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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000706900001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 12, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
WashingFon. D. c 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
12 December 1986
The Koreas: Trends in the Military Balance
Summary
North Korea's military advantage will persist
through this decade, but reductions in training have
temporarily lowered its readiness. Both Koreas are
adding new weapons at a slow but steady pace. The
balance favors the North largely because of
advantages in manpower, units, and equipment in the
ground forces (see table). P'yongyang's strength in
firepower and mobility is substantial and is the
main reason for the North's lead.
Weapons Developments
North Korea has continued to receive equipment from the
USSR, and more could come as a result of Kim I1-song's visit to
This memorandum was prepared by
Office of East Asian Analysis. n orma ion available as of 12
December 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Korea Branch,
EA M 86-20149C
Copy o2 of 35
25X1
25X1
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Personnel
763,000
544,000
Infantry Divisions
28-29
21
Mechanized Divisions
0
2
Mechanized/Armor Brigades
36
2
Medium Tanks
3,200
1,260
Armored Personnel Carriers
1,750
700
Artillery
4,100
2,600
Multiple Rocket Launchers
(Truck Mounted)
900
18
Personnel
56,000
33,000
Fighters
645
379
Bombers
71
0
Air Defense Missile Sites
48
34
Antiaircraft Guns
11,400
2,140
Personnel
37,500
23,500
Total Fighting Ships/Craft
525
133
Destroyers/Frigates
3
25
Attack Submarines
23
0
Missile Boats
36
11
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(Seoul is
introducing the first state-of-the-art tank to tne peninsula.
Production problems are causing delays with this US-designed
tank, but we expect it to greatly improve Seoul's position in an
area where the North has held a substantial lead in both
numbers and quality.
North Korean Readiness
North Korea's overall military readiness is at a low level
because of reduced training and a lack of major exercises since
1984. We are unsure what caused the reduction in military
training, but political strategy and economic problems certainly
have played a role.
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-- Reduced petroleum imports have caused shortages in
military fuel, particularly for the Air Force. At the
same time, military fuel stocks are being released to
the civil sector, particularly agriculture, because of
problems there.
-- After Seoul and Washington rejected P'yongyang's
proposal in December 1985 for a mutual cessation of
large military exercises, North Korea announced that as
of 1 February 1986 it would unilaterally suspend major
exercises. Since then no major exercises have occurred
in the North, and training--even in reaction to Team
Spirit--has remained at low levels.
Nonetheless, we believe the North could bring its readiness
back to a high level--perhaps within a few months--through a
concentrated training program. Therefore, we do not believe that
the decline in readiness necessarily will have a long-term effect
on the military balance.
We may be seeing the beginning of a new era in North Korean
training. In October, North Korean and Soviet ships and aircraft
held their first-ever joint exercise. Although the exercise was
small in scale, it could be a prelude to greater cooperation.
North Korea's Navy--in particular its fleet of diesel-attack
submarines--could learn much from the sophisticated Soviet
Navy. F-1
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SUBJECT: The Koreas: Trends in the Military Balance
Distribution:
Copy 1 - Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense
Room 4E830, Dept. of Defense
2 - Director, DCI/DDCI/Executive Staff (7E-12)
3 - NIO/EA (7E 62)
4 - NIO/Economics (7E 48)
5 - C/PPS/DO (3D 01)
6 - C/EASE 18)
7 - OGI/FSIC/PI (2G 18)
8 - OEA/NEA/Korea Branch (4G 43)
9 - OEA/NEA/Japan Branch (4G 31)
10 - OEA/NEA/STI Branch (4G 43)
11 - OEA/NEA Division (4G 43)
12 - OEA/China Division (4G 32)
13 - OEA/SEA Division (4F 24)
14 - D/OEA (4F 18)
15 - C/Production/OEA (4G 48)
16 - FBIS Analysis Group (1014 Key Bldg.)
17 - DDI (7E 47)
18 - Senior Review Panel (5G 00)
19 - Office of Legislative Liaison (7B 14)
20 - PDB Staff (7F 30)
21-25 - CPAS/IMC/CB (7G 07)
26 - CPAS/ILS (7G 50)
27 - C/PES (7F 24)
28 - NIC/AG (7E 47)
29 - DDO/EA Division (5D 00)
30 - DDO/EA (5C 45)
31 - DDO/EA (5C 19)
32 - DDO/EA (5C 19)
DDI/OEA/N
EA/ K)
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