(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000202360001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 8, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: Tunisia: Bourguiba Struggles to Strengthen his Grip
NESA M# 86-20068
Howard Teicher, NSC
Vincent Cannistraro, NSC
Philip Ringdahl, NSC
Morton I. Abamowitz, State Department
Peter Rodman, NSC
R. Rand Beers, State Department
Patrick N. Theros, State Department
Howard K. Walker, State Department
David. E. Zweifel, State Department
Martin Van Heuven, State Department
Sandra Charles, Pentagon
James L. Woods, Pentagon
DATE -!rig I __
INTERNAL:
1 - DDI OCR
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/AFR DOC NO NESA M & 3oo(08
1 - CPAS/ILS
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB P&PD
1 - D/NESA -- ~,...
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS/NESA
2 - PPS/NESA (One Copy to Analyst to Source)
1 - C/PES
1 - NID Staff
1 - PDB Staff
1 - NESA/IA
1. - NESA/PG
1 - NESA/SO
1 - NESA/AI
2 - NESA/AI/M
DDI/NESA/AI/M/AF
8May86 25X1
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SJ;L1ET
Central Intelligence Agency
Mshingan Q C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
8 May 1986
Tunisia: Bourguiba Struggles to Strengthen his Grip
Summary
President Bourguiba's recent cabinet shuffle
underscores his increasing preoccupation with quashing
dissent, which over the long-term could affect US
relations. Bourguiba has been a staunch supporter of
the United States and we believe that his opponents
will be quick to link Washington with the embattled
regime.
Bourguiba's recent reorganization of his cabinet
has focused on shifting some of the power of Prime
Minister Mzali, his handpicked successor, to General
Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, a military officer in charge
of the police and intelligence apparatus. This shift
could be a signal that Mzali is in serious trouble and
that the President believes he needs a stronger man as
Prime Minister and heir apparent.
Over the last several months Bourguiba had ordered
a series of repressive measures to cope with increasing
political unrest. His infirmity and increasingly
erratic decisionmaking is widely known among
Tunisians. Although his opponents may be intimidated
in the short term, Bourguiba's crackdown could bring
cooperation among his foes and increasing violence.
Eighty-four-year-old President Bourguiba is resorting to
heavyhanded tactics to shore up his authority. He recently
intensified an anticorruption campaign to cow critics within the
Tunisian elite and ordered the arrest on corruption charges of
This memorandum was prepared by the 25X1
Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and
South Asian Analysis. Information as of 8 May 1986 was used in 25X1
its preparation. Questions and comments should be directed to
Chief, Arab-Israeli Division
NESA M# 86-20068
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v u~. a~u i
two prominent businessmen linked politically and economically to
his estranged wife, Wassila. The singling out of the businessmen
is seen locally as related to palace politics, but the
vindictiveness of the campaign and some tough prison sentences
has badly shaken the business elite, traditionally one of the
strongest supporters of the ruling party.
At the same time, the government has cracked down on other
influential groups. Habib Achour, long time head of the
country's main trade union federation (UGTT) has been jailed on
trumped-charges and the union leadership dismantled. Bourguiba
also ordered the arrest of Ahmed Mestiri, the principal
opposition leader and secretary general of the Social Democratic
Movement (MDS), who had faulted the President for not criticizing
the US airstrike on Libya. Although Mestiri has been released
from jail for health reasons, his criminal record could
effectively exclude opposition participation in legislative
elections scheduled for November. Since these elections are only
held every five years and the opposition was denied seats in the
1981 elections, frustration among anti-Bourguiba segments of the
population is probably on the rise. Indeed, Bourguiba appears
certain to add fuel to the fire by pushing ahead with a law which
will bar parties founded on religion--a measure that will
efectively exclude Islamists--many of whom are non-extremists.
The Bourguiba regime also has instituted a get tough policy
toward students. The university campuses have been subject to
police rule since mid-February and Islamists on and off campus
have been hassled. In late April, the shooting of an Islamic
student leader by the police sparked violent demonstrations that
led to the arrest of more than 1,000 and the conscription of many
into the armed forces. Some of the Tunis University campuses
remain closed and most others are paralyzed by student strikes.
The regime's repressive measures have led previously antagonistic
Islamic militants and extreme leftists to work together.
Is Mzali On the Way Out?
Another sign that Bourguiba is making security the number
one priority of the regime is his decision to transfer the
Interior Ministry from his handpicked successor Prime Minister
Mzali to General Ben Ali--his chief security officer in charge of
the police and intelligence apparatus. According to the US
Embassy in Tunis, most Tunisians think of Ben Ali as a tough cop
who is eager to crack down on government opponents; Mzali is more
the conciliator.
This change coincides with persistent rumors in Tunis over
the past few months that Bourguiba as decided to replace Mzali,
who has held his post for five years. The summary firing of
Mzali's right-hand man, Merzri Chekir supports this belief. So
too does the fact that Bourguiba chose Public Works Minister
Mohamad Sayah--not Mzali--to organize the ruling Destorian
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5 I L KLY1'
Socialist Party (PSD's) June congress. Two other Mzali proteges
also have been shifted out of their posts by the President--
Mohamed Fredj Chedli from the Ministry of National Education and
Amur Ghedira from the position of Secretary of State at the
Ministry of the Interior to Mayor of Monastir.
There is no shortage of personalities waiting in the wings
to be asked by Bourguiba to be the new heir apparent. These
include Mansour Skhiri, the Minister at the Presidency, who has
constant access to the President and on whom Bourguiba has relied
as a way of balancing Mzali's opinions; Mohamed Sayah, who has
built a strong political base primarily of loyal PSD members who
owe their positions to him; and Ben Ali, whose power derives from
his control over security forces and ties to the military. The
President's son, Habib junior and Foreign Minister Caid Essebsi
may also be contenders, although their influence has waned
recently.
Prospects and Implications for the United States
For the present, the way still appears clear for a
relatively unobstructed and generally pro-Western transition in
Tunisia. All of Bourguiba's potential successors have had
training in the United States or France, are basically pro-
Western, and almost certainly would continue to look to the West
for economic and military assistance. Nevertheless, the post
Bourguiba generation leaders probably will be less sympathetic to
Washington's interests than Bourguiba. 25X1
most of the Tunisian elite believes that the United 25X1
States has paid insufficient attention to the country's security
needs. The Israeli airstrike on the PLO headquarters in Tunis
last October added to their frustration with Washington. We
believe each probably would strive for a somewhat more nonaligned
position, cooperate more closely with African and Arab neighbors, 25X1
and distance themselves to an extent from the United States.
Bourguiba's repressive measures could push events in Tunisia
in a way detrimental to US interests. The Tunisian political
climate could help forge links between factions who have had
little in common and make them into a formidable antiregime
force. Leaders of the Islamic fundamentalists and leftists
groups--including students, workers, and the urban poor--would
highlight the President's close relationship with Washington and
accent the point that US security assistance is being used for
repression. Such anti-American sentiment would especially be
exploited in the economically depressed south by Libyan-trained
dissidents who are well placed to play upon social unrest. Such
developments could make an orderly, relatively pro-Western
succession difficult in Tunisia, although we still think the
ruling party would prevail. If events in Tunisia took a negative
turn, however, we would expect the moderate pro-Western military
to step in to maintain political stability and socioeconomic
continuity.
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