(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000202100004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 21, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/17: CIA-RDP86TO1017R000202100004-2
SUBJECT: Israel: Unity Government's Prospects
NESA M# 86-20042
DISTRIBUTION:
Original - Robert Taylor, OSD/ISA/NESA
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - PDB Staff
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 - C/NESA/AI
2 - NESA/AI/I
DDI/NESA/AI/I/~
DATE 3 ,~ y/8G
DOC NO NESA /1
OCR 3
P&PD
/- C, is
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/17: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202100004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/17: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202100004-2
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
21 March 1986
Israel: Unity Government's Prospects
Summary
Herut's recent chaotic convention
will implement the rotation agreement with Shamir next 25X6
fall. Peres may be hoping that if Herut's internecine
conflict persists he will have greater opportunities to
force a coalition crisis over such issues as the Tabah 25X6
talks with Egypt and renewed domestic economic
growth. If the rotation nevertheless is carried out,
Israeli foreign and security policies would be unlikley
to change substantially because Labor will continue to
control five of the ten seats on the government's
executive inner cabinet. F__1 25X1
According to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv, Vice Premier Shamir
so tar has been unable to work out a compromise with his
rivals--Commerce Minister Sharon and Deputy Premier Levy--to
allow reopening of the convention that was inconclusively
adjourned in mid-March. Shamir recently turned down a proposal
by Sharon that would leave Shamir in his current position as
party chairman, but make Sharon central committee chairman with
power to appoint additional convention delegates and designate
Levy party "executive" chairman. Shamir has held at least one
face-to-face meeting with Levy since the convention, but the two
reportedly failed to reach any agreements.
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe Israe
l
25X1
Branch, Arab-Israeli Division,
Asian Analysis. Information as
preparation. Questions and com
Office of Near Eastern and South
of 21 March 1986 was used in its
ments should be directed to Chief
,
Arab-Israeli Division
25X1
NESA M# 86-20042
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/17: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202100004-2
Likud's Manuevering
Shamir presumably hopes his opponents will paper over their
differences with him to assure Likud regains the prime ministry
in October. But Levy and Sharon, who have maintained a close
working alliance, claim to control over fifty percent of the
convention delegates. They clearly are determinpd fn s their
advanta e
They probably are prepared to strike a bargain with Shamir, 25X6
but only if he concedes them significantly stonger part
Labor Bides Its Time
Peres and his Labor Party colleagues have maintained a
deliberately low profile since the Herut convention to avoid
giving Shamir a cause to rally party support. Labor leaders are
continuing preparations for the 8 April party convention, at
which they are planning to stage a united show of support for
Despite its low key public stance, the mood within Labor has
changed dramatically since the Herut convention, with many party
activists convinced that Peres has a major new opportunity to
force a government crisis and even stage an early national
election on favorable terms. Labor insiders reportedly sent a
film crew to the Herut conclave to gather footage for use in an
election campaign and have commissioned a public opinion poll to
help judge the convention's impact on public attitudes.
Peres, who in the past has kept extremely close counsel on
his coalition options, has suggested in recent public interviews
that the rotation might be endangered if Shamir proves unable to
ensure Herut support for government domestic and foreign
policies. Peres may be calculating that if the Herut internal
warfare continues he will have new opportunities to force a
coalition crisis over the Tabah negotiations with Egypt or
proposals to promote renewed domestic economic growth. Some
Labor Party Knesset members also reportedly are proposing that
Peres implement further budget reductions by reducing money
allocated for West Bank and other settlements--a move certain to
draw Shamir's opposition.
Peres probably anticipates, that if he lives up to his
agreement on rotation, his popularity will steadily erode as he
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CONFIDENTIAL
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/17 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000202100004-2
is shunted to the less conspicuous jobs now held by Shamir--Vice
Premier and Foreign Minister. Peres probably also is concerned
that, once in power, Shamir and his colleagues would score major
gains in public support if the economy begins to show signs of
growth and thus would he better able to contest Labor in the next
scheduled election in November 1988.
After exchanging jobs with Shamir, Peres's standing in Labor
also would probably decline. He would be overshadowed by Rabin,
who would benefit from the influence and high visibility of the
defense portfolio, which he will retain throughout the
government's term. In such circumstances, Rabin would be in a
strong position to challenge Peres for the Labor Party leadership
before the next parlimentary election.
Foreign and Security Policies if Rotation Goes Through
If Peres nevertheless ultimately goes through with the
rotation agreement, Israel's basic foreign and security policies
would be unlikely to change substantially. Rabin, by retaining
the post of defense minister, would continue to exercise
predominant influence over Israeli policy in Lebanon and with
respect to Israel's military posture vis-a-vis Syria. Rabin,
moreover, would continue to work with Peres on these issues and
with other Labor ministers who are members of the government's
executive, ten-member inner cabinet. Labor's control of five of
the ten seats in this "kitchen cabinet" would be its strongest
assurance that Shamir, Sharon, and other Likud leaders did not
engage Israel in new adventures beyond its borders.
These political realities, combined with Israel's continuing
austerity-related economic problems, also probably would
discourage Shamir from aggressively expanding Israel settlements
in the West Bank. Shamir, Sharon, and other Herut leaders would
be certain to press for diverting budgetary funds from other
programs to the expansion of existing settlements and
establishment of new ones, and some movement in these directions
would be likely. But tight funds and Labor's ability to veto a
massive new settlements strategy would help keep Herut's
activists in check, despite their grumbling and efforts to mount
public support.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/17: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202100004-2