SOVIET CAPABILITIES TO COUNTER US AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005512849
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: May 1, 1972

Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
CIA HISTORICAL RELEASE
PROGRAM
,JUNE 2017
DIRECTORATE OF
IN
Intelligence Report
AR 70-14
Soviet Capabilities to Counter US Aircraft Carriers
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
fr$1,t,ttf.
-TorSeepEat,
SR IR 72-10
May 1972
Copy N2 63
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
77714?!-+44.14-1L1L
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
May 1972
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Soviet Capabilities to Counter
US Aircraft Carriers
Introduction
Major elements of the Soviet naval forces are
designed specifically to counter the aircraft car-
rier. The Soviets began to develop their anticarrier
forces in the mid-Fifties, when the nuclear-armed
aircraft based on US carriers became a potential
threat to the Soviet homeland. Anticarrier capabil-
ities continued to grow during the Sixties as Soviet
naval operations expanded beyond coastal waters. The
Soviets recognized that deployed naval forces had to
be protected from carrier-based air power.
The Soviets chose to counter Western carrier
forces primarily with antiship cruise missiles,
rather than attempting to build their own carriers.
Cruise missiles have become the main armament on
Soviet submarines, aircraft, and surface ships de-
signed to combat Western surface forces.
This report describes the Soviet response to the
US carrier threat. It traces the development of
anticarrier forces and describes their operations.
It examines recent improvements in these forces and
assesses the anticarrier capabilities of the USSR.
A summary of the report begins on page 37.
Note: This report was prepared by the Office of
Strategic Research and coordinated within CIA.
77-Tr-s-442,1LLIL
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Contents
Page
Soviet Perception of the Carrier Threat
3
Potential for Strikes on Soviet Territory .
3
Vulnerability of Soviet Naval Forces at Sea
3
Support of Foreign Interventions
4
Soviet Strategy for Anticarrier Warfare
4
Anticarrier Forces . . . .......
6
Main Elements of Soviet Anticarrier Forces
7
Missile Systems . ......... . ? ?
9
Deployment Patterns . ...... . . .
9
Anticarrier Operations and Training . . . .
9
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Activity
9
Naval Air Reactions to Carrier Operations
10
Surveillance of Carriers by Surface
Ships and Submarines . . ?
11
Anticarrier Strike Tactics
12
Submarines
12
Aircraft . . . . . . ....
17
Surface Ships . . .........
20
Coordinated Exercises Against Simulated
Carriers .. . ? ? ? ? e ? 0 ? ?
21
Summary of Northern Fleet Anticarrier
Exercise in 1971 . . . ..
22
Soviet Capabilities Against Carrier Forces
26
Anticarrier Strike Capabilities
26
Dependence on Reconnaissance Systems .
27
Limited Conventional Warfare Capability
28
Defense of Soviet Territory
29
Defense of Soviet Naval Forces
30
Counterbalance to Carrier Forces in Peacetime
31
Outlook for Anticarrier Forces
32
Summary
37
Annex A. Selected Soviet Naval Order of Battle
41
Annex B. Technical Characteristics of Selected
Soviet Naval Weapons Systems
48
Illustrations
Growth and Deployment of Soviet Anticarrier
Forces (chart)
8
Typical Weapons Systems of Soviet Anticarrier
Forces (photographs) . . . . . . .
14-15
Northern. Fleet Anticarrier Exercise,
25 June - 1 July 1971 (map) .... . ? ? ? 23
Coordinated Mock Attacks in "Exercise Ocean" (map) 25
Systems Under Development (photographs) . . . . . 34
TO
2 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Soviet Perception of the Carrier Threat
The Soviets view US carriers as a threat to the
Soviet mainland and to Soviet forces at sea, and as
weapons used in support of foreign interventions.
Their public statements tend to disparage the air-
craft carrier as an antiquated and vulnerable weapon
system, but the efforts devoted to anticarrier war-
fare capabilities clearly indicate respect for the
combat potential of modern carrier forces.*
Potential for Strikes on Soviet Territory
The importance of carrier-based aircraft in a
strategic strike role has declined since the advent
of intercontinental ballistic missile systems, but
the Soviets still consider the carrier a strategic
threat. In the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT), for example, they have insisted that the
strategic attack capabilities of US carrier forces
be considered. They have shown little concern,
however, for the threat of carriers operating in
support of amphibious landings on Soviet territory.
Vulnerability of Soviet Naval Forces at Sea
US attack carriers pose a threat to the opera-
tions of Soviet naval surface forces, and antisub-
marine warfare (ASW) carriers threaten the large
Soviet submarine force.
The USSR does not have aircraft carriers, and
its surface forces operate without air cover while
on the open ocean. During the Fifties, Soviet naval
forces rarely ventured far from their own coasts and
cculd rely to a degree on land-based aircraft. Since
the early Sixties, however, the Soviet surface forces
* The US currently has 14 attack carriers, three
antisubmarine warfare carriers, and one carrier
used in a training role.
- 3 -
717-Tr-i-4444z1:
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
have established a permanent presence in the Mediter-
ranean Sea and conducted regular operations in the
Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans. Without a
counter to US carriers, these forces are vulnerable.
The USSR has limited access to the open seas,
and its submarine fleet must pass through restricted
waters to reach operating areas. Soviet writings
note that in war the US would establish ASW barriers
in such restricted passages, and that carrier forces
could form a portion of the defenses. The problem
of forcing such barriers is a major concern of Soviet
planners.
Support of Foreign Interventions
The Soviets have long recognized, and condemned,
the role of US carriers in peacetime interventions
and limited war situations. Criticism of the carrier
as a means of projecting US power in the Third World
is a recurring theme in Soviet publications. US
carrier operations against North Korea and North
Vietnam, for example, have been vigorously denounced.
Behind the propaganda barrage against the carrier
as an "oppressor of national liberation movements"
lies a tacit admission of the effectiveness of the
carrier in supporting US foreign policy interests.
Soviet Strategy for Anticarrier Warfare
In the mid-Fifties, with the appearance of
nuclear-armed strike aircraft on carriers, the Soviet
Navy was assigned the mission of destroying carriers
before they could come within striking distance of
the USSR. The alternative of relying solely on air
defenses was rejected because the Soviets were not
confident that air defenses could stop all attacking
aircraft. Destruction of the carriers before they
launched their aircraft would, on the other hand,
provide an absolute defense.
- 4 -
-177Tr-i4(2,..LLEJL
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
The Soviets considered building aircraft carriers
to provide sea-based air defenses. They had no ex-
perience with aircraft carriers, however, and prob-
ably at least six to eight years would have been
needed to develop the first Soviet carrier forces--
carriers, suitable aircraft, escorts, and auxiliaries.
Such a program, moreover, would have challenged
Western fleets in their area of greatest strength--
the Soviets would have had difficulty overcoming the
qualitative and quantitative superiority of the
Western forces.
The decision to develop anticarrier forces re-
flected a major change in Soviet naval policy.
Previously the Soviet Navy had been primarily a
coastal defense force. The new anticarrier mission,
although also defensive, required that the Soviet
Navy actively seek out and attack naval forces on
the high seas.
A major factor in the decision to adopt the
anticarrier concept was the development of cruise
missile technology. The Soviets considered the
long-range antiship cruise missile a "revolutionary"
weapon, particularly when armed with a nuclear war-
head. Just as the airplane had made the battleship
obsolete, they contended, the cruise missile would
make the aircraft carrier obsolete--missiles could
be launched from outside the carrier's protective
screen, and saturation tactics would assure th,T.t at
least one missile reached the target.*
Instead of attempting to match the carrier forces
of the West, therefore, the Soviets decided to rely
primarily on missile-armed submarines and shore-based
aircraft. The types of aircraft and submarines
available to the Soviet Navy in the mid-Fifties had
sufficient range to engage.a carrier before it came
within striking distance of the USSR. Surface ships
* More detailed information on antiship cruise mis-
siles is contained in SH IR 71-19, The Soviet Naval
Cruise Missile Force: Development and Operational
Employment, December 1971
- 5 -
77-714-4,;cd.t.LI.
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
were considered less suitable for this task because
of their vulnerability to air attack.
The Soviets also believed that they could destroy
some carriers in port. This was one of the missions
assigned to the ballistic missile submarine forces
which the Soviets began to develop in the mid-Fifties.
(Such operations, considered a form of strategic as-
tack mission, are not discussed in this report.)
Anticarrier Forces
The requirement for anticarrier defenses was the
major influence on the development of the Soviet
general purpose naval forces from the mid-Fifties
through the mid-Sixties. During this period deploy-
ment of new weapon systems designed for the anti-
carrier mission was given priority over systems
intended mainly for coastal operations. The most
significant changes were:
the deployment of long-range diesel-
and nuclear-powered submarines,
the reequipment of naval aviation with
long-range aircraft, and
the adoption of the cruise missile as
the primary antiship weapon for sub-
marines, aircraft, and some surface ships.
in the mid-Sixties, the Soviets began to place
more emphasis on ASW capabilities, but continued
to strengthen the anticarrier forces as well. New
anticarrier weapons were developed and force levels
steadily increased. Submarines and aircraft con-
tinued to form the principal anticarrier forces, but
the anticarrier capabilities of the surface forces
were also improved.
Tables showing the development of the anticarrier
forces and a detailed order of battle for the current
forces are contained in Annex A, appended. The main
elements of the anticarrier forces as of 1 May 1972
are summarized at right.
- 6 -
71-75T3-7tH;44.L112_
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
--777P-S-7175(411-ELL
Main Elements of Soviet Anticarrier Forces
Cruise missile submarines
40 nuclear-powered
20 diesel-powered
Of these, 58 submarines carry missiles which can be launched only when the
submarine is surfaced--most have the 220-nm SS-N-3, but some possibly are changing to
the new 150-nm SS-N-9 missile. Nine submarines are armed with the 30-nm SS-N-7
submerged-launch missile, and one carries an unidentified missile which is believed to be
submerged-launched and to have a range of over 100 nm.
Missile-armed aircraft
275 Badger medium bombers
Of these, 165 carry the 110-nm AS-2 missile, and 110 carry the 120-nm AS-5
missile or the new 300-nm AS-6 missile.
Missile-armed surface ships
8 cruisers armed with a 150-nm version of the SS-N-3 missile
3 patrol craft with the 150-nm SS-N-9
5 ships with the 25-nm SS-N-10
Another eight ships have the obsolescent
phased OW.
Other naval forces
SS-N-1 missile, which is being
About 300 long-range reconnaissance aircraft and free-fall bombers
These aircraft operate in direct ,upport of the prima-ry anticarrier strike forces.
About 200 gun-armed surface ships of destroyer escort size or larger
Over 200 torpedo attack submarines
'These forces have a variety of missions in addition to their role in anticarrier
warfare.
Technical characteristL.s of these forces are summarized in Annex B. Table B-5 provides
a reference !ist of antiship missiles and launch platforms.
? 7 ?
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
770,--S-E-C42-LiaL
1,000
Number of
missile launchers
800
600
400
200
on surface shlp?
041
110
1958
Mid-year
1960
1962
1954
Baltic Sea Fleet
132 cruise missile launchers
35 diesel submarines
192 recon/strike aircraft
48 surface combatants
Black Sea Fleet
119 cruise missile launchers
26 diesel submarines
129 recon/strike aircraft
71 surface combatants
1966
Northern Fleet
337 cruise missile launchers
43 nuclear submarines
93 diesel submarines
132 recon/strike aircraft
52 surface combatants
1972
Growth and
Deployment
of Soviet
Anticarrier Forces
Pacific Fleet
327 cruise missile launchers
24 nuclear submarines
65 diesel submarines
182 recon/strike aircraft
53 surface combatants
Forces shown include all Soviet attack submarines, naval reconnaissance and strike
aircraft, major surface combatants, and Nanuchka class patrol craft. Naval forces de-
ployed outside home waters?units in the Mediterranean squadron, for example?are in-
cluded in the totals for their home fleets.
? 8 ?
T , ET
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
7-07-S+=c,42.1:LL
Missile Systems
The forces described on page 7 have a total of
915 launchers for nine different antiship missiles.
The graph at left shows the growth of this force
since the mid-Fifties.
Additional missiles with anticarrier capabilities
are deployed with the strategic bomber forces (see
page 19). The Soviets also adopted cruise missiles
for coastal defense, using both shore-based launchers
and small patrol boats. (These systems would not
normally be used in an anticarrier role and are not
discussed in this report.)
Deployment Patterns
Forces with anticarrier capabilities are as-
signed to all four fleet areas--Northern, Baltic,
Black Sea, and Pacific. The main concentrations of
anticarrier forces are in the Northern and Pacific
fleet areas. The Soviets also maintain a permanent
deployment of anticarrier forces in the Mediterranean.
The deployment pattern is shown in the map at left,
and a detailed breakdown of the deployment of in-
dividual weapon systems is contained in Annex A.
Anticarrier Operations and Training
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Activity
The Soviets obtain general information on carrier
activity by intercepting electronic emissions from
the carriers. They rely mainly on long-range radio
direction finding for the initial location of carrier
forces at sea, although efforts to monitor carrier
activity probably begin with intelligence operations
directed against carriers in port.
-- 9 -
777r-s-ylgILLI
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
For reliable and detailed coverage of carrier
movements, the Soviets employ a combination of aerial
reconnaissance and close surveillance by surface ships
and submarines. Reconnaissance and surveillance ac-
tivity becomes progressively more intense as carrier
forces approach the USSR. Carriers operating within
launch range of Soviet territory are subjected to
nearly continuous observation.
Naval Air Reactions to Carrier Operations
Since the navy acquired TU-95 Bear D long-range
reconnaissance aircraft in 1965, about percent
of all aircraft carrier transits in the Atlantic and
Pacific have been subjected to aerial reconnaissance.
Bears and M-type Bisons of the strategic bomber forces
have also been involved in reactions to carrier tran-
sits, notably in the early Sixties before the navy
was equipped with the Bear D (see photograph on
page 14). Some of these operations probably are for
training purposes, but many are flown to collect
intelligence on the carrier forces.
A typical reconnaissance of a carrier transit is
performed by one pair of Bear aircraft, with another
pair assigned as backup. Some missions include direct
overflights of the carrier for visual and photographic
coverage. In other cases the Bears approach no closer
than 100 to 200 nautical miles, relying on radar and
passive sensors for information. The Bear D is fitted
with a variety of Elint (electronic intelligence)
equipment,
Aerial reconnaissance missions usually are not
launched unless the approximate position of the carrier
is known. The purpose of most missions is not to search
the ocean for a carrier, but to define the exact loca-
tion and composition of a carrier force previously
identified by the radio direction finding network or
- 10 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
other sources. The fact that these missions are
almost always successful in "finding" the carrier,
therefore, reflects the capabilities of other intel-
ligence gathering systems rather than the naval air
reconnaissance capability.
An example of a true search mission by Soviet
naval aviation occurred during "Exercise Ocean" in
April 1970. Six Bear aircraft performed an extended
mission in the North Atlantic, sweeping from the
Norwegian Sea to the vicinity of Newfoundland and
the Azores.
There were no carrier forces in
the area searched, but the mission is representative
of the type of operation that would be needed to search
for naval forces not previously located.
Most missions against carrier transits have taken
place in the western North Pacific and the eastern
North Atlantic. Some operations have been conducted
in the Philippine Sea, and one carrier was overflown
in the western North Atlantic by a naval Bear re-
turning to the USSR from a visit to Cuba.
Carrier operations in the Norwegian Sea, the
Sea of Japan, and the eastern Mediterranean are
usually subjected to intensive aerial reconnaissance.
Badger medium bombers figure prominently in this
activity in all three areas, especially in the Med-
iterranean. Carriers of the US Sixth Fleet are
regularly subjected to reconnaissance in the eastern
Mediterranean and in fact are the primary target of
Soviet naval Badgers based in Egypt.
Surveillance of Carriers by Surface
Ships and Submarines
Soviet intelligence collection ships (AGIs)
provide some information on carrier operations.
They are fitted with a variety of Elint and Comint
equipment and are deployed world-wide. They have
monitored US carrier operations in the Gulf of
Tonkin, for example, and have reported the de-
parture of carriers from US home ports. The AGIs
T 0
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
71777r-ti-74;141;a1
are not armed and do not have sufficient speed to
trail a fast-moving carrier force.
Surface combatants frequently trail carriers
operating within strike range of Soviet territory.
They provide information on flight operations and
other carrier activities, as well as continuous
position data.
Nuclear submarines have been used to trail
carrier task forces only occasionally on the open
ocean, but frequently in the eastern Mediterranean.
Although a surface ship is better equipped to ob-
serve carrier operations, a submarine is less
vulnerable to counterattack under combat conditions.
Submarines are also employed to establish barrier
patrols in areas through which a carrier force is
expected to pass. Both diesel and nuclear subma-
rines have been used for such operations, primarily
in the Norwegian Sea, the northwest Pacific and the
Mediterranean.
Anticarrier Strike Tactics
Soviet writings and exercise activity indicate
that anticarrier forces would try to attack before
carrier-based aircraft could be launched against
the USSR. Coordinated strikes by different systems
would be used to saturate the carrier's defenses.
The Soviets recognize, however, that independent
attacks by small forces may be necessary in the
attempt to destroy or disable a carrier before it
can launch its strike aircraft.
Submarines*
some information on strike tactics for Jle
* Additional information on these forces is con-
tained in SR IM 71-11, The Soviet Attack Submarine
Force. Evolution and Operations. June 1971
- 12 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
surface-launched SS-N-3 missile system carried by
the E, J, and some W class submarines. Although
targeting information for SS-N-3 firings can be
supplied by any appropriately positioned aircraft,
surface ship, or submarine, the preferred tactic
involves the use of a Bear D to provide targeting
data for a submarine located about 150 nm from the
target. When possible, firings from two or more
submarines would be coordinated so that the missiles
arrive on target nearly simultaneously and from dif-
ferent directions.
SS-N-3 missiles could be launched at ranges up
to about 220 nm. Vulnerability of the submarine
would generally decrease with an increase in range,
but the target acquisition problem would be further
complicated and the coordination of strikes by widely
separated forces would be more difficult. In addi-
tion, missile flight time would be increased and the
defending forces would have a better chance for
interception.
Attacks from shorter ranges would be more vul-
nerable to counterattack, because the submarine
needs at least several minutes to surface, launch,
and provide initial guidance to the SS-N-3 missile.
A surfaced submarine could be defended by a surface
combatant armed with surface-to-air missiles, and
SAM-armed ships have operated in conjunction with
cruise missile submarines. This tactic would not
always be practicable, however, and the presence of
the surface ship could be counterproductive if it
attracted the attention of defending forces.
Strike tactics for the new C class submarine armed
with the submerged-launched 30-nm SS-N-7 missile are
different from those employed by the SS-N-3 units.
The nuclear-powered C class has sufficient speed
and endurance to intercept and trail a carrier task
force under most circumstances. The maximum speed
of US carriers is greater than the 27
knots of the C class, but conventionally powered
- 13 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Typical Weapons Systems
Bear D
The Bear D is a maritime recon-
naissance variant of the TU-95
heavy bomber. It is specially
equipped to provide targeting data
for cruise missile submarines and
surface ships. About 50 are in
service.
E-Il Class
The E-ll class nuclear-powered
submarine carries eight SS-N-3 mis-
siles. The Soviets have 28 sub-
marines of this 'lass, plus two units
of the earlier E-I version carrying
six missiles each. The maximum
range of the SS-N-3 is 220 nm. It
can be launched only when the sub-
marine is on the surface.
J Class
The diesel-powered J class sub-
marine carries four SS-N-3 missiles.
Sixteen of these submarines are in
service, including some at are
being equipped with new SS-N-9
missiles, also launched from the sur-
face. The Soviets also have a dozen
.r-1100C older W class diesel-powered sub-
marines that carry two or four
SS-N-3 missiles.
? 14 ?
C Class
The nuclear-powered C class is
the first submarine capable of firing
cruise missiles while submerged. It
carries eight SS-N-7 missiles with a
range of about 30 nm. Nine units
are now in service.
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
of Soviet Anticarrier Forces
Badger C With AS-2
The AS-2 Kipper missile carried
by the TU-16 Badger C has a maxi-
mum range of about 110 nm.
About 165 Badgers are equipped to
carry the AS-2, which has been in
service since 1960.
Badger G With AS-5s
The AS-5 Kelt missile is carried
in pairs by the TU-16 Badger G.
The AS-5 entered service in 1965
and has a range of up to 120 nm.
About 110 Badger G aircraft are in
service. Some of these have been re-
equipped with a newer missile, the
300-nm AS-6.
Kynda Cruiser
The Kynda class light cruiser
carries 16 missiles for its eight
SS-N-3 launchers. Four Kyndas
were built in the early Sixties.
Another four missile cruisers, with
four SS-N-3 launchers?the Kresta I
class?were built in the late Sixties.
Nanuchka Patrol Craft
The small Nanuchka class guided
missile patrol craft is a threat to
some carrier operations. It carries
six SS-N-9 missiles with a range of
up to 150 nm. Three units are now
in service and production con-
tinues.
?
? 15 ?
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
T
carriers and escorts have limited endurance at high
speeds and only nuclear-powered units can maintain
high speeds over extended periods.
The sonar and Elint sensors of the C class sub-
marine probably are capable of passively detecting a
carrier within missile range, pelmitting targeting
without external assistance. A C class submarine
probably could launch all eight of its SS-N-7 mis-
siles in rapid succession--a Soviet press article
probably referring to the C class describes the mis-
siles as leaving the water like a "flight of geese."
The missiles themselves are believed to be self-
guiding, freeing the submarine for evasive action
after launch.
Under some circumstances a C class unit might
receive targeting assistance to supplement its
sensors. Soviet operations in the Mediterranean
have included simultaneous activity in the vicinity
of a US carrier by a C class submarine and a Soviet
surface combatant. In such a case, the surface
combatant could pass target information to the sub-
marine via underwater communications systems. This
tactic could be employed for preemptive strikes,
but probably would not be feasible under combat con-
ditions. The basic concept for C class operations,
therefore, probably emphasizes independent attack.
No information is available on the strike tactics
that would be employed by the single P class submarine,
which has not yet deployed beyond home waters. The
missiles carried by the P class are believed to be
launched under water and to have a range of over
100 nm. Tactics for this system may be a mixture
of SS-N-3 and SS-N-7 tactics--relying on external
targeting at long range but using an independent
attack capability at close range.
- 16 -
-71.7711-42,42...E1
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
-77m,--ti+42,42J.111L
Torpedo-attack submarines have participated in
some anticarrier strike exercises, and Soviet writings
have discussed torpedo attacks against carriers.
The majority of
Soviet torpedo-attack submarines are diesel-powered
units with limited capabilities against a modern
carrier task force. The newer nuclear-powered units
would have greater capabilities, but are probably
oriented more to ASW than to anticarrier operations.
Thus, torpedo attack submarines can be expected to
engage carrier forces as opportunities arise, but
in wartime their role would be minor in comparison
with that of cruise missile units.
Aircraft
Frequent training exercises--some using US
aircraft carriers as targets--indicate that anti-
carrier strikes by Soviet naval aviation would in-
volve mass attacks by ASM-carriers, supported by
aircraft carrying electronic countermeasures (ECM)
gear and by reconnaissance aircra:t.
An exercise
carrier
against a simulated
illustrates Soviet anti-
carrier strike tactics. One part of this exercise
involved a simulated
of Badgers:
missile attack by a force
- 17 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
7:771.1-54;44-11."
Other exercises have involved larger aircraft
forces, with several groups attacking simultaneously
from different directions. Such strikes have been
conducted independently or as part of a coordinated
operation with surface and submarine forces.
Some aircraft of the strategic bomber forces--
Long Range Aviation--also participate in anticarrier
strike exercises. Naval activity by these aircraft
is a secondary mission,
Exercises indicate,
- 18 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
77.7r-s4444.4.L.:11
however, that the Soviets are prepared to use these
aircraft for alticarrier missions if necessary:
TU-95 Bears armed with the AS-3 missile
are usually employed in small groups of
two or three aircraft. This differs
from the saturation tactics favored by
the Soviets, and the probable inten-
tion is to use a few of these long-
range aircraft against carrier forces
located outside the strike range of
other forces. The AS-3 missile is
not believed to have an antiship
homing system, but it carries a large
nuclear warhead that could be effec-
tive without a direct hit. In the
anticarrier role it could be launched
at ranges up to about 180 nm. Even if
such an attack did not destroy the
carrier, it could cause considerable
damage, leaving the carrier more
vulnerable to attacks by other forces.
-- Badgers of the strategic bomber forces
equipped to carry AS-5 or AS-6 mis-
siles regularly participate in anti-
carrier exercises, using the same
tactics as similar naval aircraft.
Participation is usually limited to
major exercises, with small groups
of these aircraft being used to
supplement larger naval air forces.
-- Blinders armed with the 300-nm AS-4
missile\
\Although
the AS-4 missile has a theoretical
antiship capability, the Soviets ap-
parently do not plan to use it for
anticarrier missions.
19 -
77171--344.42.1112...
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Electronic countermeasures are integral to
anticarrier tactics for both naval aviation and the
strategic bomber forces. Aircraft in these forces
can carry antiradar chaff and electronic equipment
designed to disrunt Western radar and communications
systems.
Surface Ships
Kresta I and Kynda class cruisers are regular
participants in anticarrier strike exercises. Both
arc equipped with the SS-N-3 missile, and the tac-
tics employed by these ships are generally similar
to those used by the SS-N-3 missile submarines.
On a few occasions a Kresta I cruiser has
carried a Hormone B helicopter equipped with radar
and video data systems of the type used by the Bear
D reconnaissance aircraft, providing a capability
for target acquisition at extended ranges. It is
not clear whether this practice will become routine,
as the Kresta I has also carried the ASW version of
the Hormone.
on the
Although not suitable for extended operations
high seas, the Nanuchka could operate effec-
tively in the Mediterranean and other closed sea
areas. The 150-nm maximum range of the SS-N-9 mis-
sile would permit anticarrier strike tactics similar
to those used by the larger missile ships.
The trailing of carriers by missile-armed surface
ships is becoming routine in the eastern Mediterranean,
and is frequently employed against carriers approach-
ing the USSR in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans
Kildin and Krupnyy destroyers, armed with the SS-N-1
missile, have frequently performed this function.
The new Kresta II cruiser also has been used for
- 20 -
7771-^-f-S-1-;4;-11.12',L
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
trailing, and this probably will be one of the tasks
of the new Krivak destroyer and the Nanuchka patrol
craft. The trailing ship normally maintains radar
or visual contact with the carrier, and is capable
of launching an attack at any time. These units
also provide continuous targeting data for other
anticarrier strike forces.
The surface forces would also have a role in ECM
support for anticarrier operations. Soviet surface
combatants, especially the newer classes, are fitted
with a variety of ECM equipment.\
Coordinated Exercises Against Simulated Carriers
Major annual exercises in the Atlantic and
Pacific
the movement of a US
carrier task force into the Norwegian Sea, Sea of
Japan, or northwestern Pacific Ocean, and the primary
mission of the Soviet anticarrier forces is to pre-
vent the carrier from launching attacks against
Soviet territory. The composition of the defending
force varies, and there is no set pattern for the ex-
ecution of these exercises. The US carrier force
ordinarily is simulated by Soviet surface forces,
although major exercises have been mounted against US
carriers operating in these waters.
A Northern Fleet exercise held in mid-1971,
summarized on the next page, provides an example of
coordinated anticarrier activity. In this exercise
a surface force consisting of a Sverdlov class
cruiser and two missile destroyers simulated a car-
rier task force moving into the Norwegian Sea from a
point south of Iceland. This exercise continued over
a period of several days and included antisubmarine
warfare operations and an amphibious landing in addi-
tion to the anticarrier activity.
- 21 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Summary of Northern Fleet Anticarrier Exercise in 1971
25 June Simulated carrier task force begins northeastward movement into the Norwegian Sea
26 June
27 June
28 June
29 June
30 June
1 July
\ Defending naval forces consisting of
a Kresta I cruiser, a C class submarine, and three Eli class submarines begin deployment
from home waters.
Four naval Bear D aircraft make a reconnaissance sweep presumably in an attempt to
locate the carrier task force. Naval Badgers also active in Norwegian Sea area.
Carrier task force refuels at sea as opposing forces draw closer. Apparent lack of associ-
ated naval air activity is possibly explained by antisubmarine warfare exercise being
conducted by separate group of forces farther north.
Reconnaissance missions by Bear aircraft of the navy and the strategic bomber forces.
Naval Badgers are also noted in the vicinity of opposing forces. Defending force split into
two groups: Kresta I, C class, and one E-li class continue to close on carrier task force;
the other two Ell class submarines appear to establish a barrier patrol across the force's
probable path northeastward alc,ng the Norwegian coast (see map, page 23). The carrier
force makes radical course changes in late afternoon and the C class turns to parallel
courses. Information on movements is probably furnished by naval Bear Ds in the area.
Flight by two ltears of strategic bomber force in early morning possibly simulates AS-3
strikes. Kresta I and Ell probably simulate SS-N-3 strikes later in the morning, followed
by heavy ASM strikes in the af ternoon. Aircraft involved include at least 32 naval Badgers
arid 11 Badgers from the strategic bomber forces. These aircraft probably simulate strikes
with AS-2 and AS-5 missiles. By rnid-afternoon
the C class (lows on the carrier task force and apparently joins in the attacks. Simulated
strikes by aircraft and the SS-N-3 forces apparently continue in the evening.
Simulated missile strikes probably continirc. At one point in the afternoon a surfaced E-I
is seen 1/11;) riln \,..\mst ()I tire carrier task font( . This submarine has lour of its eight SS-N-3
launchers elevated to firing position and treads toward the lonce. Two Bear Ds in area
possibly provide targeting data. The Kresta I is located about 10 rim from the surfaced
II-ii, engaged in undetermined activity with its Horrimne helicopter. The C class possibly
is operating in the vicinity of the carrier task force. f3y this time the carrier group is also
within the maximum range of the two [-II submarines that established the barrier to the
northeas].
Major portion of anticarrier exercise is completer,
As carrier task force continues northeastward it passes through the area where
tire two fills have been stationed since 28 June. At about this time the Kresta I is
observed prepta irrnt [Or 110 iCOptel operations, which could provide targeting data
Later, as the force passes from the Norwegian Sea
into the Barents Sea it crosses two submarine harriers formed by at least 11 diesel-
powered torpedo attack submarines. At least one or two of these submarines apparently
conducts attacks on the force.
-1751"-ti
- 22 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Northern Fleet Anticarrier Exercise
25 June-1 July 1971
Reconnaissance
and strike aircraft
Barent.; Son
Simulated
carrier force
Submarine
barrier patrols
Two E-II class
Ktesta I cruiser
E?Il class submarine
C class submarine
Kola Peninsula
? Pin' rind
Sw aen
Norwny
This "defense of the homeland" exercise simulated repeated strikes by cruise missile
submarines, missile-armed aircraft, and a missile cruiser.\
- 23 -
1Th C
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Anticarrier exercises in the Mediterranean follow
a different pattern. The usual target of simulated
strikes in the Mediterranean is a carrier of the US
Sixth Fleet. These carriers are routinely trailed
by Soviet surface combatants during operations in the
eastern Mediterranean,
This pattern suggests a preemptive strategy, as such
trailing is possible only in peacetime.
Simulated strikes against carriers in the Med-
iterranean normally have involved only surface ships
and submarines. Naval Badgers based in Egypt have
provided reconnaissance support for some exercises,
An example of high-level interfleet coordination
for anticarrier strikes was demonstrated during
Exercise Ocean in April 1970. This exercise included
nearly simultaneous strikes against six widely sep-
arated simulated carriers. In this operation, naval
TU-16s carried out ASM attacks in the Norwegian Sea,
Sea of Japan, and North Pacific, while TU-95s of the
strategic bomber forces attacked targets in the North
* Additional information on these forces is contained
in SR IS 72-11, Soviet Naval Air Strike Capability in
Es it May 1972
- 24 -
77-07+?,;-(t??;?11.1i1'
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Atlantic and the Philippine Sea (see map below).
At the same time a cruise missile
submarine and surface ships made a mock attack in the
Mediterranean.
Coordinated Mock Attacks in Soviet "Exercise Ocean", April 1970
Soviet ships simulating "aggressor" aircraft carrier group
Mock attack by Soviet naval aircraft
?4?Mock attack by Soviet Long Range Aviation aircraft
(f) Mock attack by cruise missile destroyer and submarine
? 25 ?
177,77-S-Ec,12..ELE
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Soviet Capabilities Against
Carrier Forces
The Soviets have acquired a large number and
variety of missiles and launch platforms to counter
US aircraft carriers, and the increasingly sophis-
ticated tactics demonstrated in training exercises
indicate that the Soviets are learning to make full
use of their anticarrier weapons systems. The
Soviets may well believe that they could defeat the
US carrier forces under most circumstances.
Anticarrier Strike Capabilities
High-ranking Soviet naval officers consistently
refer to the aircraft carrier in terms indicating
that they consider it vulnerable to their nuclear-
armed missile forces, not only in open statements
which might be discounted as propaganda, but in
private conversations as well.
Confidence in the effectiveness of Soviet anti-
carrier systems was shown in classified journal
articles written in 1960 and 1961 by Admiral V. A.
Kasatonov, now the first deputy commander in chief
of the navy. Kasatonov reported the following capa-
bilities against carrier task forces, even allowing
for the action of the carrier's air defenses:
a salvo of six to eight missiles from
a dispersed group of submarines would
guarantee one nuclear missile on target
a salvo of six ASMs with nuclear
warheads would be sufficient to de-
stroy a carrier (that is, at least
one missile would penetrate the
defenses and hit the target)
two simultaneous salvos of six ASMs
from different directions would
destroy two major targets (a carrier
and a cruiser) even if only six or
seven of the missiles had nuclear
warheads.
T
- 26 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
The missiles referred to in these articles prob-
ably were the submarine-launched SS-N-3 and the
air-launched AS-1 or AS-2. The AS-1 was the first
antiship missile deployed by the USSR, and has been
phased out of the active inventory. Both the SS-N-3
and the AS-2 were just entering service in the 1960-
1961 period, and have since been joined by a variety
of new improved systems.
The validity of these Soviet estimates cannot be
determined precisely. The conclusion that at least
one of each six to eight missiles would penetrate
defenses, however, appears reasonably conservative.
Training manuals have indicated that the Soviets
expect hit probabilities of 60 to 90 percent for
antiship missiles, so the examples cited by Kasatonov
evidently allow for large losses to the carrier's
defenses.
Even if Soviet antiship missiles were only half
as effective as suggested, the large numbers deployed
would still be a major threat. The current anti-
carrier forces include 68 cruise-missile submarines
with 420 launchers, and 275 naval aircraft with 385
launchers. This provides an average of almost 4
submarines and 15 aircraft--with 45 missile launchers
--for each of the 18 US aircraft carriers, which are
the primary target of these forces.
The missile threat to the carrier is augmented
by launchers on surface ships and strategic bombers.
Additional anticarrier capabilities of secondary
importance include torpedo attacks by submarines,
free-fall bombing by naval aircraft and strategic
bombers, and in some cases, naval gunfire.
Dependence on Reconnaissance Systems
Maritime reconnaissance is the weakest link in
the Soviet anticarrier effort. The Soviets can
maintain close surveillance of carrier operations
in the sea approaches to the USSR, but their ability
to monitor activity in other areas is limited. The
effectiveness of the anticarrier strike forces would
- 27 -
-7777-1.444ULLILL
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
be seriously degraded without reliable targeting
data.
A carrier on the open ocean probably could avoid
surveillance, at least during the initial stages
of hostilities. Strict control of communications
and other electronic emissions would prevent tracking
by the Soviet radio direction finding network, and
the efforts of Soviet reconnaissance aircraft could
be defeated by a combination of air defenses and the
extensive area to be searched. Soviet aircraft flying
peacetime reconnaissance missions, for example, are
frequently intercepted by fighters based in Iceland,
the United Kingdom, and Japan, as well as by carrier-
based aircraft. Although aerial reconnaissance efforts
are supplemented by the use of surface ships and sub-
marines in some areas, this tactic is less feasible
on the open ocean.
Another problem for the Soviets is that break-
downs in command and control systems could seriously
hamper anticarrier operations, which depend on the
coordination of dispersed forces for effectiveness.
Limited Conventional Warfare Capability
An engagement limited to conventional weapons
would place the Soviets at a .disadvantage. While
an aircraft carrier could be destroyed by a single
nulcear weapon, it might be able to continue flight
* Detailed information on naval command and control
is contained in SR IR 71-17, Soviet Command and
Control of Distant Naval Operations, October 1971
- 28 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
operations after being struck by several missiles
with conventional warheads. The smaller warships
used by the Soviets would be more vulnerable to
destruction by conventional weapons.
Most of the missiles in the anticarrier forces
probably have nuclear warheads, and Soviet capa-
bilities for quickly changing the mix of nuclear and
conventional weapons are limited. Naval aircraft
have the most flexibility, and could select either
type of weapon before takeoff. Submarines are not
believed to have a capability for changing warheads
at sea. Some surface ships might be able to change
warheads at sea, although this is doubtful. Carrier
forces, on the other hand, have the option of arming
their strike aircraft with either nuclear or con-
ventional weapons.
Another advantage for carrier forces is that
their aircraft can be used for repetitive strikes.
Cruise missiles are strictly single-shot devices,
and the Soviet Navy has only a limited capability
to provide replacement missiles to deployed forces.
Defense of Soviet Territory
Carrier forces within or near '_aunch range of
Soviet territory at the outbreak of hostilities
probably would be attacked almost immediately.
Such forces are routinely under surveillance and
would be closely monitored in a period of tension.
The location of the carrier would be known, elimin-
ating the need for prestrike reconnaissance. A
surface combatant trailing the carrier could be
ready to fire and probably would be supported by
other surface ships and submarines within missile
range.
If the Soviets deliberately initiated hostil-
ities, coordinated missile attacks could be launched
without warning. The trailing ship--sometimes a
missile-armed unit--probably would open fire first.
This attack might be accompanied by short-range
- 29 -
7rTir-si4ciLLIL
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
missiles launched from submerged submarines and
possibly gunfire or short-range missiles from other
surface ships.
Long-range missiles from surface ships and sub-
marines would follow. Aircraft strikes could be
timed to coincide with attacks by surface ship and
submarine missiles, but ail. strikes would complicate
the coordination of the attack as the approaching
aircraft might alert the carrier. In some cases,
therefore, aircraft might be withheld from the ini-
tial strike of a preemptive attack. Aircraft could
be used to mount preemptive attacks on carriers not
within range of other forces, however, as part of
a general attack on the carrier forces.
Even if the Soviets were not expecting hostili-
ties, carriers within or near launch range of Soviet
territory could quickly be brought under attack.
Such operations would not be as well coordinated as
the preemptive attack described above, but would
contain essentially the same elements.
Carrier forces located on the open ocean at
the outbreak of hostilities would pose a different
problem. Although the Soviets would have more time
to respond, as such forces would not be an immediate
threat to Soviet territory, they would also have the
problem of finding them. The probability of a car-
rier being detected by reconnaissance aircraft,
submarine patrols, or other forces would increase
as the carrier approached Soviet territory. If the
Soviets succeeded in finding the carrier in time,
they could deploy forces for coordinated attacks .
such as they practice during exercises (see page 21).
It is possible, however, that a carrier could reach
a position to launch strikes against Soviet territory
without being detected, or at least before major
strikes could be mounted against it.
Defense of Soviet Naval Forces
Soviet naval forces are vulnerable to air attack,
and their main defense against carriers is their
'FO
- 30 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
offensive strike capability. Deployed naval forces
could successfully defend themselves by a preemptive
attack, but would be in a difficult position if the
carrier forces had the initiative.
The Soviet naval forces have only limited air
defenses. Some of the surface ships are armed with
surface-to-air missiles, but the ability of these
forces to survive determined air attacks is doubtful.
Most of the cruise-missile submarines must surface
to launch their missiles, and only the relatively
few newer submarines with submerged-launched missiles
are free from the threat of attack aircraft. In
addition, all submarines are subject to attack by
ASW aircraft as well as other ASW forces.
In some cases the Soviet naval forces could be
exposed to air attacks without being able to strike
back at the carriers. Carrier-based aircraft out-
range the antiship missiles carried by Soviet sur-
face ships and submarines. The carrierE would have
more freedom of action in an attack on naval forces
than in an attack on Soviet territory, and possibly
could maneuver to keep out of range of the Soviet
forces.
If an engagement took place in an area remote
from the USSR, such as the Indian Ocean, the circum-
stances would be even less favorable for the Soviets.
They would be deprived of the support of their land-
based strike aircraft, and they would have little or
no aerial reconnaissance eapability.
Counterbalance to Carrier Forces in Peacetime
The Soviet Mediterranean squadron is the prime
example of an attempt to counterbalance the presence
of a US carrier force. The squadron can engage the
US forces in the event of war, it demonstrates Soviet
concern for affairs in the Middle East, and it acts
as a deterrent to Western naval moves.
The Soviet force regularly deployed in the Med-
iterranean averages 8 to 10 major combatants and
- 31 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
10 to 12 submarines, including 2 or 3 submarines and
one or more combatants armed with cruise missiles.
Air support is provided by a detachment of about 30
aircraft based in Egypt.
The Soviet capability to counter US carrier
forces in other areas is less impressive. When a
US carrier task force deployed to the Indian Ocean
in December 1971, for example, the USSR moved in
additional naval forces. The US carrier force was
in the area about 10 days, however, before the major
elements of the Soviet reinforcements arrived. The
augmented Soviet force inCluded two missile cruisers,
a missile destroyer, and two cruise missile subma-
rines. It had a substantial anticarrier capability,
including a total of 24 SS-N-3 launchers, but it was
without air support for reconnaissance or strike
missions.
The combat capability of a deployed Soviet force,
however, might be less important than its presence.
Third parties might not recognize the disparity in
the forces, or might view the Soviet force as a fore-
runner of a greater Soviet involvement.
Outlook for Anticarrier Forces
Current and projected programs will provide a
general improvement in Soviet anticarrier capabil-
ities over the next several years. In addition to
providing a better defense of Soviet territory, the
emerging forces will have a capability for extended
deployments to counter US carrier operations
elsewhere.
The deployment of new weapons systems in place
of older, less effective systems will be the major
factor in the improvement of anticarrier capabilities.
In addition, the total number of anticarrier missile
launchers is expected to increase. The table at
right shows the basic anticarrier forces projected
- 32 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Selected Soviet Naval Forces*
1 May
1972
Projected
mid-1975
Cruise missile submarines
nuclear-powered 40 47
diesel-powered 28 20
Naval aircraft
missile carriers 275 270
long-range reconnaissance
aircraft and bombers 300 250
Surface ships**
with cruise missiles 24 60
with surface-to-air missiles 50 102
Cruise missile launchers
on submarines 420 468
on aircraft 385 380
on surface ships** 110 328
* A more complete listing of forces is given in
Annex A.
** Figures cover all major combatants and the
Nanuchka class patrol craft. Additional missiles
are carried by other minor combatants.
- 33 -
-Trirr-S-1-;-caILL
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Systems Under Development
- 34 -
P Class Submarine
The P class submarine carries 10
to 12 submerged-launch missiles
with a range of over 100 nm. One P
class unit is already in service and
an estimated four units will be com-
pleted by 1975.
Backfire Bomber
The Backfire swing-wing bomber
could be ready for naval service by
about 1974. It probably will be de-
ployed as a follow-on to the aging
Badgers now in service.
445-B Cruiser
The 445-B cruiser now under-
going sea trials illustrates the em-
phasis being given to air defenses
for surface combatants. This ship
carries four twin launchers for two
different SAM systems, plus a vari-
ety of antiaircraft guns.
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
'1 .
for mid-1975. The most significant changes expected
during 1972-1975 are as follows:
The total number of missile launchers
on submarines will increase by about
10 percent, and the number of under-
water launchers will double.
-- A decline in the number of older
ASM-carrying aircraft will be offset
by the introduction of the new
Backfire bomber about 1974, and the
total number of launchers on aircraft
will remain almost constant.
-- The number of cruise missile launchers
on surface ships will nearly triple,
and the number of SAM launchers will
more than double.
The growing submarine threat to the carrier is
a good example of the impact of qualitative improve-
ments. The new nuclear-powered submarines entering
service have far greater combat capabilities than
the diesel-powered units they are replacing. This
alone more than offsets a projected reduction in
the total submarine force. In addition, the new
submarines are armed with submerged-launched missiles
and are less vulnerable to detection and counter-
attack than the older types which must surface to
launch an attack.
The deployment of the new AS-6 missile for naval
aircraft is another example of the improving capa-
bilities of individual weapon systems. The AS-6
has approximately twice the speed and range of the
other naval ASMs. Deployment of the new Backfire
swing-wing bomber would provide a similar qualitative
improvement over the aging Badger, which has been in
service since the mid-Fifties.
The new missile-armed cruisers, destroyers, and
patrol craft now entering service will improve anti-
carrier capabilities of the surface forces. The
number of ships armed with cruise missiles is expected
- 35 -
-7.77r-t.4,;(444.L2L
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
77715--STLE1:
to increase from 24 to about 60 by 1975. In addi-
tion, the number of ships with surface-to-air
missiles is expected to more than double, sub-
stantially increasing the capability of the surface
forces to defend themselves.
The increasing number of nuclear-powered sub-
marines and the growing quality of the surface
forces will improve Soviet capabilities for distant
operations. In addition to an increased strike
capability, these forces will have better capabil-
ities for monitoring carrier movements. An in-
creased use of missile-armed surface ships and
submarines for trailing US carriers would partly
offset the limitations of Soviet maritime reconnais-
sance capabilities.
The growing strength of the Soviet anticarrier
forces is compounded by programed decreases in the
US carrier forces from the present 18 carriers
to 13 in mid-1975.* The following tabulation shows
the changing ratio of Soviet anticarrier forces to
US carriers.
Soviet anticarrier forces
per US carrier
cruise missile submarines
cruise missile armed surface
ships
ASM-armed aircraft
long-range reconnaissance
aircraft and bombers
Soviet missile launchers
per US carrier
submarine, submerged-launched
submarine, surface-launched
aircraft
surface ship
May Projected
1972 mid-1975
4
5
1
5
15
21
17
19
51
90
5
12
19
24
21
29
6
25
* The US force includes one training carrier.
- 36 -
7173?S44CIII--"T.
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
77719--S-14442-LI.
Summary
The Soviets recognize the aircraft carrier as
a key element of US naval power. They have been
concerned with the strategic attack potential of
carrier forces since the early Fifties, when
nuclear-armed strike aircraft were first deployed
on US carriers. Later, as their own naval opera-
tions became more far-ranging, they found the
aircraft carrier to be a serious threat to their
surface and undersea fleets. They also became
concerned over the use of carrier forces as a means
of supporting US foreign policy interests.
The Soviets considered building carriers, but
rejected them in favor of submarine and aircraft
forces designed to attack and destroy enemy carriers.
This decision was influenced by the development of
cruise-missile technology in the Fifties. The
Soviets considered the antiship cruise missile a
revolutionary weapon making the aircraft carrier
obsolete.
The requirement to counter US carrier forces
resulted in major changes in the Soviet Navy.
Through the early Fifties the navy was oriented
basically to coastal defense missions. It has
since acquired forces capable of operating on the
open ocean as well as the distant sea approaches
to the USSR. Long-range cruise missiles have been
widely deployed as the primary armament of sub-
marines, aircraft, and to a lesser extent, surface
combatants.
The Soviets view the submarine as their primary
naval weapon. They currently have a force of some
286 attack submarines. Most of the 68 cruise-
missile submarines are armed with the SS-N-3, a
surface-launched antiship missile with a maximum
operational range of up to 220 nautical miles. Nine
submarines are equipped with the SS-N-7 missile,
which is submerged-launched and has a range of up to
30 nm. The unidentified missile system associated
with the new P class submarine probably is submerged-
- 37 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
launched and is believed to have a range of 100 nm
or more.
Aircraft also play a major role in anticarrier
warfare. Soviet naval aviation currently has a
force of over 600 bomber and reconnaissance air-
craft, including about 275 armed with air-to-surface
missiles. Most of the strike aircraft have 110-nm
AS-2 or 120-nm AS-5 missiles. A new missile, with
greater speed and range capabilities, the AS-6, is
currently being deployed. Naval aviation anticarrier
capabilities are backed up by the strategic bomber
forces, which have a secondary naval mission. These
include long-range heavy bombers armed with the AS-3
missile, as well as medium bombers similar to those
assigned to the navy.
Soviet surface forces make an important con-
tribution to anticarrier warfare by trailing carrier
forces operating in the sea approaches to the USSR
during peacetime. The use of missile-armed ships
for trailing provides a preemptive strike capability
as well as continuous targeting data for the other
anticarrier forces. In addition, some surface com-
batants are equipped with long-range cruise missiles.
The naval forces that could be committed to
anticarrier operations are equipped with about 915
cruise missile launchers, not counting coastal de-
fense weapons on small patrol boats and at shore
sites. This total includes 420 launchers on sub-
marines, 385 on aircraft, and 110 on surface ships.
Anticarrier forces are assigned to all four of the
Soviet fleet areas, with the main strength concen-
trated in the Northern and Pacific fleets. The
Soviets also maintain a permanent deployment of anti-
carrier forces in the Mediterranean Sea.
Soviet doctrine for anticarrier warfare stresses
the use of coordinated strikes by different types of
weapons to saturate carrier defenses. Training
exercises are conducted regularly and feature coor-
dinated attacks by submarines, aircraft, and surface
ships. Many of these exercises are conducted under
- 38 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
I 'EWt?44JLf
realistic conditions, sometimes with a US carrier
serving as the practice target. Some operations
have been timed to bring the target under simul-
taneous attack by various types of weapons from
different directions. Simulated carriers approach-
ing the USSR have been subjected to successive
attacks by submarines, aircraft, and surface ships
forming a defense in depth. Exercise activity as
well as Soviet writings indicate that the Soviets
would try to attack a carrier before its aircraft
were within range of Soviet territory. US carriers
in the sea approaches to the USSR are normally
subjected to continuous targeting and frequently
to preemptive practice attacks.
Soviet forces possess a large and diversified
inventory of antiship weapons, and conduct extensive
training for the anticarrier mission. The Soviets
may well believe that they could defeat the US
carrier forces under most circumstances. These
capabilities are at their best in defending Soviet
territory against carrier-based attacks when all of
the anticarrier weapons could be brought into action.
The ability of the Soviet fleet to defend itself
against opposing carrier forces at sea is less im-
pressive. Although possessing powerful strike
capabilities, the Soviet forces are vulnerable to
air attack. Despite this problem, however, the
Soviets have demonstrated a growing capability to
deploy forces in opposition to carrier operations
in peacetime and limited war situations.
The weakest link in the anticarrier effort is
a limited capability for maritime reconnaissance,
particularly in areas remote from Soviet territory.
The effectiveness of the anticarrier strike forces
would be seriously degraded in the absence of re-
liable targeting data. The anticarrier forces also
would be at a disadvantage in a conflict limited
to conventional weapons.
Current and projected programs will provide a
general improvement in Soviet anticarrier capabili-
ties over the next several years. New weapons
- 39 -
-777r-ti-144.a.Lj:
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
-71777M-FrY7C,12.ELL
systems are being deployed and the number of missile
launchers in the anticarrier forces continues to
increase. These improving capabilities probably
will result in an expansion of the deployment areas
of Soviet naval forces in opposition to the opera-
tions of US carrier forces.
- 40 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
1.11111111111 ftn? Release. 2017/06/14 C05511181MMIMM
7-01-3--S-E.G.prZaL
Annex A
Selected Soviet Naval Order of Battle
The five tables which follow present basic order
of battle data for selected Soviet naval forces.
Tables A-1 to A-3 cover the attack
submarine, naval aircraft, and surface
forces, showing deployment by fleet area
as of 1 May 1972.
Table A-4 summarizes the cruise mis-
sile threat by fleet area as of 1 May
1972.
Table A-5 gives summary order of
battle data for the years 1955, 1960,
1965, 1970, and 1975.
- 41 -
77714"-S-E-C42...ELL
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
pproved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Table A-1
Soviet Cruise Missile and Torpedo
Attack Submarines by Fleet Area
As of I May 1972
Type of Submarine
:Fleet Area
Total
Northern Baltic Black Pacific
67
1
9
Nuclear
P class a
C class a
43
1
9
0
0
24
E-TI class a
14
14
28
E-I class a
2
2
1]-1 (cony) class
3
3
V class
10
10
N class
9
5
14
Long-range diesel
56
6
0
28
90
J class a
12
4
16
F class
31
4
16
51
Z class
13
2
8
23
Medium-range diesel
37
2521
37
120
W (LB) class a
3
2
2
7
W (TC) class a
1
3
1
5
W class
26
20
12
32
90
B class
1
1
2
4
R class
9
2
3
14
Short-range diesel
Q class
0
4
5
09
Total
136
35
26
89
286
a. Armed with cruise missiles.
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Table A-2
Soviet Naval Reconnaissance and Strike
Aircraft by Fleet Area
Type of Aircraft
As of 1 May
1972
Fleet Area
Total
Northern Baltic Black Pacific
Reconnaissance
27
32
34
27
120
TU-95 Bear D
25
25
50
TU-22 Blinder
30
30
60
AN-12 Cub
2
2
4
2
10
Medium bombers
105
100
95
155
455
TU-16 Badger
C a
65
20
40
40
165
TU-16 Badger
G a
40
15
55
110
TU-16 Badger
(other)
40
40
40
60
180
Light bombers
IL-28 Beagle
0
_
60
0
0
60
Total
.
132
192
129
182
635
a. Armed with cruise missiles.
'I
- 43 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Table A-3
Major Soviet Surface Ships
by Fleet Area
As of 1 May 1972
Fleet Area
Total
Type of Ship a Northern Baltic Black Pacific
2
53
Helicopter carrier
Moskva
Missile cruisers
and destroyers
0
10
0
8
2
22
0
13
Kresta I b
3
1
4
Kresta II b
2
1
3
Kynda b
2
2
4
Sverdlov (with SAMs)
2
1
3 c
Krivak b
1
1
2d
Krupnyy b
1
3
4e
Kildin b
3
1
4f
Kashin
1
3
11
3
18
Kanin
3
1
4
Kotlin (with SAMs)
1
1
-?
_
2
7
Other cruisers
and destroyers
9
14
16
15
54
Sverdlov
2
2
2
2
8
Chapayev
2
2
Kirov
1
1
2
Kotlin
2
2
4
8
16
Tallin
1
1
Skoryy
5
6
9
5
25
Destroyer escorts
33
25
29
25
112
Petya & Mirka
20
17
18
12
67
Kola & Riga
13
8
11
13
45
Other
Nanuchka b
0
1
2
0
3
_
Total
52
48
71
53
224
- 44 -
77-0-r-s-E4;ILL J1
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Notes to Table A-3
a. The ships shown include all major surface com-
batants plus the Nanuchka class patrol craft,
a small but heavily armed minor combatant.
b. Armed with cruise missiles.
c. One Sverdlov in the Black Sea Fleet is known to
have a SAM installation, and two Sverdlovs
recently reactivated probably had SAMs added
during overhaul and modernization.
d. A third Krivak has been completed and may
already be operational.
e. Three of these units have already begun conver-
sion to the Kanin class configuration.
Two of these units are being converted to a new
configuration and are being armed with SAMs in
place of surface-to-surface missiles.
- 45 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 005512849
Table A-4
Number of Soviet Cruise Missile
As of I May
Type of Missile Launch Platform
Launchers by Fleet Area
1972
Fleet Area
Total
Launchers
Northern Baltic Black Pacific
Submerged-launched
82
0
0
0
82
SS-N-7
C class submarines
72
72
unidentified
P class submarines
10
b
10
b
Surface-launched
190
32
49
177
448
SS-N-3
E, J, W class submarines
c
162
12
14
150
338
SS-N-3
Kynda, Kresta I ships
12
16
20
48
1
SS-N-10
Kresta II, Krivak ships
16
12
4
32
,,.
SS-N-1
Krupnyy, Kildin ships
2
3
7
12
m
SS-N-9
Nanuchka patrol craft c
6
12
18
Air-launched
65
100
70
150
385
AS-2
Badger C aircraft
65
20
40
40
165
AS-5, AS-6
Badger G aircraft d
80
30
110
220
Total
337
132
119
327
915
a. Total includes all Launchers on submarines, naval aircraft, major combatants,
and the Nanuchka class patrol craft; excludes launchers at shore sites and on
small patrol boats, and launchers carried by aircraft of the strategic bomber
forces.
b. The P class carries at least 10, possibly 12 missiles.
c. Some J class submarines possibly are changing from the SS-N-3 to the 38-11-9
missile.
d. Most Badger G aircraft carry AS-5 missiles. Some are being reequipped with the
new AS-6.
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 005512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
717-ar-7F74.;12..ZIL
Table A-5
Summary Order of Battle for Major Soviet Naval Forces
Selected Years Mid-1955 to Mid-1975
Cruise missile and torpedo
attack submarines
1955
1960
1965
422
347
350
Nuclear
3
33
Long-range diesel
15
27
64
Medium-range diesel
123
212
208
Short-range diesel
284
105
45
Aircraft
3,070
530
755
Long-range recon
10
Medium bombers/recon
275
455
Light bombers/attack
950
35
105
Fighters
1,910
Other (mainly ASW)
210
220
185
Surface forces a
210
233
191
Battleships
3
Helicopter carriers
Missile cruisers and
destroyers
7
23
Other cruisers and
destroyers
145
153
81
Destroyer escorts
62
73
87
Nanuchka class
Cruise missile launchers
0
308
589
On submarines
217
On aircraft
300
320
On surface ships a
8
52
a. The ships shown include
all major surface
Projected
1970
1975
306
257
58
89
88
83
150
82
10
3
960
1,010
50
45
530
455
60
60
320
450
212
228
2
3
46
83
54
19
109
103
1
20
865
1,176
384
468
395
380
86
328
combatants
plus the Nanuchka class patrol craft, a small but heavily
armed minor combatant.
- 47 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Page# 5s,
Blank Page or Missing from Archival Copy
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Annex B
Technical Characteristics of Selected
Soviet Naval Weapons Systems
The five tables in this annex, covering selected
characteristics of weapons systems, are intended to
provide a general description of the systems for
background use. The individual systems can vary
widely in actual performance under different circum-
stances.
Tables B-1 through 3-3 cover attack
submarines, reconnaissance and strike
aircraft, and major surface combatants.
Table B-4 covers current cruise
missile systems.
Table B-5 is a brief reference list
of anticarrier missile systems.
- 49 -
77717--Si;CI4ZI:
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Table B-1
Class
Characteristics
Cruise Missiles
of
Length
(ft)
Soviet Attack Submarines
Maximum
Submerged Submerged
Displacement Speed
(tons) (kts)
Patrol Characteristics
Duration Average
(days) Speed (kts)
Type
Number
Nuclear
P
U/I
10-12
348
7,200
undeteLmined
C
SS-N-7
8
308
5,200
27
60 12-14
E-I
SS-N-3
6
375
5,750
26
60 12
E-I (cony)
a
375
5,500
28
60 10-12
E-II
SS-N-3
8
385
6,000
24.5
60 12
1
V
308
5,100
32
60 12-14
LI!
N
360
5,400
30
60 12-14
0
i
Diesel
295
2,200
16
60 5
295
2,200
15
60 5
SS-N-3
b
4
285
3,500
15
60 5
SS-N-3
4
275
1,500
12
40 5
SS-N-3
2
249
1,400
12
40 5
249
1,355
13.5
40 5
230
2,900
15
60 undetermined
250
1,800
15.3
40 5
185
510
8
coastal operations
a. E-1 class missile submarines are being converted to torpedo attack types.
b. Some J cZass submarines possiblu are being retrofitted with SS-N-9 missiles.
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 005512849
Table B-2
Characteristics of Soviet Naval
Reconnaissance and Strike Aircraft
Cruise Missiles
Gross Maximum
Weight Speed
(lbs) (kts)
Combat Radius at
Cruising Speed
(nm)
Type Type Number
TU-95 Bear D Reconnaissance
357,000 500
4,600
i
TU-22 Blinder Medium bomber a
185,000 975
1,800
vi
i--
TU-16 Badger Medium bomber a
167,000 540
1,650
1
TU-16 Badger C ASM carrier AS-2 1
167,000 540
1,450
TU-16 Badger G ASM carrier AS-5 2
or AS-6
167,000 540
1,200
IL-28 Beagle Light bomber a
51,100 490
550
AN-12 Cub A/B/C Reconnaissance b
107,000 375
1,300
a. Used In both reconnaissance and strike roles.
b. Special-purpose reconnaissance and ECM variants
of the basic AN-12
transport.
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 005512849
pproved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Table B-3
Characteristics of Major Soviet Surface Ships
Class
Cruise Missiles
Length
(ft)
Full-load
Displacement
(tons)
Max
Speed
(kts)
Range at
Cruising
Speed (nm)
Type Number
Helicopter carrier
Moskva
620
20,000
29
14,000
Missile cruisers
and destroyers
Kresta I a
SS-N-3
4
510
6,700
34
7,000
Kresta II a
SS-N-10
8
522
6,800
34
7,000
Kynda a
SS-N-3
8 b
465
5,600
36
7,000
Sverdlov
689
17,200
32
10,0u0
Krivak
SS-N-10
4
405
3,800
32
4,650
Krupnyy
SS-N-1
2 c
452
4,500
35
4,700
Kildin
SS-N-1
1 d
415
3,500
36
4,700
Kashin
470
4,450
38
7,500
Kanin
463
4,500
35
4,700
Kotlin
415
3,500
36
4,700
Other cruisers
and Destroyers
Chapayev
665
15,000
32
5,000
Kirov
626
9,060
32
3,000
Skoryy
395
3,050
36
3,500
Tallin
440
3,700
34
4,500
Destroyer escorts
Kola
315
1,500
30
3,500
Mirka
268
1,150
30
4,900
Petya
269
1,100
34
4,900
Riga
298
1,320
28
2,450
Nanuchka e
SS-N-9
6
198
650
32.5
2,600
a. The Kresta and Kynda classes are commonly identified as light
cruisers because of their surface-to-surface missiles, but they
are about the same size as a US guided missile frigate. They are
less than half the size of a US light cruiser.
b. The Kynda carries a total of 16 missiles for its eight launchers.
c. The Krupnyy carries a total of 20 missiles for its two launchers.
a. The Kildin carries a total of 9 missiles for its single launcher.
e. The Nanuchka is not a major combatant, but is included here
because of its anticarrier potential.
T
- 52 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
7177317-t-F:Is-44-ax_
Table B-4
Characteristics of
Soviet Antiship Missiles a
Type of Missile Maximum Range
Air-to-surface
AS-2
AS-3 d
AS-5
AS-6
Surface-to-surface
SS-N-1
SS-N-3
SS-N-7
SS-N-9
SS-N-10
Unidentified
Speeds
(nm) b (Mach) c
110
180 d
120
300
130
150-220 e
1.3
1.8
0.9-1.2
2.5-3.0
0.7-0.9
0.9-1.6
Warhead
(lbs)
2,200
4,500-5,500
1,100-2,200
1,100-2,200
500-2,000
1,100-2,200
a. Systems not likely to be used against aircraft carriers
are excluded. Estimates of performance for the latest
systems are tentative.
b. Range performance depends on specific flight profile
and, in some cases, whether external targeting
assistance is used.
c. The speeds shown refle..-?t variations due to different
flight profiles as well, as uncertainties as to
actual missile performance characteristics.
d. The AS-3 is basically a strategic attack weapon, but
could be used in the anticarrier role. It has a
maximum range of 350 nm against land targets, but
against ships its maximum operational range is
about 180 nm.
e There are at least three variants of the SS-N-3.
The type carried by most submarines has a maximum
range of 220 nm; the version carried by surface
ships is limited to a range of 150 nm.
f. The P class submarine carries an unidentified type
of missile. It is believed to be launched under
water and to have a range of over 100 nm.
- 53 -
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Table B-5
Reference List of
Anticarrier Missile Systems a
Type of Missile Launch Platform
Air-launched
Number of
Launchers
AS-2 TU-16 Badger C medium bomber 1
AS-3 b TU-95 Bear B/C heavy bomber 1
AS-5 TU-16 Badger G medium bomber 2
AS-6 TU-16 Badger G medium bomber 2
Surface-launched
SS-N-1 Kildin destroyer 1 c
Krupnyy destroyer 2 d
SS-N-3 E-I class nuclear submarine 6
E-II class nuclear submarine 8
J class diesel submarine 4
W class diesel submarine 2-4
Kresta I cruiser 4
Kynda cruiser 8 e
SS-N-9 Nanuchka patrol boat 6
J class diesel submarine f 4
SS-N-10 Kresta II cruiser 8
Krivak destroyer 4
Submerged-launched
SS-N-7 ,
Unidentified
C class nuclear submarine 8
P class nuclear submarine 10-12
a. Systems not likely to be used against aircraft carriers
are excluded.
b. Deployed only with strategic bomber forces.
c. Ship carries, total of 9 missiles.
d. Ship carries total of 20 missiles.
e. Ship carries total of 16 missiles.
f. J class submarines originally carried SS-N-3 missiles,
but some may be changing to the SS-N-9 missile.
- 54 -
-71711-s+4;ILLIL
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
pproved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849 .
7-171-7-tti-4-44.1,23L
Related Publications of
The Office of Strategic Research
SR TM 72-11 Soviet Naval Air Strike Capa-
May 1972 bility in Egypt
SR IR 71-21 The Wartime Missions of Soviet
December 1971 Long Range Aviation
SR IR 71-19
December 1971
The Soviet Naval Cruise Missile
Force: Development and Opera-
tional Employment
SR TR 71-17 Soviet Command and Control of
October 1971 Distant Naval Operations
SR IM 71-11 The Soviet Attack Submarine
June 1971 Force: Evolution and Operations
- 55 -
7-1771-1-44.1.4.1Z,L
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849
Approved for Release: 2017/06/14 C05512849