fleet to have, as planned, 14 or 15 modern strike carriers in
the period from 1965 to 1970, the Americans will have to build seven or
eight new ships by 1970 to replace the obsolescent carriers, that is, they
will have to lay down one carrier a year. There is currently under
construction one conventional strike carrier, and the program for the
1962/1963 fiscal year calls for the start of another one. In the future,
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the Americans contemplate building only nuclear-powered strike carriers,
but with a smaller displacement than the first nuclear-powered strike
carrier Enterprise.
As for the carrier strike aviation of the US naval forces, it is armed
with jet-propelled delivery aircraft having high tactical-technical
specifications. The strike aircraft include heavy ground-attack aircraft
and ground-attack aircraft. The heavy ground-attack aircraft are
represented by one type, the A3D-2 Skywarrior, which flies at transonic
speed, has an operational radius of more than 2,500 kilometers, and can
deliver nuclear strikes from altitudes up to 14,000 meters, as well as from
law altitudes. Expected to make its appearance in the combat squadrons in
1962 is a new heavy ground-attack aircraft, the A3J-1 Vigilante, which has
a speed of 2,200 kilorileters an hour and a service ceiling of up to 21,000
meters.
The basic type of ground-attack aircraft is the A4D-2 Skyhawk, which
flies at transonic speeds, has an operational radius of about 1,400
kilometers, and a service ceiling of up to 12,000 meters. New modified
versions of this type of aircraft will have higher tactical-technical
specifications. Expected to be put into service in 1963 is the A2F-1
Intruder ground-attack aircraft, which is intended especially for
low-altitude actions.
In addition, if necessary, the Americans can
carrier-based fighter aircraft to deliver nuclear
carrier-based, all-weather fighter aircraft F4H-1
high tactical-technical specifications. It has a
2'400 kilometers an hour, a service ceiling of 24
operational radius of up to 1,900 kilometers.
use some of the
strikes. The
Phantom 2 has especially
flight speed of about
000 meters, and an
Reconnaissance indications of preparation for a surprise attack by
carrier strike large units.
The Americans can count on the success of a surprise attack only if
they make massed use of the nuclear means of all the branches of the armed
forces and carry out in good time a vast number of defensive measures.
Therefore, even if there appear to be obvious reconnaissance indications of
preparation by carrier strike large units to deliver initial nuclear
strikes, they can only under certain conditions serve as sufficient reason
for the timely delivery of a powerful missile/nuclear strike against the
aggressor. Foremost among these conditions should be the availability of
reconnaissance indications that the US is preparing all its other nuclear
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means for a surprise strike, indications that the US and its allies in the
aggressive blocs are making immediate preparations for war, or a series of
reliable reports that the Americans intend to start a war in the near
future.
The reconnaissance indications of preparation by carrier strike large
units for a surprise attack should be reduced to two groups -- main and
supplemental. Included in the first group should be reconnaissance
indications of measures which if not carried out would make impossible or
unlikely the delivery by carrier large units of the initial nuclear strikes
in the initial period of a war. Comprising the second group should be
reconnaissance indications which, even though they would indicate the great
likelihood of preparation for the delivery of nuclear strikes, may not
appear at all (at least some of them), because the Americans may forego a
number of even very important preparatory measures in order to achieve the
greatest surprise.
One of the min reconnaissance indications is the setting out to sea
of carrier strike large units and their support forces. There can be two
variants of this.
The first variant is when, for the purpose of carrying out a surprise
attack, our probable enemy attempts to concentrate the maximum amount of
nuclear forces and means in the departure areas for operations. In this
variant, the carrier strike large units and their support forces, including
carrier hunter-killer groups and groups of servicing ships, have to depart
from the US for the eastern Atlantic, the Far East, and possibly the Indian
Ocean (Arabian Sea). Several days prior to this there obviously will be a
deployment of the antisubmarine forces -- mainly land-based aviation and
submarines -- on the antisubmarine line between Iceland and Great Britain,
on the approaches to the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the US, and at the
exits from the Sea of Japan. There may possibly be an even earlier
deployment of the maximum amount of nuclear-powered missile-carrying
submarines in the eastern part of the Atlantic.
In so doing, the departure of carrier strike large units (groups) from
the US will be carried out either under the pretext of conducting exercises
or on the signalling of an alert and without mention in the press or radio
about the purpose of the departure, as was the case with the events in
Egypt in 1956, in Lebanon in 1958, and in the following years whenever
there was a sharp increase in international tension. In either of these
instances the carrier large units will, as a rule, observe complete radio
silence during their sea transit. They will most likely move into the
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departure areas for delivering the initial nuclear strikes during darkness.
The deployment of the carrier large units (groups), with the approximate
time periods and theaters, may be as follows.
D-15: the departure of a carrier strike group from the area of the
Hawaiian Islands for the Indian Ocean (Arabian Sea).
D-10: the departure of a carrier strike large unit (group) and a
carrier hunter-killer group from the west coast of the US for the Far East,
and a carrier strike group and carrier hunter-killer group from the east
coast of the US for the Mediterranean Sea.
D-7: the departure of a carrier strike large unit (group), one to two
carrier hunter-killer groups, and a group of servicing ships from the east
coast of the US for the eastern Atlantic (the Norwegian Sea).
D-2: the departure of a carrier strike large unit and a carrier
hunter-killer group from the western for the eastern part of the
Mediterranean Sea, and a group of servicing ships for the central part of
the Mediterranean Sea; during this same period it is possible that carrier
strike groups, carrier hunter-killer groups, and a group of servicing ships
will be deployed near the east coast of Japan and in the East China Sea.
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The probable strength of the carrier strike forces in the departure
areas after deployment (only the number of strike carriers) is shown in
Table 1.
Table 1
Deployment areas
Number of str Ike carriers
Before deployment
After deployment
Norwegian Sea
3
Eastern part of the Mediterranean
3
Western part of the Mediterranean
2-3
Arabian Sea
2
East China Sea
2
East coast of Japan
3
3
Total
5-6
13
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The probable strength of the strike aviation aboard the aircraft
carriers in the departure deployment areas can be characterized by the data
in Table 2.
Table 2
Delivery aircraft
g
?r4
11
0
Z
Mediterranean
Sea
g W
?r-I 0
42Ict Cf)
.!
43
M
W
44
til
44
Heavy ground-attack A3D-2 Skywarriors
30
24
18
36
Ground-attack A4D-2 Skyhawks
96
84
24
120
Ground-attack FJ Furies
--
--
12
24
Ground-attack AD Skyraiders
24
36
36
48
Total
,
150
144
90
228
Therefore, if we assume that for the period of the general nuclear
offensive the maximum reserve of nuclear bombs per strike carrier may be as
high as 100 to 140, then the delivery aircraft shown in Table 2 will be
able in the first sortie to carry no more than 30 to 35 percent of the
reserve of nuclear bombs aboard the carrier strike large units deployed in
the departure areas (taking into consideration that 10 to 13 percent of the
delivery aircraft will not participate in the first sortie and that some of
the aircraft that take to the air will be carrying conventional weapons).
The second variant is when the strike large units may be forced to set
out to sea; that is, when, because of the situation, the Americans will be
unable or will consider it impossible to deploy strike forces from the US
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and will decide to deliver a strike with the forces of the forward
groupings. In this variant, prior to the surprise attack the carrier
strike forces of the Sixth and Seventh Fleets will already be located in
the departure areas "on combat training", ready upon a signal to deliver a
strike. Naturally, there will be a greater element of surprise in this
kind of strike, but its power will be considerably less than if delivered
with a maximum concentration of strike forces. In view of this, the US
command considers the first variant of actions preferable.
Emerging from the examination of this reconnaissance indication is the
exceptional importance of constant surveillance of the strike carriers and
their support forces even in peacetime. This will enable us to determine
at any given moment, even if only approximately, the area in which they are
located and the probable nature of their activity. With this information
we can then deduce correctly whether they are preparing for a surprise
attack and within what time frame and from which areas this attack should
be expected, or that they are not ready, to deliver a massed strike and are
only carrying out demonstrative actions or conducting ordinary planned
exercises.
Another main reconnaissance indication of attack may be the
replenishment of the carrier strike large units with various rads of
reserves, vrimarily nuclear weapons, up to the maximum norms. It is
virtually impossible to deliver an initial powerful nuclear strike without
carrying out this measure. When this replenishment of reserves takes place
-- it is carried out in a brief period of time and immediately before the
deployment of the carrier strike large units -- there will be a sharp rise
in the activity of the rear services organs and of the special weapons and
fuel depots. This will result in a considerable increase in the volume of
conversations over the various communications channels. Prior to this,
obviously, there will also be an increase in the movement of nuclear
weapons from the US to the forward (overseas) depots. Similar measures
will also take place in the forward groupings of the US naval forces, the
only difference being that the reserves for the aircraft carriers will
start being delivered to them while they are at sea (particularly for
replenishing reserves of nuclear weapons).
Consequently, this reconnaissance indication is quite a pronounced
one. Under the appropriate conditions it can provide evidence that the
carrier strike large units are very probably preparing for a surprise
attack.
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An increase in operational combat readiness and the forming of new
carrier strike large units (groups) also can serve as an important
indication of the preparation of a surprise attack. These measures cannot
be avoided, although it will not always be easy to distinguish them from
similar measures carried out for the usual combat training, particularly in
periods when there is no sharp increase in international tension. With
reference to time, these measures can be carried out either immediately
before the deployment of the carrier strike large units or well in advance
of their deployment. In identifying this reconnaissance indication we
should be guided primarily by an analysis of the indications that the naval
forces as a whole, as well as the other branches of the US armed forces,
are preparing for a surprise attack. For example, a sharp increase in the
readiness of all the missile means and strategic aviation, the rapid
formation of new operational fleets, a significant reinforcement of the
antisubmarine defense forces on the approaches to the US and at lines on
the ocean, etc. may serve as an indication that the increase in
operational readiness and the forming of new carrier strike large units
evidently are aimed at their preparation for participation in an attack.
The declaration of an increased combat alert and a general combat
alert may serve as a reconnaissance indication of an attack by the forces
=arx-ier large units. The Americans regard the declaration of these
alerts as being obligatory. They have been specially developed to ensure
the proper coordination and organization of efforts in the actions
especially of all the strike means at the outset of a surprise attack.
:Naturally, without these alerts and without the transmission of uniform
signals it is hardly possible to achieve surprise and the maximum effect
from the employment of missile/nuclear weapons.
Upon the declaration of an increased combat alert, the carrier large
units deployed at sea begin preparation for the delivery of nuclear strikes
(the move to the departure areas, the preparation of the delivery aircraft
and of the nuclear bombs, etc.). Based on the experience of a number of
exercises and maneuvers of the NATO allied armed forces, particularly the
experience of the FALLEX-60 exercises conducted in 1960, increased alert is
declared on the eve of the day military actions are to begin (D). With the
introduction of the general combat alert, which usually is declared on
D-day, the carrier strike large units are supposed to already be in
immediate readiness to deliver nuclear strikes upon receiving the special
signal permitting them to begin employing nuclear weapons.
To declare these alerts, radio communications means must unavoidably
be used. Consequently, the intercept and deciphering of messages to the
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carrier strike large units about the declaration of the appropriate alert
can make it considerably easier to accomplish the task of timely warning of
, a surprise nuclear strike that is being prepared. When making any
deduction on the basis of a particular reconnaissance indication, one
should keep in mind that for the purpose of deception the Americans may
declare an increased combat alert and a general combat alert under the
guise of "training" alerts. This can create the impression that ordinary
exercises or large-scale demonstrations are being conducted and thus, to a
certain degree, conceal the actual preparation for a surprise attack.
Some of the important supplemental reconnaissance indications may
include the tollawing:
-- conduct by carrier strike large units of planned or non-planned
larr-scale exercises in US coastal areas, in the eastern Atlantic, in the
Mediterranean Sea, in the Far East, and in the Indian Ocean with a
curtailment of the ongoing regular combat training; the simultaneous or
almost simultaneous conduct of such exercises in all or in a majority of
the indicated areas will be evidence of the great likelihood that they are
dress rehearsal exercises, that is, final preparation for the actual
delivery of nuclear strikes;
-- a considerable increase in the combat training of all the main
operational formations and large units of the naval forces, with thorough
work on the most important matters of standard naval operations for the
initial period of a war; in the first place these should include
missile/nuclear strikes, operations to provide support to the ground
forces, and operations and combat actions to protect the sea lanes.
The rapid and concealed movement of diverse types of large units out
to-sea in different naval theaters and the massive dispersal of combat
ships and merchant ships unable to participate in the initial combat
actions among the most sheltered secondary ports, bases, and bays and out
to sea. The Americans and their allies have repeatedly worked on the
conduct of such measures during exercises in recent years. It is
contemplated here that these measures will be carried out immediately
before a surprise attack in order to safeguard the large forces of the
naval and merchant fleets in the event of a retaliatory missile/nuclear
strike by the enemy.
The mobilization of a considerable number of ships from the merchant
fleet, their adaptation for actions primarily to support fleet strike
TECTs at sea, and their inclusion in the servicing forces of the naval
forces.
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A strengthening of security at naval bases, individual ports, and the
most important naval depots, with the partial evacuation of the families of
servicemen and civilian personnel from them.
The reduction or conylete cancellation of leave for the personnel of
the operational large units that may participate in the first operations of
the initial period of war, and the manning of these large units up to the
level of wartime tables of organization.
A sharp increase in the air defense forces and means on the approaches
to the US and on its coast.
The preparation and transfer of the shore staffs of the fleet to
sheltered command posts that have been prepared for wartime, and the
bringing to readiness and general checking of all the means of control of
the naval strike forces. As the experience of recent years shows, the
Americans have carried out these measures more than once by order of the US
military high command.
The preparation and putting into service of a large number of combat
ships and naval aircraft from the reserve. Here it should be noted that
the Americans may also carry out such measures on a comparatively limited
scale for the purpose of increasing international tension, without
intending to carry out a surprise attack. For example, in 1961, during the
so-called "Berlin crisis", the US put into service from the reserve more
than 30 combat ships and up to 20 land-based antisubmarine air squadrons.
A sharp increase in the production of aircraft for the naval forces,
primarily delivery aircraft and carrier-based fighter aircraft: It is
known that for the last several years the annual production in the US of
all types of aircraft for the naval forces has been approximately 900.
This makes it possible only to maintain the numerical strength of aircraft
in the naval forces at a certain level and even with some drop in that
level from year to year. During and following the conduct of a general
nuclear offensive, large losses of carrier aircraft are inevitable, a fact
that is recognized by the Americans themselves. Consequently, to replace
these losses, the US will have to establish some reserves in advance,
mainly in delivery aircraft and fighters. Obviously, to achieve maximum
surprise the Americans will begin to establish these reserves shortly
before the attack. However, this will require a certain period of time,
which will be marked by a considerable increase in the activity of the
various mobilization organs of the naval forces and of the enterprises
engaged in filling the orders. This important reconnaissance indication is
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practically impossible to conceal.
These, then, are the most important reconnaissance indications of the
preparation by naval carrier strike large units to deliver the initial
nuclear strikes. Of course, this does not completely exhaust the list of
possible reconnaissance indications, particularly the supplemental and
prewar indications. However, the appearance of just these indications
alone, or just some of them, may already be sufficient reason to draw the
.conclusion that a surprise strike from the sea is being prepared. The
detection of other reconnaissance indications will only give additional
corroboration to this conclusion.
-Tarle644EL.,
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