(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000504950001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 19, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE . 3 3 Z S f rC-
DOC NO"b (/ l i f 7 i
e
OCR 3
P&PD
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t,muai Intelligence gency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
19 March 1986
Moscow's the Communist Party aofothe Philippines
Summary
recent years has had an informal and probably indirect Moscow in 25X1
relationship with the Communist Party ofbthePhilippinat
and its armed wing, the New People's Army (NPA) and Philippines
the tie does not seem to have involved Soviet Bloc arms sup rtr,
t
for the NPA. Nevertheless, there are signs that the CPP mayohav
e
quietly begun in late 1984 and 1985 to ex re the possibility of
expanded contacts with the Soviets. 25X1
We assume--and the signs so far suggest--that Moscow will
seek normal relations with the Aquino government. Nonetheless,
the fall of the Marcos government may well have an impact on the
fortunes of the CPP/NPA which could alter Soviet policy:
-- On the one hand, if Aquino's government succeeds in
reversing the heretofore improving fortunes of the NPA,
the CPP may feel compelled to seek Soviet support to
prevent an erosion of its current position or to retrieve
it from a decline.
-- Conversely, if it appears that a CPP/NPA victory is in
sight, Moscow's incentive to render aid to the party and
its armed wing--probably through surrogates--would
increase.
This memoran um was prepared
World Division, Asia Branch
SOVA bird
Comments and inquiries are welcome and may be directed
to the Chief, Third World nct;
;
__
v
t
SOV M 86-20027x
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-- The Soviets might also be prompted to aid the Philippine
communists if Moscow fails to make any headway with the
Philippine government and the latter resolves not to
terminate US base rights.
In the near term, the Soviets are likely to pursue a two track
policy that attempts to win favor with the Aquino government
while they seek to manipulate the CPP through surro at es into
becoming more susceptible to Soviet influence.
Possible Early Contact
The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was formed in
1968 as a Maoist group that split off the pro-Soviet Partin
Komunista Ng Pilipinas (PKP), which was then declining in
membership and popularity among Filipino youth. For a number of
years thereafter, the CPP remained small, ardently Maoist, and
anti-Soviet. By the late 1970s--as the PKP dwindled to a party
of no more than 7,000 members--the CPP and its armed wing had
clearly grown, were less attached to Peking (if not more pro-
Moscow), and were rapidly becoming a threat to the Marcos
government. During the CPP's early years, Soviet media
occasionally denounced its leaders as immature Marxists and
Moscow continued to nurture its ties with its traditional ally,
the PKP by providing financial support, scholarships, and hosting
its leaders while at the same time seeking better relations with
the Marcos
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CPP Attitude Toward Moscow
In the early 1980s, the CPP apparently was largely satisfied
with its increasingly successful strategy for gaining powq r, its
approach involved a mixture of co-opting non-party members in
legal and illegal united front
groups while warfare in the countrvside_ g guerrilla
a
from church and leftist groups in WesternlEurope and othe US, and
an "arms grabbing" campaign in t-ho -1,411-
r4`Y a rations were supported by
axes in "liberated are
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Moscow's Views of the CPP
The Soviets continued to back Marcos until his regime
fell. In mid-1985, they gave
heit by
the head of the PKP, which is still nhostileytootha eMCPP~w Tvis
Soviets have also told Filipino officials--for what it is worth--
that the CPP/NPA has sought their assistance and that Moscow
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oscow
rom
flatly turned the request down. Soviet media have not published
a commentary on the CPP/NPA in recent years, but one Soviet radio
service referred to party members as "left extremists" in a
January 1986 broadcast and, according to an interview pub}'-shed
in a Philippine newspaper, a senior CPP cadre in mid-February
noted that his party had recently come under "vicious criticism"
M
f
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Evidence for an indirect Soviet tie with the CPP through
surrogates is scattered and inconclusive, suggesting that if
Moscow is taking such a tack, it is not yet expending much energy
in the process. In addition to the reported indirect contacts
through West European communist and the Sandinistas,
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tt,Ai nce for
conclusive. F
connecton is not
In our view, one of the stronger candidates for a surrogate
role is Vietnam, although the evide
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The use of foreign surrogates--possibly East Germans,
Central American communists, or the Vietnamese--would have the
advantage of placing distance between the CPP and the Soviets,
who have not wanted to compromise their relations with the..
Philippine government. Surrogates would also have the advantage
of being more acceptable to elements of the CPP that remain
hostile to Moscow, either because of its continued support for
the party's PKP rivals or because of the Soviets' "superpower
status," or other perceived offenses. Moreover, from Moscow's
perspective, fraternal ties between the CPP and a pro-Soviet
surrogate could pave the way for better relations with the entire
"Socialist bloc," including the USSR, if and when the CPP comes 25X1
to power.
Conclusions and Pros
Before the fall of Marcos, the main focus of Soviet policy
in the Philippines was the pursuit of a relationship with the
regime in power, in an effort to diminish US influence in the
islands and promote the ouster of the US military Moscow appears to have viewed the CPP as having beenetooce.
independent for too long, too tainted by its Maoist past, and too
infected with a history of animosity toward Moscow to be a ready
vehicle for Soviet policy in the Philippines. As a result,
Soviet policy toward the CPP, in the ancien re ime, appears to
have been one of attempting to turn the
with Moscow's domestic and foreign clients, whoto an umablyawoun r
esu instruct it on how to become respectable internationalists andld
serve Moscow's bidding.
How far and how fast Soviet Policy may evolve will depend,
in our view, on the actions of the Aquino government and the
CPP/NPA. 0
CPP Policy Toward Moscow.
Marcos regime, the CPP was interested mainlytinepo i l
t so of the cal recognition from the Soviet Union; this, however~mayhave been
in anticipation of a future request for financial support and
arms. If the CPP now falls on hard times--or believes it needs
an infusion of arms to prevent the NPA from suffering a setback
or to push it to final victory--its incentive to seek financial
and arms aid beyond its normal channels of support will
increase. Under those circumstances, we see a request for
support from the Soviet Uni
Soviet Polic Toward the CPP. In the short term, we suspect
that Moscow will continue to pursue a two track policy of seeking
on as a distinct Possibility.
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an accommodation with the regime in power while attempting to
bend the CPP, through the use of surrogates, toward a more
cooperative attitude with the "Socialist bloc."
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In the longer run, however, if Moscow finds that the initial
burst of good will that Aquino's government has evinced toward
the US turns sour and that an end to US base rights in the
Philippines emerges as a realistic
have little reason to step in and offer lthelinsurgentsohelp will
it did with the Marcos government, the Soviets will attempt ~tos
cultivate leaders and associates of the Aquino regime, re ardless
of their ideological bent, to achieve their goal.
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On the other hand, if Moscow perceives that it is left in
the cold by Aquino and that the US-Filipino tie has been enhanced
with the passage of time, then its incentive for aiding the
insurgents will increase. At a minimum, the Soviets could reason
that such aid, which would undoubtedly be conveyed through
surrogates, would promptly be known to the Filipino government
and might--the Soviets could reason--
their interests. At most, the aid mightseventuallyohelpdputrinto
power a regime that would undoubtedly oust the US from its bases
in the Philippines and that might be beholden to the Soviets for
their final victory. 25X1
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DDI/SOVA/TWA/A/
Subject: Moscow's Relations
of the Philippines
Internal Distribution
Orig
DCI
DDCI
SA/DCI
ED/DCI
Executive Registry
DDI
Senior Review Panel
OC PA S/ IMD/C B
Vice Chairman, NIC
NI0/USSR
NIO/EA
PDB Staff
C/DDO/SE
C/DDO/EAD
C/DDO/EA
C/DDO/SE
C/OEA/SEA
C/OEA/SEA/IB
F B I S/AG/
D/OEA
F BIS/AG/
C/DDO/SE
C/DDO/EA
(18 Mar 86)
with the Communist Party
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Subject: Moscow's Relations with the Communist Party
of the Philippines
Internal Distribution (continued)
D/OGI
C/OGI/IIC
C/OGI/IIC/I
C/ OG I/IIC/P I
D/SOVA
C/SOVA/DEIG
C/SOVA/DEIG/DED
C/SOVA/DEIG/DID
C/SOVA/DEIG/NIG
C/SOVA/NIG/EPD
C/SOVA/NIG/DPD
C/SOVA/SIG
C/SOVA/SIG/SFD
C/SOVA/SIG/SPD
C/SOVA/RIG
C/SOVA/RIG/EAD
C/SOVA/RIG/TWAD
C/SOVA/RIG/TWAD/AFLAME
C/SOVA/TWAD/A
C/SOVA/TWAD/FA
SOVA/TWAD/A/0
SOVA/TWAD/A/Chrono
SOVA/TWAD/Chrono
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Subject: Moscow's Relations with the Communist Party_
of the Philippines
External Distribution
Vice Admiral John Poindexter
Assistant to the President
National Security Affairs
Gaston J. Sigur
Senior Director, Asian Affairs
National Security Council
Honorable Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Senior Director
European and Soviet Affairs
National Security Council
Honorable Stephen R. Sestanovich
Deputy Director
Policy Development & Political-Military Affairs
National Security Council
White House
Mr. Donald Gregg
Asst to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
White House
Department of Defense
.Michael Pillsbury
Asst Undersecretary for
Policy Planning
The Pentagon
Honorable Richard Armitage
Asst Secretary
International Security Affairs
The Pentagon
James A. Kelley
Deputy Assistant Secretary
East Asia and Pacific Affairs
The Pentagon
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Subject: Moscow's Relations with the Communist Party
of the Philippines
Department of Defense (continued)
Donald Eirich
Assistant
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Brunei and Singapore
The Pentagon
Richard Perle
Assistant Secretary
International Security Policy
The Pentagon
Lt. Gen. Leonard H. Perroots
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency
The Pentagon
Commodore Thomas A Brooks
Deputy Director
JCS Support
The Pentagon
Col. George Satterhwaite
Deputy Asst Director
-Current Intelligence
JCS Support, The Pentagon
Gordon Negus
Vice Deputy Director
Foreign Intelligence
Department of Defense, The Pentagon
Dr. Wynfred Joshua
Defense Intelligence Officer
European and Soviet Political
and Military Affairs
Department of Defense, The Pentagon
John Sloan
Defense Intelligence Officer
East Asia and Pacific
Department of Defense, The Pentagon
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External Distribution (continued)
Department of Defense
Brigadier General Edward Neale Fletcher
Assistant Deputy Director
Estimates
Department of Defense, The Pentagon
Dennis Nagy
Assistant Deputy Director
Research
Department of Defense, The Pentagon
Capt. Charles Neuhaus
Soviet and Warsaw Pacts, Research
Department of Defense, The Pentagon
Col. Bruce D. Arnold
Eastern Area, Research
Department of Defense, The Pentagon
Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Department of Defense, The Pentagon
Maj. Gen. Schuyler Bissell
Asst Chief of Staff
Intelligence
Department of Defense, The Pentagon
Lt. Gen. Sidney T. Weinstein
Assistant Chief of Staff
Intelligence
.Department of Defense, The Pentagon
Commodore William Studeman
Director
Naval Intelligence
Department of Defense, The Pentagon
Richard L. Haver
Deputy Director
Naval Intelligence
Department of Defense, The Pentagon
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External Distribution (continued)
Department of State
William Courtney
Special Assistant to Undersecretary
Political Affairs
Department of State
Paul D. Wolfowitz
Asst Secretary
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau
Department of State
John Saisto
Philippines Affairs Office
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau
Department of State
Rozanne L. Ridgway
Assistant Secretary
European and Canadian Affairs Bureau
Department of State
Mark Palmer
Deputy Asst Secretary
European and Canadian Affairs Bureau
Department of State
Mark R. Parris
Director, Soviet Union Affairs
European and Canadian Affairs Bureau
Department of State
Honorable Morton I. Abramowitz
Director
Intelligence and Research Bureau
Department of State
Richard A. Clarke
Asst Secretary, Regional Analysis
Intelligence and Research Bureau
Department of State
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External Distribution (continued)
Department of State
John J. Taylor
East Asia and Pacific
Research and Analysis Division
Intelligence and Research Bureau
Department of State
Robert H. Baraz
Director, Office of Analysis for
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (INR/SEE)
Department of State
Isabel Kulski
Acting Chief
Soviet Foreign Political Division
(INR/SEE/SI) Department of State
H. Allen Holmes
Director
Bureau of Politico Military Affairs
Department of State
John Hawes
Principal Deputy Director
Bureau of Politico Military Affairs
-Department of State
Ravic Huso
Philippine Desk
Department of State
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