(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000302520001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 4, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: BANGLADESH: Implications of Parliamentary Elections
NESA M#86-20084
DISTRIBUTION:
EXTERNAL
1 - Darnell Whitt (Pentagon)
1 - Dr. Dov S. Zakheim (Pentagon)
1 - Captain Robert G. Anderson, USN (Pentagon)
1 - Ronald P. Zwart (Pentagon)
1 - Captain Edward Louis Christensen, USN, (Pentagon)
1 - Stephen Cohen (State Department)
1 - Herbert G. Hagerty (State Dept)
1 - Robert Boehme (State Dept)
1 - Robert Peck (State Dept)
1 - Charles W. Greenleaf (State Dept)
1 - Tish Butler (State Dept)
1 - Ron Lorton (State Dept)
1 - Emily Hodges (State Dept)
1 - R. Grant Smith (State Dept)
1 - James P. Covey (NSC)
INTERNAL
1 - Director/DCI/DDCI Exec Staff
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS/NESA
2 - PPS/NESA
1 - CPAS/ILS
1 - C/PES
6 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - DDO/DC/NE
1 - PDB Staff
1 - NID Staff
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/AI
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - DC/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/SO/A
1 - C/NESA/SO/S
1 - C/NESA/SO/PB
DATE
SI
%L L=
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FIL4-
DOC NO NUA N r&-.;?C0g41
OCR 3
P&PD 1
DDI/NESA/SO/PB (4Jun86)
5
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I I
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
4 June 1986
BANGLADESH: Implications of Parliamentary Elections
Summary
The Bangladesh parliamentary elections of 7 May, although
tainted by fraud and violence, will provide some legitimacy for
President Ershad as he moves toward presidential elections and
lifting martial law later this year. Ershad plans to use
pro-government forces in parliament to pass an amendment
ratifying his actions during four years of martial law. We
expect the amendment to be approved; the leftist Awami League
failed to gain the necessary seats to block it. The other major
opposition party, the centrist Bangladesh Nationalist Party,
boycotted the polls and plans to pursue a disobedience campaign.
The Army is unhappy that the pro-government party did not win
more seats but will continue its grudging support for Ershad.
Parliamentary sessions are likely.to reflect the chaotic nature
of Bangladeshi politics with Ershad's proposals for economic
reform and privatization often taking a back seat to political
horsetrading and grandstanding.
Ershad was able to p_%ll off the elections after months of wrangling
with the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
According to US Embassy reporting, Ershad secured the Awami League's
agreement to participate in elections in return for relaxing martial law,
moving back the election date, and promising to remain neutral during the
campaign. The BNP refused to compromise with Ershad and boycotted the
elections, charging that the polls would be rigged by both the
pro-government Jatiyo Party and Awami League.
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe Pakistan/Bangladesh
Branch, South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis. Information as of 3 June 1986 was used in its preparation.
Questions and comments should be directed to Chief, South Asia Division
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Election day was marred by violence and massive vote fraud by the
Jatiyo and, to a lesser degree, the Awami League, according to US Embassy
and press reports. Bangladeshi officials admitted that 12 were killed in
election violence, but press reports claim 20 dead and 500 injured. US
Embassy officers reported seeing ballot boxes being stuffed and polling
agents kidnaped. Midway through the vote counting, the government stopped
reporting results. It later announced that voting for 36 seats would be
completed on 19 May because of "irregularities." The US Embassy estimates
voter turnout at a maximum of 30 percent.
Winners and Losers
The Jatiyo Party, which Ershad helped organize from smaller parties
about a year ago, emerged from the election with a small majority (183 out
of 330 seats) (see graphic). US Embassy reporting indicates that Ershad
wanted a two-thirds majority so that he would have the necessary
votes--220--to pass a constitutional amendment to legitimize the actions of
the four-year old martial law regime.
The leftist, pro-Indian Awami League won 76 seats and seven smaller
parties allied with the League won a combined total of 21 seats. The
fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami party won 10 seats, the conservative Muslim
League received four, the leftist National Socialist Party took four, and
independent candidates gained 32 seats. The Awami League's showing was
better than the last parliamentary election, held in 1979, but below the
111 seats that Awami leader Sheikh Hasina needed to block Ershad's
constitutional amendment.
Sheikh Hasina considered boycotting parliament because she suspected
vote tampering prevented her party from winning even more seats, according
to US Embassy reporting. Hasina is
now demanding that, in ret>xn for the Awami League taking its seats in
Parliament, Ershad must restore the suspended 1972 constitution, try the
accused killers of four Awami League leaders, and declare Mujib Ur
Rahman--the first President of Bangladesh and Hasina's father--as the
"father of Bangladesh."
Constitutional Role of Bangladesh's Parliament
Bangladesh's parliament, called the Jatyo Sangsad or House of the
Nation, is a unicameral body consisting of 330 seats. Three hundred seats
are popularly elected while the remaining 30 are reserved for women and go
to the majority party as bonus seats. According to constitutional
amendments passed in 1975, the Parliament is elected every five years,
meets twice yearly, and any legislation it passes may beyvetoed by the
president without any override provisions. A constitutional amendment,
however, requires the consent of two-thirds of the members.
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Ershad's Strategy
After getting the new parliament to legitimize his martial law
actions, Ershad intends to attain the presidency and then lift martial law,
according to US Embassy reporting. We believe he plans to hold a
presidential election by November when his term as Chief of Army Staff
expires,
Ershad recently told US Embassy
officials that he will also choose a prime minister in consultation with
Jatiyo party members of parliament.
Ershad also has told US Embassy officials that martial law cannot be
completely lifted until his position as president has been secured, either
through popular elections or martial law decree.
Army Concerns
Senior Army officers, who often exercise heavy influence over
Bangladeshi politics, have been critical of Ershad's heavy-handed efforts
to advance his political goals and make deals with civilian politicians.
We belibve, however, that the most disgruntled Army officers are too
disorganized to take any action against Ershad while others see him, for
all his faults, as an adequate protector of the military-'s interests.
Outlook
We expect the parliament to convene sometime in July. To maintain the
military's support, Ershad is unlikely to show any flexiblity on Sheikh
Hasina's key demands for revival of the constitution,,trial of the accused
killers of Awami League leaders, and honoring Mujib Ur Rahman. He also
calculates, probably correctly, that the Awami League will agree eventually
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to take its seats in order to forestall another possible military coup and
the potential defection of party members who would be upset at the prospect
of losing hard-won seats. The Army will remain suspicious over Ershad's
dealings with the Awami League but will probably not move against him
except in the improbable event of an Ershad-Awami League alliance. If
Ershad dissolves parliament and reimposes martial law, which we consider
unlikely, the-:Army would have few alternatives to continuing support for
him.
We believe Awami Leaguers and independent MP's eventually will go
along with the constitutional amendment in return for revival of the 1972
Relations between Ershad and parliament will be strained if, as now
seems likely, he delays the lifting of martial law until the completion of
presidential elections. Probable Jatiyo Party factionalism will hinder
Ershad's efforts to build and maintain support for his legislative
initiatives.
,We believe that the BNP, by its boycott of the elections, will
gradually loserpublic attention and become only a nuisance to Ershad once
Parliament gets down to business. The BNP has cancelled. plans to hold
demonstrationsatto disrupt parliament because of lack of organization and
finances
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BREAKDOWN OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS
Jatiyo Party--183
Awami League--76
JSD (Socialist) --4
Muslim League--4
Jamaat-E-Islami--10
Awami League Allies--21
300 of the 330 seats were up for election.
The Jatiyo Party gained the additional 30
seats by winning a majority.
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