(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000504710001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 28, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE'OF INTELLIGENCE
28 November 1986
Yugoslavia-Libya: Military-Security Sales and Training
Summary
Yugoslavia's military-security relationship with Libya is
focused on providing equipment and training for conventional
warfare. Yugoslavia, however, has exported some equipment --
such as minisubs, undersea mines, and light weapons -- that could
be used in terrorist attacks. We have no indication that Tripoli
either plans to use Yugoslav-supplied equipment for terrorist
operations or has done so in the past. While Belgrade is
concerned not to be linked with terrorist groups, it almost
certainly will continue to sell to Libya weapons suitable for
unconventional warfare barring US threats of economically painful
sanctions -- a step that would chill bilateral relations for some
time.
This memorandum was prepared byl East
European Division, Office of Europealysiswas requested
by Mr. John Andrew Purnell for Ambassador Bremer. Comments and
questions are welcome and should be a
Acting Chief, East European Division
Copy I I of 3
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Broad Military--l9eicurity Relations
Belgrade maintains a broad military-security relationship
with Tripoli that has proven extremely lucrative for Yugoslavia.
Yugoslav military-related sales to Libya last year -- including
equipment, construction, and services -- reached approximately
$500 million. During recent years, Yugoslavia has won a range of
Libyan military contracts:
o Construction. Yugoslav firms have constructed several
Libyan military bases, including the Tripoli naval academy
bombed by US forces last April and a military airfield at
Bi'r An Namwah.
Military Sales: Intended for Terrorists?
Most of Yugoslavia's military-related sales to Libya involve
equipment -- and related training and servicing -- that supports
Tripoli's armed forces. Yugoslavia apparently has had its
greatest success in winning contracts from Libya's air and naval
forces. Nonetheless, Belgrade has sold Tripoli some weapons that
are suitable for unconventional warfare purposes -- and therefore
for potential terrorist operations.
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Yugoslavia has also delivered some light weapons and
munitions that have the potential for use by terrorists.
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Nonetheless all available evidence indicates that, to the
extent Belgrade has cared about the end use of such arms, it 25X1
intended these deliveries for Libya's armed forces.
Belgrade is almost certainly aware of the potential use of
its equipment for terrorist purposes and, in our view, may have
taken the precaution of giving Tripoli at least pro forma
warnings not to divert Yugoslav weapons to terrorists. Although
individual transfers to smaller terrorist groups -- such as the
Abu Nidal Organization -- would be difficult to detect, we have
seen no evidence thus far that Libya has passed Yugoslav-made
weapons to such groups. By contrast, equipment sold to Tripoli
by the Soviet Bloc and major Western arms suppliers is known to
have been diverted to radical Palestinian groups in Lebanon and
used by a variety of terrorists throughout the Middle East and
Western Europe. Nonetheless, Tripoli could divert Yugoslav
equipment to terrorist operations on short notice.
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Security Relations: Defensive in Character 25X1
Yugoslavia has established close contacts with the Libyan
security apparatus, but apparently has restricted the
tionship to defensive areas.
information sharing, Yugoslav instruction in counterintelligence
and VIP security techniques, and joint acquisition and production
the 19-85 protocol on cooperation, for example, calls for
of listening devices.
Libyan proposals
limited to these
for Yugoslav
areas.
Outlook
Belgrade is sensitive at this time to any development that
could link Yugoslavia to international terrorism. Faced with
continued US pressure at about current levels, Yugoslavia
probably will not significantly expand its Libya ties beyond the
present level.
However, even in the face of moderately increased US pressure
-- such as linkage of technology transfer to restraint in arms
sales -- Belgrade is unlikely to halt sales to Libya of military
equipment with a potential for diversion to terrorist groups. In
short, Belgrade will probably continue to give priority to its
close ties to Tripoli and its need to address growing financial
difficulties. Moreover, Belgrade probably will continue to
assert that Libya does not use Yugoslav equipment for terrorist
purposes.
In our view, only the suggestion of much harsher US sanctions
-- such as threatening Belgrade with a loss of
most-favored-nation trade status -- would cause Belgrade to stop
sensitive arms sales. Such US moves, however, would generate
considerable resentment in Belgrade and chill bilateral relations
for some time.
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DI/EURA/EE/
Distribution
INTERNAL
1 - ANIO/EUROPE
2 - O/DCI-DDCI EXEC STAFF
3 - D/EURA
4 - AC/EURA/EE
5,6 - EURA/PS
7,8,9,10,11 - CPAS/IMC/CB
12 - DI/PES
13 - DDI
14 - C/EURA/EE/CE
15 - C/EURA/EE/SE
16 - C/EURA/EE/NE
17 - C/EURA/EE/EREI
20 - ORIGINATORS
21 - EURA/EE/SE CHRONO
22 - EURA/SE PRODUCTION
(26 Nov 86)
23 - Mr. John Andrew Purnell, Dept of State
24 - Mr. Marc Grossman, Dept of State
25 - Mr. Martin Wenick, Dept of State
26 - Ms. Paula Dobrianski, NSC Staff
27 - Mr. Charles Smith, INR, Dept of State
28 - Mr. Barry Lowenkron, PPS, Dept of State
29 - Mr. James Dunn, DIAC
30 - Mr. Donald Gregg, The White House
31 - Col. John Berry, ISP/OSDD
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