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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000202140001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 31, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
31 March 1936
SETTLEMENT WITH AFGHANISTAN
Summary
We believe Pakistan's fundamental goals on
Afghanistan remain unchanged under the new
civilian government--to get the Soviets out and to
repatriate more than 3 million Afghan refugees.
Pakistani officials are moderately optimistic
that, because of their hardline approach, Moscow
may be willing to consider an agreement that meets
these goals. We believe the J unejo government's
response to domestic opposition to its current
Afghan policy is more likely to affect the form of
policy actions than their substance.
Islamabad would be most likely to switch
gears on Afghanistan if it felt abandoned by its
allies, the Afghan resistance collapsed, or a
neutralist-minded government took over--none of
which is an immediate risk. Significant
deterioration in the domestic security or economic
situations would also increase pressure on
Islamabad to be more accommodating to Moscow and
Kabul.
The Cordovez Shuttle: Less Than Meets the Eye
In our judgment, Pakistani expressions of optimism about
prospects for the UN-brokered peace negotiations on Afghanistan
reflect Islamabad's hopefulness that its hardline strategy is
paying off, and that Moscow may be moving toward a settlement
that satisfies both of Islamabad's requirements: return of
This memorandum was prepared by I Ithe
Pakistan,/Eangladesh '3ranch, South Asia Division, Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as of 31 March
1986 was used in its preparation. Questions and comments should
be directed to Chief, South Asia Division,
Copy (3 of j
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refugees to Afghanistan and withdrawal of Soviet forces.
Projecting the impression of movement probably is at least as
important for Prime Minister Junejo's government as it was for
the Zia regime. Domestic pressure to reach some accommodation
with the Kabul regime has increased slightly with stepped up,
Soviet-inspired Afghan efforts to destabilize the border region
and domestic political liberalization, although Afghanistan is
still not a dominant domestic political issue.
According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, UN Special
Representative Cordovez, during his 7-18 March shuttle talks, had
the impression that Kabul would agree to resume indirect talks
focused on troop withdrawal in May if Islamabad agreed to
undertake direct talks upon completion of the comprehensive
agreement. Cordovez drafted a diplomatic note that outlined that
understanding and stated for the record that the Afghans had
presented a draft timetable that had been reviewed by the
Pakistanis.
Islamabad has not shared this timetable with us, but
Pakistani officials did tell our Embassy that Foreign Minister
Yaqub Khan found the draft unacceptable on "eight or nine"
counts. Based on the record of past negotiating rounds, we
speculate that the Afghan proposal fell short because of:
-- Failure to guarantee simultaneity. Pakistan knows the
refugees will not go home before Soviet troops begin to
leave. Islamabad also has insisted that Soviet troops
withdraw as support for the resistance--interference in
the eyes of Kabul and Moscow--ends; the Afghans say
troops will be withdrawn only after interference ends.
-- Failure to guarantee Kabul's noninterference in
Pakistan. Islamabad is concerned about a revival of
Pashtun demands, supported by Kabul, for a Pashtun tribal
homeland that would include land in Pakistan as well as
Afghanistan. The Pakistanis want a measure of
recognition for the existing border by Kabul and Moscow.
-- Failure to delineate a pullback from specific areas upon
a ceasefire. Pakistan would like to see some
demonstration of Soviet good faith to encourage the
refugees to return.
-- Failure to offer a less-than-protracted timeframe for
withdrawal. Pakistan has suggested a relatively rapid
withdrawal--within six months--to reduce the potential
for resistance-initiated incidents and to reassure the
Afghans that Soviet airmobile troops will not attack as
the refugees return to their villages.
-- Failure to stipulate international guarantees of the
withdrawal. The Afghans have agreed that international
guarantees will cover the "comprehensive" settlement, but
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Pakistan wants guarantees to apply to the separate
bilateral on troop withdrawal as well. Kabul and Moscow
have insisted that an agreement on troop withdrawal
should be a bilateral agreement between them; Islamabad
wants to ensure that such an agreement does not provide a
loophole for Moscow.
Failure to drop insistence on closure of the border.
Moscow has long wanted the Pakistan-Afghan border sealed
against the infiltration of weapons and munitions.
Islamabad probably believes that such a demand is
unrealistic given the nature of the border and that it
would provide the Soviets a pretext for reneging on the
withdrawal agreement.
The Missing Five Percent
Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan told our Ambassador that he
could divulge only 95 percent of the proceedings during the
Cordovez shuttle mission because of concerns about US leaks. He
indicated he would pass the remaining 5 percent personally to
Secretary Shultz. In our judgment, the Pakistanis sincerely
believe that a leak could be damaging--jeopardizing not only the
talks but the steadfastness of the resistance.
We do not know what the 5 percent covers. Given the
Pakistani rejection of the draft timetable, we doubt that they
view leaks of the timetable, or even any other Soviet concession,
as of major concern. We believe it more likely that the
5 percent is a Pakistani offer--probably one that addresses
Pakistan's own concerns about implementation of a settlement.
For example, Islamabad may have offered assurances that it will
make the post-settlement transition as smooth as possible,
perhaps by guaranteeing that it will work to limit fighting among
the resistance groups.
Islamabad, the Afghan Resistance, and Negotiations
Islamabad has begun talking to resistance leaders about the
negotiations. Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan briefed a resistance
delegation on the status of the Geneva talks in January,
according to the Embassy, and has promised the resistance leaders
that Pakistan would discuss a peace settlement with them before
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Any recent Pakistani contacts with resistance leaders may
have been intended primarily to allay their concerns about a
sellout by either Pakistan or the United States. Over the
winter, resistance leaders were agitated by rumors of a deal
between the United States and the Soviet Union at the Geneva
Summit.
Publicly, Islamabad is also putting new emphasis on Afghan
input into the negotiations. In his National Day speech on
23 March, Junejo emphasized that Pakistan wants a peaceful and
honorable political solution of the Afghanistan problem "in
accordance with the wishes of the Afghan people." He added that
any political solution must be consistent with United Nations and
Islamic Conference resolutions on Afghanistan.
The New Government and Afghanistan
We believe that Junejo--like Zia--wants to see a speedy end
to the Afghan problem through a political settlement. He almost
certainly is concerned about the potential ability of the
opposition to mobilize public opinion against the government on
Afghanistan and, by extension, the US-Pakistani strategic
relationship. He probably even fears that an adverse turn in the
war or in the NWFP could enable the opposition to force mid-term
elections that might result in his defeat.
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We believe, however, that several factors militate against
Junejo opting for a premature settlement:
-- Continued military backing. Key military leaders--
including Zia, Army Vice Chief Arif, and Intelligence
Chief Akhtar--are unflagging in their support for the
insurgency as an integral part of Pakistan's defense
against the Soviet threat. Zia apparently has ensured
that the Pakistani military oversees security policy
through its representation on the Defense Cabinet
Committee DCC .
Ithe DCC has jurisdiction over all
defense and internal security matters--presumably
including Afghan policy. Junejo chairs the DCC, which
also includes the Ministers of Interior and Foreign
Affairs (both appointed by Zia and retained by Junejo in
the new Cabinet) the joint Chiefs of Staff, and the three
service chiefs (including Zia as Chief of Army Staff).
As Army Chief, traditionally the most influential
position in Pakistani politics, Zia has considerable
power to bring to bear against Junejo if he threatens the
military's interests.*
-- Parliamentary support for the current policy. The
government easily won endorsement for its Afghan policy
during the parliamentary debate last December.
while support
for the insurgents is not popular among parliamentarians,
they do not see an "honorable" alternative.
-- Broad popular consensus. Polls by Gallup Pakistan
consistently have indicated that the majority of the
Pakistani public--even sympathizers of parties who call
for direct negotiations with Kabul--support the current
policy.
-- A realization that US assistance is vital to Pakistan's
economic and defense needs. Junejo does not want to
alienate Washington on the heels of negotiations for a
new multiyear assistance package and while Congressional
approval is still required.
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-- A desire not to alienate China, Saudi Arabia or, and
other Muslim nations.
Pakistan's Contacts with Moscow
Zia recently acknowledged to a Western reporter that
Islamabad was in touch with Moscow "directly and indirectly."
Reporting from the US Embassy in Islamabad,
suggests that the most significant of these
contacts from the Pakistani perspective came during Foreign
Minister Yaqub's meeting in Moscow with Soviet Deputy Foreign
Minister Kornienko last August. Yagub's optimism apparently
date
s from that discussion
Despite Moscow's initiatives, we believe that Yaqub and
other Pakistani leaders maintain a healthy skepticism of its
intentions. More recently, Pakistan appears to have contacted
Moscow to crosscheck Cordovez's reports of the negotiations. Not
only is Cordovez typically more optimistic than developments
warrant, but he often tells each party what it wants to hear:
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Perceptions of the US Role
Pakistani leaders do,not perceive a change in Washington's
attitudes on Afghanistan,
although some undoubtedly question Washington's staying power.
They probably share the typical Pakistani's deep-seated suspicion
about Washington's steadfastness as an ally that stems from the
two Indo-Pak wars, reinforced by perceptions of US retreats from
Iran and Lebanon.
Pakistani decisionmakers are unlikely to see any alternative
to reliance on US assistance to meet the Soviet threat in
Afghanistan. We attribute the civilian government's early
emphasis on at least the appearance of greater nonalignment in
Pakistani foreign policy--Zia recently said it was "unrealistic"
to expect Washington to come to Pakistan's defense--to Junejo's
desire to preempt public criticism about Islamabad's close ties
to Washington.
Outlook
We expect the Pakistanis to continue to encourage
flexibility in the negotiations by expressing optimism
Soviet
about
prospects for success. We also believe Islamabad might
seek
to
increase nontacts with Moscow, F
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Islamabad will hesitate to take steps it believes might
alienate Moscow and jeopardize the talks. In our judgment, it
will particularly resist forming an overt channel to provide
humanitarian assistance to the insurgents or the Afghan
population inside Afghanistan--especially with the United States
as the easily identifiable sponsor of such an effort.
We do not believe that Zia's departure from the DCC, which
would occur if he stepped down as Chief of Army Staff, would
result in a policy shift towards accommodation with Kabul and
Moscow. Other senior military leaders would remain supportive of
current policy.
We believe a major shift in the Pakistani attitude toward
Afghanistan and the negotiations, however, would result if the
United States seemed to be moving away from support for the
resistance, if the resistance began to come apart, or if an
opposition neutralist government came to power in Islamabad. We
also believe Junejo would come under increasing domestic pressure
to reach an accommodation if the law-and-order situation in the
NWFP (or elsewhere in Pakistan) or the economy were to
deteriorate significantly and erode public confidence in the
government.
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SUBJECT: Pakistan: Intentions on a Settlement with Afghanistan
NESA M#86-200450
DISTRIBUTION:
EXTERNAL
Copy 1 - Vincent Cannistraro
INTERNAL
Copy 2 - DDI
Copy 3 - NIO/NESA
Copy 4 - D/NESA
Copy 5 - DD/NESA
Copy 6 - C/PPS/NESA
Copy 7,3 - PPS/NESA
Copy 9 - C/PES
Copy 10,11,12,13,14,15 - CPAS/IMD/C3
Copy 15 - PD3 Staff
Copy 17 - NID Staff
Copy 13 - C/NESA/PG
Copy 19 - C/NESA,/AI
Copy 20 - C/NESA/IA
Copy 21 - C/NESA/SO
Copy 22 - DC/NESA/SO
Copy 23 - C/NESA/SO/P
Copy 24 - C/NES.A/SO/A
Copy 25 - C/NESA/SO/S
Copy 25 -
DDI/NESA/SO/P3
(31Mar85)
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