(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101340001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 9, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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10 P-ttftff-
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
MEMORANDUM
BELGIUM: THE MARTENS III CABINET: FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AND THE OUTLOOK FOR TNF
Summary
~, e new Belgian government, which Prime Minister
Martens put together Zast month after 45 days of complex
bargaining, must soon deal with a series of domestic and
foreign policy problems likely to strain relations among
the coalition partners. On the domestic side, economic
policy and the Zong-standing linquistic dispute--partic-
uZarZy the status of the Brussels region--will pose the
greatest problems. In foreign policy, the issue of
greatest concern to the US--whether Belgium will base
theatre nuclear forces (TNF)--is once again the most
With the Flemish Socialists spearheading the
opposition to TNF, it is now clear that Brussels will,
be unable to make a decision in time for the NATO
ministerial meeting this month. The new government
is committed first to carry out "soundings" among the
Warsaw Pact countries in girder to reassure the Flemish
and Francophone Socialists that arms control possibil-
ities have been exhausted--a course of action that
could produce false signals from the East and give
Belgian TNr opponents further cause for delay.
TR memorandumr2 quested by the National Security Council, was
prepared by the Western Europe Division of the Office of
Political Analysis. The paper was coordinated with the National Intelligence
Officer for Western Europe and the Office of Economic Research. Research
was completed on 9 June 1980. Questions and comments may be addressed to
the Chief of the Western Europe Division
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TOP SECRET
Despite these probZe,7s, the increased Belgian attention
to the issue and the presence in the new cabinet of more
TNF advocates have marginaZZy improved the prospects for
an eventual positive decision. The Belgians will probably
focus on the question only under discreet but consistent
US pressure. The longer they delay a decision, the greater
the chance that it will become entwined with domestic
po"l.it- ca( disputes that might once again push T?VP into
the background.
Primacy_ of Domestic Policy Taxes and Buffets
The barcaininn among the parties that resulted in the formation of
the Martens III cabinet was almost entirely about domestic policies,
although agreements reached are vague on most issues. Now the government
must come up with detailed programs and this promises to stir more
controversy. For example, there is general agreement on an across-the-
board budget cut of 2.2 percent in order to deal with a spending deficit
of about $3 billion and a trade deficit which could reach $5 billion.
The speed with which the parties approved such cuts "in principle" is
not likely to characterize their deliberations on the specifics.
The government program also calls for cuts in direct taxation for
businesses and individuals--ardently favored by the Liberals--and increases
in indirect taxation--accepted with the utmost reluctance by the Socialists.
The extent of specific tax changes has yet to be determined and promises
to cause debate within the cabinet.
As a sop to the Socialists, Martens has indicated that the social
security system will be left intact and that inflation-indexing of wages
and salaries will be continued, although many Liberals doubt the wisdom
of this policy given the need for budgetary austerity. Belgium has
maintained a relatively low rate of inflation--currently about 6.3
percent--the one bright spot in the economic picture. Despite probable
Socialist opposition, the Liberals are determined to maintain strict
monetary controls and high interest rates which support the exchange
rate of the Belgian franc and help keep inflation in line.
The government faces an end of July deadline for formulating its
detailed budget and tax policy. The legislature adjourns for the summer
then, and it is likely that the parties will agree on a budget which
meets immediate needs. Longer-term measures will have to thrashed out
later among the coalition parties, however. If the economic situation
continues to worsen, agreement amonn the parties--especially between the
Liberals and Socialists--will be harder to maintain. As one observer
describes the approach of Martens III to domestic concerns:. it is like
"...six mothers-in-law, each watching jealously lest her rightful position
be infringed in one way or another."
-2-
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
Test for Survival_ P~ :onal_Autono and Brussels
The fundamental test for the Martens III cabinet will be the same
one that brought down Martens II and that has bedevilled Belgian politics
for decades---the regional controversy between French-speaking Wallonia
and Flemish--speaking Flanders. In his 20 May statement on the government
program Martens claimed that there was "a broad consensus...with respect
to new political structures" for the two countries. Efforts are to be
started "immediately" with the aim :)f transferring financial authority
to Flanders and Wallonia, a process that he hopes will be completed in
about five years. The only specifics agreed on so far are rough dates
for progress; for example, the central government will continue to
collect property taxes but within two years will transfer these funds,
at a rate of 20 percent a year, to the two proposed regional authorities.
Many potentially contentious aspects of the regional question have
yet to be resolved. Long-exposed nerves will be touched in any discussion
of additional funds for economically depressed Wallonia, especially if
aid is to come at the expense of the more prosperous Flemings. "House
keeping" details--where regional executives will be located (especially
important in relation to the Brussels problem), and whether they will be
part of the central government or autonomous--have yet to be worked out.
The thorniest issue, the status of Brussels, has simply been "put
on ice" for two year,. Any arrangement involving the capital will have
to take account of the sharp differences between its Francophone majority
and the strong and vocal Flemish minority. The members of the coalition
have for the moment all but admitted that no solution is possible. Some
Francophone Socialists nave indicated that their party should review its
support for the government if there is no movement on the Brussels
question by next summer at the latest. Flemish and Francophone differences
are as deep as ever and the longer the problem continues the more likely
it is to intrude on the Belgian decision-making process in other areas
of more concern to the US.
TNF Pros )ects Under Martens IIT
Prospects for an eventual favorable decision on TNF have improved
somewhat with the installation of the new cabinet, although Belgian
officials have now indicated that the government will not be able to
make a decision by the 22 June NATO ministerial meeting in Ankara. For
one thing, the new government's program calls for "appropriate consultations"
with the East or arms control before Belgium makes a decision on TNF.
The form, timing and result of these "consultations" will greatly influence
the Belgian decision.
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TOP SECRET
Six parties make up the Martens III cabinet--the Flemish and Francophone
Social Christians, Socialists, and Liberals. The Liberals were not in
Martens II and their inclusion reinforces the Social Christians as supporters
of TNF. However, the Liberals. because of their small size have the
i
on.
least bargaining power in the coalit
The Flemish Socialists continue to offer the most vehement opposition.
delayinc; a deployment
They continue to favor a "Dutch solution," i.e.,
decision until at least December 1981, but may suggest at a minimum
delaying any decision until after the US Presidential election, arguing
that it will be easier then to gauge the prspects for ratification.
There are even indications that Flemish
beginning to see opposition to TNF as a vote-catching issue, at least
among younger voters.
The new Foreign Minister, Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb, will play a
key role in the TNF debate. Nothomb, a Francophone Social Christian,
has generally been pro-US and pro-NATO, and supports TNF deployment.
His priority goal, however, may be to restore the post-war consensus
with the Socialists on foreign and defense policy--a consensus that was
broken by TNF. Reflecting this rift, the Socialists refused to permit a
member of either branch of their party to become Foreign Minister.
Nothomb and Martens may therefore try "lowest common
on TNF that everyone can accept, with domestic concerns without complications created by the TNF issue.
us might not be willing to take
biti
o
Nothomb, young (44) and am
great risks over TNF, considering the detrimental effect endorsement of
the progam had on the career of his Socialist predecessor, Henri Simonet.
Chances are, however, that Nothomb will be the major Belgian interlocutor
tens struggles with pressing
M
ar
on TNF over the coming months while
domestic matters. The Prime Minister may not be averse to escaping from
though his continuous active
the TNF line-of-fire to the extent he can,
a prompt decision.
urin
i
g
n sec
support for deployment is important
Belgian TNF policy Decisions: nLq_ Cautiously
al leaders,
In recent discussions with US officials, Be gran politic
including Nothomb, have indicated that Brussels
the importance Washington attaches to TNF. However, this has not reduced
Belgian resolve to proceed with "soundings" in the Warsaw Pact about
arms control.
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10P SLCPtl
US officials have urged that a,iy "soundings" be taken with Warsaw Pact
diplomats in Brussels. In this way, decision process would be hastened and the
Soviets and their allies would not be able to delay a Belgian decision simply by
saying that no meetings could take place until after June. Belgian officials
have expressed understanding of the US position and have said that they will not
allow their "soundings" to delay a decision; they emphasize that high-level
consultations are necessary mainly For domestic political reasons.
Nothomb, eager to cut a figure on the diplomatic stage, may also
be anxious to tour Eastern European capitals while conducting his "soundings" on
arms control. He even thinks that a meeting with Gromyko is necessary. The
Belgians assume that no results will come from their meetings with the Warsaw
Pact, but Martens and Nothomb do no., seem to be giving adequate consideration to
the possibility that the Belgian Socialists could seize on any Soviet offer--even
a comestic one--as another excuse for delay.
After the "soundings" on arms control the government says it will prepare a
"TNF dossier" for consideration by she Cabinet (principally the Flemish Socialists)
and Parliament.
Belgian Attitudes and US Pressure
The Belgians hope to complete the decision-making process b' the fall of
1980. However, all important Belgian policy-makers, including Martens and
Nothomb, have warned that heavy, public pressure by the US or other NATO members
would be counter-productive. Pressure from whatever source would be seen by
opponents of TNF as directed by Washington, and would give these opponents a
basis for urging resistance to "American bullying." The Francophone Socialists
are particuarly sensitive to US pressure, whether direct or through third-countries.
The Flemish Socialists were able to play upon this sensitivity to force a delay
in a deployment decision during the negotiations which brought about Martens III.
They are likely to play the card again if given the opportunity.
Discreet private US approaches to the Belgian are probably essential,
If the US simply ignores TNF, allowing the Belgians to'nroceed at their
own pace, there is a high probability that they will place the issue on
the back-burner until late this year, when domestic problems, notably
the status of Brussels in any regional arrangement, would make a decision
impossible; the situation would revert to what it was when the Martens
II cabinet fell in April--no decision possible because of domestic
considerations.
The Belgians are likely to act only if they are reminded periodically that
this is an important alliance issue and not just a favor they are doing
for the Americans or an issue useful as a bargaining chip in domestic
politics.
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1 ur JtLKL I
Martens III: Praspects for Survival
The Martens III cabinet is nothing new in Belgian politics. The
six parties that make up the coalition also comprised most of Belgium's
earlier post-war governments. The cabinet members are for the most part
long-experienced in the vagaries of Belgian politics.
Perhaps significantly, no party presidents consented to serve in
Martens III. There is a singular lack of enthusiasm for the new government among
the Belgian political elite; the general attitude during the party negotiations
seemed to be that it was better to form a government than to inconvenience everyone 25X1
n this tepid
Gi
ve
by holding elections just before the summer vacation season.
response to his new cabinet, Martens might be reluctant to move on an issue as
potentially controversial as TNF unless he remains convinced that it is vital.
The cabinet should be able to survive over the next year, if Martens can
's most divisive domestic disputes. Despite Martens'
i
l
B
um
g
e
keep the lid on
problems no party really desires an election any time soon. However, the Brussels
issue, which has been merely put off, will have to be addressed, probably sometime
this year. At present., no solution acceptable to Flemings and Walloons is in
sight, and if there is a continued deadlock, the government will be hard-pressed
to survive much beyond this year. And the longer the TNF decision is delayed,
the greater the chance that it will become linked to the Brussels issue--
os
e
uld dama
ec
__
g
r-?
r
a I II'IKdye WisL. wo
If the Belgian decision is not made before the next NATO ministerial meetings
at the end of 1980, it might also become linked to Dutch theater nuclear debates,
and vocal Dutch anti-nuclear sentiment could affect the Belgian position. Officially
the Hague has deferred its deployment decision until December 1981, but it is
- . I , - _._? .. .. .,... r.
k-, the ,.~DaI,f111C 25X1
to
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Distribution: Belgium: The Martens III Cabinet: Foreign and Domestic
Problems and the Outlook for TNF
1 - NIO/WE.
1 - NFAC Action Staff
1 - Secretary Of Production Board
1 - OER Registry
1 - NFAC Senior Review Panel (Amb. Wm. Leonhart)
1 - NFAC Coordination Staff
1 - Presidential Briefing Coordinator
1 - PDB Staff
2 - D/OPA
2 - OPA Production Staff
3 - P&PG
1 - CD/WE
2 - NE files
1 - Author
NFAC/OPA/WE/NE (9June80)
25X1
25X1
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