WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: CERTAIN PROBLEMS OF SUPERIORITY AT SEA UNDER CONDITIONS OF CLOSED NAVAL THEATERS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005584612
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: June 29, 1977

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
NEMORANDIN FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Certain Problems of
Superiority at Sea Under Conditions of
Closed Naval Theaters
29 JUne 1977
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part o
series now in preparation based on articles from a SECRET Soviet publica-
tion called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical
Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This article discusses the
capabilfties of naval forces for gaining superiority at sea in a closed
naval theater, indicating the direct dependence of this on the achievement
of air superiority. The general requirements for troops in accomplishing
tasks of and naval superiority are listed as well as the prerequisites
? and the tasks thenselves for gaining superiority, for which the need for
the massive use of ship strike forces and aircraft is emphasized. The
author also discusses ways of preventing the buildup of enemy forces in
order to retain superiority at sea once it has been gained. This journal is
published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of
articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article appeared in Issue No. 11,
which was published in 1976.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been
assigned the Codeword
William W. walla%
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT
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Intelligence Information Special Report
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DANE OF
DATE
29 June 1977
INFO. 1976
SUBJECT
WARSAW PACT JOURNAL:
Certain Problems of Superiority at Sea
Under Conditions of Closed Naval Theaters
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article rroin
a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Head-
quarters and the Technical Committee of the combined Armed Forces. This
journal is publisbqa by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists
of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article was written by Vice
Admiral V. Em, Deputy Minister of National Defense, Comnander of the Navy
of the German Democratic Republic. This article discusses the capabilities
of naval forces for gaining superiority at sea in a closed naval theater,
indicating the direct dependence of this on the achievement of air
superiority. The general requirements for troops in accomplishing tasks of
air and naval superiority are listed as well as the prerequisites and the
tasks themselves for gaining superiority, for which the need for the
MRSSiVe use of ship strike forces and aircraft is emphasized. The author
also discusses ways of preventing the buildup of enemy forces in order to
retain superiority at sea once it has been gained. This article appeared in
Issue No. 11, which was published in 1976.
End of Summary
Comment:
e author also contributed "Tasks to be Accomplished by the Navy When
Assisting Ground Forces Attacking on a Coastal Axis" to Issue No. 5 of the
Information Collection
Th
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Certain Problems of Superiority at Sea Under Conditions
of Closed Naval Theaters
by
Vice Admiral V. Em
Deputy Minister of National Defense,
Connander of the Navy of the German Democratic Republic
The concept of "superiority at sea", which took form upon the
development of the first naval fleets, has retained its prominence in naval
art up to this day. However, its content has undergone significant change.
The reasons for this are to be found primarily in the rapid development of
productive forces, particularly in technological progress, as well as in
the development, as a result of this, of the capabilities of producing
highly effective combat equipment, and based on this, in the changed
methods of armed combat at sea.
Soviet military science looks upon superiority at sea as resulting
from wide-scale naval combat actions carried out in support of other
branches of the armed forces for the purpose of establishing conditions
which ensure the successful accomplishment of the tasks of those branches
and which also prevent or hamper the enemy from achieving success.
Superiority at sea is not attained by a single attack or in a single
operation. For this a number of successful combat actions are needed,
which are aimed at the destruction in the shortest time possible of the
enemy's forces at sea, in their basing area, and in their dispersal areas.
Accordingly, the sound principle set forth by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy of the USSR, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov,
fully applies to the gaining of superiority at sea: that the totality of
all the combat activity of a navy is the complex combination of
simultaneous and successive fast-moving strikes and operations culminating
in the achievement of decisive goals which in specific cases have an
immediate impact on the overall course and outcome of an armed conflict.*
* See: Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov, "Certain
Problems in the Development of Naval Art", Naval Collection, Moscow 1974,
No. 12, pages 24-32.
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Under conditions of closed naval theaters, the gaining and retention
of superiority at sea has acquired ever immuming importance because it
constitutes not only the decisive prerequisite for the accomplishment of a
fleet's main task, but also because this superiority assists troops
attacking along the coast in the fulfilment of the goals of the operation.
The geographical conditions prevailing in the given area, together with a
number of other special features and factors, affect the gaining of
superiority at sea. It is known that the characteristics of closed naval
theaters are determined by,military geographic conditions, and in
particular by the intercommunications 'through straits zones with adjacent
naval theaters. An indented coastline with bays and fiords, coastal
islands, peninsulas, or archipelagos can have both a favorable as well as
an adverse effect on operating conditions for both sides, for example, by
hampering the reconnaissance of naval forces and naval aviation especially
when these are located in a dispersed manner in skerries and channels.
Furthermore, one must consider that due to the relatively short
distances separating opposing forces and the limited space of a naval
theater, both sides will be able to conduct combat actions by surprise.
Taking into account the high level of development of combat equipment
and the special conditions of a closed naval theater one arrives at the
conclusion that in gaining superiority at sea superiority in the air has
become decisively important. As a result of ;he fact that enemy aviation
has to cross short distances in flying from its airfields to its possible
combat assignment areas, naval forces may encounter difficulty in
fulfilling their tasks if they are not provided with reliable cover and
support from the air.
In connection with the efforts aimed at gaining superiority at sea in
a closed naval theater, where conditions inmost cases are very favorable
for the employment of mines, combating mines has assumed a special role in
that it is hardly possible to gain superiority without effective antimine
defenses.
Directing our attention to the development of radioelectronic means
attained in recent years, great importance has been given to questions of
radioelectronic warfare. The short distances and varied opportunities for
the concealed and dispersed basing of such means has made it possible to
carry out powerful and aggressive radioelectronic measures when conducting
combat actions. Therefore, it is necessary to select those forms and
methods of control that ensure maximum stability and efficiency of control
without, at the same time, overlooking the protection of one's means
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against enemy radioelectronic reconnaissance.
Together with ensuring the strictest secrecy and the production of
jamming against enemy radioelectronic means, success in radioelectronic
warfare can be achieved first and foremost by the rapid and immediate
destruction of these means.
The most important prerequisite for gaining superiority at sea, in our
view, is for our own naval forces to be qualitatively and quantitatively
superior to the enemy's forces and also for our forces and their command to
be constantly ready and capable of initiating combat actions in a short
period of time and of successfully and decisively conducting these actions
until the planned goals are achieved. Taking into account the fact that
superiority at sea is not possible without air superiority, the
requirements imposed on the forces which have to ensure the accomplishment
of the task of air superiority are the same as those imposed an naval
forces.
For the achievement of superiority at sea, these are the other
generally accepted prerequisites:
1. The firm political-morale condition of all naval personnel, their
superior combat readiness and strong discipline.
2. The outstanding preparedness of personnel, making it possible to
ensure that naval forces are utilized and controlled, that weapons and
combat equipment are serviced, and that personnel readiness is continuously
maintained or rapidly restored under all situational conditions.
3. The conduct of decisive methodical actions by naval forces in
peacetime e core of these actions being combat duty. The organization
and fulfilmentth of combat duty by naval forces should be regarded as one of
the most important prerequisites for the successful destruction of enemy
naval forces and consequently, for the gaining of superiority at sea and in
the air.
To determine the specific goals, tasks, forms, and organization of
combat duty in closed naval theaters it is necessary to take into account
the following:
-- the military-political situation in the naval theater;
-- the forces, capabilities, and views of the enemy on the methods of
initiating and conducting combat actions;
-- the capabilities of one's own forces with regard to the combined
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actions and close cooperation of coalition forces that are using common
concepts and planning as a basis;
-- the military-geographic aspects of the given theater.
The main goal of combat duty in closed naval theaters consists in
continuously striving to retain the initiative and fetter the enemy by
one's own actions, while maintaining an advantageous and carefully
coordinated balance between offensive and defensive actions.
//
By accomplishing the combat duty tasks in conformity with this goal,
one is able to establish the essential prerequisites for gaining
superiority at sea:
-- ensure the maximum possible detection of the enemy's naval forces
as they move out of their base areas, when they are in concealed dispersal
areas, and also as they enter the zone, by conducting purposeful
operational reconnaissance and by performing steady patrol duty;
-- continuously monitor the enemy naval forces by conducting tactical
reconnaissance and surveillance;
-- reliably secure the naval frontiers and coast under all situational
conditions by setting up a stable system of border security and by
preventing sabotage actions within the limits of one's own territorial
waters.
4. The organization of effective reconnaissance, a reliable air
defense system, a goal-oriented antimine defense, and effective
radioelectronic warfare and camouflage, as well as the ensuring of the
cooperation and control of the forces, for which it is necessary to
maintain stable high-speed, and secure lines of communication that meet
all modern requirements.
The accomplishment of these and a number of other tasks and measures
can create operating conditions favoring the rapid gaining of superiority
at sea in a closed naval theater.
? The primary condition for successful combat actions by naval forces
consists in the skilful utilization of the prerequisites that have been
established in the course of everyday actions, in the immediate delivery of
strikes for the purpose of seizing the initiative after combat actions have
begun, and in retaining it until superiority at sea is gained. In so
doing, special attention is devoted to the delivery of the initial strike.
To ensure its highest possible effectiveness, it is necessary to use in the
shortest time possible the maximum amount of one's own forces to the entire
depth of the area of actions or the depth of the enemy's system of bases.
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In considering the favorable conditions of a closed naval theater, one
should assign paramount importance to the massive use of ship strike forces
and aircraft. The massive use of aircraft in a short period of time
ensures the destruction or neutralization of enemy means of air attack and
the gaining of air superiority. In organizing the initial strike, the
struggle for the first salvo is of decisive importance. We subscribe to
the statement made by Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G.
Gorshkov to the effect that the well-known formula -- "the struggle for the
first salvo" -- has acquired special meaning in naval warfare under modern
conditions (conditions of the opportunity to employ combat means having
colossal power). Any delay in using weapons in a naval battle or operation
will inevitably bring about the most grave or even disastrous consequences
regardless of where a fleet might be found -- whether at sea or in its
bases.*
The experience accumulated by the navies of different countries as
well as the level of developaent attained in combat equipment enables us to
draw the conclusion that the side succeeding in successfully delivering the
first salvo will be provided with the most advantageous prerequisite for
retaining the initiative and for enlarging the advantages gained.
In most cases the initial strikes can be delivered from a state of
p4!f2_ng_gambat_dutr... For the compraensive enlarging of success, up t
routing of enemy forces and the gaining of superiority at sea, it will
be necessary in the future to purposefully and without interruption
continue delivering follow-up strikes.
In order to gain superiority at sea, as well as rapidly destroy enemy
naval forces, there may arise the necessity of accomplishing these other
tasks:
-- carrying out aggressive blockade actions to prevent the buildup of
the enemy's forces in the naval theater and to prevent him from evacuating
his forces and means;
-- landing combined amphibious and airborne landing forces for the
rapid seizing of straits, islands, and important sectors of the shore as
well as military, political, and economic centers and structures and
facilities located an them;
-- participating in the antilanding defense by destroying enemy
landing forces in their bases, on the sea crossing, and in the debarkation;
-- protecting one's own sea lines of communication and making sea
shipments in support of the ground forces;
-- effectively combating any mine hazard created by the enemy. In the?
* See: S. G. Gorshkov, "The Navy at War and in Peacetime",
Naval Collection, Moscow 1973, No. 2, pages 13-25.
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interests of inuediately ensuring the freed= of actions of one's own
forces, it is evident that the destruction of enemy mine obstacle forces or
combat against them even before they arrive at the combat actions area will
play an increasingly important role.
The successful accomplishment of the tasks connected with the gaining
of superiority at sea in a closed naval theater imposes the very highest
requirements on the planning for and organization of the utilization of
forces, and on the control of these forces by commanders and staffs at all
levels. That is why in peacetime great attention must be devoted to the
instruction and training of command personnel.
Depending on the operational significance of the naval theater, the
retention of superiority at sea can play a decisive role in the successful
outcome of combat actions as well as in the seizing of other adjacent water
areas or enemy territory.
The successful retention of superiority at sea requires primarily the
prevention of the buildup of enemy forces. This task can be accomplished
by organizing and conducting aggressive blockade actions whose
effectiveness will depend to a great extent on how far, by coordinated and
unified efforts, one is able to carry these actions into the interior of
the enemy's territory. Depending on the geographical conditions of the
naval theater, the ground forces large units operating on the coastal axis
can significantly affect the success with which the blockade is conducted.
For example, the rapid seizure of the enemy coastal area, and also the
territory adjacent to the straits, can create conditions favoring the
expansion and conduct of naval actions. In so doing, it will be necessary
to have coordinated cooperation both among the naval forces of the
coalition and also between naval forces and ground forces large units,
especially when there arises the need to very quickly land an amphibious
force or to assist ground forces when they are crossing wide water
obstacles.
Successful blockade actions by naval forces, which prevent the enemy
from moving up reinforcements and supporting forces, will have a favorable
effect on ground forces actions and on the rapid seizure of enemy territory
by these forces. By these means the struggle of naval forces to master the
closed naval theater will have a considerable effect on the gaining of the
initiative and on the success of the actions of one's own forces on the
coastal axes.
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From what has been set forth above it follows that superiority at sea,
which results from wide-scale naval combat actions and the efforts of other
branches of the armed forces in closed naval theaters, will give rise to an
operating routine that favors the successful accomplishment of a navy's
main task and prevents or hampers effective enemy actions.
Superiority in one of the operational zones or over the entire closed
naval theater also provides favorable conditions for the basing of our
forces, for the protection of the sea lanes, for coastal defense, and for
the actions of other branches of the armed forces. For example, the
successful accomplishment of this task lessens the threat of mem attack,
making it possible to allocate additional contingents of ground forces as
well as air defense forces for action on other axes. On the other hand,
the absence or loss of superiority at sea requires the use of considerable
forces to defend the coast. From this standpoint, superiority at sea can
decisively affect the course of ground forces combat actions on the coastal
axis.
Based on these facts it is necessary, even in peacetime, to take steps
to establish those prerequisites that will ensure the rapid gaining of
superiority at sea. These steps involve the maintenance of combat
readiness, the continuous study of the enemy, the inculcation of superior
morale and fighting qualities, outstanding naval and specialized training
proficiency, exemplary order in subunits and large units, and the exemplary
status of the equipment of the naval forces, making it possible to use
these forces immediately, and finally, the thorough knowledge of the combat
capabilities of the equipment as well as the ability to skilfully use the
equipment under any climatic conditions and under varied sea conditions.
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