(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000706890001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 12, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Vvashinpo, DC20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
12 December 1986
South Korean Politics
Summary
President Chun Doo Hwan seems to believe that
his party is well positioned to push its proposed
revision of the Constitution through the National
Assembly, solidly establishing a parliamentary
system and the ruling party's political predominance
in 1988. The prevention last month of a massive
opposition rally--intended to show a "public"
mandate for direct presidential elections--was a
major setback for Chun's opponents. Other
opposition actions, including a boycott of the
National Assembly, have aided government efforts to
paint the opposition as obstructionist. In our
view, Chun intends to put the ruling party's
constitutional revision bill to a national
referendum early next year, before the peak period
for student protests.
This memorandum was prepared by Office of 25X1
East Asian Analysis. Information as of 12 December was used in
its preparation. Comments and questions may be directed to the
Chief, Korea Branch, Northeast Asia Division, OEA, 25X1
DATE/7/, r/ Li
DOC NO EA /7 k6 L0 /77
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The Constitutional Revision Issue
The dialogue on constitutional reform, which began last
spring when President Chun Doo Hwan agreed to'hand the question
to the National Assembly, has been stalled since mid-August.
Hardliners in both the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) and
the opposition New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) have been
inflexible, preventing the constitutional revision committee from
meeting to hammer out a compromise:
-- The DJP favors a parliamentary form of government with a
figurehead president and most power vested in a strong
prime minister elected by the National Assembly.
-- The NKDP wants a directly elected president and a strong
legislature. The NKDP also has called for a more
independent judiciary and greater protection for human
rights.
The Government's Strategy
The government's success in
November appears to have encoura
blocking N
the KDP
ruling party is publicly urging the the NKDP to resume talks.
Nonetheless, we believe Chun inclines toward a hard line and
is prepared to arrest NKDP assemblymen if they attempt to block
Although Chun
apparently agreed to delay the bill's submission, we believe he
is determined to settle the issue by spring. Failure to hold a
national referendum by March to approve a revised Constitution
would provide the opposition an opportunity to swell its ranks in
the streets with activist students, who will return to Seoul's
campuses in early spring.
The Opposition Retrenches
The opposition has been unable to regain the initiative.
Its effort to block National Assembly passage of the 1987 budget
bill failed, and it has postponed additional rallies until next
year--probably because of concern that the holidays and
government preventive measures would cause low turnouts. But
rally in
to accelerate hic
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rallies could resume in the weeks ahead.
Risks for Both Sides
Neither side is likely to budge on basic demands or abandon
hardline tactics. But we also expect interludes of conciliatory
posturing as both sides try to appear more reasonable and
credible to the public. As a case in point, the ruling DJP's
offer to hold off on submitting its proposal in the Assembly
until next year was matched by the NKDP's announcement that it
would be willing to return to parliamentary talks on
Militant tactics by the opposition also carry the risk of
further crackdowns by the government. For example, continued
confrontation could prompt Chun to declare limited martial law--a
move that could deal the NKDP completely
process.
IThe opposition's
nary line also c o u l d cost public support, the NKDP's strongest
asset in attempts to pressure the government. Many South Koreans
already view opposition politicians as more interested in their
personal ambitions than in hammering out a compromise with the
Tough tactics pose other problems for Chun. A continued
heavy hand in the Assembly and against rallies might alienate
conservatives of minor opposition parties, whose support the
ruling party would need in an Assembly vote on constitutional
revision. If Chun cannot muster votes to pass a constitutional
reform bill, he might take more extreme actions. These actions
would entail greater risks for his administration. A growing
number of political observers believe that Chun will disband the
Assembly and call new elections if his efforts to revise the
Constitution fail. This would guarantee a sharp response from
Chun's opponents and could result in broader public backing for
opposition rallies, including the support of most of Seoul's
Moving Toward Succession
We believe Chun is pushing a parliamentary system of
government in order to position himself advan
term ends in 1988.
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We expect25X1
political unrest, marked by student demonstrations, anti-US themes,
and violence by radicals to continue in 1987. F____-] 25X1
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Over the next year, Chun and the ruling party, as well as
the opposition, will be planning strategy with an eye toward
Washington. If the United States is perceived as acquiescing in
a succession that most Koreans believe blatantly unfair, anti-
Americanism could spread to the general populace. Many Koreans
already believe US support underpins the present government, and
perceived US acceptance of Chun's agenda is likely to aggravate
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SUBJECT: South Korean Politics
Distribution:
Original - Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense
Room 4E830, Dept. of Defense
1 - Director, DCI/DDCI/Executive Staff (7E-12)
1 - NIO/EA (7E 62)
1 - NIO/Economics (7E 48)
1 - C/PPS/DO (3D 01)
1 - C/EAD(5E 18)
1 - OGI/FSIC/PI (2G 18)
1 - OEA/NEA/Korea Branch (4G 43)
1 - OEA/NEA/Japan Branch (4G 31)
1 - OEA/NEA/STI Branch (4G 43)
1 - OEA/NEA Division (4G 43)
1 - OEA/China Division (4G 32)
1 - OEA/SEA Division OF 24)
1 - D/OEA (4F 18)
1 - C/Production/OEA (4G 48)
1 - FBIS Analysis Group (1014 Key Bldg.)
1 - DDI (7E 47)
1 - Senior Review Panel (5G 00)
1 Office of Legislative Liaison (7B 14)
1 - PDB Staff (7F 30)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB (7G 07)
1 - CPAS/ILS (7G 50)
1~
1 - NIC/AG (7E 47)
1 - DDO
1 - DDO
1 - 000
1 - DDO
1-
1 -
1 -
DDI/OEA/NEA/K 25418 12 Dec. 86
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