WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: THE EXPERIENCE OF CONDUCTING INTEGRATED CHECKS OF COMBAT READINESS IN THE PEOPLE'S NAVY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005508944
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: January 31, 1979

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2050$
31 January 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
SUBJECT
John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations
WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: The Experience of
C?"="7?ronucirlegraed Checks of Combat
Readiness in the People's Navy
AR 70-14
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is
part of a series now in preparation based on articles from a
SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the
Headquarters and the Technical Cottee rrthe Comtined Armed
Forces. This article is a synopsis of how the East German navy
does the combat readiness evaluation of a unit. It lists the
objectives, describes the general procedure, and offers some
techniques that have been found effective in improving the
quality of these evaluations, or checks, as the article calls\
them. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in
Moscow, and it consists ?of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This
article appeared in Issue No, 12, which was published in 1976,
2, Because the source of this report is extremely
sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict
need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of
reference, reports from this publication have been assigned the
Codeword
TS #798005
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center
Director of Strategic Research
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Intelligence Information Special Report
COUNTRY EAST GERMANY/WARSAW PACT
DATE OF
INFO. 1976
SUBJECT
Page 3 of 10 Pages
DATE
31 January 1979
WARSAW PACT JOURNATc: The Experience of Conducting Integrated
Checks of Combat Readiness in the People's Navy
=ACE Documentary
Summar7:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an
article from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information
Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical-MITITIMI?of the
Combined Armed Forces, This journal is published by Warsaw Pact
Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw
Pact officers. This article was written by Rear Admiral G.
Hesse, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the East German
Navy. It is a synopsis of how the East German navy does the
combat readiness evaluation of a unit. It lists the objectives,
describes the general procedure, and offers some techniques that
have been found effective in improving the quality of these
evaluations, or checks, as the article calls them. This article
appeared in Issue No. 12, which was published in 1976.
End of Summary
[Comment:
Rear Admiral Gustav Hesse has been Chief of Staff of the
East German Navy since 1971.
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The Experience of Conducting Integrated Checks
of Combat Readiness in the People's Navy
by
? Rear Admiral G. Hesse,
Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff,
People's Navy of the German Democratic Republic
The effective defense of socialism requires that all
branches of the armed forces of the National People's Army of the
German Democratic Republic, including the People's Navy, maintain
constant combat readiness and the capability of quickly bringing
their forces to a higher level of readiness.
Speaking to activists of army Party organizations, the
Minister of Defense of the German Democratic Republic, General of
the Army Heinz HOFFMANN stressed that combat readiness means that
state of the control organs and troops which at any time under
complex situational conditions ensures the repulse of an
aggressor's strikes and enables groupings of our forces, by
delivering crushing strikes against the enemy, to successfully
develop subsequent combat actions.
The state of combat readiness, as is known, is characterized
by a large number of ideological-political, military, and
military-technical factors. It seems to us that this array of
factors must find its expression in the manner of checking combat
readiness. Obviously, in the course of a check, it is necessary
to determine the degree to which the control organs and troops of
the large unit or unit being checked are ready to carry out the
assigned tasks within the set times under conditions close to
those of combat, and to determine the degree to which they are
prepared to achieve victory in present-day warfare. This means,
in our view, that in the course of such a check, along with other
things, the following elements must be evaluated!
- the political, moral, psychological, and physical training
of all the personnel for war, their readiness to carry out the
tasks confronting them, and the state of military discipline and
order;
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- the availability of prepared command posts and the ability
of the commanders and staffs to exercise continuous troop
control;
- the organization of the transition of forces to a higher
level of combat readiness, and the fulfilment of the norms
established by guideline documents;
- the level of strength in personnel, weapons, and
equipment;
- the status of the weapons and combat equipment, and the
maintenance of the prescribed technical readiness factors for
ships and weapons;
- the availability and condition of materiel and technical
reserves;
- the level of operational-tactical, tactical, and combat
training.
Special attention in the preparation and conduct of an
integrated check of combat readiness is given to ensuring its
zglEuise naIaLt, allowing no oversimplifications, keeping to a
minimum restrictions on the actions of forces when they go over
to full combat readiness, and seeing to it that the control
or :a, I troo s are assi edfr?ariffic o erational-tactical and
combat tasks w ic correspond to t e speci lc situationa
In summing up the results of such checks, the main goal is
to determine measures aimed at the further increase of combat
readiness and, particularly, to come up with conclusions and
proposals with respect to the following matters.
- the further improvement of the political and military
training and indoctrination of the personnel;
- the improvement of the organizational bases needed to
bring the forces to higher levels of combat readiness;
- the continuous reduction of the time norms established for
bringing the forces to higher levels of combat readiness
(placement of personnel on combat alert, notification and
assembling of personnel, full supplying of ships and boats with
combat means, dispersal and preliminary deployment of forces) and
the working out and employment of new methods for the combat use
of ships and boats, weapons, and combat equipment.
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We endeavor to organize checks in a way that they become for
the troops being checked and for each serviceman in the People's
Navy guideposts in the matter of the further increase of combat
readiness. In accordance with this goal, a graphic outline of
the check is drawn up in advance on a nautical chart, along with
a legend. It includes the theme, goal, and time of the check, as
well as its stages and the main support problems and measures.
The outline is approved by the Deputy Minister of National
Defense/Chief of the Main Staff of the National People's Army of
the German Democratic Republic. A plan is then worked out for
the conduct of the check, which reflects the specific course of
actions to be taken by the forces participating in it, as well as
a list of the hypothetical situations and events.
From the point of view of drawing up the plan, our
experience confirms that it is most expedient, in accordance with
the outline of the check, to depict graphically on charts the
tasks to be accomplished and the time and place of the actions.
In the course of the check of combat readiness, tasks are
assigned to the forces in the form of combat orders and
instructions in accordance with the main principles of the combat
employment of the branch arms of the naval forces and with
conditions approximating an actual situation.
To maintain secrecy, the complete content of the check is
given to a limited circle of officers; the others are admitted to
the development of only individual matters in the plan, which
they prepare in the form of variants. They are not informed of
the times of the check.
In recent years, for a greater in-depth check of combat
readiness, the naval staff has coordinated support matters in
advance with the branches of the armed forces of the National
People's Army and the allied fleets in the Baltic Sea. For
.example, the Navy of the Polish People's Republic has allocated
submarines and naval aviation to represent the enemy; these have
ensured a check of the forces of the People's Navy that contains
the element of surprise and approximates real conditions.
It would be desirable in the future to coordinate in advance
mutual support measures for checks of combat readiness and to
draw on the necessary forces and means.
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In the preparation and conduct of checks of combat
readiness, a simultaneous check of combat and mobilization
readiness is, in our opinion, of great importance. The point is
that in this instance it is possible to get a real picture of the
readiness and capability of the control organs and troops to go
over to a wartime structure and to conduct combat actions.
Taken into consideration here should be the fact that it is
not always possible to conduct a check of mobilization readiness
with the involvement of reservists and technical means from the
national economy. Therefore, provision has to be made for
alternative variants that approximate the real ones, for example,
the use of active-duty personnel of other subunits to represent
certain mobilization resources.
In other instances, for the check of reception points, the
personnel and equipment of the subunits being checked have been
used to represent "reservists and equipment."
The experience of checks that have been conducted shows that
the smaller the number of restrictions on the actions of the
forces and control organs in going over to increased levels of
readiness, the greater the possibilities for thoroughly
discovering the actual preparedness of the large units being
checked.
The combat readiness check connected with the carrying out
of mobilization measures and performance of combat tasks has
proved to be an important form of evaluating the capability of
the control organs and the fleet forces to accomplish their
characteristic tasks under real conditions. Establishing complex
situational conditions and building up the situation in the
course of the checks have required the commanders and staffs to
react immediately to changes in the situation and make sound
decisions.
By analyzing the results of the checks, we have found
possible ways of reducing the times involved in signalling an
alert, notifying and assembling personnel, dispersing forces, and
conducting other measures to bring forces to higher levels of
readiness.
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Having a substantial effect on the combat readiness of ships
is the maintenance of a high and stable technical readiness
factor for ships, weapons, and technical means. These matters
are given the closest attention in the People's Navy.
The goal of all measures when checks of combat readiness are
conducted is, in the final analysis, to develop among personnel
the capability of carrying out complex combat tasks and
effectively employing their weapons in the shortest period of
time and under any situational conditions.
Of great importance for the successful conduct of such
checks has been the allocation of monitoring groups or officer
monitors to the large units and units being checked. Their
composition and preparedness must be such as to ensure an
integrated evaluation of actions when the fleet forces go over to
higher levels of combat readiness and an evaluation of combat
task performance and all-round support.
The admirals and officers making up the monitoring groups
must be able to evaluate realistically the control organs and the
fleet forces being checked; for this they must have good
specialized knowledge.
Also proving to be a positive factor has been the use of
tables listing the main time norms for the execution of measures
to bring the forces to increased readiness. A record of the
times attained by the large unit, unit, or their subunits being
checked and a comparision of the target and actual results make
it possible to draw the necessary conclusions.
It is helpful to use previously prepared forms for the
monitoring groups to report on the results of the check. They
make it possible to depict graphically the necessary data for a
thorough analysis of the results of the check of combat readiness
and do not require the preparation of voluminous reports.
To analyze and evaluate the indices achieved, it is good to
designate a critique group. Its task is to work out an overall
evaluation of the state of combat and mobilization readiness
while the check is still going on, based on the stage-by-stage
reports presented by the monitoring groups. Here, in our view,
it is particularly important to draw the proper conclusions
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directed towards further improvement of the combat readiness of
the large unit or unit being checked, as well as of the fleet as
a whole.
It has proved to be expedient in the analysis of check
measures that, after each measure is carried out, the directors
of the monitoring groups or the monitoring officers submit their
written reports in the form of prepared report forms and norm
tables to the critique group and in this way contribute to a
reduction of the preparation period for the critique.
The director of the check also hears reports at the
conclusion of each stage of the check.
All these measures make it possible to perform a
comprehensive and realistic analysis and evaluate actions within
a brief period of time, and they contribute to obtaining a
realistic picture of the state of the combat and mobilization
readiness of the large unit or unit that has been checked.
The critique of the results of the check is carried out
through the hearing of oral reports of the monitoring groups by
the director of the check in the presence of the commander and
deputy commanders of the large unit Or unit being checked, with
subsequent approval of the reports.
In another instance, an overall evaluation of the state of
the combat and mobilization readiness of the large unit being
checked is given in a report by the director of the check before
the responsible commanders and officers of the particular large
unit and of other large units of the fleet, This form of
analysis is particularly effective, since it makes it possible to
convey the acquired experience quickly to the large units of the
fleet; however, it is not always suitable because of secrecy
considerations.
In both instances, a written report on the results of the
check is drawn up. The report sets forth the conclusions that
will be used in improving the combat readiness of the fleet, and
determines the tasks directed at eliminating the shortcomings
found.
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In conclusion, we believe that it is useful to note that the
constant search for new ways of improving the existing system of
checks is a necessary condition for increasing the combat
readiness of the fleet forces. Hence, in the interests of
increasing the integrated nature of the checks, it seems
advisable at the present time:
- to further improve the coordination and mutual support of
the checks of the combat readiness among the branches of the
armed forces of the National People's Army and the allied fleets
in the Baltic Sea;
- to carry out checks of combat readiness simultaneously in
the large units, units, and rear services installations and to
constantly improve the methodology of checking combat readiness.
We are convinced that such measures will make it possible to
check thoroughly the cooperation of multiple-arm forces in joint
combat actions and the problems of mutual support, thus promoting
the consistent improvement of the combat readiness of the
People's Navy.
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