(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001100150001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 18, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
18 May 1984
London Summit: Prospects for a Declaration
on International Terrorism
Summary
In the aftermath of the killing of a London
policewoman by shots fired from the Libyan
people's bureau in London last month, Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher has announced that she
intends to raise the issue of greater
international counterterrorist cooperation at the
London economic summit on 7-9 June. At previous
summits, most of the participants agreed only
reluctantly to include terrorism on the summit
agenda, but a greater level of concern in some
countries, such as France, Italy, and the United
Kingdom, about increasing international terrorist
activity probably will permit the subject to be
broached with fewer objections this year.
Although prospects appear poor for agreement on
collective, punitive measures such as trade
sanctions against states that sponsor terrorism,
summit participants may agree on a joint call for
an international review of specific provisions of
the 1961 Vienna Convention on diplomatic
privileges and immunities.
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe
Office of European Analysis. Questions and comments may be
addressed to Chief, European Issues Division,
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An Unwelcome Summit Topic At Best
Thatcher's intention to put terrorism on the summit agenda
is somewhat at odds with the outcome of this year's final meeting
of the "Summit Seven experts on terrorism" which took place only
a few days before the shooting in London. The group, which
generally plays a peripheral role in summit planning, attempts to
identify the terrorist issues of common concern that might be
fruitfully pursued at the summit itself. Discussions of
terrorism at previous summits have led to such documents as the
Bonn Declaration on aircraft hijacking (1978) and the Venice
Declaration on the protection of diplomats (1980).*
The group had some problems agreeing this year on measures
to increase counterterrorist cooperation. US interest in
exchanging information on how each participant cooperates with
third countries in counterterrorist training activities, for
example, elicited varying responses. British, Canadian, and West
German representatives reportedly approved, but the French
objected that terrorism is inappropriate for an economic summit
and that such exchanges are, in any case, beyond the scope of
earlier summit agreements on counterterrorist cooperation. They
probably also believe that information exchanges of this nature
would compromise the strictly bilateral counterterrorist training
programs France provides to several African and Middle Eastern
countries.
The experts' meeting also concluded that although concerted
international action at times may be effective, most members, and
especially France, would like to discard the Bonn Declaration
which they view as inconsistently applied and not very useful.
* The Bonn Declaration states that in cases where a country
refuses to extradite or prosecute hijackers and/or does not
return hijacked aircraft, governments of the summit countries
should take immediate action to cease all flights to that
country. Summit governments also will initiate action to halt
all incoming flights from that country or from any country by the
airlines of the country concerned. This has been applied only
once, in the case of Ariana Afghan airlines.
The Venice Declaration denounces terrorist or criminal actions
against diplomatic or consular personnel or premises in
contravention of the norms of international law and practice.
The summit governments resolve to provide "support and
assistance" in situations involving the seizure of diplomatic or
consular establishments or personnel. The declaration also
recalls that states have the duty under international law to
refrain from supporting or engaging in terrorism.
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Indeed, the UK currently is pressing to lift sanctions imposed on
Ariana Afghan airlines under the Bonn Declaration largely because
Kabul has threatened the UK with denial of overflight rights.
Perhaps more important, however, is the general desire of
the four West European summit countries to avoid moving too far
toward formalizing a "Summit Seven" anti-terrorist group. They
have indicated that more institutionalized multilateral
intelligence exchanges or new anti-terrorist initiatives would be
unnecessary duplications of effort. France, Italy, West Germany,
and the UK already have established multilateral mechanisms for
counterterrorist cooperation--the Club of Berne*, the EC's Trevi
group**, and, with the exception of the UK, the Council of
Five***. In view of such existing mechanisms, anti-terrorist
effectiveness would not be significantly enhanced for a majority
of the summit participants. In fact, the four West European
states each have expressed on many occasions their preferences
for dealing bilaterally with the US on terrorism matters rather
than in a summit context. Thus, we believe most of the summit
governments would welcome an opportunity to hold bilateral
consultations--perhaps beginning at the summit itself--on such
matters as President Reagan's counterterrorism initiative,
example, which has stimulated British interest.
Problems with Sanctions
The summit participants almost certainly would not agree to
adopt joint trade measures aimed at punishing or isolating states
that sponsor international terrorist activity. Even after recent
Libyan actions in the UK, increased concern among summit
governments about Libyan leader Qadhafi's promotion of terrorism
does not outweigh the importance of their considerable economic
* The Club of Berne, founded in 1971, is a nine-country,
intergovernmental group of West European security services that
specializes in information exchanges on counterintelligence and
counterterrorism. Members include Belgium, Denmark, France,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK, and West
** Extant since 1976, the Trevi group is an informal outgrowth
of the EC's political cooperation process and promotes
multilateral cooperation on counterterrorism.
*** The Council of Five--Austria, France, Italy, Switzerland,
and West Germany--focuses on security of the Alpine states'
borders against terrorists and criminals.
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and political stakes in Tripoli. This fact, along with strong
doubts about the effectiveness of trade restrictions in achieving
political and economic goals, suggests that disapproval and
outrage over state-sponsored terrorist actions will not translate
into significant action. Indeed, despite British interest in
action against Libya, Foreign Secretary Howe has stated that
trade sanctions--other than a ban on any new arms sales--are not
being considered.
Of all the summit countries, Italy would be the least
willing to alter its historically strong ties with Tripoli. Rome
has no interest in discouraging Libyan purchases of Italian
goods, which totaled $2 billion in 1983. Libya, in turn, is
Italy's third-largest supplier of crude oil and petroleum
products and, according to the US Embassy in Rome, also holds a
12-percent interest in FIAT. The presence of some 15,000 to
20,000 Italians in Libya would give Rome pause even in the
absence of economic interests. Rome takes seriously Qadhafi's
France and West Germany also would not subscribe to trade
measures aimed at Libya or other Middle Eastern states sponsoring
terrorism. Libya is the second-largest oil source for West
Germany, and Iran is a key market for West German goods.
France's trade with Libya is limited, but Paris has always
opposed the principle of sanctions and would be even more
unwilling to participate in an embargo that might upset the
delicate negotiations under way with Tripoli in an effort to
break the stalemate with Chad. In two separate incidents last
year, Libya seized a number of French and West German nationals
in retaliation for arrests of Libyans in France and West
Germany. In both cases, Paris and Bonn released the Libyans in
exchange for their own nationals. Any actions against Libya
presumably would prompt similar acts which the French and West
Germans clearly would rather avoid.
Canadian economic interests in Libya, Iran, Iraq, or Syria
are limited. The Canadians nonetheless object in principle to
the concept of trade sanctions, largely because of their own
dependence on an active international trade market. Japan
probably would reject the imposition of trade sanctions as well,
having been reluctant in the past to subscribe to any measures
not universally adopted. In addition, the volume of Japanese
exports to Iran is second only to West Germany's among the summit
nations, and Japan is by far more reliant on Iranian oil
imports.
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EC Consultations
British Foreign Secretary Howe raised the question of Libya
and state-sponsored terrorism with his EC counterparts in
Brussels on 14-15 May. A top Foreign and Commonwealth Office
official informed the US Ambassador in London this month that
Howe is urging the other EC members to begin laying the
groundwork for a broad diplomatic campaign against state
terrorism. At the EC Political Directors' meeting on 17-18 May,
the British also reportedly floated a proposal on summit
treatment of terrorism. Both meetings afforded the UK an
opportunity to assess prospective French, Italian, and West
German support for a British initiative on terrorism at the
A Possible Outcome
Although the idea of trade measures against state sponsors
of terrorism is unacceptable to most summit countries, they may
agree on a joint declaration on international terrorism. At
British urging, most participants probably will be willing to
make a broad denunciation of government support for terrorist
activities, although probably not naming specific states.
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The UK also has stated that it will not seek formal changes
in the Vienna Convention--a process that could take years--
because of a desire to avoid jeopardizing sensitive areas of
international consensus. Nonetheless, Thatcher probably will
seek approval for a review of existing treaties, agreements, and
declarations that define diplomatic privileges, immunities, and
protections. Accordingly, the majority of summit countries
probably will agree to a declaration of intent to explore and
identify international standards of diplomatic practice and
behavior which could be more rigorously enforced.
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Distribution: London Summit: Prospects for a Declaration on
International Terrorism
Orig - Rear Admiral John Poindexter, The White House
1 - Ambassador Robert M. Sayre, Dept. of State
1 - Mr. Richard N. Haass, Dept. of State
1 - Mr. Ronald I. Spiers, Dept. of State
1 - The Honorable Richard Burt, Dept. of State
1 - Mr. John Kelly, Dept. of State
1 - Mr. Noel Koch, Dept. of Defense
1 - Mr. Hugh Montgomery, Dept. of State
1 - Mr. David C. Fields, Dept. of State
1 - Mr. Donald R. Fortier, National Security Council
1 - Mr. Oliver L. North, National Security Council
4 - IMC/CB
1 - OGI/IIC/TAB
1 - D/EURA
2 - EURA Production
3 - EURA/EI
2 - EURA/EI/PS
DDI/EURA/EI/PS
(18May84)
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