(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000606560001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 19, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03: CIA-RDP86TO1017R000606560001-7 -25X1
Central Intelligence Agency
DATE q `1 /2 L/ '
DOC NO CA M F6raO)39
OIR
PfPDI
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
19 September 1986
China's Cambodia Policy: Recent Signals of Flexibility
Summary
Beijing's long-term strategy for forcing the Vietnamese out of
Cambodia remains based on three policies established soon after
Vietnam's 1978 invasion: military assistance to the Cambodian resistance,
military pressure along Vietnam's northern frontier, and backing for
ASEAN's diplomatic and economic measures. But Beijing has made some
notable tactical adjustments to blunt Hanoi's diplomatic initiatives, to
convince ASEAN and others that it does not seek a return to power of the
Democratic Kampuchea (DK) or Pol Pot, and to demonstrate its flexibility
on the potential composition of a Cambodian government following a
Vietnamese withdrawal.
Beijing has taken several initiatives in the past year to steer a careful course
that clearly shows its strong committment to sustain opposition to Vietnam while
allaying fears that it seeks a DK-dominated government in Cambodia. Beijing's
series of maneuvers is designed, in part, to inject new credibility into China's
assertion that it will accept a neutral, nonaligned and independent Cambodia under
This memorandum was prepared by I Office of East Asian Analysis. 25X1
Information available as of 19 September 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, International Security
Branch, China Division, OEA, 25X1
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606560001-7
? China began by pressuring DK Supreme Military Commander Pol Pot into
retirement in August 1985.
? Chinese influence has been crucial, in our view, in moderating DK excesses in the
field and in increasing DK willingness to cooperate with non-Communist units
inside Cambodia. China's successes in moderating DK behavior mark a sharp
departure, in our view, from previous years when DK changes--such as abolition
of the Kampuchean Communist Party in 1981--were made only grudgingly. F_
The Chinese probably took a leading role in formulating the resistance
coalition's eight-point proposal announced in Beijing in March, which for the first
time allowed for inclusion of Vietnam's puppet Heng Samrin government in a
coalition government.
? The proposal also departed from previous demands for a Vietnamese pledge to
withdraw its forces prior to negotiations. Instead, it called for Vietnam and the
resistance coalition to hold negotiations on a two-stage withdrawal.
However, China's hardline opposition to any compromise that allows the
Vietnamese to continue to dominate Cambodia remains unaltered.
? Beijing continues to rebuff Vietnamese overtures to resume talks that were
abandoned by China in 1980. Although there have been recurrent reports of
"secret" peace feelers from Hanoi, we have seen no sign the Chinese have been
receptive.
The Chinese have also consistently taken the Soviet Union to task for its
unwillingness to pressure Hanoi to compromise. Of the three "obstacles" to
improved Sino-Soviet relations cited by Beijing, the Chinese insist that Soviet
willingness to terminate support to the Vietnamese in Cambodia is the "litmus test"
by which Soviet sincerity can best be gauged.
? Beijing has been particularly critical of General Secretary Gorbachev for not
showing any flexibility on the Cambodia issue in his Vladivostok speech delivered
in July.
? Deng Xiaoping dramatized the importance of the Cambodia issue in his "60
Minutes" interview by offering a summit meeting with Gorbachev if the Soviets
would use their influence to get the Vietnamese out of Cambodia--an offer he
knows will be refused.
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China will remain committed, with occasional tactical adjustments, to its
goals and overall strategy in Cambodia.
? Beijing's initiatives over the past year, however, signal greater willingness to use
diplomatic means, if possible, to achieve those goals.
? Even if diplomatic measures prove unproductive in moving toward a settlement,
continued stalemate in Cambodia, particularly at the relatively low costs involved
at present, is likely to remain an attractive option for Beijing because of the pain
it inflicts on Hanoi.
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606560001-7
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Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Room 3E880, Pentagon
RADM Less, Assistant Deputy Director for
Politico-Military Affairs, J-5, Room 2E976, Pentagon
D/DCI/DDCI Executive Staff, Room 7D60
DDI, Room 7E44
Senior Review Panel, Room 5000
PDB Staff, Room 7F30
C/PES, Room 7F24
NIO/EA, Room 7E62
CPAS/IMC/CB, Room 7G07
D/OEA, Room 4F18
C/OEA/CH, Room 4032
C/OEA/Production, Room 4048
C/OEA/CH/TT, Room 4032
C/OEA/CH/EA, Room 4G32
C/OEA/CH/PA, Room 4G32
OEA/CH/IS, Room 4032
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/03: CIA-RDP86T01017R000606560001-7