(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 26, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7J
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
26 August 1983
The Philippines: Implications of the
Assassination of Benigno Aquino
Summary
The assassination of Benigno Aquino has led many foreign
observers to conclude that the stability of the Marcos government
has been gravely undermined --a judgment we think is premature.
Whether Marcos orchestrated Aquino's assassination or not,
Aquino's death will make management of the political environment
more complex for Marcos at a time he already faces major
decisions about the economy and upcoming National Assembly
elections. His immediate concerns are maintaining internal
security, managing the country's delicate financial position, and
insulating relations with the United States from the fallout
Aquino's death may produce. Over the longer run, Aquino's death
may radicalize Philippine politics by reducing the incentives for
Filipinos to work within the political system.
This typescript memorandum was prepared byl Ithe Southeast Asia
Division, Office of East Asian Analysis. Information avaliable as of 26 August
1983 was used in its preparation. Ccnments are welcome and may be directed to
the Chief, Southeast Asia Division,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7
An Act of Consequence
The assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino last
Sunday has raised new questions both at home and abroad about
Philippine political stability and a possible erosion of
President Marcos's ability to manage the domestic political
scene. Aquino's death comes at a time when Filipinos have begun
to prepare for the 1984 National Assembly elections -- the first.
since interim legislative elections in 1978, the economy is
experiencing severe financial strains and high unemployment, and
domestic speculation about President Marcos's health is rife. It
has focused international attention on the Philippines' long-
standing problem of weak political institutions, revived an
international discussion of the morality of Marcos's rule, and
renewed debates about the nature of the Philippines' relationship
with its most important security and economic partner -- the
United States.
Philippine opposition leaders have expressed their
bitterness and frustrations with unprecedented vehemence and have
made no effort to conceal their suspicion of government
complicity in Aquino's assassination. Their public statements
have been widely reported in the international press. Although
opposition charges that Marcos is polarizing the political
environment by driving Filipinos to the far left of the political 25X1
spectrum are not new, they are now being repeated with new
conviction.
the perception of university students in Manila is that Marcos
ordered Aquino's killing. a 25X1
majority of the political opposition -- and posse e the majority
of the population -- shares this perception. 25X1
Thousands of Filipinos had prepared to meet Aquino at Manila
International Airport Sunday, and yellow ribbons were visible
everywhere as a symbol of welcome. Because Aquino had conducted
an open matching of wits with the government over the possibility
and circumstances of his return for several months and because
Marcos had so clearly gone to great lengths to keep him in the
United States, his return could not have been more dramatic.
Aquino also succeeded in focusing world attention on his reentry
into domestic politics by bringing many journalists with him on
the flight into Manila from Taipei. We believe he intended this 25X1
as a pressure tactic to force Marcos to exercise restraint in
dealing with him. When Aquino was assassinated, however,
extensive global news coverage of the tragedy was assured.
There has been little violence so far in reaction to the
assassination, and Filipinos are showing little inclination for
organized political protest. Nevertheless, Manila has prepared
for the worst.
President Marcos, meanwhile, has warned opponents not to foment
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7
unrest. He has made television appearances designed to stifle
rumors, including one that martial law would be reimposed, and to
demonstrate that the government is in control.
Who Shot Aquino?
Aquino's assassin was almost certainly a hired killer, with
extraordinary intelligence data to aid him in his mission.
the alleged killer -- whose
identity remains unknown to Philippine authorities -- wore
clothes without labels and carried no personal identification.
He successfully disguised himself as an airport maintainance
worker, apparently knew airport routine well, but he was not an
airport employee. He accomplished his mission with one
strategically placed shot into Aquino's head -- thus avoiding
Aquino's bullet-proof vest. He not only managed to elude
security measures that had kept thousands of Aquino's admirers
away from the airport, but apparently knew what flight to make
plans for at a time when Aquino's own family and friends clam
they could not determine which airline he was to arrive on.
In any case,l
government is pressing its investigation aggressively.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
At the
suggestion of senior US officials, Manila also established a
nonpartisan commission, along the lines of the Warren Commission,
to attempt to get to the bottom of the mystery. Prime Minister
Cesar Virata on Tuesday told the US ambassador that such an
approach had great merit, and Manila implemented the plan the
next day.
For its part, the government is blaming Communist terrorists
for Aquino's death. We believe most Filipinos, after hearing the
governmemt blame the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and
its military arm, the New Peoples Army (NPA), for a wide range of
crimes during the last several years, will regard this charge
with skepticism. Some government officials are arguing, however
-- and we are inclined to agree -- that the Communists have the
most to gain from Aquino's death. Stepped-up activity by the
National Democratic Front, the overtly non-Communist front
organization of the CPP, is already in evidence on college
campuses. We see no evidence yet of increased activity by the
NPA in the countryside since the assassination, but this would
only become apparent after several weeks.
President Marcos's Perspective
Whatever the circumstances leading to Aquino's
assassination, his death adds a serious, and possibly critical,
complication to Marcos's management of foreign relations, the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7
11
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7
I I
economy, and domestic politics during the next few months.
Marcos, for example, looks forward to President Reagan's visit to
Manila in November and is anxious to return the hospitality that
made his state visit to Washington last September the most
memorable event in his political career. He is aware that
considerable international attention will be focused on the
visit, and he had expected it to enhance his international status
as a statesman and put the stamp of legitimacy on his government
at home. He now almost certainly fears that events connected to
Aquino's death may force the cancellation of the visit.
During the next several months, Marcos must also make
important decisions about domestic economic policy. The
Philippines' external finances have become increasingly
precarious in recent months and a restructuring of the $23
billion foreign debt will be required to prevent payments
arrearages sometime in the next year. Central Bank liquidity is
severely strained and the Bank's own short-term debt of $2.5
billion, at the very least, requires immediate attention. If
current trends continue, the foreign trade deficit will exceed $3
billion for 1983, virtually matching last year's record setting
level. Given the Central Bank's weak financial position, this
makes foreign debt rescheduling as likely as not by year's end.
On the domestic political front, Marcos must prepare for
National Assembly elections next May. The election will be an
internationally recognized test of his willingness to liberalize
domestic politics and bolster the center of the political
spectrum. After several months of debate within the ruling
party, Marcos has yet to decide on election rules and party
accreditation. His challenge is to find a way to simultaneously
ensure a victory by the ruling party, induce participation by the
moderate opposition in order to legitimize victory the ruling
party is expected to win, and appear fair in setting the rules of
the game.
The Near-term Outlook
The course of political events during the next several weeks
will depend on decisions Marcos himself will make. His foremost
concerns between now and the National Assembly elections are
managing the security situation, relations with the United
States, and averting a financial crisis.
Security - If Marcos's track record is any guide, he will
maintain political control by exercising discipline, but stopping
short of moves that would provoke popular backlash. There is
already evidence of restraint. Marcos apparently allowed
Aquino's family to return without interference -- despite their
lack of travel documents and despite claims by Benigno Aquino,
Jr. that he would carry on in his father's footsteps. Marcos may
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7 25X1
I I
hope that Aquino's funeral next week will pass without widespread
demonstrations and, if possible, he probably intends to avoid
repressive tactics. In any case, calm continues in both the
countryside and metropolitan Manila itself. The Philippine
Constabulary, in fact, has ended its red alert status the
highest level of readiness) outside of the capital.
The security threat is probably to be found in the cities.
Student demonstrations have occurred already and can be expected
to be repeated; students were heavily represented when Aquino's
body was transported last Thursday to a church. A demonstration
on Friday at the University --ignored by most of the student body
-- degenerated into rioting in downtown Manila.
Government forces are almost certainly capable of dealing
with this sort of unrest. The chief threat to security may be
that government forces overreact, producing a public backlash.
Aquino's funeral next Tuesday in Manila is a potential
flashpoint.
In the unlikely event that demontrations do get out of hand
or rioting occurs during the next several weeks, the government's
ability to function normally could soon be seriously impaired.
We believe that Manila's security forces could handle most any
disturbance, but the necessity of heavy-handed tactics in the
current grim circumstances would gravely damage confidence in the
government both at home and abroad. Manila would rapidly find
itself besieged by criticism at a time its hands were full
keeping the lid on domestic tensions. The government's
relationship with.its allies and foreign creditors are especially
vulnerable to such a chain of events.
Increased violence and stepped up recruiting by the NPA in
the countryside, at least, appears likely in the months ahead.
We believe the government is in a position to contain this
threat, and the Communists are unlikely to seriously damage the
government's position. Nonetheless, violence would increase the
likelihood of abuses to civilians by government security forces,
and this could further erode popular support for the government
over the longer term as a side effect.
Relations With the United States. Marcos has worked hard on
improving relations with the current US administration and values
good relations as a legitimizing factor for his government. He
almost certainly understands that his US-based opponents will
press lobbying efforts with the US Government to cool relations
with Manila. Demonstrations at the United Nations and in several
US cities have already occurred, and Marcos probably believes
that this type of activity will intensify when Congress gets back
in session. Marcos probably fears that the the recently
concluded review of the Philippines-US Military Bases Agreement
will come under special scrutiny when the Congress examines the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7
$900 million base compensation package. He regards the base
compensation package as something of a victory because it allowed
him to show a domestic audience that he knew how to deal with the
Washington as an equal partner.
His chief concern, however, is almost certainly the
possibility that events will force cancellation of the
President's trip to Manila in November. He is aware of the
debate in the United States over his human rights record in the
aftermath of Aquino's death. He is also certainly aware that
some US Government officials are arguing that President Reagan
should not associate himself too closely with Marcos. A
cancellation of the visit would seriously diminish the
credibility of the Marcos government at home and reduce its
ability to govern effectively at a time when important decisions
must be made about economic management and politics.
The Financial Crisis- Aquino's death may swiftly and
adversely affect the job of managing the balance of payments.
Although the assassination may
not make a critical difference in mayor foreign banks'
perceptions of Philippine creditworthiness, smaller US and West
European banks may view the assassination as an alarm signal and
cut back credit lines in an effort to reduce risk. Prime
Minister Virata has already told the US Ambassador that he fears
Aquino's death may soon sour the Philippine's external financial
position. A financial crisis, especially foreign debt
rescheduling or default on payments, would cost Marcos dearly in
the election and discredit his economic program. It would be
especially embarrassing if it occurred just prior to a visit by
the US President.
25X1
Of the things that could go wrong for Marcos during the next
several weeks, we believe this is the most likely. The Central
Bank has operated on a razor thin financial margin since April
and is in no position to weather a loss of foreign creditor
confidence. Payments arrearages under these circumstances are
therefore a good possibility. If Marcos does not handle
financial matters adroitly, Manila could find its ability to
conduct business seriously disrupted, making an already serious
economic slump even worse. A financial crisis in the aftermath 25X1
of Aquino's assassination, combined with longstanding concern
among foreign bankers about Marcos's health and who might succeed
him, could lead to a sharp curtailment of credit.
This chain of events would almost certainly force Manila to
look to Washington for emergency financial assistance. As it is,
Manila has been sounding out US officials for financial relief
package since last June. Prime Minister Virata is now in
Washington, and the US Embassy believes he may hold discussions
with the World Bank and possibly senior US Government officials.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7
I I
Taking A Longer View
The factors that often produce political upheaval in
developing countries -- authoritarian rule, skewed income
distribution, government corruption, a sagging economy beset with
financial problems, and fragile, highly personalized political
institutions -- have long been present in the Philippines. They
have yet to produce. widespread unrest, however, and the chemistry
may never be right. In the aftermath of Aquino's death, it is
too soon to say that the assassination has contributed the
critical catalyst.
Nonetheless, we believe Aquino's death will permanently
change Philippine politics. Press reports say that the CPP has
offered to support the moderate opposition in an effort to
maximize the damage that Aquino's death will do to the
government. Even if the offer is not accepted, new bridges among
Marcos's opponents appear certain to be built and this does not
bode well for the stability of the Marcos government. Communists
in the National Democratic Front, for example, are making
considerable progress through propaganda approaches to Philippine
youth, according to US Embassy reporting. The Front is arguing
that because Marcos plotted Aquino's death, political activism
within the bounds of the law is pointless. The Front claims the
radical left is the only remaining alternative, and the Embassy
believes that, whether the government had any role in the
assassination or not, this message is winning the left new
recruits. This is especially disturbing from the standpoint of
long-run stability, because half the Philippine population is
under 18 years of age.
Aquino's death may also present Marcos with a more
formidable moderate opposition at a time that international
attention is more critically focused than ever on his conduct of
human rights. At present, even in the aftermath of Aquino's
assassination, we do not believe that the opposition has the
power to bring down the government, but much will depend on
whether the opposition will overcome its internal divisions and
present a united front.
Some reports from the Embassy suggest that moderate
opponents of the governent will boycott next May's elections.
This would cost Marcos the legitimizing factor that he so dearly
wants, but it also would ensure the moderate opposition's
virtually permanent irrelevance in the country's political
future. Alternatively, if they can unite, the opposition could
approach the elections with renewed vigor, presenting Marc_
a formidable, but we believe still manageable challenge.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7
I I
Appendix
Marcos and Aquino
Much of Aquino's personal political history -- and thus some
of Marcos's possible motives for nuetralizing him politically --
has been obscured in the confusion following the assassination.
Although the press has characterized Aquino as a man committed to
democratic processes and integrity in government, his political
.1 1
career shows that he was an opportunist
and was consumed with the ambition to run the
Philippines as President.
Aquino and Marcos each recognized the danger the other
represented. Both took an expedient, if not ruthless, approach
to their political and personal relationships throughout their
political careers. Both switched parties when they found it
advantageous. Both came from provinces with a tradition of
political violence, and both took part in it. Prior to martial
law, Aquino wrote in a June 1972 newspaper article that the
Philippines needed "a man on a white horse" to provide discipline
and guidance. But Marcos had the same vision and acted first.
The emnity between the two men was deep, personal, and
longstanding. A backroom attempt to reach an accommodation in
1966 degenerated into a heated, fist-shaking, shouting match. In
1968, Marcos publicly. accused Aquino of being a Communist
collaborator and suggested that the government might indict him
for subversion. In a 1968 speech, Aquino attacked Imelda Marcos
as a new Evita Peron and published a paper with a photo of a
bejeweled Imelda next to a malnourished Filipino child. Enraged,
Marcos called Aquino a "congenital liar" and told him to "spare
women and children." Relations never improved from that low
point.
Beyond Marcos, Aquino had enemies in a wide range of
important Philippine interest groups. The military reportedly
distrusted him, because of his revelations in the late 1960s of
Manila's involvement in a secret plan to infiltrate Sabah,
Malaysia, and his ongoing contacts with US-based anti-Marcos
terrorists and Philippine Muslim rebels in the Middle East. The
business community did not know what to expect from Aquino, and
feared that he could not ensure the political stability required
for a healthy business environment if he came to power. These
interest groups now form the lynchpin of Marcos's power base.
Nonetheless, next to Marcos, Aquino was the most important
man in Philippine politics. Although he lived in the United
States following heart surgery, he was in constant contact with
both government and the opposition. His public statements were
25X6
25X6
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7 25X1
I I
carried, and often attacked, by the government controlled press,
and unceasing speculation about his eventual return provided
grist for Philippine rumor mills. His political aura was such
that during the June 1981 presidential election, Marcos, who was
assured certain victory, prevented only one opponent -- Aquino --
from running against him.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7
The Philippines: Implications of the Assassination of Benigno Aquino
DDI
OEA/ITB
OEA/SEAD
D/OEA
C/Production/OEA
PDB (7F30)
C/NIC (7E62)
NIO/EA (7E62)
CPAS/IMD/CB (7G07)
C/PES/DDI (7F24)
DDO (3C29)
Vice President's office:
1 -- Don Gregg, Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs
Paul Wolfowitz
John Monjo
Jonathan Howe
Hugh Montgomery
Ulrich Strauss
John Maisto
Bob Carroll
Corazon Foley
Defense:
1 -- Richard Armitage
1 -- Jim Kelly
1 -- Gaston Sigur
1 -- Richard Childress
Treasury:
1 -- Douglas Mulholland -- for the Secretary
1 -- Bill McFadden
1 -- Mike O'Connor
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401380001-7