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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000300300004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of I op See
Intelligence
Iraq, Iran, and Turkey
The Kurdish Resistance in
Top Oac-rat
NESA 85-10126C
June 1985
Copy 303
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The Kurdish Resistance in
Iraq, Iran, and Turkey
This paper was prepared byl 25X1
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
with biographic information contributed by= 25X1
Office of Central 25X1
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
Top Secret
NESA 85-10126C
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Summary
Information available
as of 11 June 1985
was used in this report.
Iraq, Iran, and Turkey
The Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war have enabled Kurdish
militants in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey to revive insurgencies against their host
governments:
? In Iraq, Kurdish militants have achieved their greatest success. They
seized extensive tracts of territory along the Iranian and Turkish borders,
which they have successfully held despite sweep operations by the Iraqis
with support from the Turkish military.
? In Turkey, Kurds unexpectedly mounted an insurgency last summer,
and, despite significant increases in Turkish troop strength in the
Kurdish areas, the uprising has not been quelled.
? In Iran, a hard core of fighters survives and continues to defy the Tehran
government despite successive reverses. The Iranian Kurdish resistance is
presently tying down more than 40,000 Iranian troops.
Deep splits among the Kurdish rebel groups limit their ability to work
together, and this undercuts the effectiveness of the movement. Neverthe-
less, some tentative steps toward cooperation have been taken recently by
the Iraqi Kurdish guerrillas that could have serious implications for
Baghdad.
The Kurdish resistance is heavily dependent upon outside assistance. Syria
and Libya are the principal suppliers of arms and finances. Syria also
provides training and safehavens. Iran and Iraq both arm and subsidize
Kurdish guerrillas.
the Soviet Union is stepping up contacts with 25X1
Communist Party to influence the
Soviets apparently seek to use the
regime in Ankara.
the Kurds in Turkey.
it uses the Turkish 25X1
Turkish Kurdish insurgent groups. The
Kurds to gain leverage against the
Iraq plans to mount a major effort against Kurdish base camps in northern
Iraq this summer. The Iraqis, however, can commit only limited troops to
the offensive because of their continued conflict with Iran, and they could
suffer serious casualties at the hands of the Kurds. If Iraq appears to be
weakening under pressure of a two-front war, Turkey will try to assist by
resuming cross-border attacks on the Kurds in Iraq. Such activity on
Turkey's part, in our view, almost certainly would sour relations between it
and Iran and could stop the developing rapprochement between the two
countries.
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NESA 85-10126C
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Kurdish Resistance Organizations
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
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The Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party (IKDP)
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The Kurdish Labor Party (PKK)
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Foreign Influence on the Resistance
US Interests
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The Kurdish Resistance in
Iraq, Iran, and Turkey
Over 15 million Kurds inhabit the strategic Iraq-Iran-
Turkey triangle on NATO's southern flank.' Through
this Kurdish territory runs the main invasion route
from the northeast to the Persian Gulf. The Kurds
have exploited the rugged mountainous terrain of
their homeland to defy attempts by regional govern-
ments to subdue them. Generally, the Kurds have
been easily contained. Periodically, however, they
stage a revolt that threatens stability throughout the
area. We believe the Kurds could be on the verge of
Kurdish insurgencies are under way in Iraq, Iran, and
Turkey-the first time in over 50 years that Kurdish
uprisings have occurred simultaneously in all three
states. The unrest comes only a few years after the
rebels appeared finally to have been defeated. A
major rebellion in 1975 in Iraq, led by the legendary
Kurdish guerrilla chieftain Mulla Mustafa Barzani,
foundered after the rebels' principal backer, the Shah
of Iran, withdrew his support and the Kurdish fighters
were scattered into exile
The Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war have
allowed the Kurds to revive their rebellion. The
collapse of the Shah provided Iranian Kurds with
their first opportunity in nearly 35 years to assert
their claims to independence. Iraq's arming of Iranian
Kurds battling the Khomeini regime provoked Tehran
to assist exiled elements of the Iraqi Kurdish commu-
nity against Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. The
necessity for both countries to transfer their forces
from Kurdish areas to main fronts in the Iran-Iraq
war has further emboldened the rebels.
Aid from Baghdad and Tehran has produced formida-
ble Kurdish resistance organizations,
There are probably 10,000 to 15,000 X
Kurdish fighters established in strongholds in both)(
Iraqi and Iranian territory. After starting out as x
Iranian and Iraqi pawns, the guerrillas have begun toX
act independently.) 25X1
Kurdish Resistance Organizations
The six major Kurdish guerrilla organizations have
little in common except their desire for independence:
? Probably the toughest and best disciplined fighters
among the Kurds are the Iraqi Kurdish tribesmen
led by Masud Barzani.
? Also fighting against the Government of Iraq is the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal
Talabani.
? In Iran, an umbrella organization of Kurdish fight-
ers-the Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party
(IKDP)-is made up of a faction loyal to IKDP
leader Abdur Rahman Qasemlu; another extreme
leftist group, the Komeleh; and the remnants of the
once powerful Shikak tribe.
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Recent Kurdish History
The Kurds' grievances against the existing order in
the Middle East go back to the peace treaties that
ended World War I. Although the Kurds are the
fourth-largest population group in the area, they were
largely ignored. The peace treaties divided the Kurds
between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. There is also a
small community of Kurds in the Soviet Union.
statehood and instead asked for autonomy-whereby
Kurds would enjoy minority privileges as citizens of
existing states. Mulla Mustafa Barzani, in his revolt
against Iraq throughout the 1960s and 1970s, fought
only for autonomy. With Barzani's defeat in 1975,
practically all major Kurdish resistance groups revert-
ed to their demand for separatism.
The Kurds refused to be assimilated, demanding the
right of self-determination. They argued that they
were a distinct people and as such entitled to a land of
their own. Kurds speak a separate language and have
distinctive customs; they also have lived in their
homeland for centuries.
Since the end of World War I, the Kurds have been in
almost constant rebellion against the various states in
the region. Because of their proven qualities as guer-
rilla fighters and the rugged terrain of their home-
land, they have been able to preserve a degree of
independence; they, however, have not been able to
form a state.
The Kurds came close to realizing their goal of
statehood after World War II when they founded the
Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in Iran. The republic
was overwhelmed by the Shah's forces after the Soviet
Union, its principal backer, withdrew support. After
the Iranian Kurdish defeat, Kurds generally moderat-
ed their demands. They abandoned their goal of
? The one important Kurdish resistance organization
in Turkey is the Kurdish Labor Party (PKK), the
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groups.
^The Barzanis. The Barzani tribe, the largest Kurdish
lSgroup, numbers about 5,000 fighters, plus dependents.
The tribe has a long history of fighting against
governments in Baghdad. It was forced into exile in
Iran following the defeat of Mulla Mustafa Barzani's
revolt in 1975. From 1975 to 1983 the tribe served the
Iranian Government as mercenaries against Iraq.
Many assimilated Kurds have risen to high positions
in the Middle East. For example, Turkey's first Prime
Minister, Ismet Inonu, was a Kurd, as was the first
President of Iraq, Abdul Karim Qasem. Yet nowhere
in the Middle East are Kurds accepted as full citizens
if they choose to assert their Kurdishness.
In Turkey, Kurds are forbidden to speak or write
Kurdish. Indeed, the very concept of Kurd is consid-
ered ethnologically invalid by the Ankara govern-
ment, which officially maintains that Turkey's Kurds
are "mountain Turks." In Iran, religious discrimina-
tion is practiced against the Kurds-the largest Sunni
minority in a Shia-dominated state. In Iraq, the
Kurds are discriminated against racially and political-
ly. They are not encouraged to join the ruling Arab
nationalist Bath Party, and, although Kurds may
speak Kurdish, the language of instruction in the
schools and administration is Arabic. In all states
where there are large Kurdish minorities, the Kurdish
areas are the most economically backward.
The tribe is led by Masud and Idris Barzani, the sons
of Mulla Mustafa. Masud is the group's leader,
although Idris, who is well respected by the tribesmen,
also is capable of assuming command.
Masud is not a dashing guerrilla
captain in the tradition of his more renowned father,
but he has a reputation as a shrewd diplomat.F-
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Barzanis set up an 25X1
Legendary Kurdish guerrilla chief Mulla Mus-
tafa Barzani in the uniform of a Soviet army
general. Taken in 1946, when Barzani led the
army of the Soviet-supported Kurdish Republic
Other Barzani guerrillas then infiltrated the 25X1
independent base in Iraq. Following the Haj Umran
operation, they ordered approximately 800 of their
fighters to occupy a strip of territory along the Iraq-
Turkey border, F_ I 25X1
area. Successful infiltration was possible because
Baghdad deliberately had drawn down its troop
strength in the Kurdish north to confront Iranian
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The Barzanis have adopted a relatively low profile,
and they seem intent on building their strength before
they risk provoking retaliation from Baghdad.0 25X1
they have not tried to take the major cities of
the area, such as Zakhu, nor have they attempted to
cut any of Iraq's vital lifelines, like the Iraq-Turkey
oil pipeline.
,(In July 1983 the Barzanis spearheaded an Iranian
X Army probe that seized the small Iraqi border town of
~C Ha' Umran.
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The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The PUK,
the second-largest Iraqi Kurdish guerrilla group, has
3,000 to 5,000 members. It is made up mostly of city
Kurds, unlike the tribal Barzanis, and is led by the
Marxist intellectual, Jalal Talabani. He and the
Barzanis have long been rivals for leadership of the
Iraqi Kurdish resistance. From 1976 until 1983, the
PUK waged a low-level guerrilla war against Bagh-
dad's forces in the area around As Sulaymaniyah in
southern Iraqi Kurdistan.
The PUK aligned with Iraq after the Haj Umran
invasion. Talabani agreed to take Iraq's side in the
war if, in return, Baghdad agreed to grant autonomy With no chance of reaching an accommodation with
to the 2.5 million Iraqi Kurds, the government, at least for the time being, Talabani
With Talabani's help, Baghdad soon regained has begun to seek alliances with Iran and Syria.
control over a major part of Iraq's Kurdish territory,
but the autonomy talks broke down last October after
dragging on for 10 months.
We believe the talks foundered because of Talabani's
excessive demands. he
insisted that Iraq turn over defense of the Kurdish
provinces to his guerrillas and that the PUK adminis-
ter the Kurdish region in place of the ruling Bath
Party. Bath Party officials probably regarded Tala-
bani's proposals as a bid to share power, and a
lessening of the Iranian threat removed some of the
rationale for continued cooperation with him. More-
over, other Iraqi Kurdish tribes who had long cooper-
nated with Baghdad objected to the prospect that
X Talabani, with whom they had bitter feuds, might
again power in Iraq.
Last February, Baghdad attacked Talabani's camps,
marking the final break between him and the govern-
ment.
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The Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party (IKDP). The
Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party directs the Kurd-
ish resistance in Iran. It is an umbrella organization.
When founded in 1979, it included about 40,000
fighters in over a dozen groups,
Tehran's success cost the Kurds most of their fortified
bases and forced them to switch tactics. The resis-
tance now largely is mobile, conducting guerrilla raids
from strongholds in Iraq.
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To-
day, ravaged by ruthless Iranian attacks, the IKDP
has dwindled to two groups and the remnant of a
third, with a combined strength of only a few
thousand:
? A faction loyal to the IKDP's leader, Abdur Rah-
man Qasemlu, has about 5,000 fighters.
? An extreme Marxist group-the Komeleh-has
about 1,000.
? The remnant of the once powerful Shikak tribe-
the so-called Mount Ararat Group-has about 250.
Iran's Kurds initially supported the Khomeini regime
but quickly became disaffected when Tehran refused
to consider their demands for a locally elected parlia-
ment, a Kurdish militia-to serve exclusively in the
Kurdish provinces-and guaranteed freedom of wor-
ship. Khomeini rejected the Kurds' autonomy bid,
arguing that it threatened Iran's national survival,
To grant the
Kurds autonomy would invite similar demands from
other Iranian minorities, he claimed. Labeling the
Kurds counterrevolutionaries, Khomeini ordered
Kurdish cities and towns bombed. Kurdish dissidents
fled into the mountains, but Iran's ground forces-
weakened by the turmoil of the revolution-could not
secure the Kurdish territory, and the rebels soon
reoccupied the region from western Azerbaijan to
Sanandaj.
The Kurdish Labor Party (PKK). The Kurdish Labor
Party is the only important Turkish Kurdish resis-
tance organization. It also is the only Kurdish group
that practices terrorism. The PKK originated in Tur-
key in the late 1960s or early 1970s and, according to
statements of the group's leaders, is a Marxist-
Leninist organization dedicated to the creation of a
Kurdish state encompassing all of Turkey's Kurdish
As the Khomeini government regained confidence,
however, Tehran recouped. Khomeini turned the job
of pacifying the Kurdish region over to the Revolu-
tionary Guard. The Guard members quickly regained
control of most towns in Kurdistan, and last year
Tehran ordered an all-out assault in which it commit-
ted 40,000 troops, including regular Army units,
By October, according to Western
press reports, Tehran claimed its forces had cleared a
In the spring of 1983, the PKK began efforts to
stimulate a revolt in southeastern Turkey. Using
safehavens in the Barzani-held territory in northern
Iraq as staging areas, the PKK made hit-and-run
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2,000-square-kilometer area.
Nevertheless, with the first winter snows in Decem-
ber, the Kurds hit back. They harassed isolated 25X1
Iranian garrisons, ambushed relief convoys, and in- 25X1
flicted heavy casualties on the Iranians, according to
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guerrillas, will free Iraqi troops to confront the Irani-
ans. According to US diplomats in Baghdad, the
Iraqis and Turks had agreed in 1983 to permit Turkey
to conduct cross-border raids against the Kurdish
guerrillas.
Iran's protests have temporarily deterred the Turks,
who are reluctant to resume their raids as long as
Tehran objects.
army supports resumption of the cross-border raids
when necessary, but Turkey's civilian leaders prefer to
seek an accommodation with Tehran.
Meanwhile, local skirmishing is continuing, and both
the Turkish Army and the PKK are preparing for
attacks against Turkish security posts. The following
summer it launched two daring raids into Turkey,
killing and wounding a number of gendarmes and
civilians. The raids were against two subprovincial
seats, Semdinli and Eruh, in Hakkari and Siirt prov-
inces. According to US diplomats in Adana, the
raiders isolated the towns by cutting communications
and for three days urged the townspeople to support
Kurdish separatism. F__1
The raids shocked the Turks, who are extremely
sensitive to disaffection in their southeastern prov-
inces, the site of large-scale rebellions in the 1920s
and 1930s. They were taken aback by the organiza-
tion displayed by the PKK and the brazen manner in
which the raids were carried out. Even more disturb-
ing was the fact that the raids were supported by some
local Kurds and met with sympathy by many others,
according to US diplomatic sources in Ankara.
Ankara responded by mounting cross-border attacks
into Iraq to root out the PKK rebels and destroy their
safehavens. The incursions by Turkey's troops largely
were unsuccessful, in part because the Barzani Kurds
offered the PKK cadres protection. Moreover, Tehran
and Damascus angrily protested the Turkish action.
Iran and Syria fear that Turkey, by suppressing the
cess against the rebels, but the area's rugged terrain is
hampering operations, US diplomats in Ankara re-
port.
Foreign Influence on the Resistance
The survival of the Kurdish resistance depends to a
large extent on outside support. As the Iran-Iraq war
has become increasingly stalemated, foreign aid to the
guerrillas has grown.
Syria. We believe Syria supports the Iraqi Kurds
primarily to exhaust Iraq's Army and undermine
popular morale. It also hopes to keep. the Iraqis
preoccupied so they cannot pursue subversion against
Damascus. Syria supports the Turkish Kurds to put
pressure on Ankara on issues of concern. According to
US Embassy officials in Damascus, the Syrians are
wQrried that Turkey's construction of the Ataturk
Dam on the Euphrates will diminish Syria's water
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supply and limit its hydroelectric power generation.
President Assad also almost certainly fears that Turk-
ish ties to the United States work against Syria's
strategic interests. During the crisis in Lebanon, the
Syrians have complained to Ankara that Washing-
ton's use of Turkish military facilities has been a key
element in what Damascus sees as a plan to undercut
Syrian influence in Lebanon.
Libya. Libya is the principal financial supporter of the
Kurdish resistance in Iraq and Turkey and also
supplies arms and training.
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Iran also must take care that aid to the Kurds does
not antagonize the Turks, since Ankara is liable to
take Iraq's side in the war. After Iran successfully
blocked Turkey from staging anti-Kurdish incursions
into Iraq last year, relations between the two countries
cooled. Turkish newspapers in November and Decem-
ber printed diatribes against Tehran, and some Irani-
an deputies attacked Turkey in the Majles. F---]
In January, Iran initiated high-level contacts with
Ankara, seeking to ease strained relations. Ultimate-
Iran. Iran supplies both the Barzanis and Talabani ly, Tehran agreed to prevent the PKK rebels from
using the Barzani enclave.
even prisons.
Iraq. Iraq supports all factions of the IKDP. It
supplies them with weapons, financing, and safe-
havens, a 15-
kilometer strip along Iraq's border with Iran between
Qal'at Dizah and Panjwin has in effect been turned
over to the Iranian Kurds. Inside the enclave the
guerrillas maintain hospitals, barracks, arsenals, and
Iraq, like Iran, uses the guerrillas to tie down its
enemy. Resistance activity in northwestern Iran
forces Tehran to keep several divisions of troops in the
power base.
in its dealings with the Kurds because of fears about
strengthening Kurdish separatism. It gives the Kurds
enough aid to keep their revolt against Iran going, but
tries to prevent them from developing an independent
conduits for aid to the Kurds
The Left. The Turks have long claimed that the Soviet
Union uses Middle Eastern Communist parties as
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Since the start of the Iran-Iraq war, Turkey has
become increasingly active in suppressing the Kurdish
resistance. Of all the states with Kurdish minorities,
Turkey is the most concerned about the destabilizing
effects of the movement. Turkey has the largest
Kurdish population in the Middle East, and Turkish
Kurds are largely disaffected from the Ankara gov-
ernment. The Kurdish region is depressed economical-
ly in comparison with the rest of Turkey. It also
remains under martial law five years after the mili-
tary took power-along with other security problem
areas like Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul. Ankara long
has feared a spillover effect from revolts by Kurds in
neighboring states.
the more important Kurdish organizations, using
members of the Turkish Communist Party (TCP).C
the Soviets are trying to direct the
Kurdish insurgents to fulfill Communist objectives.
According to press earlier this year
the well-organized and politically active TCP an-
nounced a united front with the PKK and publicly
quarter of Turkey's population.
Ankara's fears seem overdrawn but are perhaps un-
derstandable in view of Turkey's experience with the
Kurds and other minority groups. After World War I,
Turkey nearly was torn apart by revolts among its
Greek, Armenian, and Kurdish communities. More-
over, the Kurds account for perhaps as much as one-
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endorsed Kurdish national rights. The TCP regularly 25X1
propagandizes the Kurdish cause over its clandestine
broadcasts from East Germany. Among other themes,
the TCP calls on the Kurds to oppose US bases in the 25X1
Turkish Kurdish areas.0 25X1
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In Iraq, the Barzanis last October allied themselves 25X1
with a faction of the Iraqi Communist Party carrying
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on guerrilla operations against Baghdad. In Syrian
press interviews after the alliance was formed,
Masud Barzani charged the United States was an
imperialist power and "tool" of Zionist Israel. He also
attacked Turkey as a member of the "hated" NATO.
Barzani's comments surprised Western diplomats in
Damascus. The Kurdish leader previously had been
considered a conservative tribal chief, predisposed
toward the United States.)
We believe cooperation between the Kurdish groups
and the Communist parties in Europe and the Middle
East is largely tactical. The Kurds offer the Commu-
nists a made-to-order constituency for opposing
NATO, since Turkey is among the main opponents of
Kurdish separatism. At the same time, the Kurds use
the Communists to propagandize the Kurdish cause.
Moscow probably is stepping up its involvement with
the Kurds in Turkey to gain leverage in future
dealings with the regime in Ankara. The Soviets,
however, are unlikely to jeopardize ties with Turkey
or with Iran and Iraq by supporting Kurdish attempts
to overthrow the governments of these countries.
Moscow has a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty
with Baghdad, and Soviet-supplied arms have enabled
Iraq to sustain its war with Iran. In recent years,
Moscow has not attempted to incite Iranian Kurds-
despite Soviet-Iranian frictions-because, in Mos-
cow's eyes, the fiercely anti-Western Khomeini re-
gime is an improvement over the pro-Western govern-
ment of the Shah. Moscow's relations with Ankara
also have taken a turn for the better in recent months.
offensive against the Kurds this summer,
Outlook
In our judgment, the Kurdish situation, particularly
in Iraq, will become more unstable during the coming
months. If Tehran continues to fail in its attempts to
overcome Iraqi defenses in the south, it is likely to try
opening a second front involving the Kurds in the
north. At the same time, Iraq has planned a major
If challenged by the Iraqi Army, we believe the Kurds
will fight hard. They have won back land they believe
rightfully belongs to them, and they will not easily
surrender it. Moreover, after the breakdown of auton-
omy talks between Talabani and Baghdad, the Kurds
know they have nothing to expect in the way of a
political settlement. They can surrender to Bagh-
dad-on Baghdad's terms-or they can fight.[
The Kurdish threat to Iraq could-in our opinion-
increase sharply if any one of the following were to
occur:
? The Kurds score a significant number of kills
against Iraqi aircraft using shoulder-fired SAM-7s
newly acquired from Syria.
? The Kurds cut Iraq's oil pipeline through Turkey.
? Iraq appears to be fragmenting under the pressures
of having to fight a two-front war, a development
that probably would compel Turkey to take military
action against Kurdish guerrillas in Iraq.F--]
We believe that acquisition of sophisticated weaponry
by the Kurds has altered the balance of power in the
north. The Kurds almost certainly have only a limited
number of surface-to-air missiles, but they can use
them to knock down helicopters, the scourge of the
guerrillas. Iraq, therefore, must expect heavier losses
than in the past if it moves against the Kurds.
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For most of its recent history, the Kurdish resistance
has avoided the use of terrorism. That situation
appears to be changing, however, largely because of
the influence of the Turkish Kurds.
The Kurdish resistance in Turkey developed in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, when violence was a part
of the political process. Hence, Turkish Kurdish radi-
cals, along with Turkish radicals generally, resorted to
assassinations, hostage taking, and operations deliber-
ately planned to instill fear.
Until recently, Turkish claims of Kurdish cooperation
with terrorist groups were difficult to substantiate.
Last summer, however, European police noted a
marked increase in violence among PKK cadres. In
Sweden, the Netherlands, and West Germany, Kurds
linked to the PKK were assassinated, apparently by
fellow PKK members.
a faction of
the PKK has decided to pursue terrorist methods and
is eliminating members who refuse to go along.
Kurds.
Last January a terrorist operation that probably was
committed by the PKK occurred near Hamburg,
West Germany. The Kurds joined with German radi-
cals in firebombing trucks stored in a German Army
depot. A letter to a West German newspaper linked
the attack to the Kurdish resistance and the West
German Red Army Faction. The letter claimed the
trucks were bound for Turkey to be used against the
Meanwhile, in Iraq, Kurdish rebels have begun kid-
naping foreigners working on development projects in
the Kurdish areas. The rebels have seized over 15
technicians-from Italy, Japan, China, and Romania.
Their aim appears to be to embarrass Iraq by demon-
strating to foreign firms that Baghdad cannot protect
their workers.
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Nevertheless, we believe the Iraqi military will pro-
ceed with its summer offensive against the guerrillas.
Iraq's Army has a longstanding grudge against the
Kurds, whom it has never been able completely to
subdue. To back away from the planned campaign
would involve a considerable loss of prestige for Iraq's
military commanders.F_
If the anti-Kurdish drive is not quickly successful, we
expect the Iraqis to cut short the fighting. Since the
start of the war with Iran, Saddam has followed a
strategy of minimizing casualties. The Iraqi Presi-
dent, therefore, is likely to limit himself to containing
the guerrillas. Complete pacification will be deferred
until after the Iran-Iraq war.
We believe destruction of the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline
is a more remote possibility. The line is vulnerable to
Kurdish attack as it passes through areas of Kurdi-
stan difficult to patrol. The Kurds, however, are
unlikely to attack the line without Iran's permission,
The fragmentation of Iraq is the least likely possibili-
ty, since Baghdad appears capable of resisting the
Iranians militarily. Nevertheless, Baghdad cannot
afford to engage indefinitely in significant conflicts on
two fronts. Iraq lacks the human and material re-
sources to defend its southern front against Iran and
also contain a large-scale Kurdish uprising in the
north. At present, the northern Kurdish areas are
defended by reservists of Iraq's Popular Army. These
troops, according to US diplomats in Baghdad, are
largely ineffective. If Iraq begins to weaken under
pressure of combined Kurdish-Iranian attacks, we
believe it will call on Turkey to assist it by stepping up
cross-border raids on the Kurds. The Turks will
comply, and this will increase strains in Ankara's
relations with Tehran and Damascus
US Interests
The Kurds' desire for an independent entity adds to
instability in this already volatile region and is a cause
of great concern to Turkey and Iraq, two states of
strategic interest to the United States. Although
unlikely to be formed, a Kurdish state would be small
and inherently weak and could only be created at the
expense of existing states. The Kurdish rebellion,
moreover, provides opportunities for Moscow to gain
greater leverage in the area.F__1
rillas.
Kurdish threats to Turkish stability are particularly
worrisome since Turkey forms the southern flank of
NATO and US bases are located in the troubled
Kurdish region of Turkey. The Turkish military ulti-
mately is more than a match for the insurgents, but,
because of widespread sympathy for the rebels among
local Kurds, the Turkish Government must be careful
in dealing with the rebellion. US diplomats in Ankara
have reported rioting in areas where the Army has
conducted random arrests to round up Kurdish guer-
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