SOVIET ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE: CURRENT CAPABILITIES AND PRIORITIES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005512850
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 99
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: September 1, 1972

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
CIA HISTORICAL RELEASE
PROGRAM
JUNE 2017
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTORATE OF
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
Intelligence Report
Soviet Antisubmarine Warfare.
Current Capabilities and Priorities
AR 70-14
OL
SR IR 72-13-S
MOSI-STIRISCI72-6-S
September 1972
Copy N 307
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Comments on the facts and judgements contained in
this report should be forwarded through appropriate
channels lo the Director of Strategic Research, CIA
Headquarters, Washington, D.C., 20505.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
Directorate of Science and Technology
September 1972
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Soviet Antisubmarine Warfare:
Current Capabilities and Priorities
Introduction
During World War I the attack submarine emerged
as a serious threat to surface ships on the high seas
and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) became an important
component of naval operations. Until the recent ad-
vent of the ballistic missile submarine, the object
of ASW was the protection of warships, troopships,
and cargo vessels from attack. Success in ASW meant
the maintenance of a sufficient level of security
at sea to preserve the strength of the fleet and
ensure the transport of ground forces and war materiel.
Some losses--frequently large ones--could be accepted,
and destruction or neutralization of every enemy sub-
marine was not essential.
The nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
has radically altered the dimensions of the ASW
problem. First, nuclear submarines, because of their
speed and endurance and their capacity to remain com-
pletely submerged for long periods, are much harder
to find and destroy than were older submarines. Se-
cond, ballistic missile submarines need not approach
hostile forces to carry out their mission, and in
fact purposely evade other forces. Third, and
Note: This report was prepared by the Office of
Scientific Intelligence and the Office of Strategic
Research and coordinated within CIA.
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most important, ballistic missile submarines have a
far greater destructive potential--a factor which has
drastically altered ASW requirements. In past wars
the limitation of damage was an acceptable goal, but
in a nuclear war failure to destroy all ballistic mis-
sile submarines--leaving even a few--could mean catas-
trophe. A single US Poseidon submarine, for example,
is capable of delivering approximately 160 nuclear
warheads. The consequences of allowing even one such
submarine to launch its missiles could be severe.
The beginning of the Soviet effort in open ocean
ASW coincided with the post-World War II venture
of the Soviet Navy from the coastal waters onto the
high seas. The development of ASW defenses for the
fleets at sea has occupied much of the Soviet effort
since that time. The emergence of the nuclear attack
submarine, moreover, has increased the Soviets' long-
standing concern for the security of their coastal
areas and intracoastal shipping. Consequently they
initiated efforts to develop ASW defenses in coastal
areas as well as on the open ocean.
A Soviet ASW response to the development of
ballistic missile submarines has been less evident.
Although Soviet writings since the late Fifties have
indicated awareness of the threat posed by Polaris
submarines, the Soviets probably had enough experi-
ence and understanding by the mid-Sixties to realize
that the problem of Polaris would not readily yield
to conventional naval forces.
This report evaluates the spectrum of Soviet ASW
operations, including present ASW methods, the ships
and aircraft employed, ASW organization, and command
and control of Soviet ASW forces.* Soviet operations
are also examined to discern possibilities that pre-
viously undetected ASW systems are being employed.
A summary begins on page 7.
ASW in this report is considered as operations
against submarines at sea. Tactics such as dis-
ruption of communications or destruction of sub-
marines in port are not discussed.
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Contents
Summary .
The Submarine Threat Confronting
Page
7
the Soviets . . . . . .
.
11
Western Ballistic Missile Submarines . .
.
11
Soviet Perception of the Ballistic Missile
Submarine Threat 0 . .... .. ? 6 0 ?
?
11
Western Attack Submarines
12
Soviet Perception of the Attack Submarine
Threat . . . ..... a a. ?
?
13
Soviet Capabilities for Submarine Detection,
Localization, and Destruction . . . . .
14
Submarine Detection Capabilities .
.
14
Submarine Contact Reports . .....
17
Detection Systems for Ocean
Surveillance . . . . . .
.
20
Capabilities for Localization . ? ? ?
.
20
Surface Ship Sonars . . . . . . . ?
.
23
Submarine Sonars . . . . . . . . .
.
25
Airborne ASW Sensors ? ? 0 0 ? ?
?
26
Sonobuoys. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
26
Radars . 0 . . .. . . ? ? .
.
28
Dipping Sonar . . . . . . . . . . ? ?
28
Magnetic Anomaly Detection . . . . .
.
29
Other Airborne Sensors . . . . . . ?
0
30
Capabilities for Destruction B ? ?
30
Production of ASW-Capable Ships and Aircraft
35
Major Surface Ships . . 0 0 ? 0 0
?
35
Submarines . . .... . . . .....
38
ASW Aircraft . ? . ? ? 0 0 0 ? 0 6 ? ? ?
?
40
Organization and Control of Soviet ASW
Equipped Forces . ? .....
42
Fleet Organization . . . . . . . . . . .
.
42
Command and Control Implications for ASW
.
44
Submarine Communications . . 0 . ? . .
45
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Contents (continued)
Soviet ASW Operations and Mission
Capabilities
? ? ? . ? 0
Page
47
Strategic Offensive ASW . ? B ? e ? 800 47
Possible Strategic Offensive
Operations . . . . 6 ? ? ? ? 47
Surveillance Capabilities 060060 49
Trailing Capabilities e?e e vase 49
Strategic Defensive ASW . ? 51
Coordinated Submarine Transits . . . ? 51
Strategic Defensive Capabilities . ? . 53
Defense of the Fleet . . . . . 53
Command and Control . . .
Operations and Exercises
Fleet Defense Capabilities
Defense of Sea Approaches
ge e??
p ? ?e?
e ??
O 0
? ?0 ? 9 0 ? ?
54
54
55
55
Command and Control . seeeee??? 55
Exercises . . . . . . . ... 060 56
Approach Defense Capabilities 0 ? ? ? 57
Defense of Coastal Areas ? ...... 58
Command and Control . . . ? ? ? ? ? 58
Coastal Defense Exercises . . 59
Coastal Defense Capabilities . . ? ? 60
Outlook for Soviet ASW
? 0 ? 0 ....... 60
Annex A. Technical Analysis of Potential ASW
Detection Methods 63
Annex B. Characteristics of Soviet ASW-Equipped
Forces ..... . . . . . 81
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Page
Tables
Soviet Surface Ship Sonars ?0000?0??? 22
Soviet Submarine Sonars . . . 0??0????0 24
Soviet Air-Dropped Sonobuoys ? 08000??? 27
Soviet ASW Torpedoes . . . . e?O 31
Soviet Rocket-Propelled Charges . . . . . . . 32
Soviet: Naval Mines With ASW Potential 00 . 33
Charts
Soviet Major Surface Ship Procurement and
Conversions, 1962-1971 . . . . . . . . 34
Trends in Soviet Surface Ship Development,
1958-1971 . . . . . .
? . 36-37
Soviet Submarine Construction, 1962-1971 . ? 39
Soviet: ASW Aircraft Deployment, 1962-1971 . ^ 41
Operations of the Moskva and Leningrad ASW
Helicopter Carriers 000000000??
Maps
O?
46
Distribution of Major Soviet ASW-Equipped
Forces. ......
Typical Coordinated Transit: Y and C Class
Outbound, 15-18 July 1971 .
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52
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Glossary of Terms Used in This Report
Attack submarine ? A submarine whose principal combat function is to
destroy other submarines and surface ships. Principal armaments may be
surface-to-surface cruise missiles or torpedoes.
Ballistic missile submarine ? A submarine whose principal combat
function is to launch ballistic missiles against strategic land targets.
Barrier ? An array of sensors, usually in a line across a narrow strait,
for detection of passing submarines. Barriers may be composed of
ASW-capable forces or fixed sensors.
Bistatic sonar ? Active sonar in which the receiver is located at some
distance from .the transmitter, thereby separating the receiver from the noise
at the source. Theoretically this improves the sonar range capability.
Bottom bounce A mode of active or passive sonar operation in which
the active pulse or target-radiated acoustic energy is reflected from the ocean
bottom to obtain increased ranges.
Convergence zone ? Ring-like zones of sound focusing, about 25 to 30
miles from a sonar, occurring in many deep-water ocean areas. This phenom-
enon enables sensitive sonars to achieve extended active or passive ranges.
Delousing -- A tactic in which forces friendly to a submarine attempt to
detect and remove hostile trailing submarines.
Direct path The simplest mode of active or passive sonar operation in
which sound follows a direct line without being reflected.
Infrared (1 R) ? Thermal radiation of wavelengths longer than visible
light, of possible application in submarine wake detection systems.
Localization A phase in ASW in which the location and movement of
a submarine are determined with sufficient accuracy for launching an
antisubmarine weapon. This phase may also include measures to determine
the identi Ly of the submarine.
Ocean surveillance ? A continuous watch over ocean areas for
submerged submarine activity, accomplished by fixed or mobile systems.
Open ocean ASW Antisubmarine warfare conducted in the broad
expanses of major oceans and sea areas, as opposed to coastal areas,
restricted seas, and gap areas.
SOS US Sound surveillance system, a US fixed acoustic ocean
surveillance system operating at low acoustic frequencies.
SSBN US Navy designation for nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarine.
Trailing The tactic of following a submerged submarine with another
submarine for the purpose of gathering intelligence, maintaining surveillance,
or eventual destruction. Trailing may be covert or overt.
Transducer -- A device which transforms electric energy into acoustic
energy, or the reverse. Used as the sending and receiving elements in sonars.
Variable-depth sonar (VDS) ? A sonar which can be lowered by cable
from El surface ship to varying depths of several hundred feet to reach more
favorable acoustic conditions.
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T ,
Summary
Soviet capabilities for antisubmarine warfare
fall far short of the minimum requirements for
protection of the surface navy and represent an
almost negligible threat to the US ballistic mis-
sile submarine fleet. The low level of effective-
ness results primarily from the lack of an open-ocean
surveillance system and from inadequate sensors.
Soviet ASW weapons appear adequate, but delivery
platforms are too few in number and are not opti-
mized for the ASW mission. Although research and
development on ASW systems are being pursued, pros-
pects for improvement are confined principally to
defense against submarines in Soviet coastal waters.
Soviet statements suggest that strategic offen-
sive ASW--directed against ballistic missile sub-
marines--is a major concern of the Soviet Navy.
Analysis of Soviet naval operations presents a
contrary view. Almost all observed ASW activity
supports fleet defense and coastal ASW missions.
The dominant theme in naval exercises is the defense
of the ocean approaches to the USSR, especially
against Western carrier strike forces.
The Soviets have two avenues of approach to
strategic offensive ASW, either through open-ocean
surveillance or through submarine trailing. Analysis
of Soviet ASW operations,
and assessment of
Soviet ASW-related technology indicate that the
Soviet Navy does not now have an effective capability
for broad ocean surveillance to detect submarines.
The Soviets have conducted several coordinated sub-
marine transits involving Y class ballistic missile
submarines and attack submarines through the Nor-
wegian Sea. These operations suggest that the
Soviets are primarily concerned with the protection
of their own SSBN force. Observation of these and
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other Soviet operations and the units involved sug-
gests that the Soviets have not developed the tactics
and the submarines to trail effectively the quieter
US units.
The command and control system of the Soviet
Navy probably is adequate to direct surface and air
forces in large-scale, coordinated ASW exercises.
Command and control is, however, a potential con-
straint on Soviet submarine operations against other
submarines. At present, the Soviets cannot maintain
the continuous direct two-way communications between
headquarters and trailing submarines that would be
necessary for near-simultaneous destruction of an
enemy ballistic missile submarine force.
Analysis of Soviet production of naval aircraft,
surface ships, and submarines from the late Fifties
onward indicates that no large-scale specialized ASW
construction program was undertaken during that
period. Although the Soviets have produced about
100 surface warships since 1958, these ships are
multiple-purpose units whose ASW weapons and sensors
are designed for self defense. They have also pro-
duced attack submarines--considered by the Soviets
to be appropriate for ASW--at a low but steady rate.
In the late Sixties the Soviets began series pro-
duction of a new generation of ASW aircraft, pri-
marily for use in coastal defense, but also including
some longer range aircraft for a tactical capability
against hostile submarines in the sea approaches to
the USSR.
Despite a continuing effort to build ships capa-
ble of defending themselves from enemy submarines,
the Soviets still are unable to protect their forces
from submarine attack. The prognosis is not opti-
mistic. Their surface forces for the near term are
likely to remain vulnerable to submarines.
The Soviets have recently begun to pay increased
attention to ASW operations in the sea approaches to
the USSR. Without a broad area ASW surveillance
system, they have little hope of success except with
operations incorporating concentrated submarine
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barriers augmented by air and surface ASW forces.
Even in these operations, the technical deficiencies
of Soviet sensor systems are likely to prevent the
Soviets from developing effective ASW defenses in
their sea approaches in the near future.
Except in the waters within a few miles of naval
base entrances, Soviet ASW forces have little capa-
bility to protect the coastal areas from submarine
intrusions. Lack of effective detection systems and
the apparent low state of crew training owing to the
unchallenging nature of Soviet ASW training are
largely responsible for this inefficiency.
The inadequacies of the ASW sensors--especially
sonars--are a major factor limiting Soviet ASW
capabilities. About 90 percent of the major ASW
surface ships have sonars which provide little
detection capability, even under favorable condi-
tions. Fewer than 20 Soviet ships are equipped
with the latest model sonars with range potentials
similar to those of currently operational Western
sonars. Even for these, however, the Soviets ap-
parently lack the signal processing techniques used
by the West and thus cannot fully exploit the po-
tential of the sonars.
Similarly, despite steady efforts to improve them,
the latest passive sonars on Soviet submarines have
detection ranges of only about one-half those of
modern US nuclear submarines. The difference is due
in part to the greater noise generated by Soviet
submarines, but probably also to technical deficien-
cies in the sonars themselves.
/The Soviets are known
to have nuclear warheads for torpedoes, but it is
uncertain whether these are ASW torpedoes and, if
so, how they would be delivered. They probably are
developing improved acoustic homing torpedoes and
may be developing a missile capable of delivering
a torpedo to a range of 30 nautical miles.
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Major ASW concerns of the present are likely to
influence the shape of Soviet efforts in the next
several years. Requirements for coastal defense and
for defending naval forces in distant deployments
against Western submarines will motivate Soviet pro-
duction of ASW equipment and the development of ASW
forces. The Soviet coastal defense posture may be
moderately improved with the development of shallow-
water, medium-range detection systems and improved
surface ships and submarines.
The quest for a counter to the Polaris threat
will involve research and development on sensors
and the development of trailing capabilities. With-
out a major advance in ocean surveillance technology
or substantial improvement in trailing capabilities,
however, Soviet anti-Polaris capabilities probably
will not be substantially improved over the next
five years.
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The Submarine Threat
Confronting the Soviets
Western Ballistic Missile Submarines
The Polaris and Poseidon forces of the United
States and the United Kingdom* present a combined
threat of 45 ballistic missile submarines.
More than
20 of these submarines are on station at any time
in the Pacific, the North Atlantic, the Mediter-
ranean, and the Norwegian Sea.
By 1976 a total of 31 of the US ballistic mis-
sile submarines will be converted to launch the
Poseidon C-3 missile. The Poseidon missile delivers
from 6 to 14 independently targeted warheads. Po-
seidon warheads further complicate the threat be-
cause of their small size and greater reentry speeds,
rendering interception by ABM more difficult. The
remaining US and UK submarines will carry the
A-3 Polaris missile. The greater range of the A-3
and C-3 missiles has expanded the previous operat-
ing area for the US SSBNs by a factor of more than
four.
Soviet Perception of the Ballistic
Missile Submarine Threat
Soviet military writers began to consider the
Western ballistic missile submarine threat early in
its development. The Soviets may have had more
confidence about dealing with the Polaris threat in
1960 than they have today. The Polaris A-1 missile
of that time had a range of about 1,200 nm and car-
The French are building an independent force o
ballistic missile submarines.
the entire force is expected to b
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ried one warhead which slowed to subsonic speeds
after reentering the atmosphere. In their long-
range planning the Soviets may have envisioned that
a large ASW program, supplemented by widely de-
ployed ABM defenses, would effectively limit
damage from a Polaris strike.
The Soviets probably underestimated the com-
plexity of combating the Polaris system. Early
attempts to develop a means for locating and de-
stroying Polaris submarines were probably important
lessons to the Soviets in the realities of offensive
ASW. The advent of the longer range A-3 Polaris
and the announcement of the Poseidon program com-
plicated the problem even more.
To support a Soviet "bolt-from-the-blue" first
strike or to weaken the US ability to strike the
USSR, Soviet forces would have to conduct successful
preemptive ASW attacks against large numbers of on-
station submarines shortly after receipt of the order.
US analyses of such hypothetical warhead exchanges,
however, show that there is no rational incentive for
the Soviet Union to strike US strategic attack forces
unless the Soviets possess a capability to destroy
nearly all of the Polaris fleet simultaneously.
The Soviets apparently decided, in view of the
risks inherent in such a strategy, that their response
to the US Polaris fleet should not be a defensive re-
action with anti-Polaris forces, but rather a ballistic
missile submarine force of their own.
Western Attack Submarines
The development of the attack submarine into a
fast, concealed warship of high endurance and in-
dependence has had a profound influence on the world's
major navies. ASW weapons and sensors are now ap-
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parent on the decks of modern major warships. These
ASW armaments rank in importance with antiair and
antisurface ship systems. A warship, however potent
its offensive capabilities may be, is of dubious
value if it cannot detect and at least evade the
attack submarine. The old tactic of holding a
hostile submarine down until its deteriorating bat-
tery and atmosphere forced it to face destruction
on the surface has become obsolete. The nuclear
submarine is free to run, possibly faster than its
pursuer, and reattack from a new direction.
The US fleet has 54 nuclear attack submarines
and it plans to increase that figure to about 90
the end of the Seventies. The British Navy has
nuclear attack units. The US now has 40 and
the UK diesel-electric submarines, but most of
the US submarines probably will be phased out by
the end of the decade. About 65 diesel-electric
submarines of other NATO countries operate within
range of the coastal areas of the European USSR.
Soviet Perception of the Attack
Submarine Threat
In recent years the Soviet Navy has increasingly
exposed its forces for political and military effect
in distant areas such as the Caribbean, the Mediter-
ranean, and the Indian Ocean. The credibility of
these forces as instruments of Soviet foreign policy
and their viability in hostile circumstances are
dependent on their defensive capabilities. The
Soviets probably consider cruise missile armaments
on most of their surface forces to be adequate
against, the surface threat. But experience has
probably taught them to be less than complacent
about their abilities to deal with attack submarines
They have taken measures to bolster their defenses in
particularly vulnerable areas, such as the Mediter-
ranean, through the use of surface, air, and submarine
barrier forces.
The Soviets are concerned that their relatively
concentrated centers of naval and maritime activity
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along the Soviet littoral would be particularly in-
viting to Western submarines in war. These areas
are also sensitive in peacetime as Soviet forces con-
duct exercises and advanced systems testing.
The Soviets regard the nuclear attack submarine
as the greatest threat to their own fleet of ballis-
tic missile submarines. They have written that they
would expect to confront Western submarine barriers
in areas on the routes to the open seas. The Soviets
have read and discussed US proposals for trailing
and escorting ballistic missile submarines. These
concerns may have led them to escort some of their
Y class missile submarines with their attack sub-
marines.
Soviet Capabilities for Submarine
Detection, Localization, and Destruction
The Soviets have recognized that they must de-
velop systems and tactics to solve each of the three
elemental tasks in ASW: detection, localization,
and destruction of the target submarine.
Submarine Detection Capabilities
Detection has become more complex with the ad-
vent of ballistic missile submarines. The chief
problem is the vast ocean area which must be searched.
The more traditional problems of coastal ASW and
fleet defense required the search of restricted areas
along coastlines or those areas immediately surround-
ing deployed forces. Mobile detection systems aboard
modern surface ships, submarines, and aircraft de-
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Air .
veloped for these limited area searches and for
localization of targets are not adequate to the task
of searching open ocean areas.
A surveillance system capable of conducting
open ocean searches is a necessity for combating
the ballistic missile submarine in any strategy
which does not rely on trailing tactics.* It is
also a significant aid in other forms of ASW. For
example, an ocean surveillance system can warn de-
ployed forces or coastal defense units of the ap-
proach of hostile submarines.
Ocean surveillance systems could conceivably be
attached to the seabed, located in satellites, po-
sitioned ashore, or carried by conventional naval
forces. Such phenomena as acoustics, magnetics,
wake turbulence, communications interception, in-
frared, and nuclear activation could possibly become
the basis for an ocean-wide detection system.
The subject of trailing, as an alternative to
ocean surveillance, is treated on pages 49-50
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Detection Systems for Ocean Surveillance
There is no evidence that the Soviets have pro-
duced mobile or fixed detection devices useful for
long-range detection of submerged submarines.
Present Soviet sensors aboard ships and aircraft
have short range and are designed for localization
or small-area search.
Soviet fixed acoustic detection devices
are
4assive systems of short rancle.\
r The
Soviets have not attempted a large-scale acoustic
undersea surveillance system such as the US SOSUS
system.
(Annex A of this report discusses the potential
of various acoustic and nonacoustic phenomena as
possible approaches to ocean surveillance.)
Capabilities for Localization
Soviet production programs, tactics, and
training have concentrated chiefly on the locali-
zation phase of ASW.
Once a submarine has been detected by an ASW
force, its position and movements must be determined
with sufficient accuracy to launch a weapon. One
of the greatest obstacles to the development of ef-
fective ASW sensors is the effect of environmental
conditions which limit the performance of the sensor
in locating a submarine. Sonar, the most widely
used ASW sensor, is affected by water temperature
and salinity, the depth of the target, the topog-
raphy of the ocean floor, and other factors. The
uncertainties involved in depending on a single
type of sensor have led both the US and USSR to
develop other shorter range ASW sensors, such as
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magnetic detection systems, that are not as suscep-
tible to these particular environmental conditions.
Sonar can detect the presence of a submarine
either passively by detecting the sound generated
by the submarine, or actively by transmitting a
sound pulse and detecting its echo. Surface ships
ordinarily utilize active sonar, but submarines can
employ either mode effectively. Sonar performance
depends on its ability to discriminate the sub-
marine noise or returning echo from the sonar's
electrical noise, the platform's noise, and the
ambient noise of the sea. In the active mode, a
sonar's capabilities are also degraded by sound
energy reflecting from the ocean surface and the
bottom, and by the scattering and absorption of
sound energy in the ocean.
The adverse effects of some natural phenomena
can be reduced by using sonar which operates at
lower frequencies . A lower
frequency signal results in less absorption of
sound in the ocean. A larger acoustic array is
required, however, to obtain directional accuracy
at low frequencies.
Magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) devices,
the second most widely used ASW sensors, measure
the disturbance in the earth's magnetic field
generated by a submarine. MAD sensors are usually
installed only aboard aircraft because surface
ships and submarines create disturbances in the
earth's magnetic field which would interfere with
MAD system operation.
Radar, optical, infrared, and radio direction
finding equipment are used by ships and air-
craft to detect submarines at or near the surface.
These systems are of limited utility in locali-
zation because of the capability of the submarine
to deny their use. For example, current radar and op-
tical systems are ineffective against submarines
operating at great depths. (See Annex A for addi-
tional details.)
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ation Type IOC
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Soviet Surface Ship Sonars
Frequency
Deployment
First hull about 24-30 kHz
mounted 1950
Second hull early 15-23 kHz
mounted to mid
1960s
Third hull late 8 kHz
mounted 1960s
variable late
depth 1960s
Fourth hull
late
mounted 1960s
hull late
mounted 1960s
About 40
percent of
major surface
forces
About 50
percent of
major surface
forces.
Kresta II,
Kanin, Grisha,
possibly Krivak*
8.5 kHz Krivak, Moskva,
some Petyas
3 kHz
Moskva
4.5 kHz Moskva
* Krivak may have a new 4-kHz hull-mounted sonar.
Remarks
High-frequency region
limits detection range be-
cause of propagation losses.
Single operating frequency
vulnerable to counter-
measures.
Small power input requires
directional transducer,
which limits search rate,
Separate sonars for search
and attack.
Apparent simple signal
structure limits perform-
ance, particularly in
shallow water.
Helps overcome gaps in
coverage resulting from
the thermal layer.
May operate at large
depression angles for
bottom bounce and conver-
gence zone detection. Has
automatic system for vec-
toring helicopters.
Probably high source level.
May have additional mode,
probably has track mode.
High source level.
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Surface Ship Sonars
Soviet surface ship sonar development has gone
through four recognizable stages since World War II.
Many of the sonars presently deployed on Soviet
major surface ships are limited-capability systems
of the first and second generations. (Character-
istics and capabilities of each generation are
summarized in the table at left.)
First-generation sonars, the Tamir and Pegas,
were installed on the majority of Soviet surface
ships constructed during the Fifties and are still
on about 40 percent of the operational Soviet major
surface ships.
The high frequencies (24 to 30 kHz) and the
low power input limit the active detection range
of those early sonars to about 4,000 yards. They
have little detection capability even under favor-
able conditions. The availability of only pre-
selected discrete operating frequencies renders
these models susceptible to countermeasures.
The Soviets introduced second-generation sonars
in the early and mid-Sixties which are still in
operation on about half of the major surface ships.
Separate sonars for search and attack were installed
on the ships, enabling the Soviets to make better
use of the other technical improvements. The capa-
bility of the sonar was increased through the use of
lower frequencies (15 to 23 kHz) and a higher power
source--extending the range to about 5,000 yards
under ideal conditions. An improved automated fire
control system enabled the Soviets to make better
use of sonar information in directing ASW attacks.
Two third-generation sonars became operational
in the late Sixties. They are the 8-kHz hull-mounted
sonar on the Kanin and Kresta II and possibly Krivak
destroyers, and the 8.5-kHz variable-depth sonar (VDS)
installed on some Petya escort ships, the Moskva
helicopter carrier, and the Krivak destroyer.* The
Characteristics of ships, submarines, and aircraft
discussed in this report are summarized in Annex B.
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7.73.1"?SiSG-REZ
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Gener-
ation IOC
First about
1950
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Soviet Submarine Sonars
Frequency
24-30 kHz active
12.5-13.5 kHz
passive
250 Hz-2 kHz
passive
Second about 15 kHz active
1956
about 500 Hz-60 kHz
1956 passive
Third about 3 kHz active
1967
about unknown
1967 (conformal
passive array)
Deployment
(submarine classes)
W, 0, Z
J;
H, E, N, F
C, V, Yr P
Cr V, Y, P
Remarks
Uses continuous wave impulses
and operates at low power
levels.
Operates with both scanning
and search modes.
Some capability to determine
depth of the target.
Uses continuous wave pulses.
Detection ranges less than
half that of US sonars.
Does not have advanced signal
format.
May be able to operate on two
different frequencies.
May have directional and omni-
directional transmission modes.
Array of hydrophones conforms
to hull of submarine which
improves directivity and
sensitivity.
Operational capabilities of
sonars on these classes only
about half that of US subma-
rine sonars.
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VDS enabled the Soviets to fill gaps in sonar cover-
age resulting from layers of water at varying tempera-
tures. Fewer than 20 ships are known to have been
equipped with any of these sonars to date. Maximum
range from these systems is about 10,000 yards under
ideal conditions.
The fourth, and latest, generation of Soviet
sonars is installed on the Moskva elico ter carrier
and possibly the Krivak destroyer0
achieve substantial improvements in
detection ranges. Direct-path ranges of about 15,000
yards and convergence-zone ranges of up to 80,000 yards
are possible with these sonars under ideal conditions.
Submarine Sonars
Soviet submarine sonars have undergone three
identifiable stages of development. Despite steady
improvement, however, Soviet capabilities remain
inferior to those of the US. (See table of charac-
teristics at left.)
The first postwar Soviet sonars, installed in some
W, 0, and Z class submarines, were relatively ineffec-
tive as their power levels were low and their fre-
quencies high . Although some of these
submarines are still operational, with the exception
of the Z class they seldom deploy to the open ocean.
Soviet submarines of the J, H, E, N, and F
classes were outfitted with the second generation
of sonars, featuring lower frequencies and greater
power. Available evidence suggests that second
generation sonars achieve passive detection ranges
less than half those of modern US units.
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*
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Soviet submarines which have become operational
since 1966--the C, V, Y, and possibly the P--are
equipped with powerful active sonars of the third
generation.
Although a number of improvements have been in-
corporated into this generation of sonars, experience
of US forces indicates that Soviet passive detection
ranges are now perhaps half those of modern US nu-
clear submarines. Some of this difference probably
results from the noise generated by Soviet submarines.
Airborne ASW Sensors
Airborne ASW sensors are capable of localizing
submarine contacts when provided with initial posi-
tion information. They are also employed, like
submarine and surface ship sensors, for small area
searches and barrier operations.
Soviet ASW aircraft are equipped with surface
search radars, expendable sonobuoys, magnetic
anomaly detection (MAD) gear and, in the case of
the Hormone helicopters, dipping sonars for sub-
marine search. In addition, an infrared search
device may be nearing operational use.
Sonobuoys
The Soviets have been producing passive sono
buoys since at least 1956. Improved electronics
and acoustic system reliability, observed in cap-
tured models, have not substantially increased
sonobuoy detection capabilities.
26 -
1-737.""SECALEI.
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Soviet Air-Dropped Sonobuoys
Designation IOC
RGAB-56* 1956
RGAB-56*
(Transis-
torized)
1961
RGAB-64* 1964
RGMB
1971
A US designation.
pt,t There is
Number
of radio
channels Remarks
18 No longer used
18 3,000-yard de-
tection range
against a
noisy target
18 Smaller and
lighter than
RGAB-56 but
with about the
same capability
at Much improved
least electronics
24 but acoustic
subsystem only
slightly im-
proved
evidence of other versions of this
sonobuoy, inc using a possible directional buoy.
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-Thlt3---SEGRELL
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0 1' r *),
Radars
Soviet airborne surface-search radars are capable
of detecting surfaced submarines at ranges of up to
about 100 nm and exposed masts and periscopes of
submerged submarines up to about 25 nm. None of
the Soviet radars is capable of reliably detecting
wake effects from submerged submarines. Aircraft
carrying the latest Soviet airborne radar, the
Weteye, apparently make some limited area searches.
The Weteye radar
BM-1 sonobuoy's position_
Code name Aircraft
also selectively determines
the new
Maximum range (nm)
for surfaced sub-
marine/exposed masts*
Mushroom
Hound
50/10
Short Horn
Hormone
70/15
Weteye
May
100+ /25
ASW Bear
of 250
square
meters for a
Based on a
radar cross section
surfaced submarine and 10 square
meters for exposed masts
under ideal conditions.
Dipping Sonar
A dipping sonar carried by the KA-25 Hormone
helicopter operates in active or passive modes. In
the active mode it can make detections at ranges of
6,000 yards or more and in the passive mode, up to
2,500 yards. Range and bearing accuracies of the
dipping sonar
-within luu yards ot range and one degree of
bearing?are superior to many other Soviet sonars,
which are accurate to within 200 yards and 21/2 degrees.
During the early deployments of the Moskva
class helicopter carriers, operations suggested
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-7(717--S-ECI.R.RT
that the Soviets were attempting to conduct bistatic
sonar sweeps using the Moskva hull-mounted sonar as
the transmitter and the Hormone dipping sonar as
receiver. The Hormone dipping sonar probably was
designed to operate in this fashion. Bistatic
operations have not been observed during the past
two years. Difficulties encountered with the
Moskva sonar or with data transmission probably
are responsible for the stand-down, rather than
shortcomings of the dipping sonar.
If the Soviets were to develop an effective
bistatic sonar operation, the Hormone dipping sonar
could operate in the first convergence zone, about
30 miles from the ship. At present, Hormone heli-
copters based on the Moskva class helicopter car-
rier conduct sonar operations both independently and
in coordinated groups of four or more.
Magnetic Anomaly Detection
Soviet ASW aircraft, except TU-142s, use mag-
netic anomaly detection equipment for target lo-
calization and for limited area search. Since
introducing this equipment in about 1960, the
Soviets have deployed severalIMAD systems.
The latest Soviet ASW aircraft, the Hormone
helicopters and the IL-38 May patrol aircraft,
are probably equipped with a new MAD system. The
May aircraft operate their system at about twice
the altitude of earlier patrol aircraft, and tenu-
ous evidence from helicopter operations indicates
that the new MAD system has a detection radius about
half again that of the earlier systems. The improved
radius is estimated to be between 1,500 and 1,800
feet--large enough to justify small area searches
by MAD-equipped aircraft.
Similar area searches at these higher operating
altitudes have also been noted during recent Mail
aircraft MAD operations, suggesting that some of
these older aircraft may have been refitted with
the new equipment.
401-
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-7017--sEczAzz
Other Airborne Sensors
There is some circumstantial evidence that
some Soviet aircraft may be equipped with an ex-
perimental detection device, possibly an infrared
wake sensor. These aircraft have conducted searches
at altitudes beyond the ranges of the most recent
MAD systems.
At the present time, however, Soviet
technoIbg-y-as probably not advanced sufficiently
to support more than the development of a basic
infrared localization device. (See discussion at
Annex A.)
Capabilities for Destruction
ASW weapons in use in the Soviet Navy consist
of acoustic homing torpedoes, standard depth charges,
and small rocket-propelled charges (the MBU) fired
in salvos from surface ships.
their capabilities against evasive Western tactics
and countermeasures are not known. In addition to
these ASW weapons, the Soviets have mines which are
believed to have ASW applications. (Characteristics
of Soviet naval weapons with ASW potential are tab-
ulated on the next three pages.)
The Soviets are continuing to develop improved
ASW weapons. A missile was observed in 1969 on the
Moskva's forward dual-arm launcher during a weapons
readiness test. This missile has been estimated to
have an antisubmarine role, and has been designated
the SUW-N-1.
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Soviet ASW Torpedoes*
Diameter Length Range Speed Max depth Homing Warhead
Designator (inches) (feet) (yards) (knots) (feet) system weight (lbs)
E-40-65A "0 /r
15 8,000 27 1,000 acoustic 220
passive/
active,
83 kHz
E-40-68A (air-dropped version of E-40-65A, with similar operational parameters)
E -45 -70A
18 13 10,000 30 1,500 acoustic 150
passive/
active
ET-80-A (60)** 21
26 8,000 23 660 acoustic 200
passive/
active,
25 kHz
* Soviet writings suggest that some torpedoes may have nuclear warheads. It is
not known whether they are ASW torpedoes, or for what delivery platform they are
designed.
** Improved versions of this weapon are estimated to exist, with silver-zinc
batteries to extend range and with an improved acoustic homing capability.
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Soviet Rocket-Propelled Charges
Max range
Weapons per
Warhead
Designator
(yards)
launcher
weight (lbs)
Reload
MBU-2500
3,000
16
80
manual
MBU-2500A
6,500
12
60
automatic
MBU-4500
5,000
6
120
manual
MBU-4500A
5,000
6
120
automatic
Designator
Soviet Depth Charges
Length Diameter Explosive
(inches) (inches) charge (lbs)
Depth settings
(feet)
4VM
25
8
35
40,80
M-1
17
10
55
40,70,
120,160
4VB
29
18
250
50-700
B-1
29
17
300
65-700
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Type
Bottom-laid
MKD
AMD 500
AMD 1000
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Soviet Naval Mines With ASW Potential
Maximum Explosive Exploder
depth (ft) charge (lbs) type
180
80
180
1,725
660
1,545
magnetic
magnetic
magnetic
Deploying
platforms
surface ships and
submarines
surface ships and
aircraft
surface ships,
submarines, and
aircraft
AMD-II (similar to AMD 1000 but with additional acoustic sensor)
Moored
MAG
260
500
PLT
450
500
PLT
3
420
220
contact
contact
contact
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surface ships
submarines
submarines
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Soviet Major Surface Ship Procurement and Conversions, 1962-1971
1962 I 1963 I 1964 I 1965 I 1966 I 1967 I 1968 I 1969 I 1970
Helicopter Carrier
Moskva
1
1
I 1971 I
Cruise Missile Destroyer
1
Krivak
Kresta II
Kresta I
1
2
1 1
1
2
1 1
Kynda
3
Krupnyy
Destroyer
Kanin*
1
Kashin
1
1
3
3
4
1
SAM Kotlin*
1
1
Escort
Petya
10
9
2
1
2
5
8
4
5
6
5
Patrol
Mirka
2
2 2
4
3 3
2 2
Grisha I
I I I I
1962 1963 1964 I 1965 I 1966 1967 1968 1969
'Conversions
? 34 ?
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5
1970 1971
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Production of ASW-Capable
Ships and Aircraft
Analysis of Soviet naval aircraft, surface ships,
and submarines produced since the late Fifties indi-
cates that no specialized large-scale ASW construc-
tion program was undertaken during that period. There
were, however, surges in the construction of sub-
marines armed with ballistic missiles and cruise
missiles which reflected Soviet emphasis on strategic
strike and anticarrier capabilities.
Major Surface Ships
Since 1958 the Soviets have produced about 100
multiple-purpose major surface ships. These ships
were designed primarily to counter Western naval
surface forces and also were armed with anti-air and
anti-submarine defensive systems. The Soviets have
been building three basic types of oceangoing surface
warships cruise missile armed destroyers, destroyers,
and small coastal escorts. (See charts at left and next
two pages.) In the mid-Sixties they built two special
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Trends in Soviet Surf ce Ship Elavelapment, 1958-1971
Gruise EssiCe
Destroyers
Destroyers
1958
Surface-to-air
missile system (SA-1\1-_ _
1959
KiEdEn KrEliplyy
3,500 Tons 4,500 Tons
New Cruise
MissRe Destroyer
Fs sorts
New Patrol] Draft
1958 1959
1960
Mad KatEEn
3,500 Tons
1961
1962
Patya E
1,100 Tons
5,600 Tons
1963
S
Ertashiro AEW .KatEErE
3,500 Tons 4,450 Tons
Ridiska
1,150 Tons
1960 1961 1962 1963
? 36 ?
71737-8-E-GR.E.1_
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7-or-sE?Rai.
The Soviets undertook three major surface ship production and conversion programs
from 1958 to 1971?cruise missile destroyers, destroyers, and escorts. Succeeding classes
of ships within each program show improvement in weapon and sensor systems, but the
multiple-mission capabilities of the cruise missile destroyers and destroyers have been
maintained in preference to specializing these ships for a specific ASW mission.
Production patterns appear to have shifted in the late Sixties with the curtailment of the
destroyer and escort programs and the introduction of a smaller cruise missile destroyer,
the Krivak, and a large patrol craft, the Grisha.
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Kresta I Kresta II
6,700 Tons 6,800 Tons
?.66.11salkow
Kanin
4,800 Tons
Petya H
1,200 Tons
A
GriSha
900 Tons
4
Krivak
3,800 Tons
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
? 37 ?
r-1-.01P--"SEGIZEI
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helicopter carriers of the Moskva class intended for
ASW but have since built no more of that type.
The Soviets continue to build multiple-purpose
ships with improved ASW capabilities at a rate of
about ten units per year. The current program con-
sists of the Kresta II class cruise missile armed
destroyer of about 62800 tons displacement, a larger
follow-on cruise missile destroyer, the Kara class of
about 9,000 tons, and the Krivak class 3,800-ton
cruise missile armed destroyer. In addition, they
are producing the Grisha class 900-ton coastal sub
chaser at the rate of about four per year.
Submarines
? The Soviets have been producing three types of
nuclear submarines since the late Fifties torpedo
attack, cruise missile attack, and ballistic missile
submarines. These types were built in two consecu-
tive generations, the first ending about 1963 and
the second still in progress.
During the first generation, the cruise missile
attack submarine program was predominant in terms
of units produced. (See chart at right.) Cruise
missile submarines are designed primarily for at-
tacking surface ships. During the production of the
second generation, the Soviets have concentrated
more on ballistic missile submarine construction.
According to the Soviets, nuclear-powered torpedo at-
tack submarines, such as the V class, are the appropri-
ate submarines for ASW. Since 1963, these have been
produced at about a constant rate of two per year.
The Soviets clearly have not given a high priority
to building a submarine force with a primary ASW
mission.
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-Thr"--S-ECZLEI
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17 71 37-8-EGIZE.Z
Soviet Submarine Construction, 1962-1971
I 1962 I 1963
Ballistic Missile
Diesel Nuclear
1964 I 1965 I 1966
1967 I 1968 I 1969 I 1970 I 1971 I
5
6
8-9
6-7
1
Y Class
Cruise Missile Attack
1
P Class
2 2 2 2
C Class
6 6
5
4
2
E Class
3 3
2 2 2 2 2
1 Class
Torpedo Attack
A Class
(The A class did not become operational until 1972)
2 2 2 2 2
V Class
2 2 2
1
N Class
2
1
B Class
R Class
F Class I
9
4
5 5
6
3
2
1
II
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
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--17014*--SELGaiEl_
ASW Aircraft
The Soviets began series production of their
first all-weather coastal ASW patrol aircraft, the
BE-12 Mail, in 1965. At about the same time they
temporarily converted about 15 TU-16 Badger medium
bombers for ASW operations as an interim measure.
Prior to the deployment of these two aircraft, the
only Soviet ASW patrol aircraft were flying boats,
which were unable to operate during the several
months of winter ice conditions.
In late 1967, the Soviets began series produc-
tion of their first medium-range ASW patrol aircraft,
the IL-38 May. (See chart at right.) In late 1969
or 1970 the Soviets also began making an ASW version
of the TU-95 Bear heavy bomber, the TU-142. The
IL-38 continues in production, but at a rate of
only about ten aircraft per year. The status of the
TU-142 program is uncertain--by mid-1972 fewer than
15 of these aircraft had been identified. Production
may be continuing at the low rate of about five air-
craft per year
About 1967 the Soviets began producing the KA-25
Hormone ASW helicopter for use aboard the Moskva class
ASW cruisers and a few other ships. The Soviets had
employed land-based MI-4 Hound helicopters for coastal
ASW missions since the mid-Fifties, but did not make
any significant use of shipborne helicopters until
the appearance of the Hormone. The ASW Hormone is
produced at the modest rate of about 25 aircraft
per year.
In sum, the Soviets in the late Sixties began
series production of a new generation of ASW air-
craft. Two types--the IL-38 and the TU-142--were
marked departures from past patterns, but most
simply replaced older aircraft for coastal ASW.
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--7-17317"-tEGR-E1
Soviet ASW Aircraft Deployment, 1962-1971
I 1962 I 1963 I 1964 I 1965 I 1966 I 1967 I 1968 I 1969 I 1970 I 1971 I
10
Long-Range Patrol
TU-142
ASW Bear
10 10 10 10
Medium-Range Patrol
IL-38
May
Coastal Patrol
15 15 15 15
10 10
BE-12
Mail
Helicopters
5
15
25 25 25 25
KA-25
Hormone
10
5 5 5
Mi-4
Hound1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
These figures indicate the approximate number of aircraft added to operational
units each year. The total number of aircraft produced exceeds the number
deployed.
? 41 ?
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?
Organization and Control of
Soviet ASW-Equipped Forces
Fleet Organization
There is no known formal organization for con-
trol of ASW forces in the Soviet Navy. Seagoing
naval forces of all types are subordinate to one
of the four fleets. (See map at right.) Within
the fleets, ASW-equipped forces are subordinate to
the fleets ? major commands, as follows:
Fleet command
Major surface forces
Offshore defense forces
Submarine forces
Fleet air forces
- 42 -
ASW-equipped units
helicopter carriers
large destroyers
destroyers
escorts
escorts
patrol ships
all submarines
all ASW aircraft
-707-5E-cazz
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Distribution of Major Soviet ASW-Equipped Forces*
BALTIC FLEET
SURFACE SHIPS AIRCRAFT
Kashin 3 Hormone 5
Kotlin 4
Kresta II 2
Krivak 2
Krupnyy 1**
Mirka 14
Petya 4
?
Kaliningrad
Sevastopol'
Hound 25
Mail 10
SUBMARINES
F4
R2
Severomorsko
BLACK SEA FLEET
NORTHERN FLEET
SURFACE SHIPS SUBMARINES
SURFACE SHIPS
AIRCRAFT
Kara
1
Hormone
55
Kashin
10
Hound
25
KiWin
3***
Mail
30
Kotlin
7
May
5
Krivak
1
SUBMARINES
Kynda
2
B 1
Mirka
6
R 3
Moskva
2
Petya
9
Kanin
4
A
1
Kashin
2
B
1
Kotlin
2
C
9
Kresta I
3
E
14
Kresta ll
2
F
31
Petya
20
1
12
AIRCRAFT
N
9
Bear
10
P
1
Hormone
35
R
9
Hound
25
V
10
Mail
20
May
20
Fleet Headquarters
Vladivostok
PACIFIC FLEET
SURFACE SHIPS AIRCRAFT
Kashin 3 Hormone 30
Kildin 1** Hound 35
Kotlin 10 Mail 30
Kresta I 1 May 20
Krupnyy 3*** SUBMARINES
Kynda 2 B 2
Petya 12 E 19**
F 16
J 4
N 5
*Excluding units assigned to the Caspian Sea Flotilla
One unit undergoing conversion
Two units undergoing conversion
Data as of 1 July 1972
? 43 ?
TO13--SECRET
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TThIrt-EG-14ET
Within these commands, the forces are further grouped
into brigades and divisions by types. These organi-
zations are charged with training and administration.
Task organizations are established temporarily
for major fleet undertakings such as exercises,
transits, and other operations involving numbers of
ships and aircraft. These organizations may include
ASW elements when appropriate.
Command and Control Im lications for ASW
The Main Naval Staff in Moscow is ultimately re-
sponsible for all naval operations, including ASW.
The four fleet commanders are directly responsible
for ASW, anticarrier warfare, and all other opera-
tions in their areas of responsibility except SSBN
operations. The fleets do not have deputy commanders
specifically for operational control of ASW forces
as do the US Atlantic and Pacific fleets. These
command and control arrangements suggest that the
Soviet Navy does not view the ASW mission as opera-
tionally distinct from other naval missions.
The Soviet naval command system is characterized
by highly centralized operational control of ships
and submarines at sea vested in the Main Naval Staff
in Moscow. The chief impetus for centralization has
apparently come from the need for positive control
of nuclear weapons and naval forces in close prox-
imity to Western naval forces on the high seas. The
Main Naval Staff has the capability for direct con-
trol of Soviet ships and submarines in the Mediter-
ranean and Norwegian Seas, and in the North Atlantic
and Indian Oceans,
the main Naval Staff
relies on Pacific Fleet headquarters in Vladivostok
for operational control of naval forces in the Pacific.
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The general command and control system of the
Soviet Navy probably is adequate to direct Soviet
surface and air forces in large-scale coordinated
ASW operations. Limited communications capabilities,
however, may be a constraint on Soviet submarines
operating submerged against other submarines.
Submarine Communications
The Soviets have developed both short- and long-
range communications systems for submarines, which
are generall ade uate for other than anti-SSBN
o erations.
Theoretically, a surface ship or another sub-
marine could accompany a trailing submarine to act
as a communications relay point and to assist in
maintaining contact with a hostile submarine. Among
other problems in this procedure, the submarine and
surface ship would have to communicate through the
thermal layer often present in the water, which
tends to deflect the acoustic energy of communica-
tions systems,\
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For one-way communications from a submerged
submarine to an aircraft, the Soviets have a com-
munications buoy, designated the RBM-200
Operations of the Moskva and Leningrad ASW Helicopter Carriers
1967 1968
Moskva
Shakedown operations First
deployment
Located in the
Black Sea area
Operations in the
Mediterranean and
North Atlantic
1969 1970
Second Third Fourth
deploy- deploy- deployment
meet meet including
"Exercise
Ocean"
Leningrad
1971 1972
Probably into Probably
shipyard at departed
Sevastopol shipyard
Shakedown First Second third Fourth
operations deployment deploy- deploy- deployment;
"Exercise went went in Atlantic
Ocean" for rescue of
disabled H-I1
submarine
The Moskva spent 35% of its days in the Mediterranean
and the North Atlantic at anchor, and the Leningrad 60%.
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Soviet ASW Operations and
Mission Capabilities
The following sections review ASW-related oper-
ations conducted by Soviet naval forces and assess
the capabilities demonstrated for destroying Western
ballistic missile nuclear submarines, protecting
Soviet SSBNs from Western submarines, defending
deployed surface forces, and guarding the ocean
approaches and coastal areas of the USSR.
Strategic Offensive ASW
Published Soviet statements suggest that stra-
tegic offensive ASW--operations directed against
ballistic missile submarines--is a major concern
of the Soviet Navy. These writings over the last
ten years have emphasized strategic ASW priorities
through discussion of the Polaris problem. They
have placed little stress on the more traditional ASW
tasks of fleet and coastal defense. Yet operationally
the emphasis is reversed--almost all observed ASW ac-
tivity supports fleet defense and coastal ASW missions.
Although major fleet exercises have had a larger ASW
component in recent years, only a few appear to be
related to possible anti-SSBN operations.
Classified Soviet writings from 1959 through 1962
suggested an intent to develop defenses against the
US Polaris force projected for the Sixties. The
authors proposed using ABMs, surface ships, special
ASW submarines, and ASW aircraft. The Soviets pro-
duced some of each type of system, but not in numbers
sufficient to challenge the Polaris force.
Possible Strategic Offensive Operations
The two Moskva class ASW helicopter carriers
built in the Sixties probably represent early hopes
for an offensive strategic ASW ship. There is no
evidence to indicate, however, that either of the
two Moskva class ships has located or tracked pa-
trolling ballistic missile submarines. The Moskva
class ships have normally operated in ASW defense
of the Mediterranean squadron. (See chart at left.)
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The Moskva's performance as a strategic ASW
system has probably been disappointing to the
Soviets and may account for their decision to build
only two ships of the type. As shown in the chart
at left the Moskva class ships have operated at a
relaxed pace. Activity since 1970 suggests that
their mission has been expanded to include other
operations, such as air defense and command ship
roles, in addition to ASW tasks.
Both the IL-38 and the new TU-142 have con-
ducted independent ASW operations in areas distant
from the USSR. IL-38s have twice been observed
operating in the Norwegian Sea in a possible anti-
SSBN role during exercises, and they have operated
in the sea approaches to the Pacific and Northern
fleet areas and in the Mediterranean. Most activity
of the IL-38s and TU-142s, however, has occurred with-
in the fleet operating areas remote from potential
Polaris patrol areas.
The majority of the IL-38 exercises observed in the
first half of 1971
involved only aircraft,
indicating that these aircraft may work independently
of other forces much of the time. From analysis of
exercises, it appears that Northern and Pacific
fleet ASW exercises are planned to respond to de-
tections from ASW barrier forces in the fleet ap-
proach areas and the coastal areas.
The role of the four IL-38s stationed until re-
cently in Egypt was less clear. Their mission in
case of war was probably ASW support of the Medi-
terranean squadron. Routine independent IL-38 op-
erations in the Mediterranean may have been tactical
exercises with Soviet submarines or searches for
NATO submarines in the eastern basin. The observed
ASW operations of those aircraft reflected some
limited capability to react to detections made by
other means, such as radio direction finding.
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Surveillance Capabilities
The Soviets have conducted two forms of sur-
veillance against ballistic missile submarines.
Soviet intelligence collection ships (AGIs) often
monitor Polaris bases. In addition, Soviet attack
submarine patrols in the Philippine and Norwegian
seas and near the British Isles may be partly re-
sponsible for collecting information concerning
Western ballistic missile submarines.
Intelligence collection ships observe Polaris
deployment rates and collect tactical intelligence
on ballistic missile submarines. They probably
have determined the general schedule of Polaris
operations, and communicate any changes to Moscow
which might indicate differences in US strategic
readiness.
Soviet submarines, among other tasks, reconnoiter
the Polaris training areas and suspected patrol zones,
possibly in anticipation of chance encounters. Given
the capabilities of Soviet and US submarines, the
best chance the Soviets have of accomplishing sur-
veillance is in lying quietly in wait for a fast
transiting Polaris submarine.\
As noted in an earlier section (page 20), no indi-
cations of an effective ocean surveillance system
exist. Without an open-ocean detection system,
trailing remains the only possible anti-Polaris
tactic available to the Soviets.
Trailing Capabilities
An alternative to an ocean surveillance network
might be the use of attack submarines which gain
contact on enemy submarines at a narrow strait or
base area and then trail them. The Soviet naval
leadership has been aware for several years from
open sources that the US has considered this tactic
as an ASW measure.
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Current Soviet submarines, however, do not have
a capability for continuous trailing of US SSBNs.
Although the speed and active sonar capabilities of
the V class probably are adequate for overt trailing
of a nonevading submarine, the requirements inherent
in trailing escorted SSBNs or SSBNs employing tech-
nical or tactical countermeasures exceed the poten-
tial of the V class submarine. Even if the Soviets
believed the V class submarine were adequate for
trailing, they probably would calculate that a mini-
mum of 100 submarines would be necessary to maintain
a force sufficient for initial detection and trailing
of the Polaris force. As of early 1972 the Soviets
had only about 10 V class submarines. They are
building new ones at a rate of only two per year.
(See pages 38-39.)
Soviet plans to trail more than one Polaris
submarine actively would have to account for the
defensive reaction by the United States or the
United Kingdom. Not only would assisting forces
be sent to the aid of the trailed submarine, but
those deploying subsequently would be given ex-
tensive delousing to remove potential trailing sub-
marines. The Soviets might expect to trail one
submarine for a short time to intimidate or embar-
rass the West, but active trailing against a number
of Polaris submarines would probably be viewed as
a risky and unworkable scheme.
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Strategic Defensive ASW
Coordinated Submarine Transits
The Soviets may be developing methods for pro-
tecting their Y class ballistic missile submarines
from being trailed by Western nuclear submarines.
Since December of 1970, the Soviets have con-
ducted coordinated submarine transits
of the Norwegian Sea. involved Y class
ballistic missile submarines proceeding to missile
stations accompanied by C or V class submarines.
Historically, the Soviet Navy has been more in-
clined to operate submarines in consort with other
forces, including other submarines, than Western
navies. The merits of coordinated submarine opera-
tions were noted by Admiral Pantaleyev in 1961 in a
classified Soviet publication. Two submarines
operating together made the first Soviet submarine
fleet transfer around Cape Horn. Groups of about
six submarines transit in company from the Barents
to the Mediterranean and back about every six months.
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Typical Coordinated Transit:
Y and C Class Outbound
[Each position noted hy date-time group)
Iceland
Faeroe Is.
Y Class
1516
152003
C-Class
151150
51830
152200
160230 160100
160400
1608307 160700
161410 161000
161600 161300
161520
161935
L62100
170046
170304
170404
170645
170825
70700
171005
171000
171115
71346
161900
162200
170100
170400
171300 71458
171600
171900
1
180155 71900
172125
180421
180421
180625 80625
100800
180901
181647,--
Shetland Is.
United
Kingdom
Finland
Coordinated Transits of the Norwegian Sea Involving Y Class Submarines
'Speculative. Data insufficient to establish nature of operation.
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Judging from Soviet sensitivities, probable
requirements, and force capabilities, the transit
activities are probably defensive in nature. The
Soviets may have reacted to Western ASW threats by
escorting some of their deploying SSBNs, believing
that a second submarine could deter or counter-
detect a trailer.
Although the coordinated transits could be
trailing practice for offensive ASW, it seems
likely that they are part of a program for the
defense of Y class SSBNs. Even if the primary
purpose of the coordinated transit is defensive,
however, the tactical experience gained is di-
rectly applicable to trailing.
Strategic Defensive Capabilities
Escorting Y class ballistic missile submarines
could be an effective measure for discouraging or
detecting potential covert trailers. If the es-
cort is far enough behind the Y class, the trailer
might interpose itself between the two, possibly
subjecting itself to counterdetection by the es-
cort. Trailing the escort is an alternative ap-
proach, but in that case contact with the Y class
probably would be broken, sacrificing the mission
objective.
Once the presence of a trailing submarine is
disclosed, the escort could assist the Y class
in attempting to evade by the use of counter-
measures and evasion tactics, or both might simply
elect to outrun the trailer, using their speed
advantage.
Defense of the Fleet
The new Soviet naval strategy of the Sixties
increased operations in distant ocean areas and
brought with it a requirement for fleet defense
against submarine attack. Shore-based ASW sys-
tems were not available in the new operating areas.
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T
The forces had to be able to fend for themselves in
distant operations. Naval construction programs were
influenced--self-defense against submarine attack
was emphasized sometimes even in preference to of-
fensive striking power. Since 1960 no new class of
Soviet major surface ships has been built without
ASW systems.
Command and Control
The tactical commander of a Soviet task group
in distant waters is normally responsible for ASW
protection of the group. When ASW aircraft oper-
ate with surface forces, the ASW surface commander
designates an ASW ship to coordinate the aircraft
tactics with the surface forces.
Operations and Exercises
In Soviet naval operations, major combatants
generally do not use ASW screens defensively.
(Screen-type formations are used to broaden the
width of offensive ASW sweeps.) These ships oper-
ate most of the time either in small groups of 2
to 5 ships or independently, and must rely on their
own defense capabilities. There appears to be no
important place in Soviet operational doctrine for
escorting combatants or their support ships on the
high seas, although the Soviets practice the es-
corting of merchant and amphibious group convoys.
In Mediterranean operations, where there are
normally about 15 to 20 surface combatants, the
Soviets generally do not employ ASW screening
forces even during exercises. They have, however,
practiced forming surface ship and submarine bar-
riers across the Sicilian Straits and to the south
of Crete to seal off the central and eastern Med-
iterranean from submarine attack. The four IL-38
aircraft formerly stationed in Egypt practiced fleet
defensive roles against their own submarines both
in airborne ASW barrier operations and in general
reconnaissance missions.
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-7iTur-sEclux.
Fleet Defense Capabilities
Although fleet defense is simpler in concept
than strategic ASW, the Soviets still lack a gen-
erally effective defense for their ships against
Western nuclear submarines. Modern submarine
weapons have effective ranges well beyond the
potential direct path ranges of almost all Soviet
sonars. Moreover, Western submarines have operated
within sonar range of Soviet forces in the Mediter-
ranean usually without reaction. This may be ex-
plained by such factors as environmental effects,
inferior signal processing equipment in the sonar
system, or sleepy sonar operators.
Despite a continuing, concentrated effort to
build ships which can defend themselves from enemy
submarines, the Soviets have little chance for an
effective fleet defense. Improving tactics, weapons,
and acoustic sensors will probably at best keep pace
with submarine weapons development. The Soviet
fleet is far from secure from submarine attack.
Defense of Sea Approaches
The Soviets probably are becoming more concerned
about the capabilities of Western attack submarines in
the sea approaches to the USSR. Soviet naval opera-
tions have recently begun to reflect increased ASW
interest in such areas, probably related to a con-
cept for forward ASW defense of the USSR's coastal
shipping lanes and naval concentration areas. The
Soviets may also have a heightened desire to protect
surface ships and submarines deploying to distant
areas through these waters.
Command and Control
The control of forces engaged in ASW in the sea
approaches is the responsibility of the fleet com-
mander. Forces used in ASW operations in the
Norwegian Sea and the Pacific approaches include
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the ASW-equipped ships of the major surface forces,
submarine forces, and long-range ASW aircraft. The
Northern Fleet headquarters at Severomorsk and, in
the east, Vladivostok provide the control points
for their operations. The Main Naval Staff in Mos-
cow is capable of controlling ASW operations of
surface ships in the Norwegian Sea.\
The tactical organization for forces in the
approaches is not well defined. When combined
operations occur, the officer in tactical command
of the surface forces exercises immediate tactical
authority over ASW surface ships and an undefined
measure of control over cooperating submarines and
aircraft.
Control of independent ASW operations by sub-
marines in the Norwegian Sea is probably shared by
the Main Naval Staff in Moscow and Northern Fleet
headquarters. Similar arrangements probably exist
between Moscow and Pacific Fleet headquarters for
control of submarines in the Pacific. Independent
ASW aircraft operations are controlled by the re-
spective fleet aviation headquarters.
Exercises
Almost every year the Pacific and Northern
Fleets each conduct a major exercise'
The ASW aspect of these exercises has grown to
include what probably are combined ASW barrier and
search operations off northern Norway or near the
Kurile and Japanese island chains.
Although the Soviets apparently devoted some
training time in Exercise Ocean to ASW defense
in the ocean approaches to the USSR, over three-
fourths of the defending forces were principally
involved in anticarrier and antishipping operations.
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ASW training operations in the Norwegian
Sea in defense of the ocean approaches are still
small. The trend suggests, however, that the
Soviets plan to commit ASW forces there in time
of war rather than to defend against submarines
only near the coasts of the USSR.
The situation is somewhat different for the
Pacific Fleet. There the exercise forces deploy
along the Japanese and Kurile island chains, making
use of the natural geographic features. The bar-
rier thus formed serves as a forward defense against
both submarine and surface threats to the Soviet
Far East south of the Kamchatka Peninsula.
In the last year or so, the Pacific Fleet has
begun to conduct air ASW operations in the sea ap-
proaches to the far eastern USSR. Judging from
the trend in the Northern Fleet, where the earlier
IL-38 ASW units were formed, the Pacific Fleet ASW
patrol aircraft will probably provide support to
other ASW forces operating in the sea approaches.
Approach Defense Capabilities
The Soviet capability to determine the presence
of transiting Western submarines through the sea
approach areas depends on ASW barriers. Because of
the deficiencies of Soviet sensor systems, overall
detection capabilities would not be much improved in
the Norwegian and Barents sea areas even if all of
the barrier forces were devoted to ASW rather than
to countering surface ships. In the Pacific, al-
though the force size and disposition during exer-
cises would otherwise seem adequate to detect transit-
ing submarines, sensor deficiencies render effec-
tive ASW defense there unlikely for the near future.
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--TCYP-SECIF
Without an ocean surveillance system the Soviets
probably will continue to rely on barrier forces for
detection in the sea approaches. These barriers will
require large numbers of forces--more than they have
used in the past--consisting of submarines, surface
ships, and aircraft.
Defense of Coastal Areas
The Soviet Navy has continued to maintain a con-
cern for the security of the USSR's coastlines.
This concern for an element of naval warfare which
has been downgraded by most modern navies can be
traced to several long-term influences. Until the
last decade, for example, the chief missions of the
Soviet Navy were the protection of seaward flanks
of the Soviet army and of the coastal areas of the
USSR.
Command and Control
Soviet naval base commanders are responsible for
the defense of coastal sectors adjacent to their
bases. These commanders have at their disposal com-
bat-ready detachments of the offshore defense force.
Escorts and patrol craft comprise the ASW elements
of this force. The base commander can augment his
assigned offshore defense forces with elements from
the major surface forces, the submarine forces, and
the fleet air forces. There is evidence that ASW air
regiments maintain some of their aircraft in a ready
status, and that the same may be true of submarines.
Combat information posts, located at or near the
naval bases, are used to integrate control of coastal
air and sea forces with coastal observation stations.
Coastal observation stations monitor ASW sensors such
as hydroacoustic devices, electronic intercept equip-
ment, and radar.
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The coastal observation stations, a few naval
(and occasionally KGB Border Guard) ships, and
naval aircraft carry out routine ASW surveillance
tasks in the coastal regions. These efforts prob-
ably would be ineffective against modern quiet
nuclear submarines except near choke points and
harbor entrances where intruding submarines would
be forced by geography to approach within detection
ranges. Submarines could detect shore- or ship-
originated radar emissions and active sonar trans-
missions early enough to avoid detection.
A portion of the coastal ASW forces apparently
are poised for reaction to submarine contacts.
Aircraft ordinarily arrive in the
contact area first--helicopters with dipping sonar
and fixed-wing patrol planes with MAD gear and
sonobuoys. Ships operating nearby are often di-
verted to the scene, then augmented by surface
forces from the base.
The degree to which
submarines are used in coastai-ASW, however, is
unclear.
Coastal Defense Exercises
Most Soviet naval exercise activity occurs in
the coastal areas near fleet bases.
both multiple-force
and single-unit exercises occur there. The most
active of the ASW exercise areas are near the
Northern and Pacific Fleet base areas.
The majority of these exercises are conducted
by forces of coastal defense types, suggesting a
substantial commitment to coastal ASW.\
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Coastal Defense Capabilities
Except in the waters within a few miles of naval
base entrances, Soviet ASW forces have little capa-
bility to protect their coastal areas from submarine
instrusions. The lack of reliable submarine detec-
tion systems, and the low caliber of the crews--owing
to the unchallenging character of Soviet ASW train-
ing?are largely responsible for this inefficiency.
Outlook for Soviet ASW
Major ASW concerns of the present are likely
to influence the shape of Soviet efforts in the
next several years. Requirements for coastal de-
fense and defending naval forces in distant deploy-
ments against Western submarines will probably con-
tinue to motivate Soviet production of ASW equipment
and development of ASW forces. The quest for a
counter to the Polaris threat will involve research
and development on sensors and development of trail-
ing capabilities. Without a major advance in initial
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l't6R-EZ1
detection technology, or a substantial improvement
in trailing capabilities, the anti-Polaris program
will probably not result in the development of
large forces in the next five years. The Soviets
will continue their efforts to develop capabilities
required in all ASW for localization and destruction.
They will also expend efforts on developing systems
capable of conducting limited area search in re-
stricted areas.
Improvements in platforms will include further
development of specialized ASW systems such as the
IL-38 aircraft, and the continued incorporation of
ASW capabilities in their multipurpose ships such
as the Krivak. Programs such as the A class sub-
marine probably represent efforts to improve plat-
form capabilities.
The quest for a trailing capability is likely to
lead to improvements in sensors. Current Soviet
test and evaluation programs for improved magnetic
detection equipment, sonars, and other sensors indi-
cate that the Soviets will probably make consider-
able improvements in the next few years in their
capability to carry out the localization phase of
ASW. Similarly, ongoing development programs for
ASW weapons over the next few years should improve
Soviet capabilities to carry out the destruction
phase of ASW.
The Soviets will continue to deploy their surface
forces to distant areas and this will probably lead
them to seek better tactics and defensive procedures
against submarine attack. The coastal defense pos-
ture may be moderately improved with the deployment
of shallow-water, medium-range fixed ocean detection
systems and improved surface ships and submarines.
The Soviets can also be expected to continue to em-
phasize the extension of ASW defenses beyond the
coastal areas into the Norwegian Sea approaches and
the waters along Japan and the Kuriles.
Only a breakthough in the ocean surveillance tech-
nology or in trailing capability would allow the
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Soviets to begin to come to grips with the Polaris
and Poseidon problems. Considering the magnitude
of the task and the current state of Soviet programs,
they will probably not achieve any significant open
ocean surveillance capability or fully develop trail-
ing capability within the next few years.
To achieve an effective ocean surveillance
system, the Soviets would probably have to mount a
complex, costly, large-scale development program ex-
tending over several years. Such a program would prob-
ably be detected, but it is less certain that it would
be readily identified as an anti-Polaris program.
Development of an effective trailing capability
also would be a major undertaking. It would require
development of a large force of submarines, improve-
ments in sensors and communications, and extensive
training.
Less ambitious strategic ASW objectives--the
ability to locate and destroy a few US SSBNs--may
appear to improve Soviet capabilities, but analysis
shows that the Soviets would have purchased little
security with such a program in a full-scale war
because of the destructive capability of the re-
maining forces. The Soviets probably also recognize
that the acquisition of a capability to neutralize
some Poseidon submarines might be considered by the
US as undermining its deterrent credibility and re-
sult in an upgrading of the US ballistic missile
nuclear submarine force.
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Annex A. Technical Analysis of
Potential ASW Detection Methods
This annex describes certain physical phenomena
which are associated with the operation of nuclear
submarines and which might be exploited to develop
ASW detection systems. The current Soviet potential
for developing ASW detection systems based on these
phenomena is examined in the light of the experience
of US research and development in these areas and
what is known of Soviet research and development
progress.
The results of this analysis, along with the
findings of other analyses developed in the main part
of this report, sustain the judgment made in the
report that the Soviets do not now have effective
broad area ocean surveillance systems. In this
context, only systems with a potential for searching
at least several hundred square nautical miles of
ocean per hour are defined as ocean surveillance
systems, lower search rate systems being more appli-
cable to the localization problem than to the initial
detection problem.
Any effective Soviet ocean surveillance system
would be complex and costly, and its development
would likely extend over several years. If the
Soviets were to undertake such a large program, how-
ever, considerable delay might ensue before intel-
ligence identified it correctly, although evidence
that some large program was under way would probably
be obtained soon after its development began.
Systems Based on Acoustic Phenomena
Passive Fixed Systems
The Soviets are aware that the US has had success
with fixed passive acoustic undersea surveillance
systems. They realize that this has been the most
straightforward and successful approach to the ocean
surveillance problem.
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The Soviets have done much theoretical work on
low-frequency sound propagation, and have conducted
at-sea propagation experiments in the appropriate
frequency regions. There are, however, five factors
which limit the Soviet potential for exploiting acous-
tic techniques to detect US submarines
-- One main limitation is a fundamental geo-
graphic problem. Long-range, passive acoustic de-
tection systems work only in deep water--in most areas
of the world at considerably more than 1,000 feet.
Except for certain areas in the Pacific, such regions
lie at great distances from the Soviet coastlines.
Moreover, the Soviets do not have allies which are
strategically located for the emplacement of such
systems.
-- Complementary to the geographic problem is
an apparent Soviet deficiency in cable technology.
The most recent evidence indicates that the Soviets
are several years behind the US in low-impedance
underwater cable technology.
To build
a SOSUS-like detection system they would need to
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make cable runs on the order of 1,000 nm, or to
develop a satellite readout capability.
-- A third constraint is the apparent Soviet
lack of a low-frequency signal processing capability.
Such a capability is notably lacking in current Soviet
naval equipment and would be necessary in the de-
velopment of a detection system of the SOSUS type.
-- A fourth factor that may be hindering the
Soviets in perfecting detection systems of this
type is their proclivity for using rigid hydrophone
arrays in acoustic systems. The BM-1 sonobuoy is
the only known Soviet acoustic device which uses a
flexible array of hydrophones. Even in this case,
the Soviets probably designed this multiple hydro-
phone set for reliability rather than as a first
attempt at flexible arrays. Flexible arrays are
a practical necessity for a deployable SOSUS type
of system.
-- The quietness of US nuclear submarines is per-
haps the most intractable of the problems the Soviets
are encountering in ASW. Although SOSUS can detect
Soviet submarines fairly reliably, these targets are
an order of magnitude noisier than modern US ballistic
missile submarines. SOSUS cannot reliably detect US
submarines. The Soviets would have to exceed the
capabilities of SOSUS to a marked degree to detect US
nuclear submarines on patrol in the open ocean.
The Soviets have developed short-range, passive
acoustic detection devices which they use to protect
harbors and ports. A few passive acoustic systems
such as the Ingul device have probably been emplaced
in the Pacific to monitor areas of straits and en-
trances to ports. These are apparently in relatively
shallow water and probably are of limited range--
less than 100 nm. Ingul devices are thought to be
located off Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok.
In the Northern Fleet area the Soviets have ex-
perimented with moored buoy detection devices and
may be deploying them at strategic points. The
earliest installation was probably near Russkaya
Gavan, and
it may have become operational in 1967. The most re-
cent activity is off North Cape, where the Soviets may
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have emplaced a few of these moored buoys connected
by cable to shore. If cable laying did occur, it
involves the longest cable run to date by the So-
viets--over 100 nm. These installations, if beyond
the experimental stage, are probably intended to
provide early warning of incursions of foreign sub-
marines into areas close to Soviet naval bases in
the Barents Sea area.
In addition, the Soviets have been working since
the early Sixties to develop a passive surveillance
system to monitor the Arctic Ocean region under the
ice cap. Some of this work has been in support of
under-ice operations by Soviet nuclear submarines
and has involved underwater communications research.
Equipment shipments and other evidence indicate that
work is also being done on passive acoustic, under-
ice detection systems. Relatively simple systems
could monitor significant areas in the Arctic Basin
owing to the natural ducting effect occurring at the
interface between the cold, stable water and the bot-
tom of the ice cap.
Passive Mobile Systems
An alternative approach to obtaining broad area
surveillance with a passive acoustic system involves
the use of a mobile sensor such as a towed array.
The Soviets have used towed single hydrophones in
seismic work in the Pacific, and clearly understand
the theory involved. A few W and Z class submarines
in the Pacific have been observed with winches and
other suspect devices on their stern areas, but there
is no confirming evidence that the Soviet Navy has
ever used a towed array. (A towed system, however,
could go undetected for some time.)
The Soviets could, potentially, make important
gains through the use of towed arrays, which greatly
increase low-frequency detection capabilities.
Their submarines could use towed arrays to detect
trailing submarines. Because a towed system moves
the sensors away from the high noise level of the
towing submarine, the Soviets could use this ap-
proach in an attempt to overcome their relative
TO
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noise disadvantage and prevent US submarines from
trailing them. Surface ships could use towed arrays
to increase their ASW search areas. This approach
would be particularly useful in the Mediterranean,
where strong thermal gradients in the water and high
background noise are problems.
There are some constraints which may be hinder-
ing or preventing Soviet development of towed-array
submarine detection systems. They may have problems
with transducer quality and with the necessary signal
processing equipment to take advantage of this ap-
proach. The greatest potential for the towed array
appears to be in the low-frequency region. But the
Soviets have displayed little ability to produce
systems in this frequency range.
Active Acoustic Systems
Low-frequency active acoustic systems have been
proposed in the US for monitoring extensive ocean
areas. High-frequency active systems have been pro-
posed for monitoring small areas or straits.
There is no evidence that the Soviets have any
system of this type under development. Limitations
on their transducer capability and overall cable
technology probably prevent their development of
active low-frequency area surveillance systems.
High-frequency systems are possibly within their
capability, but the cable runs necessary to connect
to any areas of strategic significance would be pro-
hibitive. Satellite readout is possible but ex-
pensive Pro-
viding power to tne devices would still ie a problem.
Active systems are especially susceptible to counter-
measures. There may be some application for harbor
defense, where the active capability overcomes the
high background noise that limits passive systems
in such areas.
Infrasonic Phenomena
The band of acoustic energy below 10 Hz is gen-
erally termed the infrasonic region.
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In addition, turbulent wake decay
may generate infrasonic signals. Some recent Soviet
publications show considerable interest in propaga-
tion of sound at these frequencies in the ocean.
The Soviets have indicated that they believe there
may be a propagation "window"--a narrow frequency
region where propagation loss in the ocean is very
low--in the vicinity of 5 Hz.
The principal problems that would be involved
in attempting to build a system to exploit sound in
the 5-Hz region involve the high ambient noise in
this region from shipping and wave action, coupled
with the low level of these signals originally and
the limitations on attainable array gains due to the
extremely long wavelengths involved. Calculations in-
dicate that the energy radiated by a submarine in this
region would be virtually undetectable at any reason-
able range. There is no evidence of actual Soviet ef-
forts to develop an operational system of this type.
Magnetic Detection Systems
The magnetic field of a submarine results from the
magnetization of ferrous materials in the hull and
internal equipment. A net magnetic moment is pro-
duced by a combination of the permanent magnetization
caused by the magnetic history of the submarine and
the moment induced by the magnetic field of the earth.
The magnetic anomaly produced is small in compa
to the intensit of the earth's ma netic field.
Presently operational saturable-core magneto-
meters are sensitivity limited and can provide de-
tection ranges of 1,000 to 1,400 feet under favor-
able conditions. The newest optically pumped magneto-
meters have a sensitivity of .01 gamma, and can ob-
tain detection ranges of 2,000 feet under good
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conditions. Signal processing and information han-
dling problems, however, generally constrain the
practical ASW application of magnetometers with sen-
sitivities greater than .01 gamma. The earth's mag-
netic field in comparison is approximately 50,000
gamma, and anomalies in this field must be rejected
by processing. There is no evidence of Soviet use
of any techniques more sophisticated than simple
correlation and coincidence signal processing in the
frequency ranges appropriate to the more advanced
magnetometers.
There are several methods by which improved sen-
sitivity may be obtained, but none appear to have
any detection potential beyond a mile or two. An
optically pumped magnetometer should be capable of
a sensitivity of .001 gamma, and zero-field reso-
nance cesium magnetometers could theoretically ob-
tain a.0001 gamma sensitivity. Superconducting
magnetometers using the Josephson effect could yield
a sensitivity better than .00001 gamma. Inhomo-
geneities in the ambient magnetic field are much
greater than this and reduce the potentially achiev-
able range. Even these more sensitive magnetometers,
unless employed in extensive grids, would be appro-
priate only for localizing previously detected sub-
marines.
The Soviets are actively engaged in an extensive
program to improve their MAD capability. The success
of their efforts is evidenced by their being the
first to develop a self-oscillating, metastable he-
lium magnetometer. Research being carried out at a
magnetics laboratory for the electronics directorate
of the Soviet Navy involves cesium, and may be aimed
at development of a magnetometer. In addition, some
classified Soviet work in superconductivity may have
application to the development of superconducting
magnetometers.
Present Soviet aircraft MAD gear is estimated to
have a detection range of 1,500 feet. The Soviets'
extensive effort in MAD sensor technology should
allow them to extend this somewhat. Evidence from
recent naval aircraft operations indicates that im-
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provements have been made. Their weakness in signal
and data processing will probably limit them to
at most a 50 percent increase in range in the near
future.
Fixed magnetic detection systems are princi-
pally limited in range by variations in the ambient
magnetic field. They are quite useful in constrict-
ed areas, such as in harbors. The Soviets have used
magnetic loop detection systems for harbor defense
for several years. The system located
across the approaches to the harbor at Petropavlovsk
is one example. This system is backed up by an
acoustic system to discriminate against surface ship-
ping. Some of the work being conducted at the mag-
netics laboratory at Krasnaya Pakhra may be for fur-
ther development of such magnetic detection systems.
Broad area magnetic surveillance systems, however,
require automatic monitoring of, and compensation for,
changes in background noise. The information pro-
cessing requirements for such systems exceed those
of any of the presently realizable systems. In
addition, the physical extent of such a system--
laying a grid across the floor of a whole ocean--
makes this approach unlikely. There is no evidence
that the Soviets are developing any large area cov-
erage systems based on magnetic detection principles.
Electromagnetic Systems
The electromagnetic signature of a submarine in-
cludes extremely low-frequency electric and magnetic
fields due principally to modulation of the galvanic
currents which flow between the hull and the propul-
sion shaft. This modulation results from variations
in the resistivity of the current paths produced by
the rotation of the shaft, and produces an electro-
magnetic field oscillating at a frequency correspond-
ing to the shaft rotation rate. Theoretical work to
date indicates that detection ranges of up to about
3,000 feet could be obtained by arrays of fixed sensors
using this principle.
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Another source ?of electromagnetic radiation from
submarines is the energy radiated at ship's service
turbine-generator frequencies by radiation through
the hull and through leakage paths at hull penetra-
tions. Studies indicate that detection ranges up to
about one mile could theoretically be obtained by
exploiting this phenomenon.
Electromagnetic detection techniques, therefore,
have some potential applicability for ASW. Their
very short range, however, limits their applicability
to barrier operation in shallow water in constricted
areas. Platform self-noise would restrict their use-
fulness on a mobile platform.
The motion of a submarine through the water can
cause scattering of natural and artificial electro-
magnetic fields. Potentially, this scattering phe-
nomenon could be used in a submarine detection system.
Theoretical studies indicate, however, that the max-
imum achievable range against a modern nuclear sub-
marine would be less than 500 feet.
Radar Detection Systems
Radar can be used to detect submarines in two
ways. First, masts such as periscopes, antennas,
S
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and snorkels which protrude above the surface of the
water can return a radar signal. Second, it is some-
times possible to detect surface effects caused by a
submarine's wake or by its trailing communications
wire.
Mast Detection
The vulnerability of a submarine to detection is
increased whenever it extends a mast above the surface.
The main physical problem encountered in search-
ing for an exposed mast of a submarine is in dis-
criminating the target return from the background
sea clutter. High-resolution radar technology
using short pulses and pulse compression techniques
which improve the discrimination capability of the
radar is being pursued by the Soviets. The princi-
pal problem which they face is that of adequately pro-
cessing the information obtained.
Mast detection is not completely reliable because
a submarine can control its mast exposure to reduce
the risk of detection. Moreover, a high sea state
greatly reduces or prevents detectability.
Trailing Wire Detection
When there are no masts or antennas extending
above the surface, a submarine may still be vulner-
able to detection by radar if it has extended a trail-
ing wire communications antenna.
the
principle is well known, and similar techniques may
have been used in recent Soviet efforts to map ice
fields using side-looking infrared sensors.
Surface Effects Detection
Even when there are no protrusions through the
sea's surface and no trailing wire, a submarine may
be detectable by radar because of the surface effects
caused by the motion of the submarine through the
water. These effects are subtle and difficult to
detect using conventional radars. The development
of ultra-high resolution radars and synthetic aper-
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ture radars may make this detection technique use-
ful. The deeper and the slower the target, the
smaller are the surface effects produced. In addi-
tion, when the sea is rougher than about State III,
the surface effects are masked by the sea turbulence.
The development of advanced ASW radars may rep-
resent one of the more promising approaches for
the Soviets in developing improved ASW sensors.
The communications wire trailed by US SSBNs makes
them vulnerable to radar detection, as does the
occasional exposure of masts and periscopes. Soviet
technical literature
indicate that the Soviets are working on
such experimental advanced radars, perhaps with a
view to ASW applications. Radars designed for wake de-
tection, however, are probably farther in the future
because the wake signatures of submerged submarines
are less distinguishable than those of exposed masts
and trailing wire antennas. Problems with signal
processing to overcome sea state masking will prob-
ably continue to hamper efforts in this area.
Nuclear Detection Phenomena
Neutrons
The reactor of a nuclear-powered submarine pro-
duces an intense neutron flux which cannot be com-
pletely shielded. When the submarine is submerged,
direct detection of the escaping neutrons is pos-
sible only at short ranges--on the order of tens
of feet--and only with sophisticated equipment,
because water is an excellent neutron moderator.
Antineutrinos
The operation of a fission reactor produces
prodigious quantities of antineutrinos--essentially
massless particles which have extremely small ab-
sorption cross sections. These particles cannot be
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shielded by any means--in fact, the vast majority
of the neutrinos produced by a nuclear reaction
could pass through the earth without being absorbed.
Although the absorption cross section is exceedingly
small, the number of antineutrinos produced in a
reactor is so large that a workable submarine de-
tection system based upon antineutrino detection
is conceivable.
There are two possible approaches to building
such a system. A mobile system could detect the
increased presence of antineutrinos as a platform
approached an operating nuclear submarine. The
detector would have to be very large, however, prob-
ably larger than an aircraft. The size necessary
to obtain any reasonable range rules out this ap-
proach for a mobile ASW sensor.
In an alternative approach, a fixed detector
could be built to monitor an area of ocean. This
would require a detector that could indicate the
direction of the momentum vector of the original
antineutrino to provide a bearing indication. The
physical dimensions of a detector which would pre-
serve momentum and have a reasonable capture cross
section would probably rival the US Navy's Project
Sanguine in size. Although nothing is known about
Soviet work in this area, the development of de-
tectors of this type would be difficult to conceal
because of their great size. Also, no known nuclear
reaction with a reasonable antineutrino capture rate
preserves momentum. This approach to ocean surveil-
lance would therefore appear to be infeasible.
Activation Radionucleides
The radiation escaping from an operating nuclear
submarine can cause stable elements present in sea-
water to become radioactive. Of these, radioisotopes
of sodium and chlorine appear most likely to be de-
tectable. It is possible to build detectors which
can sense the trace quantities of such radioisotopes
in the wake of a submarine, but there are no indi-
cations that this is a reliable detection technique.
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a gamma ray spectrometer
designated Vityaz used for detecting, analyzing, and
recording radioactive emissions from trace quantities
of radioisotopes in seawater. The Soviets had re-
portedly had success in detecting their own nuclear
submarines with such
a system.
There have been no conclusive experiments indi-
cating detection of the wakes of US submarines by
such techniques. Even if workable detectors were
developed, these techniques would probably always be
inferior to acoustic techniques and could easily be
defeated by countermeasures.
Optical Detection Methods
Submarines can be detected optically by both
active and passive systems, but only short ranges
have been achieved to date, even in clear-water.
In bright sunlight, submarines have been seen and
photographed from aircraft at depths as low as 150
feet. The employment of low light level television
could possibly match this capability for nighttime
search operations. Ranges of present passive sen-
sors, therefore, would not be sufficient for search
operations.
Soviet passive optical capabilities appear to be
limited. Whereas they are just beginning to outfit
their ASW aircraft with searchlights for night work,
US ASW aircraft are removing their searchlights in
favor of low light level systems. The Soviets are
known to be working on high-energy lasers operating
in the blue-green region of the spectrum where at-
tenuation in the ocean is the least. No foreseeable
improvements in technology, however, would make
underwater laser or optical systems competitive with
acoustic systems, or an aircraft-mounted optical
system competitive with MAD gear. Similarly, no
foreseeable improvements could make optical systems
competitive with radar systems for detecting masts
and periscopes, nor could projected optical systems
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E
be competitive with IR and radar techniques for de-
tecting trailing wires. There may be some advantages
in optical systems for wake detection over IR and
radar systems, but the information processing problems
are beyond the capabilities of any existing systems.
One other application of optical detection tech-
niques is the use of optical interference sensors to
detect the turbulent wake left by a submarine. This
appears to be one of the most promising approaches
for detecting turbulent wakes. Because of the dis-
sipation of wakes, lack of classification capability,
and directional ambiguity, these techniques would be
useful in trailing situations, but would probably not
be of much value in area search.
Detection Through Wake Effects
The passage of a submarine through water produces
a wake with physical properties which are slightly
perturbed in comparison with the surrounding water.
Also present within the wake are minute quantities of
materials left behind by the submarine. A variety of
sensors are capable of detecting this wake. Some of
these sensors show promise as aids to submarines for
trailing other submarines.
Refractive Index Changes
The passage of a submarine through water causes
changes in both temperature and salinity. These
changes produce a change in the local refractive in-
dex of the water. Optical interference systems can
detect these changes and thus allow the submarine's
wake to be localized. A localization system based
on this technique, capable of detecting wakes up to
several hours after the passage of a submarine, could
theoretically be built now.
Turbulence
A submarine passing through water leaves behind
it a turbulent wake which can be sensed with adequate
pressure transducers. US sensors of this type have
provided detections of wakes up to one hour behind a
target submarine.
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Of the possible systems discussed above, de-
velopment of a pressure transducer turbulence detec-
tion device seems the most likelv.
certain tactical aspects of some of the coordinated
transits of the Norwegian Sea by Soviet submarines
could be explained either by the existence of such
devices or by long-range underwater communications.
The problems of limited
search rate, high false-alarm rate, lack of classifi-
cation capability, and susceptibility to countermea-
sures appear to preclude the development of any area
search system based upon wake sensing devices. How-
ever, the application of such devices for maintain-
ing covert trailing of a submarine once initial de-
tection has been accomplished is a likely Soviet
development, either now or in the near future.
Reverberation
Remote wake sensing may be possible using ultra-
sonic or optical sensors to detect the volume re-
verberation of the turbulent wake. This could allow
a trailing submarine to operate with a depth separa-
tion of up to a few hundred feet, a valuable aid in
trailing.
Chemical Detection
Trace amounts of various chemicals are introduced
into the ocean from a submarine, some continuously and
some intermittently. Corrosion and erosion products
such as minute quantities of antifouling paint from
the hull, copper and nickel from the piping which car-
ries coolant water, and zinc from sacrificial anodes
are introduced into the water continuously. In ad-
dition, when a modern submarine is operating submerged,
the by-product hydrogen gas from the oxygen generators
is discharged continuously. These chemicals are the
most likely candidates for a chemical-based detection
system because they are continuously produced.
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The concentrations of the chemicals in a submarine
wake are typically only a few tenths of a part per
billion above the background levels in the ocean, and
their detection would require extremely sensitive in-
struments. Chemical detection techniques will probably
always be inferior to wake turbulence detection tech-
niques because the physical wake is much more stable
and defined.
There are several indications that the Soviets are
working in various areas with potential application
to wake detection systems. These research programs
include development of lasers operating in the blue-
green spectrum, detailed turbulence studies, experi-
ments with optical and ultrasonic interference mea-
surement systems, and sensitive chemical detectors.
Some of the various devices protruding from the hulls
of certain Soviet submarines may be experimental wake
detection devices.
Elint Detection
The Soviets have a large system of fixed land-
based HF intercept sites backed up by mobile systems
and by installations in collaborating communist coun-
tries. They also have a growing Sigint satellite
program.
The usefulness of a Soviet intercept system is
circumvented by the ability of a submarine to conduct
a patrol in radio silence. The Soviet intercept effort,
therefore, does not constitute a comprehensive and
effective submarine surveillance system.
Infrared Phenomena
An operating submarine, particularly a nuclear
submarine, produces changes in the thermal reflec-
tivity and emissivity microstructure of the sea sur-
face above it. This can be caused by temperature
changes in the water due to heating effects from the
submarine, particularly if the submarine is shallow
or hovering. It can also be caused by the aniso-
tropic distortions of the sea surface caused by the
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wake left by objects which protrude through the sur-
face such as masts and periscopes, or by a trailing
wire. Even when there are no protrusions, a submerged
submarine leaves a trail of surface microstructure
anomalies owing to wake effects which rise to the
surface. Perhaps the most effective means of search-
ing for these microscopic discontinuities is by
analyzing infrared radiation which is reflected
from the sea surface.
Infrared sensors appear to have significant poten-
tial for airborne ASW systems, as they can provide a
greater area coverage than MAD gear although they
entail a higher false-alarm rate and demanding signal
processing requirements. For any sort of broad ocean
surveillance application, however, it appears necessary
to use a satellite-borne system. The high atmospheric
absorption of infrared energy is a major limiting factor
for satellite-borne systems.
An operating submarine continually introduces
heat into its environment, primarily through its
use of seawater as a coolant. In large nuclear
submarines, the rate of coolant flow can be several
thousand gallons per minute, with an increase in
temperature of 10?C or more. A submarine which is
operating very shallow, as in the case of an SSN
copying or sending communications, or one which is
hovering at greater depths, as in the case of an
SSBN about to fire its missiles, causes a measur-
able rise in the temperature of the sea surface
immediately over its position because of convective
flow of the heated water. This greatly enhances
the detectability of the submarine.
Masts or periscopes protruding through the sea's
surface produce linear thermal discontinuities which
can persist for hours in a low sea state. Such tracks
have been observed stretching for miles behind sub-
marines.
Trailing wire antennas generate a linear thermal
discontinuity on the sea surface which can also per-
sist for hours in a low sea state. The form of the
discontinuity is somewhat different from that left
by a mast or periscope, and is much broader.
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Some of the perturbations which produce the
wake effects discussed earlier rise with time to
the sea surface where they produce a trail of ani-
sotropic disturbance of the infrared microstructure
of the sea surface. This effect is much,more subtle
than the others mentioned and far more difficult
to detect.
Analyses of these phenomena indicate that an
effective infrared ASW sensor system would have to
be capable of monitoring a range of wavelengths,
with sensitivities of .001?C or better, and with
narrow instantaneous fields of view.
The Soviets have developed and operated air-
borne IR sensors for such applications as mapping
of ice fields.
Soviet research and development on IR sensors
is well advanced. The Soviets have shown consid-
erable interest in developing sensors with high
sensitivities in the short wavelength region nec-
essary for atmospheric transmission. Their tech-
nical publications indicate that they are specifi-
cally interested in the development of sensors
capable of monitoring the microstructure of the
sea surface.
Even with the development of the necessary
sensors and satellite vehicles, an enormous signal-
processing problem remains, greater than any thus
far encountered. Detection of submarines from a
satellite using IR sensors with an acceptably low
false-alarm rate would require an extremely sophis-
ticated automatic pattern recognition capability
even with the best of sensors. It is unlikely that
the Soviets now have, or will have within the next
few years, an operational broad area IR detection
system. They have, however, probably begun test-
ing and evaluation of airborne IR sensors for limit-
ed area ASW search and localization. IR systems
will always be hampered by problems with rough
water--sea states higher than State III--and rain
or fog, which absorb IR radiation.
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TO- E R-Ex
Annex B. Characteristics of Soviet ASW-Equipped Forces*
Moskva Class ASW Helicopter Carrier
Length
620 feet ASW weapons
Beam
112 feet
dual SUW-N-1 launcher
Displacement
20,000 tons
2 quintuple 21-inch torpedo tubes
Maximum speed
29 knots
2 MBU-2500Ab
Endurance
14,000 nm at 12 knots
Helicopters
20 Hormone
Units operational
2
10Ca
1968
Active sonar
3- and 4.5-kHz hull-mounted
8.5-kHz VDS (variable-depth sonar)
The Moskva is equipped with a 3-kHz sonar, probably intended for convergence
zone and possibly bottom bounce operation. The 4.5-kHz sonar is probably for target
tracking, and may have an BDT (rotating directional transmission) mode. It appears
that the Soviets originally intended the Moskva class helicopter carriers to be capable
of conducting bistatic sonar searches, using their hull-mounted sonar as the source and
the Hormone helicopter dipping sonars as receivers. The Soviets may have encountered
difficulties in attempting to exploit this complex technique. They have not been
observed conducting such operations during the past 2 years. The Moskva underwent
an overhaul from late January to early August 1971, during which the Soviets may
have taken steps to overcome these difficulties.
a. IOC ( initial operational capability) is the date when the first unit of a class of ships becomes
available for operational service.
The numbers of operational units listed in this annex are current figures as of 1 July 1972.
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Krivak Class Cruise Missile Destroyer
Length 410 feet
Beam 47 feet
Displacement 3,800 tons
Maximum speed 32 knots
Endurance 5,000 nm at 15 knots
Units operational 3
IOC 1971
Active sonar
possibly 8-kHz hull-mounteda
8 5-kHz VDS
ASW weapons
2 quadruple 21-inch torpedo tubes
2 MBU-2500A
2 mine rails
none
Helicopters
Krivak construction apparently will be a large building program. Construction is
under way at shipyards on both the Baltic and Black seas.\
Kresta II Class Cruise Missile Destroyer
ASW weapons
Length
522 feet
2 MBU-2500A
Beam
56 feet
2 MBU-4500A
Displacement
6,800 tons
2 quintuple 21-inch torpedo tubes
Maximum speed
34 knots
Helicopters
1 Hormone
Endurance
7,000 rim at 14 knots
Units operational
4
IOC
1969
Active sonar
8-k Hz
The Kresta-II 8-kHz search sonar probably is supplemented by a separate
target-tracking sonar.
a.
There is a possibility that this sonar is in the 4-kHz range.
? 82 ?
-7T-0136-SECRELE
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-Tor-s-E-craz
Kresta I Class Cruise Missile Destroyer
Length
510 feet ASW weapons
Beam
56 feet
2 MBU-2500A
Displacement
6,700 tons
2 MBU-4500A
Maximum speed
34 knots
2 quintuple 21-inch torpedo tubes
Endurance
7,000 nm at 14 knots
Helicopters
1 Hormone
Units operational
4
I OC
1967
Active sonar
15- to 23-kHz
Th p Kr-Asia-I search sonar, which operates at one of several fixed frequencie
, probably is augmented by a target-tracking sonar operating a a
separate fixed frequency in this band.
Kynda Class Cruise Missile Destroyer
Length
465 feet ASW weapons
Beam
52 feet
2 triple 21-inch torpedo tubes
Displacement
5,600 tons
2 MBU-2500A
Maximum speed
36 knots
Helicopters
1 on pad
Endurance
7,000 nm at 14 knots
Units operational
4
10C
1962
Active sonar
15- to 23-kHz
The Kynda is equipped with a search sonar operating at one of several fixed
frequencies , probably augmented by a separate
target-tracking sonar operating in the same frequency band.
? 83 ?
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Krupnyy Class Cruise Missile Destroyer
Length
452 feet ASW weapons
Beam
49 feet
2 triple 21-inch torpedo tubes
Displacement
4,500 tons
2 MBU-2500
Maximum speed
35 knots
Helicopters
none
Endurance
4,700 nm at 15 knots
Units operational
1
IOC
1959
Active sonar
15- to 23-kHz
The Krupnyy is equipped with a search sonar operating at one of several fixed
frequencies probably augmented by a target-tracking
sonar operating at a separate frequency in this same band. Krupnyys are being
converted to Kanins in the only known Soviet conversion program which involves the
installation of a more modern hull-mounted sonar.
Kildin Class Cruise Missile Destroyer
Length
415 feet ASW weapons
Beam
43 feet
2 twin 21-inch torpedo tubes
Displacement
3,500 tons
2 MBU-2500
Maximum speed
36 knots
Helicopters
none
Endurance
4,700 nm at 11 knots
Units operational
1
IOC
1958
Active sonar
15- to 23-kHz
The Kiklin sonar, which operates at one of several fixed frequencies
, probably is augmented by a target-tracking sonar operating at a
separate fixed frequency in this same band. This class is in the early stages of
conversion. The cruise missiles are probably being removed and replaced by a surface-
to-air missile launcher. Three units are presently believed to be undergoing conversion.
? 84 ?
SEI
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PZL
Kanin Class Destroyer
Length
460 feet ASW weapons
Beam
49 feet
3 MBU-2500A
Displacement
4,800 tons
2 quintuple 21-inch torpedo tubes
Maximum speed
35 knots
Helicopters
1 on pad
Endurance
4,700 nm at 15 knots
Units operational
4
IOC
1967
Active sonar
8-kHz
Kanins are the result of the conversion of older Krupnyys. This is the only known
Soviet surface ship conversion program in which an improved hull-mounted sonar
system was installed.
Kashin Class Destroyer
Length 472 feet
Beam 52 feet
Displacement 4,450 tons
Maximum speed 38 knots
Endurance 7,500 nm at 10 knots
Units operational 18
IOC 1963
Active sonar 15- to 23-kHz
ASW weapons
2 MBU-2500A
1 quintuple 21-inch torpedo tube
2 mine rails
1 on pad
Helicopters
The Kashin is equipped with a search sonar which operates at one of several fixed
frequencies . This is augmented by a target-tracking sonar
which operates at a separate fixed frequency in this same band. Kashins are under-
going extensive overhaul, essentially in the order in which they were originally built.
In the future the Soviets may, during overhaul, equip their Kashins with the
Krivak-type VDS.
? 85 ?
-Thr-sEcazi,
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""gt6-11-E-T.
Kotlin Class Destroyer
Length 415 feet
Beam 43 feet
ASW weapons
1 quintuple 21-inch torpedo tube
Displacement 3,500 tons 2 MBU-2500
Maximum speed 36 knots 2 MBU-4500
Endurance 4,700 nm at 11 knots 2 mine rails
some have landing pad
Units operational ... 23 (includes all versions)
IOC 1954
Active sonar 15- to 23-kHz
Helicopters
The three types of Kotlins differ principally in armament. The characteristics listed
above are for the modified Kotlin. The unmodified Kotlin has two quintuple 21-inch
torpedo tube installations, six depth charge mortars, and no MBUs. It may also be
equipped with an older sonar . The SAM Kotlin
has two MBU-2500 or two MBU-2500A launchers, and carries neither mines nor depth
charges.
Mirka Class Escort
Length
Beam
268 feet ASW weapons
30 feet .... 1 or 2 quintuple 16-inch torpedo tubes
Displacement
1,150 tons
2 or 4 MBU-2500A
Maximum speed
30 knots
1 depth charge rack
Endurance
4,800 nm at 10 knots
Helicopters
none
Units operational
20
IOC
1963
Active sonar
15-to 23-kHz
irka search sonar operates at one of several fixed frequencies
It probably is supplemented by a separate search sonar operating at another
ixe requency in this band. Some Mirkas have been equipped with the same dipping
sonar used by the Hormone helicopter, probably as a makeshift VDS installation.
? 86 ?
77313-SE?44F-1.
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Petya Class Escort
Length
268 feet ASW weapons
Beam
30 feet .... 1 or 2 quintuple 16-inch torpedo tubes
Displacement
1,100 tons
2 MBU-2500A or 4 MBU-2500
Maximum speed
34 knots
2 depth charge racks
Endurance
4,900 nm at 10 knots
Helicopters
none
Units operational
47
IOC
1961
Active sonar
11-to 23-kHz
The Petya is equipped with a search sonar which operates at one of several fixed
frequencies This is
augmented by a target-tracking sonar which operates at a separate fixed trequency in
the same bands. Some Petyas are equipped with VDS installations resembling the one
on the Moskva.
Grisha Class Patrol Ship
Length
235 feet ASW weapons
Beam
30 feet
2 twin 21-inch torpedo tubes
Displacement
900 tons
2 MBU-2500A
Maximum speed
36 knots
2 depth charge racks
Endurance
4,500 nm at 10 knots
Units operational
11
IOC
Active sonar
1968
possibly 6-8-kHz
? 87
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A Class Torpedo Attack Nuclear Submarine
Length 260 feet
Beam 32 feet
Submerged displacement 4 300 tons
Maximum speed unknown
Operating depth unknown
Units operational 1
IOC 1972
Active sonar unknown
ASW weapons
possibly a rocket torpedo*
possibly torpedoes
* "Rocket torpedo" is a Soviet designation for a
weapon possibly similar to the US ASROC or
SUBROC.
The appearance of only one A class to date, together with its extended fitting-out
period, suggests that the A may be an advanced technology prototype. Possible
exploratory areas include advanced sensors, nonstandard hull materials, and exotic
propulsion techniques. The possible association of a rocket torpedo with the A class
suggests that it may be intended for an ASW role.
V Class Torpedo Attack Nuclear Submarine
Length 308 feet
Beam 33 feet
Submerged displacement 5,300 tons
Maximum speed 32 knots
Operating depth 1,300 feet
Units operational 10
IOC 1968
Active sonar
3-kHz
7-and 27-kHz
ASW weapons
32 torpedoes
Although little technical information is available concerning the V class passive
sonars, the overall passive sonar detection range capability of the V is probably only
about hall that provided by modern US equipment under similar conditions.
? 88 ?
TOSECRFt
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E-I Class Torpedo Attack Nuclear Submarine
Length 375 feet
Beam 30 feet
Submerged displacement 5,500 tons
Maximum speed 28 knots
Operating depth 1,000 feet
Units operational 3
IOC 1961
Active sonar 15 -kHz
ASW weapons
22 torpedoes
Ed attack submarines are the result of conversions of E-I cruise missile units. The
passive sonar installation may have been improved, with the refitting of equipment
approaching that of the V class in capability, but limited by the generally higher noise
levels of the E-I at most speeds.
N Class Torpedo Attack Nuclear Submarine
Length 360 feet
Beam 30 feet
Submerged displacement 5,400 tons
Maximum speed 30 knots
Operating depth 1,000 feet
Units operational 14
10C 1959
Active sonar 15-kHz
ASW weapons
32 torpedoes
The N class passive sonar capability probably provides detection ranges less than
half those of modern US equipment under similar conditions.
? 89 ?
RET
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1-101P-SEGRET.
P Class Cruise Missile Nuclear Submarine
Length 354 feet
Beam 38 feet
Submerged displacement 6,700 tons
Maximum speed probably 30 knots
Operating depth at least 1,300 feet
Units operational 1
IOC 1971
Active sonar ..............possibly 3-kHz
ASW weapons
probably torpedoes
Although the P class is believed to be primarily intended for an anti - surface ship
role, it has some ASW ca
similar to that on the V
11 ?
? -
- ? ? ? ?
? ? ? _ ?
C Class Cruise Missile Nuclear Submarine
Length 308 feet
Beam 31 feet
Submerged displacement 4,800 tons
Maximum speed 27 knots
Operating depth 1,300 feet
Units operational 9
10.0 1968
Active sonar
3-kHz
7-and 27-kHz
ASW weapons
18 torpedoes
The C class passive sonar capability is estimated to be similar to that of the V.
? 90 ?
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B Class Torpedo Attack Submarine
Length 230 feet
Beam 32 feet
Submerged displacement 2,900 tons
Maximum speed 18 knots
Operating depth 900 feet
Units operational 4
IOC 1968
Active sonar unknown
ASW weapons 12 torpedoes
Although there is no evidence concerning the B class sonars, they are probably
improved over those of earlier Soviet diesel submarines and may approach the
capabilities of the V class.
F Class Torpedo Attack Submarine
Length 300 feet
Beam 24.5 feet
Submerged displacement 2 300 tons
Maximum speed 16 knots
Operating depth 920 feet
Units operational 51
IOC 1959
Active sonar 15-k H z
ASW weapons
22 torpedoes
The F class is equipped with the Feniks passive sonar
? 91 ?
--T013--SEC.REZ
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Operating radius
Payload
Units operational
IOC
ASW weapons
depth bombs
mines
torpedoes
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7-0"-p-steR
TU-142 ASW Patrol Aircraft
3,350 nm (3 hours on station)
13,500 pounds
10
1971
ASW sensors
Weteye radar
BM-1 sonobuoys
These ASW versions of the TU-95 the new BM-1
sonobuoys and probably have a monitoring capability for these buoys similar to or
greater than that of the I L-38. They can conduct either extended-range patrols or
long-duration patrols at shorter ranges. These aircraft probably are not equipped with
MAD (magnetic anomaly detection) gear because of the problems that would be
encountered in attempting to operate such a large fast aircraft at the very low altitudes
necessary for MAD operations. They may be equipped with a new infrared sensor.
Operating radius
Payload
Units operational
IOC
ASW weapons
mines
depth bombs
torpedoes
ASW sensors
1L-38 May ASW Patrol Aircraft
1,350 nm (3 hours on station)
6,400 pounds
45
1968
Weteye radar
BM-1 sonobuoys
MAD
To date, I L-38 Mays have
sonobuovs
i I he
IL-38 may not be capable of monitoring the older sonobuoys and probably carries
them only to expedite turnover operations with BE-12s. IL-38s can employ large
the newer BM-1
numbers of the newer BM-1 sonobuoys;
Some I L-38s may carry a new infrared sensor.
? 92 ?
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Tcw?EI
s E
BE-12 Mail ASW Patrol Aircraft
Operating radius . 750 nm (3 hours on station)
Payload 17,500 pounds
Units operational 90
IOC 1966
ASW weapons
depth bombs
mines
torpedoes
ASW sensors
Mushroom radar
RGAB-56 and RGAB-64 sonobuoys
MAD
To date, BE-12 Mails have
RGAB-64 sonobuoys,r?
the older RGAB-56 and
The BE-12 probably
lacks the capability to monitor the new buoys, and may carry them only to expedite
turnover operations with I L-38s. Some BE-12s apparently have been refitted with an
improved MAD gear,
? 93 -
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KA-25 Hormone ASW Helicopter
Endurance 2 hours
Payload 3,000 pounds
Units operational 125
10C 1967
ASW weapons
depth bombs
torpedoes
ASW sensors
Big Bulge radar
RGAB-56 and RGAB-64 sonobuoys
towed MAD
15- to 16-kHz dipping sonar
The Hormone is operated from the Moskva and Leningrad as well as from some
Kresta-I Is. In addition, it is replacing the Hound as a land-based ASW helicopter.
MI-4 Hound ASW Helicopter
Endurance 2 hours
Payload 1,350 pounds
Units operational 110
IOC 1953
ASW weapons
depth bombs
torpedoes
ASW sensors
Mushroom radar
RGAB-56 and RGAB-64 sonobuoys
towed MAD
The Hound is a land-based ASW helicopter that is being phased out in favor of the
more versatile Hormone.
? 94 ?
7-0171-S.E?1424rEki.
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T-
HRG Declassification Document Index
7-31rRE-T._
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