WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: CERTAIN PROBLEMS IN THE COORDINATION OF LARGE UNITS AND UNITS OF ALLIED NAVIES IN COMBINED TACTICAL EXERCISES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: WARSAW PACT
• Keywords: ARMED FORCES
• Keywords: TROOP CONTROL
• Keywords: WARSAW PACT STATES
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001459997
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: February 24, 1975

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AR 70-14
71-7434.
-11111-1386?1411f-fete"Ifff-BE-REPRESHEBB?
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
24 February 1973
MINDRANDUki FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : WARSAW PACTJUJRNAL: Certain Problems in the
Coordination of Large Units and Units of Allied Navies in
Combined Tactical Exercises
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on articles from a SECRET Soviet publica-
tion called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical
Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This article concerns coordination
of combined naval forces in minesweeping efforts and in antisubmarine, air
and antimissile defense during combat operations in a 1972 tactical
exercise. Although generally successful, the exercise showed a need for
more emphasis on underwater sabotage and communications problems in future
combined training operations. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact
headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact
officers. This article appeared in Issue No. 5, which was published in
1973.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict-need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference r rts from this publication have been
assigned the Cod it
1 3.am
Deputy Director for erations
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Scientific Intelligence
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT
DATE OF
ROKX September 1972
SOURCE
---TarlEGRET
-111.1.8-13t3CUMENPI4W-meT-Beiteptereema?
Intelligence Information Special eport
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SUBJECT
"1124 February 1975
WARSAW PACT JCCRNAL: Certain Problems in the Coordination of Large Units
and Units of Allied Navies in Combined Tactical
Exercises
Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article from
a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Head-
ivarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This
journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists
of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article was written by Rear
Admiral V. Saakyan, who reviews problems of coordinating combined naval
forces in minesweeping efforts and in antisubmarine, air and antimissile
defense during combat operations in a 1972 tactical exercise. Although
generally successful, the exercise showed a need for more emphasis on
underwater sabotage and communications problems in future combined training
operations. ,This article appeared in Issue No. 5 which was
published in 1973.
End of Summary
Covalent:
There is no information in available reference materials which can be
firmly associated with the author. The names of authors are given in
Russian transliteration.
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Certain Problems in the Coordination of Large Units and
UWits or Allied Navies in combined Tactical txercises
by
Rear Admiral V. Saakyan
Deputy (lief of Staff of the Red
Banner Black Sea Fleet of the USSR
The unity of goals of the allied navies their combat capabilities, as
well as the geographic conditions of the Black Sea naval theater, require
close coordination in the carrying out of certain tasks.
As is known, the essence of tactical coordination is the coordination
of the operations of large units and units of navies according to goal
(objective), place, time, and methods, and the directing of their efforts
toward the achievement of the common goal. It depends to a considerable
extent on uninterrupted communications, warning, identification, and
exchange of information, as well as personal contact between commanders and
chiefs of staff of coordinating large units (units). Close tactical
coordination is especially important in the delivery of combined missile
and torpedo strikes against enemy ship groupings, in mutual support of the
passage of ships by sea in operational zones of allied navies, and in the
combat support of operations of groupings of forces.
Combat against enemy submarines will be successful only through
coordination between ship bunter-killer groups of the allied navies and
antisubmarine aviation, and through wide use of all means of observing the
underwater environment.
Antimissile defense of ships during passage by sea and at mobile
basing points should also be organized on the basis of combined operations
by allied naval forces.
Covering ships from the air, especially in remote areas of the sea, is
one of the most complex types of combat support of combined operations by
allied navies. Experience gained from training exercises shows that
successful air defense of ship large units can be achieved only through
efficient coordination of the operations of the air defense forces and
means of the allied countries and navies.
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As the exercises show, when organizing the defenz; and protection of
ships in roadsteads and at mobile basing points, serious attention must be
given to combatting enemy underwater sabotage forces and means. Without
reliable protection against than, a ship anchorage cannot be considered
secure.
A serious threat to ships in shallow areas of a theater is posed by
mines. In organizing anti-mine defense of ships at sea and at mobile
basing points, it is very important to plan a system of measures, including
anti-mine observation, search and destruction of mines, convoying of ships
behind minesweepers, destruction of minelayers, and timely warningof
allied naval forces concerning the danger of mines.
Al]. these matters were given attention at the combined tactical
exercise (training cruise) of ships of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, the
Navy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, and the Navy of the Socialist
Republic of Romania, held in September 1972.
In the exercise the tactical coordination of forces was worked out for
the performance of the following tasks:
-- search and destruction of strike groupings of enemy surface ships
and submarines;
-- air defense of ships during passage by sea and at mobile basing
points;
-- convoying of ships behind minesweepers, control minesweeping of
anchorages and channels and other types of defense and protection of ships
during passage by sea did at mobile basing points.
It should be noted that the weather in the area of the exercise was
unfavorable. The ships had to operate under fairly adverse conditions, but
in accomplishing their tasks the commanders of allied naval tactical groups
and ships displayed strong will, creative initiative, and an effort to
conduct persistent and aggressive combat operations. Their decisions were
specific in nature, corresponded to the assigned tasks, and were
coordinated and backed up by calculations. Of great value was the effort
by commanders of large units to find the optimum methods of utilizing their
forces for carrying out their assigned tasks. Measures were considered and
planned for comprehensive support of combat operations by allied naval
forces. At the same time, it seems to us, the areas could have been
assessed in greater detail than was done in the tactical exercise, from the
point of view of the currents, the nature of the depths, and the effect of
these factors on the organization of antisubmarine and anti-mine defense
and on combat against underwater sabotage forces and means.
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The exercise showed that in future combined opern"ons, it is
obviously necessary that a more extensive study be made of methods to
combat underwater sabotage forces and means, and that the plans of naval
base (large unit) commanders include more specific assignment of tasks to
subordinate forces with regard to repelling possible sabotage.
During the tactical exercise all planned measures were taken for
working out naval offensive operations and all types of defense. One group
of missile patrol boats and two groups of motor torpedo boats, using data
obtained by tactical reconnaissance and guidance data from a brigade
command post, delivered a successful strike against a detachment of combat
ships during passage by sea. The strike was delivered simultaneously from
various directions and from the furthermost ranges of fire. The personnel
of these boats acted decisively and with aggressiveness and speed.
During the exercise, air defense problems were worked out. Taking
part in them were aviation from the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet of the USSR
and aircraft from air defense aviation and the air forces of the Bulgarian
People's Army. The elements of coordination were worked out between ships
of the Black Sea Fleet and the Navy of the Bulgarian People's Republic on
the one hand, and forces and means from the air defense and the air forces
of the Bulgarian People's Army on the other, during combined repelling of
enemy strikes from the air. In all, there were nine instances of guiding
fighter planes framIshipboard control posts and eighteen from onshore
guidance posts of air defense units of the Bulgarian People's Republic. It
should be noted that the crews of the ships and the flight personnel
performed with boldness and confidence, displaying a high level of combat
training. It will clearly be useful in 1973 to move on to the study of the
problems of air defense of ships in a more complex situation and to begin
working out the covering of ship forces by fighter aviation over the full
tactical radius, with rebasing of fighters to airfields located near the
areas of operations of naval forces.
In the exercise a high level of combat training was noted among
submarine personnel.
The exercise confirmed that the use of all-arms antisubmarine forces
considerably enhances the effectiveness of submarine search. In our
opinion, it would be advisable in the future to improve coordination among
ships, patrol boats, aircraft, and helicopters of antisubmarine defense, to
work out a monitoring system for submarine search, and to develop combined
antisubmarine protection for detachments of combat ships by multinational
forces from allied navies.
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The combined exercise for submarine search conductc! by ships of the
Navy of the Bulgarian People's Republic and the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet
helped to further raise the level of tactical training of staff officers
and ship commanders, to improve mutual understanding, and to improve
coordination and teamwork among ships.
Another instructive feature of the exercise was the development of
several ways of defending a detachment of combat ships of the Red Banner
Black Sea Fleet in the zone of the Navy of the Socialist Republic of
Romania. Specifically, in order to ensure the anti-mine defense of a large
unit, a number of measures were taken, including even diving exploration of
ship anchorages for the purpose of seeking out bottom mines.
Contributing to the success of the combined operations was the
party-political activity carried out by the commanders and political
organizations of the allied navies during the exercise, which helped to
increase the combat readiness of ships and large units and to further
strengthen the fraternal ties and friendship among the peoples and servicemen
of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Socialist Republic of Romania,
and the Soviet Union.
Based on the experience of the tactical exercise, it would be
advisable, in our opinion, to continue the combined working out of problems
involving seeking out, tracking, and destroying submarines with the
participation of antisubmarine forces from the navies of the People's
Republic of Bulgaria and the Socialist Republic of Romania and from the
Red Banner Black Sea Fleet of the Soviet Union. Mien taking measures to
provide combat training for the forces of allied navies, more attention
should be given to working out problems of coordination communications at
the tactical level, using the YUG-2 set of documents.
It has obviously become necessary to have shortwave radio antenna
systems aboard ships, with a microphone system of operation, and to
complete the equipping of command posts of senior air defense commanders
with more powerful transmitters, which will make it possible to reduce the
time needed to transmit commands to one or two minutes.
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It would be advisable also to study in greater depth the methods of
conducting combined combat operations and to conduct more frequent cruises
in combined formations and combat dispositions, controlling the forces from
the command posts of the commanders of large units of the navies of the
People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Socialist Republic of Romania, and of
the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet of the USSR.
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