WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: PROBLEMS OF REAR SERVICES SUPPORT OF NAVAL FORCES UNDER CONDITIONS OF A CLOSED THEATER OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005508946
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: October 4, 1977

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
4 October 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM ?
. William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Problems of Rear Services
support of Aavar Forces Under Conditions
of a Closed Theater of Naval Operations
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is
part of a series now in preparation based on articles from a
SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the
Headquarters and the Technical Committee ot the Combined Armed
Forces. This article describes the functions, organization and
POZTaires of rear services support of naval forces under
conditions of a closed theater of naval operations. The need for
cooperation with the rear services of other armed forces branches
is noted throughout. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact
Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw
Pact officers. This article appeared in Issue No. 5, which was
published in 1973.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely
sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict
need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of
reference, reports from this publication have been assigned the
Codeword
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
. Page 2 of 10 Pages.
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Intelligence Information Special Report
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COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT
DATE OF
INFO. 1973
SUBJECT
DATE
4 October 1977
WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Problems of Rear Services Support
Under Conditions of a Closed Theater of
Naval Operations
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an
article from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information
Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical committee of the
Combined Armed Forces. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact
Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw
Pact officers. This article was written by Rear Admiral F.
Scheffler. This article describes the functions, organization and
procedures of rear services support of naval forces under
conditions of a closed theater of naval operations. The need for
cooperation with the rear services of other armed forces branches
is noted throughout. This article appeared in Issue No. 5, which
was published in 1973.
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End of Summary
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Problems of Rear Services Support of Naval Forces
Under Conditions of a Closed Theater of Naval Operations
by
Rear Admiral F. SCHEFFLER
Deputy Commander of the People's Navy
of the German Democratic Republic
Chief of the Rear
The constant improvement of combat equipment entails a sharp
rise in the volume and complexity of the tasks to be carried out
by rear services.
For the rear services of naval forces this means the rapid
growth of materiel-technical requirements and complication of the
related tasks involving the storage and transport of these items,
the preparation of complicated equipment, and the repair of
electronic and other complex systems and devices. All of this of
course puts forth new demands for preparedness on the part of
personnel of all levels of the rear services.
In this article, based on experience accumulated during a
period of training exercises, are set forth some problems of rear
services support of naval forces under conditions of a closed
theater of naval operations.
It must be noted that under such conditions naval forces
usually carry out their main task in cooperation with other
branches of the armed forces, For this reason, the nature and
volume of tasks carried out by the navy are determined to a
considerable extent by the combat activity of the ground forces
operating on the coastal axis.
Several features characteristic of coastal theaters of
military operations exert a particular influence on the work of
the fleet rear, hampering or facilitating it:
-- the enemy'has the capability to take action against
units, subunits, and installations of the fleet rear with the
forces and means of his ground forces over a great depth (even up
to operational depth);
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-- the fleet rear units and installations must be located in
the rear area of the ground forces operating on the coastal axis;
-- cooperation between the fleet rear and the ground forces
rear, and also with the rear services of other branches of the
armed forces, must be set up on a wide scale;
-- joint utilization of transportation lines, various
production facilities, depots, etc. must be coordinated with
other branches of the armed forces, but at the same time there is
a capability to interchange materiel-technical means of the same
type among the rear services of the armed forces branches.
Taking into account the nature of the operations of naval
forces in a closed theater of naval operations, and the
conditions which arise for the rear services in this case, we
shall consider the problem of rear services support as an
aggregate of measures, a problem including the organization of
the fleet rear services as well as materiel, medical, technical,
emergency rescue, engineer, chemical, airfield engineer, airfield
technical, and aviation technical support.
As is known, the main task of the fleet rear services is to
carry out comprehensive and timely rear services support of fleet
forces in conformity with standards.
The creation of a rear services organization in full
conformity with the nature of the tasks it is to carry out is a
determinant condition for successful work by all of its subunits
and installations. Indeed, it is precisely in the coastal area
of a closed theater of naval operations that subunits,
facilities, and even whole groupings of rear services are
concentrated, and they must be disposed with consideration for
the requirements of dispersed deployment. Preference here is
always given to operational-tactical interests. In other words,
the fleet rear must sometimes refrain from deploying its own rear
subunits to the fleet's advantage, giving the preference in this
regard to the rear services of the_ground foes or of other
armed forces branches. An unavoiaibre-feiluirement on the rear /
services support of naval forces under such conditions is the
forming of detachments of auxiliary ships from the complement of
floating forces and means; we regard the employment of such
detachments as a means for uninterrupted rear services support of
naval forces. During the exercises which were conducted,
auxiliary ships with a displacement of 1,500 to 2,000 tons showed
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good results, It also became clear that it is extremely
important to make wide use of the capabilities of river and
coastal fleets. All of these measures can make it possible to
substantially relieve the burden on ground transportation carried
out on behalf of other armed forces branches and to organize the
transport of materiel for naval forces, even up to rear naval
groupings, without additional transshipments.
In our opinion, special attention should be given to the
protection and security of rear services subunits and facilities.
A fleet rear unit located in a ground forces rear area not only
runs the danger of being subjected to enemy air strikes but is
also within the operating range of the tactical and
operational-tactical missiles of the enemy ground forces. In
resolving the problem of protecting the rear, it is obviously
necessary to concentrate the main attention on those of its
subunits and installations which exert the decisive influence on
the entire process of rear services support. In dispersing rear
units and facilities in order to protect them, we must still not
lose sight of the importance of preserving their high operating
efficiency.
As experience shows, in order to quickly eliminate the
aftereffects of enemy strikes on a rear grouping which includes
subunits, units, and facilities of several armed forces branches,
it is expedient to form temporary rear subunits. In case of
need, they can be of significant assistance to all armed forces
branches.
As regards materiel support, the proper echeloning and
allocation of supplies are of decisive importance, in our
opinion. If we assume that supplies located aboard ships and
launches (part of the supplies of the tactical rear) must be at
the highest possible level, then the supplies (up to SO percent)
placed at rear services facilities must be located aboard
floating means. In addition, it is considered expedient to keep
an equal amount of supplies aboard auxiliary ships of the
operational rear in order to provide for the uninterrupted
replacement of field supplies which are used up or are destroyed
by the enemy.
As a rule, naval strike forces in a closed naval theater are
capable of advancing to a new area of combat operations in a
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short time, because of the relatively short distances to be
covered. Under these conditions, the ships are in combat through
almost the entire operation and thus do not have time for
restoration of their combat effectiveness. This in turn entails
an increased expenditure of the various means by each separate
unit of the fleet's combat complement.
The fleet rear must of course carry out a great many
measures connected with the preparation, transport, and delivery
of various kinds of materiel and combat means.
It must also be kept in mind that under these conditions,
especially in areas of deep water, both sides use mines
extensively. The performance of minesweeping activities involves
the expenditure of a great deal of minesweeping equipment, the
supply of which is an important task of the rear services.
The work of the rear services to provide materiel-technical
support of naval forces is considerably facilitated if national
navies operating jointly in a closed theater of naval operations
use materiel of standard type. In this connection, it is
expedient, in our opinion, to form rear services subunits and
facilities in such a way that they have identical functions and
capabilities regardless of nationality.
For successful medical support of naval forces personnel, it
is necessary to select a form of organization for the medical
service such that casualties can be given timely medical aid at
sea and evacuated to shore within the stipulated time limit.
The principal method of medical aid in a closed naval
theater is the provision of specialized and professional medical
aid at shore medical facilities.
In case of a debarkation of amphibious landing forces or the
conduct of an antilanding defense, a major role is played by
cooperation between naval medical services and those of the other
armed forces branches. It is precisely during the debarkation of
a landing force that the naval medical service is obliged to
assume responsibility for a series of medical support measures,
in particular the evacuation of casualties from the debarkation
zone.
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In our view, emergency rescue support throughout the
operational zone can be organized according to emergency rescue
sectors. The emergency rescue forces operating in each sector
will function in support of all the naval forces located within
that sector. For emergency rescue support of strike forces
operating on the main axis and the secondary axes, it is
considered expedient to provide for mobile emergency rescue
forces equipped with high-speed auxiliary combat ships, supported
when possible by helicopters.
The better we succeed in setting up established points for
comprehensive ship repair, utilizing unfortified ports, harbors,
and areas in which mobile subunits and facilities can be
deployed, the more successfully we can provide technical support
to our naval forces. Shipyards, bases, and large ports are
obviously unsuited to this purpose in view of their overall
military importance. We consider that most of the technical
malfunctions which arise will have to be dealt with by mobile
repair groups directly at their basing points or at appropriate
anchorages under cover of the shore. Thus, in order to avoid
excessive concentration of forces at repair points, it is
necessary to have highly mobile repair forces on shore and at
sea. The most effective form of eliminating malfunctions,
particularly at the tactical level, is to replace entire
equipment units or assemblies. In this case there is a saving of
time expended on dicovering the malfunction, and rapid
restoration of the equipment's technical readiness is achieved.
Because of the concentration of rear subunits and
installations of different armed forces branches in the coastal
area under conditions of a closed theater of naval operations,
very great impotance is attached to cooperation of the rear
services. The need for efficient cooperation of the fleet rear
with the ground forces rear is dictated by the fact that the
naval forces coordinate their actions with the actions of ground
forces groupings located on the coastal axis. Under these
conditions, in our view, the principle of control, the one
ensuring the rapid mutual exchange of information and closer
cooperation, must be the exchanging of operations groups from the
rear services. Basically, however, control of the rear services
must be implemented through the rear control post. We are
assuming here that the rear services are represented at the main
fleet command post by a liaison group made up of staff
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specialists and officers with specialties. Such an organization
facilitates the rapid preparation of a plan in practically any
situation and provides for timely assignment of tasks to
subordinate rear subunits and facilities.
Regarding questions of rear services support of naval forces
in a closed theater of naval operations, in our view, the
following conclusions may be drawn:
-- the fleet rear deploys its subunits and facilities on
land; this must be coordinated in advance with the ground forces
operating on the coastal axis;
-- existing rivers and canals in the coastal area must be
used primarily by the fleet rear;
-- with the aid of auxiliary ships, comprehensive rear
services support must be organized in such a way that the
supplying of naval forces would not be disrupted in case of a
massive incapacitation of shore bases;
-- the use of temporarily formed bodies as groupings to
eliminate the aftereffects of enemy employment of weapons of mass
destruction must be carefully coordinated with all armed forces
branches operating in the coastal zone;
-- if several navies of a military coalition are operating
in a closed theater of naval operations, it is necessary to have
standard weapons and equipment and above all standard materiel,
in order to provide for mutual support and interchange;
-- it is very important to achieve standardization of the
organizational structures of the rear services of a military
coalition; at the very least there must be standardization of the
level of operating capacity of subunits and facilities of
identical function in the different navies;
-- it is necessary to have on board auxiliary ships a
certain quantity of materiel-technical means, which will comprise
part of the supplies of large units and of the fleet;
-- in the cooperation system, it is expedient to use the
method of exchanging operations groups among the rear control
posts of the navies, and of the groupings operating on the
coastal axis of the ground forces, and of other armed forces
branches.
In our opinion, we should continue to develop highly
efficient forms and methods of rear services support of all armed
forces branches.
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