(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000502240001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 22, 1983
• Content Type: LETTER

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Central Intelligence /agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
`?a~o~
NC?TE FbR: Director of Central Intelligence
F'RCx~i Rdaert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
The attached letter for your signature
and the accompanying iren~torandum respond to
Under Secretary Ol~r's request for a CIA
assessment of Tvest European reservations about
US efforts to increase exports to China of
COCOM-controlled items. In general, analysts
in tY~e Directorate believe our allies are
primarily concerned that the United States is
unilaterally atte$npting to change the operating
procedures and principles of COC.~M. Strategic
considerations probably play only a marginal
role i1n allied misgivings over such sales.
Robert M. Gates
_ 25X1
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Eentral Inte~ligence f~ency
The Honorable Lionel H. Olmer
The Under Secretary for International Trade
Department of Commerce
Washington, D.C. 20510
Thank you for your recent request for our views of West
European reservations about the developing trade relationship
between the United States and China. In brief, we believe
strategic concerns contribute only marginally to West European
apprehension over our policy and related US initiatives in
COCOM. I have attached a memorandum which assesses in mare
detail our allies' attitudes on this subject.
Please let me know if we can provide you any further
analysis on this topic.
Yours,
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
COCOM Reactions to the New US Policy Toward China
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? pY pp
Central fnielli~ence Agency
1Nashington, [?. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
COCOM Reactions to the New US Policy Toward China
We believe West European concerns over US moves to increase
exports to China of COCOM-controlled items reflect primarily
their apprehension that the United States is attempting to change
unilaterally the operating procedures and principles of COCOM.
Commercial interests also play an important part in their
complaints. Strategic considerations, in our view, add only
marginally to their misaivinas over increased exceptions for
sales to Beijing.
Many COCOM members believe US proposals to establish special
procedures to streamline the review process far excepted sales to
China would reintroduce the issue of political differentiation
into the COCOM mechanism. They maintain COCOM`s review process
must remain technical and uniform despite the increased number of
exception requests stemming from the new US export guidelines.
o Great Britain and West Germany welcome Washington`s
pledge to expedite US review of exception requests but
.reject any procedures that even loosely introduce
special treatment for any country on the proscribed
lists, including China. They believe all exception
cases should be handled objectively and expeditiously,
reflecting strategic, not political, criteria..
This memorandum was prepared by European Issues 25X1
Division, Office of European Analysis, was coordinated with
the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research and Office of
Global Issues. Research was completed on 22 November 1983.
Comments and questions are welcome and ma be addressed to the
Chief, European Issues Division, EURA, 25X1
EUR M 83-IO269
25X1
25X1
"`'?'25X1 ?
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o Belgium and Norway have expressed similar reservations
and have suggested that China be dropped from the
proscribed lists altogether. Brussels argues that COCOM
can not handle the increased number of exception
requests and suggests exports to China could be reviewed
ex post facto. Norway suggests cooperation between
COCOM and China is possible because of their mutual
interest in maintaining technology transfer controls
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Oslo admits the question of
potential "leakage" will have to be addressed.
o France rejects the US attempt to introduce geographic
differentiation into the COCOM process and views the US
moves as antithetical to Paris' attempts to reduce COCOM
controls to a "hardcore" list. Moreover, France
probably perceives that Washington's China policy could
lead to arrangements in COCOM that would codify--
formally or informally--a special status for China.
Paris probably believes introducing separate criteria
for Beijing would not streamline multilateral e
~
controls but would make them more cumbersome.
West European resistance to the US proposals probably
reflects an additional fear that the United States is trying to
capture the market in high-tech sales to China. According to
US Embassy reports, most COCOM countries
have long wanted to increase their own commercial sales to
Beijing, including exports that incorporate same sensitive
technologies and presently require COCOM approval. West European
governments probably are piqued that US efforts to liberalize
trade with China come only after US business contracts with
Beijing have been negotiated.
France's senior COCOM delegate believes the US policy
is opportunistic and caters to American business. He believes
other COCOM delegates share his view.
25X1
25X1
25X1
France and other COCOM members 25X1
probably are purposely footdragging on US proposals and exception
requests for China in retaliation against past delaying tactics
that they believe the United States has used against them. The
French delegate to COCOM implied further that these delays are
likely to continue in order to drive the point home to Washington 25X1
that cooperation on export controls must be reciprocal.
We believe our COCOM partners' strategic reservations over
China's acquisition of Western technolo are lar e1y
superficial, (Beijing's 25X1
determination to acquire Western technology with military
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application. France, indeed, has expressed apprehension that
Chinese foreign policy is fluid and unpredictable, but Paris'
numerous exception requests for exports to China and their
proposals in COCOM for a "hardcore" list cast doubt upon the
salience of this concern. During President Giscard's
administration, France did refuse to sell China some
technologically advanced products for so-called strategic
reasons, but in our view this policy reflected his
administration's attempt to forge a unique relationship with
Moscow. We do believe, however, that West European states
genuinely are fearful that the new US commercial policy toward
China could exacerbate Soviet security concerns and contribute to
a further deterioration in East-West relations.
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1 - EURA/EI
2 - EURA/EI/EI
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Ex. Dir.
1 - Ex. Reg.
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - DDI Reg.
1 - D/EURA
4 - IMC/CB
2 - EURA Production
DDI/EURA/EI/EI/
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