(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000400760001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 24, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
24 February 1983
China-Africa: Premier Zhao's Eleven-Nation Tour
Summary
(0
Beijing used Premier Zhao Ziyang's month-long tour of
Africa--the first of its kind since Zhou Enlai's swing through
Africa in 1963-64--to dramatize its renewed interest in forging
close ties with the Third World. The trip, which included talks
with African leaders of varying political hues, is a direct
outgrowth of China's efforts since 1980 to establish an
"independent" foreign policy line and to offer itself as an
alternative to the US and the USSR. Beijing refused to commit
itself to much new economic and military assistance, but China's
leaders probably believe that their strong diplomatic backing on
political issues of interest to the Africans and efforts to
promote commercial relations will lead to stronger bilateral ties
over the long run.
China's media have been touting the success of Premier
Zhao's December-January visit, citing the warm treatment Zhao
received in most of the countries he visited and the common views
expressed on numerous political and economic issues. The
Africans welcomed the Chinese Premier's extensive visit as a
demonstration of China's renewed concern for African problems.
Many African leaders also were pleased by Beijing's willingness
to assume a higher profile on contentious issues such as
apartheid and the Palestinian problem and they echoed Zhao's call
for increased South-South cooperation. Nevertheless, there were
expressions of disappointment with the paucity of new Chinese aid
commitments even though the Africans did not have high
expectations.
This memorandum was prepared byl the
Office of East Asian Analysis, China Foreign Affairs Branch.
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The trip epitomizes China's low-cost effort to improve its
standing with Third World countries, offering political backing
in return for support on issues, such as Kampuchea and
Afghanistan, that matter to Beijing. Beijing hoped to repair the
damage to Sino-African relations
At
most of his stops. Zhao charged that superpower rivalry was the
main source of political and economic instability in Africa and
the rest of the Third World. In an effort to eliminate the
Africans' tendency to associate Chinese policy with the US, Zhao
singled out unpopular US policies in the Middle East and southern
Africa for criticism. At the same time, he avoided caustic
references to either the US or the USSR in public--partially out
of deference to African sensitivities. In private, however, Zhao
probably warned most of his hosts about Soviet intentions on the
continent and the dangers of dependence on the USSR for miliary
assistance.
Zhao's meetings with PLO chief Arafat and with
representatives of the South-West Africa People's Organization
and the leaders of the African National Congress and the
Pan-African Congress enabled him to demonstrate Beijing's support
for "liberation" movements. Beijing no doubt is concerned that
Moscow has become the sole heir of African revolutionary
groups. By renewing ties with SWAPO and opening up a dialogue
with the ANC, Beijing probably hopes to contrast its
undiscriminating policy with Moscow's more partisan support.
Despite Zhao's strong rhetorical comments, including his
remark in Zambia that "a revolutionary storm is brewing in
southern Africa," we believe that several factors will continue
to limit Chinese assistance to insurgent groups in southern
Africa:
--Beijing continues to place the highest priority on its own
economic modernization program and will be unwilling to
spend large sums in an area so far removed from its
immediate concerns.
--The Chinese have received little in the way of political
returns on their past investments in African
revolutionary movements. The groups they supported
often either turned to the USSR after liberation, as was
the case in Mozambique, or lost out to Soviet-backed
organizations, as in Angola.
--Beijing apparently sees little prospect for forcefully
overthrowing the South African authorities in the near
term and it believes that endemic instability in the
region plays into Soviet hands. China, therefore,
continues to see Western diplomatic and economic
pressure on South Africa as the best method of making
Pretoria change its apartheid policies.
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--Chinese support of insurgency groups is designed to please
the Frontline States. Beijing recognizes that these
states fear South African reprisals if the insurgent
groups operate unchecked and would not welcome heavy
Chinese assistance to the insurgents.
--China, we believe, will continue to monitor SWAPO and ANC
ties to their major benefactor--the USSR--before
committing more than token aid.
In addition to enhancing China's political capital in
Africa, the tour also is aimed at increasing China's economic
opportunities in the region. In 1981, China recorded a $6.1
billion trade surplus with the developing world, compared to a
deficit of more than $2.8 billion with the West and Japan. Total
trade with Africa reached $1.1 billion in 1981, and China's trade
surplus with the region amounted to $442 million. Although China
wants to maintain a surplus, at least two countries on the tour,
Algeria and Kenya, indicated to the Chinese delegation that it
could become an irritant in bilateral relations. (see
table 1)
At most of his stops Zhao offered to conclude trade and
economic cooperation agreements as Beijing's contribution to the
economic development of Third World nations. These agreements,
which emphasize joint investment in small projects, are intended
to partially compensate for the decline in China's foreign aid to
Africa. African states received over half of the $4 billion in
foreign aid China extended in the 1950's and 1960's, but their
priority and share have decreased since the mid-1970's. (see
table 2)
While the Chinese did not agree to any major new aid
projects, they did agree to reschedule past loans to Zaire and
certain other African countries that are suffering from
balance-of-payments problems. Beijing apparently decided that
since those countries are unlikely to ever repay their debt, such
a move at least would generate some political benefits.
Nevertheless, Beijing reportedly will discontinue its policy of
offering long-term low-interest loans to these countries and will
instead encourage barter arrangements to avoid the economic
losses associated with its past policies.
This in part reflects Beijing's unhappiness with the results
of its earlier expensive aid projects, especially the Tazara
railway linking Tanzania and Zambia--Beijing's most ambitious
foreign aid project to date. Tazara continues to be a headache
after years of Chinese effort and expense and Chinese officials
have complained that it resulted in few gains in political
influence. This pessimistic assessment and China's own domestic
economic needs will continue to impose limits on aid to Third
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World countries. Nevertheless, the few new aid projects
initialled on this trip demonstrate China's willingness to
continue modest assistance on a selective basis to protect its
political equities and to lay the groundwork for what may be a
more lucrative economic relationship in the future.
The Tour
Egypt: 20 Dec.-24 Dec. 1982
The Egyptians read some importance into the fact that Zhao
made Cairo the starting point of his tour. Egypt and other
moderate Arab states also were probably quietly pleased that Zhao
left Libya off his itinerary despite Qadafi's visit to Beijing in
late October. The Chinese Premier weighed in on Egypt's side by
explicitly recognizing Israel's right to exist. At the same time
Zhao made it clear that China presently has no intention of
recognizing Israel. Zhao's frequent praise of the Fez summit
peace proposals during the remainder of his tour was qualified by
his statements that China welcomes all "reasonable" and "just"
solutions to settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
The only major deal of the trip--a commercial contract for
70 Mig-21 fighter aircraft--was signed in Cairo. A tentative
agreement on the deal was reached early last year, but was
delayed due to financing and engineering problems. The Egyptians
also expressed an interest in Chinese participation in a number
of joint projects.
Algeria: 24 Dec.-27 Dec. 1982
The US embassy in Algiers reports that there were no
surprises and no concrete results but adds that the visit was
important in further consolidating Sino-Algerian relations. The
Algerians also reportedly saw it as a primary step toward a
reinvigorated Chinese interest in African affairs which the
Algerians welcome as a potential means of balancing Soviet
influence. Zhao met with Yasir Arafat, underscoring China's
recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of
the Palestinians.
The Algerians expressed the view that China is sufficiently
advanced technologically to be a viable economic partner. At the
same time they made it clear to the Chinese delegation that
Algeria was concerned about China's growing trade surplus with
Africa.
Morocco: 27 Dec.-30 Dec. 1982
This stop was reported to be long on rhetoric, leading the
Moroccans to complain that not much was accomplished. Zhao
praised King Hassan's role in promoting Arab unity and, in
private talks he probably approved of Morocco's proposal for a
plebiscite on the Western Sahara. The Moroccans would clearly
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appreciate this tacit Chinese support and China's continuing
nonrecognition of the Polisario Front. The Moroccan Foreign
Minister informed US embasssy officials that Zhao took a tough
anti-Soviet position in private discussions.
The Moroccans reportedly put forward a number of concrete
proposals for economic and military assistance but the Chinese
demurred, saying they did not have the resources. The Chinese
did agree to look into several projects and less than one month
after Zhao's visit a trade agreement was signed which included an
exchange of technical experts.
Guinea: 30 Dec. 1982 - 1 Jan. 1983
The US embassy Conakry reported that Zhao's talks with
Guinean leaders reinforced bilateral relations despite the
absence of substantive agreements. Guinean President Toure
agreed to visit China in the near future.
Toure's effusive praise of Chinese assistance programs was
interpreted by most observers in Conakry as a swipe at the
USSR--Guinea's erstwhile benefactor.
Gabon: 1 Jan.-2 Jan. 1983
Gabon was a last minute addition to Zhao's itinerary at the
specific request of the Gabonese government. According to press
reports, the Chinese agreed to expand economic cooperation, which
probably means they will increase the number of technicians in
Gabon.
Zaire: 2 Jan.-4 Jan. 1983
The Chinese delegation worked out an agreement with Zaire's
leaders, allowing Zaire to repay a $100 million debt with Zairian
currency for Kinshasa's share of the cost of joint Sino-Zairean
projects. This gesture cost the Chinese little; Zaire in effect
would have defaulted on the loan anyway and the Chinese would
have had to pay the local cost of the projects themselves. Zaire
reportedly agreed that future economic cooperation could in part
be in the form of joint ventures.
Congo: 4 Jan.-5 Jan. 1983
Zhao was well-received in Brazzaville; in fact, the banquet
held in his honor reportedly turned into a "love feast."
an economic aid agreement
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covering a five-year period was signed. The Chinese also
contracted to build a dam at a cost of $135 million, although it
was not clear if this was to be in the form of aid or a
commerical deal.
Zambia: 5 Jan.-9 Jan 1983
Zhao was effusively praised by Zambian President Kaunda
during the longest stop of the tour.
The Chinese have
been unhappy with their limited political influence in Lusaka
even though Zambia has been one of its major aid recipients.
Kaunda was probably catering to his Chinese guest in order
to secure Zhao's agreement to reschedule loans that Lusaka owes
Beijing as part of the $400 million in loans to Zambia and
Tanzania for the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway.
China recognizes that neither
Zambia nor Tanzania is in a position to start making the payments
due this year. The Chinese are hoping to secure a symbolic
payment at least and then would be willing to allow the payments
to slip until Tanzania and Zambia can pay.
While in Lusaka, Zhao met with representatives of the
South-West Africa People's Organization and the resident of the
African National Congress, Oliver Tambo.
The meeting with the ANC was unprecedented and represents a
significant departure from past ANC policy of avoiding the
Chinese. In his dicussions with Zhao, Tambo requested material
aid, but the Chinese premiere said that the ANC would first have
to send a delegation to Beijing.
Zimbabwe: 9 Jan.-11 Jan. 1983
Beijing considers Zhao's stopover in Harare an unqualified
success In fact, official
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Zimbabwean efforts to demonstrate enthusiasm for the visit at
times got out of control--five people were killed in a crowd
stampede at the airport during Zhao's arrival.
several aid packages were
signed, the largest of which included a Chinese committment to
build a sports complex. A joint textile venture was also
discussed.
Military aid discussions included training for Zimbabwean
pilots and aircraft procurement.
Tanzania: 11 Jan.-15 Jan. 1983
The US Embassy in Dar es Salaam reported that the visit was
considered highly successful by both parties although few new
agreements were reached. The Tanzanians reportedly felt that the
high-level visit demonstrated Chinese interest in Tanzanian and
African affairs.
Zhao singled out the Chinese-Tanzanian Joint Shipping Line
as a well-run enterprise--obviously contrasting it with the
Tazara Railway--and suggested that it embodied the principles of
equality and mutual benefit that he outlined in his discussions
of economic cooperation. The Chinese knew that the Tanzanians
would be no more able to meet their obligations relating to the
Tazara than the Zambians, but Beijing is willing to look the
other way until the Tanzanians are able to pay.
Zhao held talks with Pan-Africanist Congress leader Pokela
during his stay.
During Zhao's stay, Beijing announced that China and Angola
had reached an agreement to establish diplomatic relations.
Mutual recognition was announced last September but the two sides
had been unable to agree on the modalities of formal relations.
Kenya: 15 Jan-17 Jan 1983
Zhao emphasized the importance of the Organization of
African Unity in his talks with Kenyan President Moi, who is
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presently the organization's chairman. The most important aspect
of the trip in Kenyan eyes, however, may have been the exclusion
of Somalia from Zhao's itinerary. The Chinese agreed to purchase
more Kenyan products to help balance bilateral trade.
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TABLE 1
China: Trade with Africa 1971-1981*
Exports Imports
Balance
1971
243
174
69
1972
256
186
70
1973
376
195
181
1974
514
212
302
1975
457
211
246
1976
495
151
344
1977
532
240
292
1978
702
269
433
1979
552
312
240
1980
667
366
291
1981
756
314
442
*Exports and imports are measured Free-on-board (FOB).
a
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TABLE 2
China: Economic Aid Extended To Africa
Recipient 1959-74 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982(a) Total
TOTAL 2,147.3 319.2 118.9 134.2 105.6 39.1 236.4 57.4 10.0 3,168.1
NORTH AFRICA 218.7 35.0 .. 57.0 20.0
ALGERIA 92.0 .. .. .. ..
MAURITANIA 86.7 .. .. .. ..
MOROCCO 35.0 .. 20.0
TUNISIA 40.0 .. .. 57.0
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1,928.6 284.2
BENIN 44.0
BOTSWANA
BURUNDI 20.0
CAMEROON 71.0
CAPE VERDE
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 4.0
CHAD
50.6 17.0
CONGO
DJIBOUTI
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
ETHIOPIA
GABON
GAMBIA
GHANA
GUINEA
GUINEA BISSAU
KENYA
LIBERIA
MADAGASCAR
69.2
24.1
85.8
42.0
98.8
25.0
26.8
16.6
118.9 77.2 85.6 39.1 236.4 57.4 10.0 2,837.4
.. .. .. .. .. 16.6
30.0 .. .. 30.0
32.4 .. .. .. .. 103.4
15.3 1.5 0.1 .. .. .. 16.9
10.0 .. 0.2 .. .. .. .. 14.2
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 67.6
NA .. .. .. .. NA
6.0 .. .. 36.4 .. .. 111.6
.. .. 330.7
.. .. 44.0
.. .. 58.0
24.1
.. .. 138.5
.. .. 25.0
92.0
86.7
.. 55.0
97.0
26.8
.. .. 42.0
0.7 .. 34.0 .. 10.0 143.5
.. .. .. 16.6
46.4 .. .. 64.3
23.0 .. .. .. .. 23.0
20.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. 89.4
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TABLE 2 Continued
Recipient
1959-74
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Total
MALI
124.1
2.4
..
..
..
..
0.4
..
126.9
MAURITIUS
35.2
..
..
..
..
..
35.2
MOZAMBIQUE
59.3
..
0.5
..
..
4.4
..
..
64.2
NIGER
52.3
..
..
..
.
,.
..
52.3
RWANDA
22.2
..
34.3
.,
,.
..
56.5
SAO TOME PRINCIPE
..
17.6
..
..
..
0.7
..
..
..
18.3
SENEGAL
51.8
..
..
..
0.1
,.
,.
51.9
SEYCHELLES
..
..
..
3.5
..
..
..
3.5
SIERRA LEONE
61.2
..
..
..
,.
..
61.2
SOMALIA
136.3
0.5
..
..
18.0
9,7
??
164.5
SUDAN
81.6
..
..
0.3
57.0
..
138.9
TANZANIA
334.5
27.5
..
..
..
6.5
..
.,
368.5
TOGO
45.0
0.5
..
..
..
45.5
UGANDA
15.0
..
..
..
26.5
,.
?
,.
41.5
UPPER VOLTA
50.8
..
..
0.2
51.0
ZAIRE
100.0
37.0
..
0.3
0.3
137.6
ZAMBIA
279.9
24.0
27.5
..
..
..
6.5
?.
..
337.9
ZIMBABWE
.?
??
??
??
??
??
26.5
?.
..
26.5
(a) Data for 1982 are preliminary.
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I I
SUBJECT: China-Africa: Premier Zhao's Eleven-Nation Tour
Original - CH/FOR
1 - CH/D
1 - D/OEA (4F18)
1 - C/Production/OEA (4F38)
1 - PDB (7F30)
1 - C/NIC (7E62)
1 - NIO/EA (7E62)
2 - DDI (7E44)
1 - Executive Director (7D55)
5 - OCO/IMD/DB (7G07)
Department of Defense
1 - LTC. Jerry Van Sickel
China Desk
Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary for East
Asian & Pacific Affairs (ISA)
Room 4C840
1 - John Sen, Chief
China/Far East Division (DE-3)
Deputy Director for Estimates
Pomponio Plaza West, Room 1012
Department of State
1 - Richard Haass, Director
Office of Regional Security Affairs (PM/RSA)
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Room 7424
1 - William F. Rope
Director, Office of Chinese Affairs
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EA/C)
Room 4318
1 - C. Thomas Thorne, Director
Office of Analysis for Africa (INR/AA)
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 4536
- Daniel Simpson, Deputy Director
Office of Southern African Affairs (AF/S)
Bureau of African Affairs
Room 4238
1 - Curt Kamman, Director
Office of East African Affairs (AF/E)
Bureau of African Affairs
Room 5240
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Distribution (cont'd):
1 - Galen Fox, Chief
Office of Analysis for Near East and South Asia
(INR/NESA)
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 4536
1 - Robert Bruce, Director
Office of West African Affairs (AF/W)
Bureau of African Affairs
Room 4250
1 - Robert Flaten, Director
Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia (NEA/AFN)
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 5250
1 - Edward Peck, Director
Egypt (NEA/EGY)
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 6251.
1 - Donald Westmore
Member, Foreign Policy Planning Council (S/P)
Room 7330
Department of Commerce
1 - David Peterson
Director, Office of Intelligence Liaison
Room 6854
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