THE SOVIET ATTACK SUBMARINE FORCE EVOLUTION AND OPERATIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: DI SOVIET ANALYSIS
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0002013695
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: September 1, 1971

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AR 70-14
Intelligence Memorandum
The Soviet Attack Submarine Force: Evolution and Operations
tscr-et,
SR IM 71-11-S
September 1971
Copy N2 138
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Comments on the facts and judgments contained in this
report should be forwarded through appropriate channels
to the Director of Strategic Research, CIA Headquarters,
Washington, D.C., 20505.
0
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?Sre-R.EZ_
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
September 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Soviet Attack Submarine Force:
Evolution and Operations
Introduction
The Soviets view the submarine as their primary
naval weapon system. The Soviet navy now has some
335 submarines, the largest submarine fleet in the
world. About 55 of these have a strategic strike
mission. The remainder--some 280 attack submarines--
is the principal force for strategic defense against
Polaris ballistic missile submarines, for countering
aircraft carriers, and for interdicting sea lines of
communication. The attack submarine force is also
an important contributor to ocean surveillance.
About 150 of the attack submarines are obsolete
by today's standards, but 130 are modern long range
diesel and nuclear powered units. The Scviet Union
now has about 60 nuclear powered attack submarines,
slightly more than the United States. The propor-
tion of first line attack submarines is increasing,
however, through a large construction program and
the retirement of obsolescent units,
Since 1963, the number of days on distant patrol
by the Soviet attack submarine force has increased
sevenfold. The most dramatic increase has been in
the Mediterranean where a small representation in
the early Sixties has grown to the most concentrated
and continuous Soviet submarine patrol effort. De-
ployments into the Indian Ocean began in 1968 and
into the Caribbean Sea the following year.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Strategic Research and coordinated within CIA.
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This report traces the evolution in the mis-
sions of the Soviet attack submarine force since
1950 and describes the various classes of attack
submarines the Soviets have built. It briefly
describes the operations and capabilities of the
force and speculates on trends in force composition,
capabilities, and operations. Selected characteris-
tics of Soviet attack submarines are presented in an
annex on pages 38 and 39. A summary begins on page
40.
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Contents
Evolution of the Attack Submarine Force and
Its Missions
Growth of Interdiction Force, 1950-1957
Development of Anticarrier Capability,
1958-1966
Search for Antisubmarine Capability:
Page
5
6
8
The New Attack Classes
14
V Class
16
B Class
16
A Class
17
Possible New ASW Weapon .
18
Continued Concern for Carrier Threat ? ?
18
C Class
18
P Class
20
Conversion Programs
20
Possible New Class
21
Current Inventory of New Attack Classes
?
?
22
Fleet Distribution
22
Scope of Distant Submarine Operations
25
Pacific
27
Atlantic
27
Mediterranean
28
Caribbean
29
Indian Ocean
30
Force Capabilities
31
Interdicting Sea Lines of Communication
?
?
31
Contending With Carriers
31
Antisubmarine Operations
33
Outlook--Future Developments in the Attack
Submarine Force
35
Operations
35
Operational Units
36
Annex: Selected Characteristics of Soviet
Attack Submarines
38
Summary
40
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SrNT
Tables
1. Fleet Distribution of Soviet Attack
Submarines, 1 June 1971
2. Operational Units of the Soviet Attack
Submarine Force
Chart
Page
23
37
Chronology of Soviet Attack Submarine Procure-
ment, 1950-1975 5
Photographs
Torpedo Attack Submarines Procured During Inter-
diction Phase, 1950-1957 (4, Z, and Q classes) 7
Diesel Powered Cruise Missile Submarines Procured
During Anticarrier Phase, 1958-1966 (W-conv Twin
Cylinder, W-conv Long Bin, and J classes) . . 10
Nuclear Powered Cruise Missile Submarines Pro-
cured During Anticarrier Phase, 1958-1966 (E-I
and E-II classes) 11
Torpedo Attack Submarines Procured During Anti-
carrier Phase, 1958-1966 (N, F, and R classes) 13
Attack Submarines Procured During Current Antisub-
marine Phase CV, B, and A classes) 15
New Cruise Missile Submarines (C and P classes) 19
Maps
Soviet Attack Submarine Force:
Pacific Fleet Operating Region Following
Western Fleets Operating Region page 30
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Evolutirl of the Attack Submarine
Foice and Its Missions
During the past 20 years, the Soviet attack
submarine force has developed in three general
phases (see chart below). Before 1957 the Soviets
procured a large number of submarines to provide a
sea line interdiction capability. From that time
until about 1966, however, the focus of their
efforts shifted to the development of a force of
cruise missile submarines to cope with the threat of
US aircraft carriers. Another shift in emphasis
became apparent in 1967 when the Soviets introduced
the first in a series of attack submarines evidently
designed for antisubmarine warfare--a natural
response to the large Polaris force which the US
acquired during the early Sixties.
Chronology of Soviet Attack Submarine Procurement 1950-1975
CRUISE MISSILE CLASSES
Nuclear Powered
E-I (6 SS-N-3)'
E-II (855 N-3)
C (0 SS-N-7)
P (at least U 55-N-H
Diesel Powered
W-conv, Single Cylinder (1 SS-N-3)--
W-conv, Twin Cylinder (2 SS-N-3 ?
W-conv, Long Din (4 SS-N-3)
J (4 SS-N-3)
TORPEDO ATTACK CLASSES
Nuclear Powered
A
New Class
Diesel Powered
r;
*(number of tubes
and type of missile)
INTERDICTION PHASE ANTICARRIER PHASE
cR
51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 tv 61 62 63 64 65 66
EIGIMOMEINtalawm
Nummamnsmuy
td
ANTISUBMARINE PHASE
67 60 69 Ne/.1 71 72 73 74 75
E=Mto92111
Alcaraa21,z4wAgaglia,441
EZEM-17
MA
tggzv
,1"? SL.2=10
mmammammaimalim
Lam
ktlagta
?
FEMNIMIMMil
IEZEMEMIZIEEMEME1
The figures within the bars are the estimated numbers of submarines of the indicated class procured
or to iJe procured within the time periods covered. These numbers do not represent units now
operational in the Soviet attack submarine force. Many older units have been sold or transferred to
other countries, retired, lost at sea, or converted to different configurations, and some of the newer
submarines are still undergoing fitting-out, testing, and trials. Table 1, on page 23, shows the current
fleet distribution of the Soviet attack submarine force.
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.????
Growth of Interdiction Force, 1950-1957
After World War II, the Soviets recognized that
the outcome of a future war with the West might depend
on Soviet ability to disrupt or sever the US supply
route to Europe and to defend the sea approaches to
the USSR.
Impressed with the success of German interdiction
efforts during World War II, Stalin evidently decided
on a massive submarine procurement program as his
solution to this problem of interdiction--possibly
as many as 1,000 new submarines were planned to be
built. The Soviets also studied German construction
methods and designs and used expatriated Germans to
work on the program.
In 1957 the Soviets stopped far short of their
goal of 1,000 units. As shown in the tabulation
below, 292 submarines of the W, Z, and Q classes
(see photographs on page 7) had been constructed,
fewer than a third of those originally planned:
Number
Days on station
Patrol
Class
built
per patrol
radius (nm)
W
236 a
20
1,200
Z
26 b
20
2,400
Q
30
25
coastal
operations
a. Thirteen units were converted to fire cruise
missiles.
b. Six of these units were converted to fire
ballistic missiles during 1955-1957, but three
were later reconverted to attack types.
6
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Torpedo Attack Submarines
Procured During Interdiction Phase, 1950-1957
? ???-? ?
3.
The procurement program for the medium range W class diesel powered submarine was
the largest ever undertaken by the Soviets. About 95 units are still operational,
-
r?
: 1;47 -
- ?
? -
The Z Class diesel powered submarine was the first Soviet long range attack submarine.
A conversion of this class in 1955-1957 resulted in the first Soviet ballistic missile
submarine?six units were so converted. Three of these were subsequently reconverted to
attack types, and there remain 23 such types now in operation.
?
- - -??
?.
The Q class diesel powered submarine is a coastal patrol unit and because of its short
range has been limited to operations in the Baltic and Black Sea areas. Some 9 units
remain operational.
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W and Q class submarines, operating from the
Northern Fleet, could not be effective against US
sea lines of communication to Europe--which are
some 1,800 to 2,400 nm distant. The W class,
under optimum conditions, can remain on a patrol
station located about 1,800 nm from its base for
about 10 days. It is better able to defend the
sea approaches to the USSR and interdict naval
vessels in the Norwegian Sea, however. Soviet
submarines in the Baltic probably would be denied
access to the open sea. Of the submarines built
during this phase, only the few long range Z
class units are suited to reach US sea lines to
Europe and conduct lengthy operation's. (See
annex on pages 38 and 39 for selected character-
istics of Soviet attack submarines.)
The development of nuclear powered submarines
in the US undoubtedly hastened the end of the large
Z, W, and Q class procurement program. The Soviets
were aware of the capabilities of nuclear submarines
and were proceeding with the development of the N
class--capable of operating 20 days on station with
a 5,800 nm patrol radius, or 30 days at 4,300 nm.
The Soviets have continued to improve their
sea line interdiction capability, but in the late
Fifties a more serious threat was recognized--the
US aircraft carriers and their potential for nuclear
strike on the Soviet Union.
Development of Anticarrier Capability, 1958-1966
To meet the carrier threat, the Soviets devel-
oped cruise missile submarines capable of striking
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a carrier before its aircraft could be launched
(see photographs on pages 10 and 11).
Soviet efforts to launch cruise missiles from
submarines began about 1959 with the conversion of
W class units to carry one, two, and four launch
tubes. Some units had four launch tubes built in
the sail, others had launch tubes mounted on the
deck. The Soviets converted 13 W class submarines
to carry a total of 39 launch tubes.
Several new classes of cruise missile subma-
rines were being designed while the conversions to
the W class submarines were under way. First was
the nuclear powered E-I class capable of firing
six cruise missiles. Only five E-I units were
produced. Before the E-I program was completed,
two new cruise missile submarine classes appeared--
the nuclear powered and the diesel powered J.
The E-II has eight missile tubes but otherwise is
similar to the E-I. The Soviets built 28 E-II
units and 16 of the J class, which has four launch
tubes.
In all, 49 E-I, E-II, and J class submarines
with a total of 318 launch tubes were produced by
1968. All were equipped with the SS-N-3 cruise
missile with a range of about 250 nm.
The Soviets did not neglect interdiction while
they were developing the anticarrier capability.
Three classes of torpedo attack submarines totaling
83 units were built: 15 units of the N class, the
first Soviet nuclear powered submarine; 48 units of
the long range diesel F class; and 20 units of the
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Diesel Powered Cruise Missile Submarines
Procured During Anticarrier Phase, 1958-1966
The J class is a diesel powered cruise missile submarine and has four
missile tubes for surface launching All 16 units are still operational.
v,?
. .,141?
A
_
Some W class submarines were converted to fire cruise missiles from a
surfaced position. The Twin Cylinder conversion, shown above, had two
missile tubes on deck behind the sail. Five units were converted, and all are
still operational.
Long Bin was another W class conversion to fire cruise missiles while
surfaced. It had four missile tubes built into an oversized sail. Only seven
units?all still operational?were converted.
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Nuclear Powered Cruise Missile Submarines
Procured During Anticarrier Phase, 1958-1966
The E-I class was the first Soviet nuclear powered cruise missile submarine. The
submarine has to surface to fire its missile. Five units of this class were constructed but
are now being converted to torpedo attack submarines by removal of their missile tubes.
Three converted units are probably now operational.
.??
, ???? ` ? -.4.*
?????"' '0 ?
?3141i
The E-ll class nuclear powered cruise missile submarine is similar to the El but has
eight missile tubes. All 28 units remain operational.
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medium range diesel R class. (See photographs on
page 13.) Two of these new classes, the N and F,
improved Soviet interdiction capability because of
their greater range and endurance. The R class was
an improvement over the W class in that it could
operate at increased depth for greater periods of
time.
In addition to the 13 W class units converted
to carry cruise missiles, a total of 132 new attack
submarines for anticarrier and interdiction opera-
tons were built during the period 1958-1968, as
shown in the following tabulation:
Launch tubes Number
Class
Type
per unit Propulsion built
E-I
Cruise missile
6 Nuclear
5
E-II
Cruise missile
8 Nuclear
28
J
Cruise missile
4 Diesel
16
N
Torpedo attack
- Nuclear
15
F
Torpedo attack
- Diesel
48
R
Torpedo attack
- Diesel
20
Total
132
The Soviets continued to build diesel as well
as nuclear powered submarines during this period.
Diesel submarines are cheaper to produce and
operate--about one-third the cost of a nuclear
powered unit--but economics alone may not have
been the reason. The Soviets may have concluded
that these diesel submarines might be needed in
case of setbacks in their nuclear program. Their
first nuclear powered class--the N--did have dif-
ficulties, occasicned by breakdowns of its propul-
sicn system. Early operations of the N class were
cautious, with the submarines being shepherded
closely by surface units for assistance when needed.
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Torpedo Attack Submarines
Procured During Anticarrier Phase, 1958-1966
Otr
' Pi"
'
The N class was the first Soviet nuclear powered submarine. Bow diving planes are
shown extended in this photo. One unit of the N class was lost in the Atlantic in 1970.
The remaining 14 units built are still operational.
?
4.4;1,Li T.
m.,
)1.
1.1
The F class, the Soviets' second long range diesel powered submarine, probably is an
improved version of its precursor, the Z class. Of the 48 units built, at least 45 are known
to be still operational.
The R class diesel powered submarine is an improved version of the W class?it can dive
deeper and remain submerged longer. Six of these units were sold to the UAR. The
remaining 14 are still operational in the Soviet fleet.
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The Soviets improved their anticarrier capability
with nuclear propulsion and cruise missiles, but
their achievements were overtaken by a naval threat
more potent than the aircraft carrier--the Polaris
ballistic missile submarine. These submarines not
only have more strategic attack potential than air-
craft carriers, but also are more difficult to detect
and track. The Soviet attack submarines developed
for interdiction and anticarrier missions had only
limited ASW capabilities and had no capability to
cope with the Polaris force.
Search for Antisubmarine Capability: The New
Attack Classes
To counter the Polaris threat, which developed
in the early Sixties, the Soviets have improved
their surface ships and naval aviation force, but
the emphasis has shifted toward developing advanced
antisubmarine warfare submarines. This has been
evident in the introduction of five new attack
submarine classes since 1967. Three of the new
classes (see page 15) are evidently designed for
an ASW role. The two other identified new classes
carry cruise missiles, but could be employed in
either an anticarrier or ASW role.
The Soviets have stated publicly and in clas-
sified journals that the submarine is the most ef-
fective counter to the Polaris threat. To this
end they have incorporated greater speed, advanced
sonar, and possibly increased depth capability and
new weapons in their new classes of submarines.
Because ballistic missile submarines are dif-
ficult to detect in the open ocean, one method of
maintaining contact with or countering them is to
trail them from their operating bases. Two prereq-
uisites for trailing other submarines are sufficient
speed and a sonar system capable of maintaining con-
tinuous contact with the target?with active or
passive tracking devices.
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Attack Submarines
Procured During Current Antisubmarine Phase
The nuclear powered V class?the best Soviet ASW submarine?is the fastest
operational submarine in the world?about 32 knots. There are eight operational
units of this class.
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The B class submarine is the
newest diesel powered submarine
built by the Soviets. The photo-
graph shows a temporary ice
breaker fitted to the bow.
The A class is the smallest of the
new nucledr powered attack
classes?about 250 feet long. It up-
pears to be intended for deep diving
and high speed. The first unit is not
yet operational.
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V Class
The V class torpedo attack submarine, the first
unit of which became operational in 1968, may repre-
sent the first Soviet attempt to develop an antisub-
marine submarine. There are now eight V class units
operational, and, at current production rates, eight
more will be operational by 1975. This class is
nuclear powered and is probably capable of speeds up
to 32 knots. A submarine believed to be a V class
has engaged in operations with a Y class nuclear
powered ballistic missile submarine which may have
been an ASW escort operation. The V class also has
frequently patrolled Western submarine transit routes.
The Soviets have made some progress in quieting these
submarines, but their noise levels are still higher
than those of US nuclear submarines, and too high
for covert trailing operations.
B Class
The ability of the B class diesel submarine to
get under way quickly and its quiet operational as-
pects are advantageous in detecting submarines ap-
proaching waters contiguous to the USSR. A diesel
submarine can get under way without time-consuming
preparations, providing quick response to a coastal
ASW alert. In contrast, nuclear submarines require
several hours for propulsion plant startup. More-
over, a diesel submarine, submerged and operating
on its battery, is inherently quieter than a nuclear
submarine. Its lack of speed and endurance, how-
ever--a maximum of 20 knots for one hour--weighs
against the use of the B class as a trailing
submarine. This class became operational in 1968,
and five are now in service. If production continues,
a total of 13 units is projected for 1975.
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A Class
The A class is the smallest Soviet nuclear
powered submarine, about 250 feet long.
The first submarine of this class was launched
in April 1969 in Leningrad. It spent about 18
months in a fitting out position between two barges
used to support fitting out activities in connection
with nuclear powered attack submarines. In October
1970, this unit and its support barges departed
the shipyard and probably were transferred through
the inland waterway system to the Northern Fleet
area where nuclear submarines built in the Baltic
area normally undergo trials.
It is suspected that the A class may have
characteristics different from those of other new
classes of submarines. This is suggested because
of its long fitting out period at the building
yard and the fact that a second unit has not been
launched. The long fitting out period could mean
that either advanced weapons, sensors, or other
technical systems may be involved. It is also
possible that production has been delayed be-
cause of "bugs" related to hull or propulsion
systems.
The A class may represent a further step in
the Soviet search for a suitable ASW submarine.
At present, the V class is the best candidate
but Soviet naval statements indicate a continuing
interest in submarines that are faster, quieter,
deeper diving, and equipped with better sensors
than earlier models.
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cmz
The first A class probably will be operational
by the end of the year. A possible nine units
could be operational by 1975.
Possible New ASW Weapon
The large bow torpedo tube shutters on at least
two and possibly all of the new classes of attack
submarines may indicate that they carry a new or
larger weapon that could have ASW applications.
These shutters are about three feet in diameter,
in contrast to the older attack submarines which
have two-foot shutters.
The new or larger weapon may be rocket propelled.
The Soviets are known to have worked for nearly a
decade on a rocket-torpedo. If there is a new
weapon on the new attack submarines, it could be
similar to the US MK-48 torpedo or possibly a SUBROC.
Continued Concern for Carrier Threat
Despite the recent interest in the ASW mission,
the Soviets continue to demonstrate their concern
over US aircraft carriers. They probably view the
carriers as a many-sided threat--a nuclear strike
potential against the USSR, a threat to Soviet
naval forces, and an intervention force. The C and
P classes (see page 19) represent a continuation of
the cruise missile response to the carrier, giving
the attack submarine force a submerged-launched cruise
missile capability in addition to the surface-launched
one.
C Class
The nuclear powered C class is an improved
antiship or ASW submarine, the first unit of
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New Cruise Missile Submarines
, ? C,7:48V7-31F1W-5,77"7"?."- 'rilr?,Warl'*".: ?
,:,0:10.7 ?
The C class nuclear powered cruise missile submarine is the first Soviet submarine able
to fire its cruise missiles from a submerged position. It carries eight SS-N-7 antiship cruise
missiles. It probably also has an ASW capability. Seven units of this class are now
operational.
The P class is the largest of the new nuclear powered attack classes-348 feet long?and
carries at least 8 cruise missiles. It is believed to have an ASW capability. One unit of this
class is operational.
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which became operational in 1968. Seven are now
operational and as many as 21 units could be opera-
tional by 1975. This submarine carries eight
SS-N-7 antiship cruise missiles which have a range
of about 30 nm. They can be submerged launched and
require no external target acquisition platform.
Earlier cruise missile submarines had to receive
target information from another source and had to
surface to fire their missiles. The C class prob-
ably has ASW capabilities also, either for self-
protection or for a secondary role as an ASW sub-
marine. It appears to be similar to the V class
in such characteristics as hull streamlining, tor-
pedo weapons system, and propulsion. The C class,
with a speed of 27 knots, is probably slower than
the V class.
P Class
Little is known about the speed, noise character-
istics, and sonar of the P class. It probably has
antiship and ASW capabilities similar to those of
the C class. The P class is larger than the C class,
is nuclear powered, and is believed to carry at least
8 cruise missiles. Information on the characteristics
of the missile carried by this submarine is lacking.
The first P class became operational in 1971. A
total of seven operational units is projected by
1975.
Conversion Programs
Conversion of older attack submarines may
also contribute to Soviet ASW and interdiction
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capabilities. Cruise missile launch tubes are
being removed from the E-I class submarines and it
is possible that a new sonar is being added. Also,
three of the six Z class units that were originally
converted to fire ballistic missiles have been re-
converted to torpedo attack submarines by removing
their missile launch tubes. Although the specific
purpose of these conversion programs is not known,
both appear to be ASW related.
Possible New Class
Possible Soviet intentions to develop and build
a new class of attack submarine in the next five
years or so are not clear. Because the characteris-
tics of the newest attack submarine--the A class--
are not known, it is difficult to determine whether
another new class will be required soon.
By 1975, the C, V, and B classes will have been
in production for about nine years and should be
ready to be phased out of production during the
mid-Seventies leaving only the P and A classes
still under construction. If the C, V, and B
classes phase out of production, it seems likely
that one of the three shipyards building these
submarines--Gorlkiy, Admiralty Leningrad, or
Komsomol'sk--would continue to build submarines,
but of a more advanced type, based on operotional
experience gained from the present classes.
The first unit of a new class of attack submarine--
if begun this year--could be completed in 1974 and
operational the following year.
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Current Inventory of New Attack Classes
As shown in the following tabulation, 21 units
of the new attack classes have now been built and
the total Soviet force of attack submarines consists
of some 280 units, nearly three times the current
US force of about 100. By 1975, nearly 70 units
of five new classes probably will be operational,
including one unit of a possible sixth class.
Class
Launch
tubes
per
Type unit
Number
built
Propulsion 1 June 71
Number
projected
operational
by mid-1975
Cruise missile 8
Cruise missile at
least
Nuclear
Nuclear
8
7
1
21
7
V
Torpedo attack -
Nuclear'
8
16
A
Torpedo attack
Nuclear
0
9
Torpedo attack
Diesel
5
13
New
Torpedo attack
Nuclear
1
Total
Fleet Distribution
21
Soviet attack submarines are assigned to four
fleet areas (see Table 1 on page 23) but priority
in assignment of first line units is given to the
two major areas--the Northern and Pacific Fleets.
In these two areas, Soviet submarines have access
to the open sea. The Baltic and Black Sea areas
require that Soviet submarines transit restricted
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Table 1
Fleet Distribution of Soviet Attack Submarines
1 June 1971
Northern Baltic Black Pacific Total
Cruise missile classes
Nuclear powered
E-I 2 2
E-II 14 14 28
C 7 7
P 1 1
Diesel
W conversion (TC)a 1
W conversion (LB)b
12
3 1 5
3 2 2 7
4 16
Total
35 _
3 _
5 23 66
Torpedo classes
Nuclear powered
N 9 5 14
^ 8 8
E-I conversiona 3 3
Diesel powered
W 26 20 12 37 95
Z 12 3 8 23
Q 4 5 9
F 26 3 16 45
R 9 2 3 14
B 1 1 3 5
Total 91 32 21 72 216
Grand Total 126 35
26 95 282
a. Twin cylinder, a converted W class unit with 2 missile
tubes.
b. Long Bin, a converted W class unit with 4 missile tubes.
c. E-I, a cruise missile unit converted to torpedo attack
by removing its missile tubes.
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waters under foreign control. All 63 nuclear
powered attack submarines now are based in the
Northern and Pacific fleets.
Of the 66 cruise missile units in the attack
submarine force, 35 are stationed in the Northern
Fleet and 23 in the Pacific. Of the remaining
eight cruise missile units--all of the old con-
verted types--5 are assigned to the Black Sea
Fleet and 3 to the Baltic.
Torpedo attack submarines are distributed
among the Soviet fleet areas in a similar pattern.
Of the 216 units, 91 (including 17 nuclear powered)
are in the Northern Fleet and 72 (8 nuclear) in
the Pacific. The remaining 53 (all diesel) units
are distributed nearly evenly between the Baltic
and Black Sea fleets.
Operations within the four fleet areas normally
are in support of training and tactical development.
Attack submarines in all the fleets are frequently
involved in ASW exercises, torpedo firings, and
evaluating new weapons and equipment. Baltic and
Black Sea units also frequently participate in
coastal defense, local interdiction, and local ASW
exercises.
Most distant operations originate from the
Northern and Pacific Fleets from bases located in
the Kola Gulf area in the North and the Petropavlovsk
and Vladivostok areas in the Pacific. Submarines
from the Baltic and Black Sea fleets deploy out-
side their fleet areas in distant operations only
occasionally.
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Scope of Distant
Submarine Operations
In the Sixties, the Soviet attack submarine force
departed from its pattern of short range operations
and began deploying to the world's oceans in a delib-
erate program to gain experience in long range oper-
ations. By 1969, the number of identified out-of-area
long range patrols by attack submarines had grown to
145 per year from fewer than 40 in 1963. The following
tabulation shows a sevenfold increase in distant area
patrol days at sea from 1963 to 1969, reflecting the
Soviets' growing confidence in their ability to operate
away from home waters.
Identified distant area
patrol days at sea
Year Atlantic Mediterranean Pacific Indian Total
1963
500
200
600
0
1,300
1969
4,700
4,100
1,700
200
10,700
Year in which initial patrol detected
Atlantic Mediterranean Pacific Indian
1955* 1958 1956* 1968
The greatest change occurred in the Mediterranean
as a result of the reinforcement of the Soviet naval
squadron following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The
growth of operational activity in the Atlantic and
Pacific can be related to anti-Polaris operations
and tracking US carrier transits. The purpose of
other patrols has not been clear. (The operating
regions of Soviet attack submarines are shown in the
maps following page 30.)
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The character of attack submarine operations has
grown more complex, more mission oriented, and more
innovative. In the early Sixties Soviet submarines
ventured into the open ocean only in company of a
rescue vessel. Now, unattended attack submarines
observe and stalk Western naval forces. At the
beginning of the decade the attack submarine force
began under-ice transfers from the Northern Fleet
to the Pacific Fleet. In 1966 the Soviet Union
conducted a submerged fleet transfer of :-.wo sub-
marines from the Kola Gulf to Petropavlovsk around
South America--a distance of some 18,000 nm. In 1963,
out-of-area patrols averaged about 30 days. In 1969,
they averaged about 70 days. This increase is due in
part to the long duration of Mediterranean patrols.
To support the expanded scope of operations,
the Soviets have built a mobile support system with
capabilities for replenishment and minor repairs
at sea. They have not inaugurated a system of
foreign bases on the US pattern, and to do so would
be to condone what they have long condemned. The
Soviets have, however, used joint facilities in
Egypt--such as those currently at Alexandria and
potentially at Mersa Matruh--to provide limited
support. In the future, these facilities may be
used for intensive support of submarines. Soviet
repair ships and tenders have serviced attack sub-
marines in the Caribbean and the Mediterranean with
little apparent reliance on shore facilities. Soviet
anchorages in international waters suitable for
deployed submarine tenders have been identified
in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean near Guam.
The Soviets have experimented with servicing sub-
marines without mooring or anchoring. In 1967, a
Soviet submarine tender on the high seas carried out
a successful six-month submarine support operation
near the Cape Verde Islands, off Dakar in West
Africa, servicing both nuclear and diesel submarines.
Because of their limited capacity, present submarine
tenders probably cannot provide comprehensive support
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to nuclear submarines for more than about two con-
secutive patrols. Tenders with greater capability
are not known to be under construction in the Soviet
Union.
Pacific
A focal point for Soviet attack submarine opera-
tions in the Pacific has evolved in the Philippine
Sea Patrols have
been maintained in the region since 1965, and in
1968 the Soviets laid mooring buoys in international
waters 300 nm north of the Polaris base in Guam. The
moorage is well positioned for a tender to support
anti-Polaris operations.
In addition to the ASW activity, cruise missile
submarines from Pacific Fleet areas and mid-ocean
patrol zones have reacted to US carrier transits
to and from the west coast of the US, by conducting
simulated strikes.
In wartime a submarine defensive barrier would
probably be established in the Kuril region and the
three entrances to the Sea of Japan. The barrier
deployment could serve the dual function of anti-
surface and ASW defense.
Atlantic
Attack submarine patrol areas have been estab-
lished in the Norwegian Sea along the critical gap
between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom
(G-I-UK gap) and northern Norway. These patrol
zones are occupied sporadically--usually in re-
sponse to US activity or in conjunction with Soviet
exercises. Submarines in these areas would probably
be used during a crisis to track ships, or during
a.war to interdict US fleet movements.
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SE
Some of the exercine activitien in the Norwegian
Sea have been linked to anti-Polaris operations.
During the Soviet naval exercise Okean in April 1970,
nuclear and diesel powered submarines engaged in ASW
tactics against a Y clans ballintic missile submarine
which appears to have simulated a Polaris unit in the
Norwegian Sea. Nearly continuous operations west of
the British Isles conducted by Baltic-based diesel
submarines are probably related to surveillance of
Polaris operations and British naval exercises. Many
North Atlantic patrols are conducted by diesel
powered submarines, suggesting that they are primarily
tasked for surveillance operations rather than
prosecution of contacts.
The new V class submarines have deployed to an
operating area south of Iceland, a position which
permits surveillance of US submarine transits, and
"delousing" of inbound and outbound Y class bal-
listic missile submarines. What was possibly a V
class accompanied a Y class through the Norwegian
Sea in December 1970 in an apparent escort role.
It probably took station in the operations area
south of Iceland and escorted the Y class back to
port in late February 1971.
Mediterranean
More than one-third of all Soviet distant sub-
marine operations have been carried on in the Med-
iterranean in an effort to cover NATO carrier
operations and to maintain surveillance of Sixth
Fleet movements and Polaris operations. Most sub-
marines assigned to the Mediterranean are based in
the Northern Fleet. About three cruise missile
*
Delousing Is a procedure in which the presence
of a trailing submarine is icurtained by a third
unit.
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submarines, usually including one of the new C clans,
are maintained on station and are targeted against
carriers. Six diesel torpedo attack submarines de-
ploy there on a six-month rotational basis for
surveillance. These submarines have also formed
barriers in the Gibraltar and Sicilian straits
during crises. The concentration of Sixth Fleet
units and Polaris submarines in confined Mediter-
ranean waters offers many opportunities for Soviet
surveillance and tracking operations.
Mediterranean deployments have been extended and
the efficiency of the operations has been improved
by the placement of a Soviet repair ship at an
anchorage in the Gulf of Sollum to provide replen-
ishment services and ma).ntenance for diesel sub-
marines. The USSR also takes advantage of a loophole
in the Montreux Convention of 1936 v,aich forbids
submarine transits of the Turkish straits except
for repairs, by annually "repairing" two submarines
in the Baltic area and returning them to the Black
Sea, conducting patrols in the Mediterrancan before
and after.
Caribbean
Submarine operations in the Caribbean represent
the most recent introduction of the Soviet attack
submarine force into new areas. In 1969, two F
class submarines entered Havana, the first such
visits by any Soviet submarines. An ocean Llig and
two barges of a type associated with nuclear sub-
marine maintenance were positioned in Cienfuegos
late in 1970. From September 1970 to June 1971,
a submarjne tender visited Cuba three times--
twice in company with an E-II class submarine,
once accompanied by an N class unit.
The reasons for the Soviet interest in the Car-
ibbean seem to be both political and military.
Politically, Soviet naval visits to the Caribbean
may be intended to acclimate the United States and
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71)
Latin America. to a Soviet presence?a presence which
may increase in frequency and numbers. The military
value of a submarine support anchorage in Cienfuegos
to the Soviets could be:
Provision of an anchorage for emergency repair
of damaged or disabled submarines which are
deployed off the US east coast. The presence
of the Soviet ocean salvage tug there suggests
this. Similar tugs usually deploy to the
vicinity of Soviet submarine operating areas.
As a forward contingency facility to which
attack submarines could be deployed in ad-
vance of a crisis, for eventual operations
against cast coast naval targets and
Gulf of Mexico shipping. These sub-
marines would be beyond the US barrier
forces along the G-I-UK gap.
Provision of a convenient peacetime facility
for attack submarines engaged in surveil-
lance operations against cast coast naval
forces, including Polaris submarines.
Indian Ocean
Soviet attack submarines, both nuclear and
diesel powered, have patrolled on occasion in the
Indian Ocean since 1968. Submarine patrols, which
may have been conducted largely for familiarization
of the crews in this new operating area, are evi-
dently a hedge against possible future large scale
deployment of US or UK naval forces. The Soviets
have conducted extensive hydrographic operations in
the Indian Ocean--another sign of their interest
in future submarine operations there. If the West
were to increase its presence, particularly through
the introduction of ballistic missile submarine
patrols in the Indian Ocean, the level of Soviet
attack submarine activity would probably increase
significantly.
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TattigiQ
Force C(Tabilitles
Interdicting Sea Lines of Communication
The attack submarine force has gained experience
in the conduct: of long patrols and the techniques of
surveillance at sea, and frequently exercises anti-
ship tactics and torpedo firings, but the effective-
ness of Soviet submarine weapons and the degree of
skill of the crews are largely unknown. The number
of submarines potentially available and the increasing
proportion of nuclear powered units among them suggest
an effective interdiction capability, however.
As an example of the attack force potential, the
Northern Fleet could maintain 23 long range submarines
of the F, N, Z, E, J, and C classes on continuous
patrol in the North Atlantic (assuming a readiness
posture of 50 percent and an allowance for transit
time). The Pacific Fleet could maintain about 13
long range attack submarines of the same classes
on continuous patrol.
Contending With Carriers
Soviet cruise missile and torpedo attack submarines
are sufficient in number and armament and fast enough
to stalk and attack the US carrier force at sea. There
are currently about 54 first line cruise missile sub-
marines (all but 16 are nuclear powered), and the
number is increasing by two to three per year. The
number of US attack carriers, about 14, presents the
Soviets with the opportunity for concentrating the
operations of several submarines on each US carrier.
The cruise missile submarine confronts the
carrier with a complex defensive problem. While most
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t;C-944.,
of these submarines must fire from the surface, the
250 nm range of the SS-N-3 missile affords the at-
tacker some 200,000 square nautical miles from which
to launch. Although this long range missile requires
target data assistance, such data can be obtained and
transmitted by another submarine or an aircraft. Ob-
servations of some cruise missile attack exercises
indicate the Soviets have developed tactics for
coordinated surprise raids carried out by submarines
and aircraft or surface ships.
The potential for a coordinated surprise raid is
enhanced in the Mediterranean where carriers arc
under constant surveillance and their locations are
usually known. Sonar conditions favor the submarine
there, and the continuous presence of "crowded" naval
forces contributes to uncertainties in recognizing
the beginning of an attack.
Cruise missile attacks on carriers in the Pacific
and Atlantic would be more difficult because US ocean
surveillance is generally more effective there than
in the Mediterranean. The great distances involved
and the existence of SOSUS* arrays in many areas in-
crease the probability of detecting a cruise missile
submarine attempting to intercept a carrier group.
The submarine would probably stalk the carrier for
some time before a coordinated strike to assure
itself of contact with the target at the moment a
strike is ordered.
Soviet submarine exercises and reactions to
carrier task forces indicate that the greatest
strike effort would be concentrated against those
* SOSUS (sound surveillance system): A stationary
ocean bottom acoustic submarine monitoring system
with wide area detection capability.
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carriers within, or nearest to, aircraft launch
range of potential strategic targets in the Soviet
Union. As indicated in exercise Okean, an echelon
of cruise missile submarines would deploy in defensive
barriers presumably to interdict other surface forces
and carriers which might have escaped attack.
Antisubmarine Operations
Soviet antisubmarine operations are hampered by
inadequate surveillance. A wide area ocean surveil-
lance system such as SOSUS is not a practicable sys-
tem for the USSR. Soviet technology is believed to
be incapable of producing the sensitive hydrophones
or cables which could reach from potential SOSUS
areas to the USSR mainland. Although overt and
covert trailing offer some promise, both methods arc
susceptible to countermeasures such as delousing.
Soviet submarines are too noisy for covert detec-
tion of the quieter US submarines. Barring an unsus-
pected technological breakthrough, improved sonars
installed on quieter submarines would still be limited
to the short detection ranges imposed by oceanographic
conditions and the low noise emissions of US submarines.
Overt trailing provides temporary surveillance but
it is unlikely that it will be attempted on a number
of US submarines at once--either routinely or sporadic-
ally. Such an occurrence would be percei7ed as an
immediate threat to the US strategic deterrent and
therefore would likely be avoided by the Soviets
except in extraordinary circumstances.
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Soviet submarine ASW operations are evidently
now focused on reconnaissance of Western submarine
patrol areas and transit routes. As the confidence
and the ability of their crews improve, Soviet attack
submarines might attempt more involved operations--
possibly including trailing of Western submarines.
Soviet intentions in this area are not known, however.
It may be Soviet policy to avoid any deliberate
contacts with the Polaris deterrent system. The
Soviets might assume that this stance would encourage
a similar US attitude toward Soviet ballistic mis-
sile submarines. Furthermore, such a policy would
eliminate a source of misunderstanding in a crisis
environment. Soviet submarines will probably develop
trailing tactics among themselves for those crisis
situations in which the advantages derived from overt
trailing would seem to outweigh the risks.
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--atiV?171-11Q
Outlook--Future Developments in
the Attack Submarine Force
Operations
As the attack force acquires more new sub-
marines and experience in distant waters, its
operations will probably involve closer and more
frequent surveillance of US naval operations in and
near US coastal waters and near US foreign bases.
US aircraft carriers probably will encounter an in-
creasing number of Soviet submarines with surface- and
submerged-launched cruise missile capability.
Developments in the US Undersea Long Range
Missile System (ULMS) will probably cause the Soviets
to intensify efforts in distant ASW missions. The
expanding operational areas and refinement and im-
provement in tactics and capabilities might further
encourage the Soviets to favor submarine trailing
tactics over surface search with aircraft and surface
ships. For the next five years or so the emphasis in
submarine developments almost certainly will remain
on ASW. Attack submarines will continue to patrol in
Polaris related or suspected areas, and the V class
probably will be used to protect the Soviet Y class
strategic submarine force by delousing.
The Soviet navy probably will continue to support
submarine activities on a world-wide scale without
acquisition of foreign bases. Protected anchorages
similar to those in the Mediterranean and at
Cienfuegos--rather than "bases"--will be established
where the USSR requires them. Support facilities
will continue to provide routine maintenance and re-
supply in the absence of shore bases.
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Soviet efforts may be under way to develop titanium
for use in pressure hull construction for submarines.
The Soviet Union has a large titanium industry and
uses this metal extensively in its shipbuilding
industry. The lightness and strength of titanium
offer an increased depth capability, which could result
in extended sonar ranges and evasion potential.
There is also evidence that the Soviets are at-
tempting to improve submarine command and control
systems and on-board tactical and machinery system::
through the use of computers.
A prime area of interest will continue to be
noise quieting. Soviet military literature has
recognized quieting as a vital element in the
achievement of a submarine ASW capability. Submarine
construction during the last five years has shown
noise quieting improvements over earlier submarines.
Operational Units
On the basis of observed and projected produc-
tion rates, and rapid retirement of older diesel
powered units, the Soviet attack submarine force
will probably consist of about 235 operational
units by mid-1975, down from 280 in mid-1971.
Some 75 will be cruise missile types with 520
launch tubes-300 surface and 220 submerged.
About 160 submarines will be torpedo attack types
and probably about 45 of these will be nuclear
powered. Continued construction of the new
classes will probably be accompanied by rapid retire-
ment of older diesel powered units. The composition
of the projected 1975 force is shown in Table 2 on
page 37.
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Table 2
Operational Units of the
Soviet Attack Submarine Force
Cruise missile
classes
Nuclear
powered
E-I (6 SS-N-3)
E-II (8 SS-N-3)
C (8 SS-N-7)
P (at least 8
SS-N-?)
Diesel powered
W-conv (2 SS-N-3)
W-conv (4 SS-N-3)
J (4 SS-N-3)
Torpedo classes
Nuclear powered
N
V
E-I cony
A
New class
Diesel powered
W
Z
Q
F
R
B
Total
Total
Grand Total
1 June
Estimated
1971 Mid-1975
2
o
28
28
7
21
1
7
5
o
7
3
16
16
66
75
14
14
8
16
3
5
o
9
o
1
95
30
23
10
9
5
45
45
14
14
5
13
216
162
282
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Annex
Selected Characteristics of Soviet Attack Submarines
Class
Length Beam
(ft) (ft)
Operating
depth
limit
(ft) a
Maximum
submerged
speed (kts)
Patrol
characteristics
Average
transit
speed (kts)
Normal
patrol
duration
(days)
Weapons
b Torpedoes c
missiles
No. of
tubes
Type of
missile
Nuclear powered
360
30
1,000
30
12-14
60
32
E-I
375
30
1,000
26
12
60
22
6
SS-N-3
E-I conversion
375
30
1,000
28
10-12
60
22
E-II
385
30
1,000
24.5
12
60
22
8
SS-N-3
308
34
1,300
26.7
12-14
60
18
8
SS-N-7 d
(A)
C?
A
308
250
33
32
1,300
at least
32
undetermined
12-14
12-14 f
60
60 f
32
undetermined
d
d
)91/
1,300
I
348
38
1,300
undetermined
12-14 f
60 f
undetermined
at
SS-N-? d e
td
least
8
1-.
Diesel powered
249
23
656
13.5 (1 hr)
5
40
12
W (Long Bin)
275
23
656
12 (1 hr)
5
40
10
4
SS-N-3
W (Twin Cylinder)
249
23
656
12 (1 hr)
5
40
12
2
SS-N-3
295
24.5
750
15 (1 hr)
5
60
22
185
18
450
undetermined
coastal
operations
25
8
300
24.5
920
16 (1 hr)
5
60
22
250
23
920
15.5 (1 hr)
5
40
18
285
33
1,300
14 (1 hr)
3
60
22
4
SS-N-3
230
32
900
20 (1 hr)
undetermined
60
undetermined
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Footnotes
a. The operating depth limit is the depth to which a submarine may proceed during
normal operations. During emergencies a submarine may exceed this depth by
an indeterminate amount approaching collapse depth (which is substantially
greater) and still survive.
b. Patrol duration is the normal length of time that a submarine could remain at
sea without replenishment under combat conditions. It is estimaed on the
basis of crew endurance, general habitability and consumption of food, spare
bl parts, and other consumables including fuel.
c. Mines could be carried instead of or in combination with torpedoes.
d. i tcrpedo-like weapon may be operational and could be fired from the torpedo
tubes on the new classes of attack submarines. This system may be similar
to the US SUBROC system.
e. Type of missile is undetermined.
f. These figures are rough estimates based on other nuclear powered units under
construction.
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irek"F&'
Summary
During the Sixties, the Soviet attack submarine
force abandoned its pattern of local fleet area exer-
cises for an ambitious program of distant area de-
ployments. The force now maintains cruise missile
coverage of aircraft carriers deployed to forward
areas, conducts reconnaissance of Western naval
forces, and is acquiring experience in long range
patrols. Instead of procuring foreign bases for their
operations, the Soviets have opted for a mobile inde-
pendent system of repair ships, capable of operating
from international waters.
The evolution of the Soviet attack submarine
force reflects changing naval threats. Soviet re-
sponse to new threats resulted in three general
phases of submarine development. The first phase
took place during 1950-1957 when nearly 300 diesel
powered submarines were built for interdiction of
sea lines of communication and for defense of the
sea approaches to the USSR.
During the second phase, 1958-1966, nuclear pro-
pulsion and cruise missiles were incorporated into
Soviet submarines to meet the threat of US aircraft
carriers. Some 130 submarines were built in this
phase; about 50 were cruise missile types. Soviet
achievements in nuclear propulsion and cruise
missiles were overtaken by the need for a counter-
weapon to the Polaris type nuclear powered ballistic
missile submarines.
The present phase, which began in 1967 and will
probably extend at least until 1975, gives more
attention to antisubmarine capabilities. High
speed, advanced sonar, increased depth capability,
and new weapons are being incorporated in new classes
of submarines in an attempt to increase Soviet capa-
bilities to detect, intercept, trail, and destroy
hostile submarines.
Five new attack submarine classes are now being
produced--the V, B, C, P, and A classes, which are
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all nuclear powered with the exception of the B class.
The V, B, and A classes appear to be better designed
for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) than the older classes
of Soviet submarines. The V class is capable of 32
knots and thus may have the capability to trail US
submarines overtly. It is noisier than US attack
submarines, however. Although limited in range and
endurance, the B class can respond quickly to coastal
ASW alert and has the advantages of quiet submerged
operation. The A class is the smallest new Soviet
nuclear submarine. It may represent a Soviet attempt
to produce a deep diving, high speed submarine capable
of operating at greater depths in order to enhance
its capability to detect other submarines and to evade
ASW weapons. The C and P cruise missile classes rep-
resent continuing efforts to meet the US carrier
threat but both are estimated to have also an ASW
capability--primarily for self-protection.
As of June 1971, 21 units of the new classes had
been built and, by mid-1975, about 70 units are expected
to be operational, including one unit of a possible
sixth class.
Half of the Soviet attack submarine force is too
limited in range for effective use in interdiction
of the major sea lines of ?Jommunication in the Atlantic
and Pacific. There are, however, enough long range
units to maintain a continuous interdiction force of
20 to 25 submarines on station in the Atlantic and 10
to 15 in the Pacific. These numbers will increase
as the production of nuclear powered submarines con-
tinues. Interdiction exercises are conducted fre-
quently and the long range units of the submarine
force probably have achieved an interdiction capability.
The cruise missile submarines pose a threat to US
aircraft carriers, particularly if employed as pre-
emption weapons. This type of submarine has been seen
deployed in defensive barriers during exercises and
shadowing US ships in the Mediterranean, Atlantic,
and Pacific. The introduction of submerged launched
missiles in 1968 has further enhanced the Soviet
ability to effect a counter to the aircraft carrier.
- 41 -
SE ET
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Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 CO2013695
The thrust of current Soviet attack submarine ASW
activity appears to be in reconnaissance of Western
submarine areas and active exercise and tactical de-
velopment programs. While the USSR is evidently
avoiding any action which might be construed as in-
terfering with the US Polaris force, there is evidence
that it is attempting to develop trailing tactics
for contingency operations. Current Soviet attack
submarines are too noisy to conduct trailing operations
undetected. There are no indications that Soviet
command and control systems can support the exacting
requirements for simultaneously destroying a large
portion of the Polaris force.
By mid-1975, the attack submarine force will
probably decrease from its present size of about 280
operational units to some 235 operational units be-
cause of retirement of many older diesel submazines
About 100 of those remaining will be nuclear powered.
About 75 units probably will be cruise missile sub-
marines with a total of 520 missiles of which 220
can be launched while submerged.
- 42 -
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