(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000404270001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 22, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Eastern Europe: State of Societies
Eastern Europe is beset with enduring political and economic
problems which if not carefully managed by both the domestic
leaderships and Moscow could create future "hot spots." The
populations do not seem volatile at present as the bitter
experiences of past opposition and tight security controls have
caused them to retreat into sullen apathy, consumerist socialism,
and private pursuits. Nonetheless, there are enough traditional
headaches such as poor economic performance and ethnic tensions
as well as new concerns such as the environment and youth
alienation to keep the pot bubbling in East European societies.
The East European regimes--with the recent exception of
Romania--have sought to coopt their populations by providing an
increasing standard of living, but economic pressures are making
this increasingly hard to do.
o Draconian austerity and Ceausescu's irrational economic
policies have forced Romanians to focus on personal and
family survival while the Polish population's
preoccupation with eroding living standards remains a
basic obstacle to reconciliation with the regime.
o Economic problems are cutting ever more deeply into the
social fabric in Hungary and Yugoslavia where inflation,
stagnation, and widening economic inequalities are sowing
confusion in the leadership and undermining the political
consensus of these societies.
Ethnic tensions continue to simmer in several states and
periodically lead to friction between countries.
o The greatest threat to stability probably rests with the
Serbs and Albanians in Yugoslavia although the
Czech-Slovak rivalry for positions of power and economic
resources could lead to bitter behind-the-scenes disputes
in a post-Husak succession.
o Reflecting the concerns of its populace, Hungary has been
increasingly forthright in expressing displeasure with
Romania's treatment of the Magyar minority in
Transylvania, protests that Bucharest views as unwarranted
interference.
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o A new sense of assertiveness and "German-ness" has become
increasingly evident in the GDR, apparently provoking
friction with Moscow.
Although the Polish Catholic Church is the only East European
church able to confront authorities on policy issues, religious
groups in several countries appear to be attracting more
adherents disaffected with regime values and seeking a
quasi-legitimate forum for dissent.
Environmentalism has similarly attracted growing popular
attention--particularly in the wake of the Chernobyl accident.
The impact has been greatest in Yugoslavia, where widespread
objections have forced Belgrade to reassess its nuclear power
program, but the Polish, East German, and Hungarian regimes have
also had to demonstrate greater attention to popular concerns.
Because environmental issues reflect a generally accepted social
good, they provide oppositionists a comparatively safe forum for
questioning regime policies.
Throughout the region, the younger generation seems
paraticularly disspirited by the stagnation in these societies
and alienated from Communist ideology and regimes.
o In more westward-looking regions such as the GDR and some
Yugoslav republics, some young people have been galvanized
by youth activism in the West and have formed rudimentary
protest movements on issues such as arms control, human
rights, and the environment.
o On balance, most East European youth currently seem too
complacent or apathetic to enage in serious unrest.
Nonetheless, they are an ideologically uncommitted,
politically unstable element that could cause more serious
trouble in the future if not given a greater stake in
these societites. Indeed, a small but growing number of
Polish youth have resorted to violence.
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Albania
Tirane's xenophobic isolation ensures the regime's continuing
stranglehold on society.
o Seized by its paranoia of outsiders, the regime wages a
continuing puritanical battle against Western influence
among Albanian young people, a problem aggravated by easy
reception in many areas of Italian, Greek, and Yugoslav
broadcasts.
o Over the longer term, economic problems and the regime's
cautious opening to the West may pose growing problems for
Tirane in blunting the attraction of Western culture among
Albanian youth and intellectuals.
Bulgaria
Despite growing economic aproblems, the society is remarkably
stable, partly because the party is so entrenched Soviet
influence so pervasive, and possible centers of opposition weak
to nonexistent.
o The regime's assimilation campaign against ethnic Turks
sparked violence and has left the Turkish minority even
more wary and resentful of its Slavic masters. The
problem caused the regime the most grief internationally,
however--smearing Sofia's image in Western capitals,
embarrassing the Soviets, and adding to Moscow's
displeasure with Zhivkov.
o The regime routinely harasses the Catholic Church and
several Protestant denominations, but these groups are
small and virtually powerless.
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Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovak society is marked by stability, despite the
almost complete estrangement of the populace from the Communist
leadership. Social unrest or unmanageable dissent probably will
not be a problem for the government in the short term, but
several economic, social and political trends could prove
troublesome farther down the road.
Living Standards
The Husak regime has maintained a tacit social contract with
the population since 1968 in which it has provided one of the
highest standards of living in Eastern Europe in return for
widespread political apathy. Economic growth and consumption
levels have stagnated in recent years, however.
o The leadership faces difficult choices among increasing
long-neglected investment, boosting living standards, and
meeting Soviet demands for more exports.
o While Prague probably will not be able to provide
significant gains in consumption in the future, the regime
probably can prevent living standards from falling below
politically acceptable levels.
Ethnic Tensions
Czech - Slovak ethnic tensions continue to simmer at various
levels of society. The majority Czechs resent Slovak domination
of the country's economy and government.
o Slovaks control several key government and party postions:
Husak is party leader and president, and Bilak is the
CPCZ's number two man, controlling both ideology and
foreign policy.
o Slovakia has received a disproportionate amount of
investment since 1968.
While ethnic tensions have historically hindered
consensus-building in Czechoslovakia, they have not resulted in
outright unrest and are not likely to do so today. The Czechs
probably will move to regain control of the regime's top
positions after the departure of Gustav Husak and will try to tip
the economic balance back in favor of the Czech lands.
o Any Czech reassertion of power, however, will almost
certainly be balanced by the principle of ethnic
proportionality. Political confrontations, though
potentially bitter, will probably be kept behind closed
doors.
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Dissident Groups
Charter 77 and the Catholic Church are the two major sources
of dissent in the CSSR. In the near future, the activities of
Church members present more potential for political and social
instability than Charter 77, a group of intellectual dissenters
who have found little resonance within society.
o Charter 77 is seen as a Czech phenomenon that does not
address the Slovak populace.
o The human rights orientation of its message holds little
appeal for many inward-looking Czechoslovaks, who are more
concerned with material comfort.
The Catholic Church, on the other hand can boast of a
widespread network of members that by its nature is a grassroots
organization.
o Its leader, Cardinal Tomasek, is the focal point of
reverence due to his strong moral stance.
o Youth disaffection from "consumer socialism" and lack of
real social participation is leading a growing number to
turn to the Church for moral and spiritual guidance.
Continued state repression of legal as well as illegal
practitioners is creating the atmosphere where clandestine
worship is the only alternative for many.
o This reflects the regime's alarm over its inability to
control the Church and over the Church's potential to
become a center of opposition.
o If stalemate occurs in naming an eventual successor to the
87-year old Tomasek, the lack of moral focus in the public
Church could lead others into the underground, presenting
the regime with an even more serious problem of control.
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East Germany
The mass of the GDR populace can best be described as
politically inert and resigned to pursuing material interests
within the bounds set by an internal security apparatus presumed
to be omnipresent.
o The experience of a failed revolt in 1953, the presence of
400,000 Soviet troops, and the strongest economy and
highest living standard in Eastern Europe strengthen this
tendency.
But this veneer of apathy and retreat into materialism can
only partially obscure several countervailing tendencies.
o Some young people have been galvanized by West German
youth activism concerning current world issues (arms
control, human rights, ecology) and have coalesced into
rudimentary political protest movements.
o To a lesser degree, the public at large fears the
East-West conflict over arms control, tending to blame
each competing alliance roughly equally.
o Increasing environmental pollution and especially the
GDR's reticent handling of the Chernobyl disaster has
upset the public at large and eroded even more of the
regime's credibility as a guardian of the public welfare.
o The autonomous Protestant (mainly Lutheran) Churches act
as a protective umbrella for the unofficial peace movement
and as a clearing house for ecological information.
o Despite their relatively high standard of living, the East
Germans' expectations are yet higher, as they compare
themselves not to Romania or Poland, but to "the other"
Germany, to which they are exposed constantly by FRG
television and travelers.
o Efforts in recent years to improve economic efficiency and
labor productivity have created some unemployment.
o Disgruntlement over shortages is chronic, but rarely leads
to significant incidents of worker or consumer unrest.
As always, the impact of West Germany and the pull of German
national sentiment remain variables which the GDR regime and
Soviets never forget.
o In our view, this sentiment is more of a latent than
active variable. East Germans appear to believe their
fate is not in their own hands, but in those of the Bonn
government, which negotiates on their behalf with the
regime to ease their lot.
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o Disgruntlement over travel prohibitions may be the
public's main bone of contention, intensified presumably
by large number of West German travelers to the GDR.
o The most discontented do not rebel, but emigrate or escape
to the FRG.
o Traditional anti-Slavic feelings strengthen popular
antipathy to the overbearing Soviets and their occupation
troops, but most people appear to accept Soviet dominance
as an unavoidable consequence of losing the war.
o A new sense of assertiveness and "German-ness" on the part
of the regime has been evident in recent years as GDR
"comes of age," and takes growing pride in its economic
acomplishments. This appears to be a source of friction
between Moscow and East Berlin.
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Hungary
Party leader Kadar largely succeeded in healing the wounds of
1956 and made Hungary a model of stability and prosperity in
Eastern Europe by forging a social consensus based on consumerism
and relaxed relations between the party and the people. The
consensus is now fraying, however, largely as a result of
economic stresses and the approach of succession.
Increasing Social Strains
Economic hardships and inequalities are at the root of the
public's souring mood.
o Rising inflation has forced most Hungarians to work second
jobs just to maintain their standard of living. The
resulting stress has produced an increased incidence of
suicides, divorces, alcoholism and crime.
o The problem is compounded by growing income inequalities.
The few who have prospered through permitted private
enterprise and blatantly illegal activities have tended to
flaunt their wealth before the many.
o Urban industrial workers appear particularly resentful.
Unconfirmed reports of strikes have reached the West, and
workers voiced unprecedented criticism of the ailing
economy and feeble union performance at the trade union
congress held earlier this year.
o The regime appears concerned that an alternative workers'
movement similar to Solidarity could emerge if economic
conditions do not improve or if the unions are not more
successful in winning worker allegiance.
Growing Political Confusion
Hungarian society is permeated by a sense of political
confusion and ideological contradictions. Hungarians complain
openly about a sense of drift in policy making and a lack of
leadership.
o Officials who have been assigned new responsibilities as
part of the reform often do not understand their new
duties or disagree with them. The result is inactivity
and inertia among institutional leaders.
o There is no clear ideological consensus on public
policies. Even within the party, opinion is divided over
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the doctrinal legitimacy of such things as private
boutiques and prices that are linked to market forces.
Social Groups to Watch
Increased social strains and confusion have not had great
impact so far, although continued economic stagnation and
political uncertainty may lead to instability.
o Dissidents are not now numerous, well-organized, or very
influential. Only if they unite on a common platform,
bridge the gap to the workers, or benefit from the fertile
ground created by declining living standards can they hope
to influence public opinion.
o many Hungarian intellectuals feel a rebirth of nationalist
sentiment centered on concern for Hungarian minorities
abroad. They put what pressure they can on the regime to
aid the Magyars in Transylvania and Slovakia. If the
regime responds, it may run afoul of its neighbors and the
Soviet Union; if it does not, it may lose further
credibility, which it can ill afford during a period of
economic stagnation.
o Hungarian youth are disproportionately hurt by the current
economic troubles. Since they did not experience the
trauma of 1956, they may be more likely to express their
alienation and frustrations politically, perhaps even
resorting to violence. They form an ideologically
uncommitted, politically unstable element that may cause
serious trouble in the future if they are not better
integrated into the society.
o An environmental movement composed of intellectuals,
dissidents, students, and other concerned citizens has
formed to oppose the construction of a hydroelectric
project on the Danube. This issue holds the potential for
uniting diverse elements of the opposition, but it may not
last beyond the beginning of construction.
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Poland
Six years after the birth of Solidarity, most of the same
conditions exist that brought about the prolonged workers' strike
in Gdansk and the formation of the union.
o The average Pole is preoccupied with eroding living
standards and mistrustful of reforms that entail austerity
measures.
o The populace remains dissatisfied over the regime's
suppression of Solidarity, does not subscribe to official
claims of normalization, and does not believe the current
regime can emerge from the crisis.
Additional social problems have intensified as a result of
the ongoing political and economic crisis.
o Poland is in the grip of a health crisis: salmonella
poisoning is up 50 percent over last year because of
unsanitary public eating places; infant death rates have
risen in dirty maternity wards; pharmaceuticals will be in
short supply into the next decade; Poland cannot even
produce a toothbrush that meets minimum WHO standards.
o Environmental problems have attained catastrophic
proportions and since Chernobyl have overtaken economic
and political issues in some opposition quarters as the
major focus of attention.
o Alcoholism and drug abuse have risen dramatically and have
become the focus of government and Church abstention
programs. POLMOS, the state alcohol monopoly,
consistently ranks number one in revenues in the Polish
version of the "Fortune 500."
Opposition to the regime remains alive even though government
controls and punitive measures have reduced the level of
demonstrations and active resistance.
o Workers, according to recent Solidarity-endorsed polls,
are politically apathetic, prefer socialism, but mistrust
the regime. Few appear willing to work hard to bring the
country out of its economic crisis.
o Most youth remain disaffected from the regime and a small,
but growing number are willing to turn to violence. A
Gdansk anarchist group attacked ZOMO troops on May Day
1985 and later that summer rioted at the annual Jarocin
rock festival.
o The underground is evolving into a classic East European
dissident movement dominated by disaffected intellectuals,
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but one that remains a threat to the regime because it
maintains its ties to the workers through educational and
cultural programs.
o The Church hierarchy actively supports the underground's
nonviolent educational activities and is increasingly
becoming impatient with the regime's failure to lead the
country out of its political and economic crisis.
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ROMANIA
Romanian society is deeply divided along ethnic, social, and
regional lines and can fall prey to intense nationalist
sentiments. The country's unending economic crisis has added to
the strains in this society but a direct challenge to Ceausescu's
rule seem unlikely.
Nationalism
One result of Romania's long--and only partially
successful--quest for national independence and identity has been
the development of an intense, sometimes xenophobic Romanian
nationalism. This nationalism is shared, encouraged and
sometimes exploited by the government.
o While this nationalism has been used to paper over some
social divisions, it has led to tensions with minorities,
especially Hungarians, who number nearly two million,
about 10% of the population. In recent years, Hungary has
been more forthright in expressing concern over
Bucharest's repression of its Hungarians in Transylvania
and efforts to isolate them from Budapest. Bucharest
views such protests as signs of continuing Hungarian
irredentism.
Economic Troubles
The slide in living standards since 1980, which has included
draconian rationing of basic food staples, gasoline, home and
office heating and declines in medical and social services, has
seriously cut public morale, but widespread, organized resistance
is unlikely to develop soon.
o Centuries of cruel and exploitive rule have taught
Romanians to survive through simple endurance,
suspiciousness of outsiders, and avoidance of direct
challenges to authority.
o In the face of current hardships brought about by
exploitive and irrational Stalinist economic policies, the
population's typical reaction is to "hunker down" and look
for ways to assure personal and family survival through
barter, bribery, personal connections or exploitation of
cracks in the system.
Lack of Opposition
In the past, President Ceausescu has been able to deflect
discontent through a popular nationalist foreign policy,
occasional veiled warnings about an alleged Soviet or Hungarian
"threat", scapegoating of lesser officials, intimidation by the
pervasive security apparatus and (intentionally or otherwise) by
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having criticism focus on his powerful but unpopular wife. This
is no longer working as well: popular grumbling now focuses on
Ceausescu himself, and wishful thinking has led to widspread
rumors of his ill-health.
Nevertheless, the absence of any national institutions
independent of the government and the general climate of stoicism
and fatalism make the concept of nationally-organized resistance
alien to most Romanians.
o The Romanian Orthodox Church is effectively run by the
government and smaller, more dissident denominations
represent only a tiny fraction of Romanian believers.
o Virtually all independent-minded members of the Romanian
intelligentia have been forced to emigrate; those who
remain have been largely coopted by the government, and
are isolated from other social classes.
o In the past, extremes of oppression have sparked sudden,
disorganized and intensely violent peasant revolts; this
could eventually happen again. So far, however, Ceausescu
has shown a good feel for the limits of the population's
endurance, and has successfully isolated and quashed
sporadic, localized protests.
Possible Succession Scenarios
An in-house coup, though unlikely, could occur if the
situation threatened a nationwide revolt. There are few obvious
candidates for a succession, however. If Ceausescu were to die
tomorrow, his most likely immediate successor would be his wife,
but only for a very short time.
o Prolonged indecision during a succession crisis could
bring all these social tensions to the fore, but the
leadership is aware of this and will feel compelled to put
on at least a show of unity as quickly as possible.
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Yugoslavia
More than six years after Tito's death, Yugoslavia is proving
to be relatively stable and resilient, but centrifugal regional
forces and ethnic tension are hampering Belgrade's ability to
govern. The self-confident Yugoslavs of Tito's days are now
unsure about the future, preoccupied by falling living standards,
and alienated from a complex, inefficent political system.
o The Communist party has clearly lost prestige in the
population's eyes--as seen in its difficulties in
recruiting new members--and respect for other political
institutions is hardly greater. Nonetheless, the public
appears too self-absorbed, demoralized, accepting, or
divided to stage nationwide protests.
o Moreover, there is no consensus on policies for change and
the above traits suggest the public is unlikely to develop
the sense of duty and sacrfice needed for economic and
political recovery.
Economic Woes
Public unhappiness with slow growth, run-away inflation, high
unemployment and a declining living standard has prompted the new
Mikulic government to respond with emergency measures.
o Although the public seemingly welcomes the appearance of
decisive government action and tougher controls it has
resisted the program's restraints on income and
consumption. Unhappiness over new wage controls has
provoked a rising tide of strikes.
o Disparities in wealth and economic development among the
different regions are widening, an intolerable situation
to many in a communist society.
o Discontent with economic ills, however, is tempered by the
opportunities available to earn income in the very active
second economy. While less numerous than in the past,
opportunities to work abroad also continue to serve as a
safety valve for the more ambitious of the unemployed.
Ethnic Strains
The greatest threat to stable relations among the many ethnic
groups currently comes from the Serbs, a large and historically
forceful group in the south, and from Albanians who make up about
80 percent of Serbia's autonomous province of Kosovo. Many Serbs
feel resentful about their lost influence at the national level
and in Kosovo.
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o Kosovo Serbs staged several demonstrations in recent
months protesting their treatment, and the national
leadership has had to intervene to promote calm.
Anti-nuclear Power Movement
Growing and unusually broad-based anti-nuclear
sentiment--reinforced by the Chernobyl accident--has become one
of the salient features of the current Yugoslav public mood.
o Youth groups have been among the most outspoken and
visible opponents of nuclear power, but the movement has
found adherents in nearly all interest groups in society.
Polls following Chernobyl showed that three-quarters of
adult respondents believed nuclear plants to be
unnecessary.
o The movement has already forced Belgrade to reassess its
plans for nuclear power, a nearly unprecedented
development in Yugoslavia's elite-dominated decisionmaking
process.
Youth Unhappiness
Recent months have seen some increase in protests by young
Yugoslavs, particularly in the more advanced westward-looking
republics of Slovenia and Croatia.
o The official Slovene youth organization in April called
for sweeping liberalization of the Communist system,
including direct elections and legalization of dissent.
Slovene and Croatian youth groups have also played a
leading role in the anti-nuclear power movement.
o National youth day festivities featured unusual barbs
against bureaucracy, unemployment, and nuclear power.
o Recent public opinion polls revealed a high level of
alienation among young Serbs from the Communist party and
officially-sponsored labor groups.
Most youth, however, seem too complacent or apathetic to
engage in more serious unrest.
o Polls show that a majority of young Serbs, including the
unemployed are satisfied with their lot. Such attitudes
are even stronger in the poorer republics.
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Background Paper on East European Countries for D/EURA
Distribution:
Orig - D/EURA
1 - C/EURA/EE
4 - IMC/CB
1 - PS
1 - C/EURA/SE
1 - C/EURA/CE
1 - C/EURA/NE
1 - Production
1 - Chrono
2 - Originators
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