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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00313R000300070005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret-
Intelligence
Soviet Fishing
in Third World Waters:
Continued Gains Unlikely
Seeret-
SOV 84-10170X
October 1984
Copy 407
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Soviet Fishing
in Third World Waters:
Continued Gains Unlikely
This paper was prepared byl I Office
of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Third
World Activities Division, SOVA
Secret
SOV 84-10170X
October 1984
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Soviet Fishing
in Third World Waters:
Continued Gains Unlikely
Key Judgments After having overexploited nearby fishing grounds in the 1950s and 1960s,
Information available the USSR greatly expanded operations in more distant waters-the open
as of 30 September 1984 seas, Antarctica, and the coasts of less developed countries (LDCs)-for
was used in this report.
larger stocks. The Soviets also modernized and expanded their fishing fleet
to more effectively harvest these high-yield fisheries. In the mid-1970s,
when Moscow's success in Third World waters was threatened by the
imposition of 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zones by LDCs, the
Kremlin launched a major effort to ensure continued access by negotiating
bilateral fishing treaties and joint ventures
This policy, which offered the prospect of financial and technical aid to
LDC fishing industries, initially paid off with dozens of agreements and
joint ventures. Since 1980, however, the USSR's efforts to negotiate new
agreements with LDCs and to increase its fish harvest in the Third World
have faltered. Equatorial Guinea, for example, abrogated a treaty allowing
exclusive Soviet access to its fishery zone, and Congo, Cape Verde,
Seychelles, and Liberia brushed aside Soviet entreaties for fishing accords.
As a result, the USSR's yields off African and Latin American coasts have
risen only marginally, and most of the increase in Moscow's overseas catch
has come from the northwest Pacific, off Japan.
Moscow's interest in access to distant fishing areas has been fueled by the
important role fish plays in the Soviet diet. As a source of animal-based
protein, fish is a direct substitute for meat. Its importance, together with
endemic problems in the livestock sector, is a strong incentive for economic
planners to safeguard access to Third World fisheries.
The USSR is the largest source of fisheries aid to the developing world,
having extended at least $250 million since the mid-1950s. Although a
significant part of the USSR's economic aid, this program has required the
expenditure of little hard currency and has resulted in significant gains for
Moscow-namely, fish for Soviet consumers and foreign exchange earn-
ings. The Soviets have had more success in Africa than in Latin America
and Asia, primarily because the newer African fishing industries badly
need technical aid. The USSR has signed bilateral agreements with
Angola, Egypt, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Somalia, and Sierra Leone.
Latin American nations generally have more established fishing industries,
however, and have resisted Moscow's offers. The USSR has won access to
the fishing zones of only Peru and Argentina, in addition to those of its two
client states-Cuba. and Nicaragua. Most Latin American nations fear
iii Secret
SOV 84-101 SOX
October 1984
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commercial competition from the Soviet fishing fleet. Their political
leaders and naval officials suspect the fleet's purposes, and
several countries maintain patrols to counter Soviet encroachments into
their zones.
Soviet fisheries aid probably was initially a net benefit to most LDCs
because few could take advantage of the new, exclusive rights they had de-
clared in the mid-1970s. As a result, Third World nations may view Soviet
aid to their. fishing industries as only a temporary expedient. They
generally now believe that they are getting too little in return. Some
African countries that accepted such aid have abrogated their bilateral
fishing agreements or have turned to Western companies because of Soviet
overfishing and failure to deliver the promised aid.
Despite these practices, most LDCs seem unwilling to let their resentment
lead to a serious weakening of ties because fishing is a minor part of their
relations with the USSR. Although Egypt and Somalia terminated their
fishing accords when they broke diplomatic relations over broader issues,
Moscow probably calculates that fishing problems will almost never cause
relations to worsen seriously.
The USSR will continue to work toward maintaining and expanding
fishing rights in the Third World, in part to further its campaign to
improve the Soviet diet. While past improvements have been based mostly
on increases in per capita consumption of livestock products, Soviet
officials almost certainly count on maintaining (or possibly raising) fish
consumption. As stocks in open-sea fisheries contiguous to 200-mile zones
are depleted, the Soviets are almost certain to continue pushing for fishing
rights inside LDCs' zones. Moscow may have additional success with West
African nations-some of which, like Guinea, are vulnerable to its
economic pressure. Despite offers of lucrative contracts, the Soviets are
likely to continue encountering stiff resistance in Latin America. They will
probably be more successful, however, in gaining access to port facilities
there to support fishing operations in the southern oceans and off
Antarctica. Nevertheless, on balance, the reluctance of many Latin
American states and the desire of African nations to reduce their
dependence on Moscow demonstrate the developing world's cautious view
of Soviet aid to fisheries. This hesitation, reinforced by Soviet failure to
fulfill earlier promises, probably will prevent Moscow from repeating the
success it enjoyed in the 1970s.
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Key Judgments
Soviet Motivations for Expanding Access
Moscow's Approaches to LDC Fisheries 4
Prospects
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Soviet Fishing
in Third World Waters:
Continued Gains Unlikely
Introduction
With the largest fishing fleet in the world, the USSR
in recent years has placed second in total catch, with
13 percent of the world's total, while Japan has been
first with 14 percent (figure 1). In 1982 the Soviet
fishing fleet had 34 percent more vessels than Japan
and was almost six times larger in total tonnage
(figure 2). Increasingly, the fleet is composed of ships
for transporting fish and large factory vessels with
onboard refrigeration and equipment for all types of
processing operations (figure 3). In 1982, 117 of the
world's 131 factory vessels and carriers that exceeded
10,000 gross tons sailed under the Soviet flag. Even
though the Soviets have an expanding fleet and plans
for larger catches, however, the Soviet catch has
leveled off at 9.5-10 million tons since 1975.
Moscow's interest in continued access to fishing areas
around the world has been driven in large measure by
the important role of fish in the USSR's food supply
and the failure to expand output of close substitutes
such as meat. Per capita consumption of fish-
providing almost 10 percent of total protein-is high-
er than that in most industrialized countries. More-
over, because of Soviet agriculture's deep-seated prob-
lems and the very high cost of meat production,
economic planners wish to maintain and, if possible,
increase the use of fish as a substitute. They therefore
view access to distant fishing grounds as a factor in
improving the Soviet diet.' Large catches also provide
important benefits to agriculture in the form of
nonfood byproducts, such as feed and fertilizer.)
This paper examines the trends that have affected
Soviet fishing in the Third World since the mid-
1970s, Moscow's efforts to gain access to the fisheries
of less developed countries (LDCs), and the USSR's
record in keeping its agreements once it has gained
' In 1982, per capita consumption of fish in the USSR was 18
kilograms (kg), while it was 7 kg in the United States. Under the
Food Program announced in 1982, Soviet planners are devoting
enormous resources to increasing production and consumption of
livestock products and other high-quality foods. The government
target is for fish consumption to reach 19 kg per capita by 1990.
Although this is a smaller increase than that envisaged for meat
consumption, economic planners almost certainly realize that meet-
ing or, if possible, exceeding this goal would ensure improvement of
the Soviet diet if, as we expect, they fall short in reaching the meat
Figure 1
Catches of the 10 Most Important
Fishing Countries, 1982 a
Million metric tons
0
Japan
USSR
China
United States
Chile
Peru
Norway
India
South Korea
Indonesia
M
a Nominal catches; includes crustaceans and mollusks
but not cetaceans or seaweeds. The 1982 world total
was 76.8 million metric tons.
Source: 1982 Yearbook of Fishery Statistics: Catches
and Landings (UN Food and Agriculture Organization:
1984), p. 80.
access. It also discusses reactions to Moscow's en-
treaties to Latin American and African nations for
fishing cooperation, the impact on Soviet. political
relationships with LDCs, and the USSR's prospects
for winning increased access to Third World fisheries.
Soviet Motivations for Expanding Access
In the early 1950s, when a limited cruising range
confined Soviet fishing craft mainly to the USSR's
coastal and inland waters, the annual catch stayed
under 2 million metric tons, with 60 percent coming
from inland and nearby waters. Following the over-
exploitation of these areas in the 1950s and 1960s, a
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Figure 2
Comparison of the Soviet Fishing Fleet With
Other Major Fleets, 1976 and 1982'
USSR 1976
1982
Japan
United States
Spain
South Koreab
Norway
Peru
Canada
Poland
Cuba
USSR 1976
1982
Japan
United States
Spain
South Koreab
Norway
Peru
Canada
Poland
Cuba
R a_
it Includes fishing vessels, factory vessels, and fishing carriers.
b Excludes factory vessels and carriers in South Korea's fishing fleet in 1976
because data are unavailable.
Source: 1982 Review of Fisheries in OECD Member Countries (OECD: Paris,
1983), pp. 21-22. This information, which OECD derives from Lloyd's
Shipping Register, differs somewhat from the US Navy data cited in the
inset "Soviet Long-Distance Fishing Capabilities." Nonetheless, we believe
it accurately reflects the relationship among the world's fishing fleets.
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Figure 3. The Sivash, an
Atlantic-class fish factory
trawler, operated off the coast
of Namibia during April 1984.
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Figure 4
Recent Soviet Fishing Grounds
North
Pacific
Ocean
South Pacific
Ocean
200-nm maritime zone
rapid expansion of the high-seas trawler fleet enabled
Soviet fishermen to move to the North Atlantic and
North Pacific Oceans. When the output target for fish
outstripped even these supplies, the fleets headed
farther afield, scouring the coasts of distant coun-
tries-primarily LDCs-the open seas, and Antarcti-
ca (figures 4 and 6).Z Between 1950 and 1960, the
share of the catch obtained from the open sea rose
from 46 to 72 percent. In 1975 the Soviets caught
roughly three-fifths of their total 10-million-ton
harvest within 200 miles of foreign shores
The USSR's freedom to operate in distant fishing
areas was threatened in the last half of the 1970s,
when most littoral states established 200-nautical-
mile fishing zones to prevent overfishing by the major
maritime powers. In view of an increase in per capita
fish consumption in the USSR from 12.5 kilograms
' As the fishing fleet moved closer to Third World nations, it began
operating in fisheries located both in what later became (circa 1975)
their "exclusive economic zones" and in the open sea. Comprehen-
sive data on catches by the USSR and other countries inside these
200-mile zones are unavailable; figure 6 shows quantities of fish
caught both in these zones and in the open sea
South
Atlantic
Ocean\
(kg) in 1965 to 18.5 kg in 1976 and the stagnation in
meat output, the loss of these fisheries would have set
back efforts to improve the Soviet diet. In response,
Moscow searched for underexploited fisheries outside
these zones, claimed a 200-mile zone of its own, and
stepped up its campaign to persuade LDCs to sign
additional fishing agreements. The heavy concentra-
tion of fish in LDC coastal areas-as much as two-
thirds of global stocks, according to one open-source
estimate-explains why Moscow began offering aid to
the fishing industries of LDCs in return for renewed
access to their fisheries.
Limitations on Soviet fishing in the coastal waters of
developed countries also may have pushed the Krem-
lin to explore opportunities in the Third World. After
the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States and
New Zealand severely restricted Soviet fishing rights
within their 200-mile coastal waters.' A European
' On 25 July 1984 the United States partially lifted this sanction by
granting the Soviets an annual fishing allocation of about 50,000
tons, much smaller than the earlier 400,000- to 500,000-ton
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Because of modernization and expansion, the Soviet
fishing fleet has gained a range that enables it to
reach the prime high-yield fisheries of the developing
world. US Navy data on the size of thefleet currently
show 3,626 vessels, including high-seas trawlers,
factory ships, refrigerated cargo ships, and research
vessels and service craft (for example, tankers and
tugs). (The number of vessels in 1982 shown in figure
2-4,064-is based on Lloyd's Shipping Register
rather than on US Navy data.) The Soviets have
purchased modern trawlers and fishing equipment
from Western Europe, Japan, Poland, and East Ger-
many. For example, East Germany, according to an
Izvestiya report, is scheduled to deliver 58 trawlers
for catching and processing fish in 1984, and it has
built 1,200 fishing boats for the Soviets over the past
35 years.
The USSR's oceanographic research fleet-about a
third of which is devoted to fisheries research-also
has become larger and more sophisticated. This fleet
helps locate the most fertile fishing grounds. Yields
also have risen with the use of electronic fish-finding
equipment and other efficient techniques.
Community decision to protect fish resources by
limiting catches by foreign fleets also affected Mos-
cow's ability to exploit European fisheries.
Having expanded activities in Third World fishing
grounds in the 1960s, the Soviets under the new
bilateral agreements pushed for permission to build
ports and other facilities, such as fish-processing
plants and refrigerated storage. Many African and
Latin American countries-among them Angola,
Nicaragua, and Peru-have granted Moscow such
privileges. The need to supply, repair, and recrew the
Soviet fishing fleet has intensified as its range has
increased by thousands of miles (see inset, "Soviet
Long-Distance Fishing Capabilities"). The acquisition
of facilities for maintaining and repairing ships and
the right to transfer fishing crews-especially in Peru
and Argentina-have been particularly important to
support operations on the high seas and in Antarctica.
The USSR also needs to service the many oceano-
graphic vessels engaged in fisheries research.
Figure 5
Soviet Fish Exports, 1965-83
i
- Exports to
soft currency
countries
Exports to
hard currency
countries
Moscow's Approaches to LDC Fisheries
Moscow is the largest source of fisheries aid to the
developing world, having extended at least $250 mil-
lion since the mid-1950s. Although a significant part
of the USSR's economic aid, this program has re-
quired the expenditure of little hard currency and has
resulted in significant gains for Moscow-namely,
fish for Soviet consumers and foreign exchange earn-
ings. In 1983, fish exports to hard currency customers
reached their highest level-$169 million (figure 5).
Most of the USSR's bilateral fishing agreements call
for the formation of joint ventures to develop the local
fishing industry and exploit fish resources. The Sovi-
ets usually assume 49-percent ownership in the com-
panies, which use ships leased or purchased from the
USSR for fishing, conducting research, and training
LDC personnel. Seventeen such companies effectively
secure Soviet access to LDC fishing zones; sometimes
the USSR has won exclusive rights, driving West
European and Japanese firms from these markets. In
addition, Moscow has promised in a number of bilat-
eral agreements to supply research vessels and crews,
to share data on fishery stocks, to host "partner
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country" scientists aboard Soviet ships, to pay a fee
(in cash or in kind) in return for fishing operations,
and to extend loans and credits for constructing port
and other facilities
In general, agreements cover a wide spectrum of
activities directly or indirectly related to fishing. For
example, the USSR has:
? Transferred to Angola a fifth trawler and a fishing
complex, including wharves and a processing
factory.
? Turned over four fishing vessels for incorporation
into Mozambique's fisheries fleet.
? Trained 1,000 Angolan seamen on Soviet vessels
and 20 Mozambicans in the USSR.
? Committed itself to building a drydock and pier in
Nicaragua to service the Soviets' Pacific fishing
fleet and promised to pay Nicaragua a $200,000
annual rental fee, provide tuna fishing boats, and
train about 100 Nicaraguans to use the equipment.
In such agreements, the developing country's main
obligation is to grant Soviet trawlers access to its
fishing zone and allow them a specified portion of the
catch. The host government also may be required to
supply anchoring and berthing facilities to Soviet
fishing vessels, food and fuel, maintenance, repair,
and fish-unloading services. Under some accords, the
LDCs grant Moscow a permanent fisheries represen-
tative in the country and landing rights to Aeroflot for
the transfer of fishing boat crews. Moscow's renewed
access to LDC fisheries, which it achieved as a result
of government-to-government agreements and joint
ventures, has enabled it to maintain its annual global
catches at about 10 million tons.
Africa. The USSR has only a limited economic
involvement in Africa (apart from military aid), but
much of the economic aid is devoted to the fishing
industry largely to support its own import needs and
to earn hard currency. Moscow has had six joint
fishing ventures with African nations, as well as
fishing agreements with Angola, Egypt, The Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mauriti-
us, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Somalia, and
Sierra Leone. The Soviets concentrate on the conti- 25X1
nent's fish resources along the Atlantic coast, location
of the richest stocks. Hundreds of Soviet fishing
vessels operate there.
Several West African states where fishing is of major
importance to the economy have complained that
Moscow fails to adhere to the terms of the bilateral
agreements. These countries object not only to the
depletion of their fishing stocks but also to Moscow's
failure to provide the quantities of fish promised.
Complaints about overfishing have been made by
Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Morocco, Mo-
zambique, and Namibia. For example, the USSR
regularly fails to remit the required 12 percent of its
catch to Angola, and, according to a foreign press
report, Soviet and Cuban fishing has driven out the
local fishing industry. Likewise, 50 to 70 Soviet
trawlers operate in Guinean waters when only 10 are
legally entitled to be there.
Several African countries
seized Soviet fishing trawlers for illegal operations;
however, after Morocco did so in 1981, a Soviet
minesweeper began to patrol West African waters to
guard the fisheries fleet. The continued presence of
this minesweeper has deterred Rabat from impound-
ing any more Soviet trawlers.
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Once it has access to LDC fisheries, Moscow fre-
quently refuses promised financial and technical aid.
The Somalis, before abrogating their bilateral agree-
ment in 1977 for political reasons, were unhappy that
almost all the income from their joint fishing venture
went toward Soviet technicians' salaries and other 25X1
administrative costs. Morocco and Guinea also have
been disappointed with Moscow's failure to supply the
vessels, training, and facilities as promised.
Like Somalia, other countries have translated their
resentment of Soviet overfishing and stinginess into
action by terminating accords and joint companies. In
1977, Mauritius canceled a seven-year-old agreement.
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Mauritania followed suit the next year, and Equatori-
al Guinea ended a treaty allowing exclusive Soviet
access to its fishery zone in the early 1980s. Other
countries have spurned the USSR's offers for fisheries
aid. In 1981 Congolese President Sassou, under pres-
sure from his political advisers, signed a friendship
treaty with the USSR that did not contain a fisheries
protocol, which the Soviets desired. Cape Verde,
Seychelles, and Liberia also have brushed aside Soviet
entreaties for fishing accords.
To mitigate the damage from Soviet overfishing and
to avoid the results of broken promises of aid, some
African countries have taken measures short of can-
celing their agreements. In 1983 Guinea-Bissau di-
verted part of the catch it had previously allocated to
Moscow to a joint Bissauan/Portuguese fishing com-
pany and barred the Soviets from deepwater fishing
once they filled their quota. In 1982, the Angolan
regime discussed with Japanese, Scandinavian, Arab,
and US companies initiatives intended to rehabilitate
its fishing industry
The Kremlin tried to coerce Guinea in 1983 into
extending the bilateral fishing agreement by stopping
fish deliveries to Conakry (which depends entirely on
Soviet supplies) for several months. To reduce its
dependence on Moscow, the Guinean Government
subsequently sought Western fishing companies to
replace the USSR and signed a three-year fishing
agreement with the European Community. Neverthe-
less, in July 1984, the Guinean Government acceded
to Soviet proposals to establish a fishing port on an
island near Conakry,
Under the proposal, Soviet trawlers would
obtain fishing rights and the Guineans would receive
fish-handling and -processing equipment, 10,000 tons
of the catch per year, training of personnel, and
financial compensation.
Latin America. The Kremlin's campaign to win fish-
ing privileges has been as intense in Latin America as
in Africa but far less successful. Moscow has won
access to the 200-mile fishing zones of only Peru and
Argentina-in addition to those of its client states,
Cuba and Nicaragua. Chile permits the fishing fleet
to use port facilities and to transfer boat crews but not
to fish. In several countries, longstanding Soviet offers
have met with strong resistance from well-organized
in Argentina, Chile, and Peru have ques-
tioned whether Soviet trawlers engage in activities
other than fishing.'
The Soviets' difficulty in winning Argentine approval
of an agreement allowing fishing, particularly in the
aftermath of the Falkland Islands crisis, illustrates
their problems with obtaining agreements throughout
the continent. As Moscow intermittently negotiated
with Buenos Aires from 1973 to 1982, Argentina
seized several Soviet fishing vessels that had crossed
the 200-mile limit. A March 1980 agreement granted
the USSR only the right to conduct fisheries research,
not to fish. Argentine naval officers opposed even this
agreement, and the Argentine Government insisted on
having at least six of its nationals on board each
research vessel. In the early 1980s, the Soviets tried to
use their increased purchases of Argentine grain and
meat as a lever to persuade Buenos Aires to grant
Moscow access to its coastal fisheries. In April 1982
(when the Falklands war began) the Argentines finally
signed a joint-venture agreement permitting fishing
within the 200-mile zone. The owners of deep-sea
fishing vessels in Argentina, however, have strongly
opposed this protocol, claiming that Soviet overfishing
depletes the nation's stocks and that Moscow's sales to
third countries hurt Argentina's own fish exports.
Despite its ultimate success in Argentina, Moscow has
not been able to persuade other South American
states to sign similar accords.
Moscow has not yet had a
response from Colombia to its April 1984 request for
a joint fishing enterprise. In several countries, politi-
cal strains create almost insuperable obstacles to
negotiating fishing rights. For example, the Soviets
have been prohibited from fishing in Chilean territori-
al waters since 1973.
With their sophisticated gear for sampling and analyzing the
ocean environment, finding fish, and communicating, the Soviet
fishing fleet's 3,600 vessels, particularly those outfitted for fishery
research, could provide limited support for intelligence and military
activities. Although the fishing fleet as a whole may not have an
explicit intelligence collection mission, we believe individual ships
domestic fishing interests
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Despite these difficulties, the USSR has enjoyed some
success in Latin America. The Soviet fishing presence
in Peru, for example, is substantial. According to the
US Embassy, in 1980 about 10,000 Soviet fishermen,
who worked in factory ships outside Peru's 200-mile
zone, passed through the Lima airport for transfer to
Moscow on Aeroflot; a Lima newspaper stated that
the number of fishermen transiting in 1983 had
increased to 30,000. Prior to 1983, Soviet vessels were
excluded from Peru's 200-mile fishing zone but could
enter Peruvian ports for maintenance. The fleet was
granted the right to catch 180,000 tons of fish in
Peruvian waters in a 1983 government decree requir-
ing foreign fishermen to remit 30 percent of the catch
to a Peruvian company. In a harsh criticism of this
accord, a Peruvian television commentary claimed
that Peru had received only $300 million worth of fish
out of a total catch of $2.2 billion and urged renegoti-
ation of the agreement.
The Soviets have been more successful in Cuba,
Nicaragua, and (before the US intervention) Grenada.
In addition to providing access to logistic facilities
that the Soviets need for their fleet, the fishing
agreements constitute another-though minor-link
binding these countries to the "socialist" community.
Soviet-Cuban cooperation began with a Soviet loan to
build a fishing port in Cuba; Havana partly repaid
this loan by providing services to the Soviet fishing
fleet. Under an accord signed with Managua in 1981,
Moscow agreed to build a repair facility on Nicara-
gua's west coast to service the Soviet Pacific fishing
fleet. This shipyard is much better located than the
one in Peru that was formerly used because of its
proximity to the Panama Canal and to tuna fishing
grounds. In the summer of 1983, the Soviets also sent
Nicaragua a drydock for fishing vessel repair, which
they had removed from Angola. Moscow also used its
relationship with Grenada to improve logistic support
for its fishing flee
Other Third World Areas. Although providing techni-
cal aid to many other Third World countries, the
USSR depends considerably less on them as a source
of fish. Soviet catches are negligible in waters off
Asian, Middle Eastern, and Pacific LDCs.s Nonethe-
less, Moscow has approached some of these countries,
primarily with offers of joint fishing ventures and
technical aid. The USSR has made proposals to
North and South Yemen, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, In-
dia, and Bangladesh to:
? Deliver fishing ships and factory vessels.
? Construct training centers, shipyards, hatcheries,
cold storage facilities, and fish-processing plants.
? Conduct oceanographic surveys.
In 1976 when visiting the South Pacific island states
of Tonga and Western Samoa, a Soviet delegation
offered to build up their fledgling fishing industries by
giving them a dockyard, a cannery, and a small
fishing fleet in return for fishing rights. These govern-
ments eventually rejected Moscow's proposals, al- 25X1
though they may have used them to try to obtain
critically needed aid from Australia, New Zealand,
and the United States.
In other Third World countries where they have been
more successful, the Soviets have engendered the
same criticism as in Africa.
the out emen
Government is unlikely to restrict operations by Sovi-
et trawler captains, who are required only to declare
the amount of fish caught
Costs and Benefits of Soviet Involvement in LDC
Fisheries
With the proliferation of 200-mile fishing zones in the
Third World in the mid-1970s, Soviet involvement
probably was initially a net benefit to developing
countries. Few LDCs could take full advantage of
their new, exclusive rights because they lacked the
technical and scientific expertise and the equipment
to fish outside of nearby shallow waters. For the many
LDCs with small and aging fishing fleets and port
facilities, inviting the USSR and other maritime
' As figure 6 indicates, however, Moscow relies more on fishing
areas in the northwest Pacific Ocean-particularly those off the
coast of Japan-than on any other maritime region0
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powers to provide aid, even on a quid pro quo basis,
was an attractive short-run option. They stood to gain
as much as Moscow from increased catches. The
Soviets' training of local fishermen, both on Soviet
ships and in schools in the USSR, probably helped
boost catches, thus benefiting LDCs suffering from
shortages of domestically produced food and allowing
others to occasionally sell the excess for foreign
exchange. LDCs also received fees for Moscow's use
of their fishing grounds, and local employment in the
fishing industry, including fish processing and fleet
maintenance, grew.
The Soviets never lost sight of the benefits to be
gained from giving aid to Third World fisheries.
Moscow's primary objective-regaining access to rich
fishing areas as 200-mile exclusive economic zones
were being declared throughout the Third World-
was to maintain an important source of protein for the
Soviet population. The USSR has shipped to Soviet
consumers a large share of its Third World catch. For
example, current plans for a Soviet-Argentine fishing
port call for the USSR to lend Argentina $160 million
to be repaid within five years in fish exports worth an
estimated $300 million,
Other benefits to Moscow include
sales of fish to obtain foreign exchange and access to
onshore facilities needed to service its large fishing
fleet.
In addition, the USSR has reaped political and
intelligence benefits from an expanded fishing pres-
ence in the Third World. The Kremlin has achieved
additional access to LDC officials and has increased
the number of in-country Soviet personnel by posting
fishery representatives to LDC ministries. This influ-
ence could be used to affect negotiations for continued
fishing access or the construction of permanent facili-
The USSR has failed to furnish promised levels of
financial aid to Third World fishing industries. Often,
technical aid accounts for only modest gains in local
employment because the Soviets usually process most
of the fish on self-contained factory ships anchored
offshore. In many cases Moscow refuses to deliver the
quantities of fish promised, and less frequently it has
raised the price of that portion of the catch it sells
back to LDCs. Furthermore, the Soviets show little
concern for conservation in their Third World fishing
activities.
Although offshore fishing often aggravates relation-
ships with Third World countries, the economic bene-
fits to Moscow probably far outweigh the political
costs. LDC complaints about depletion of fish re-
sources and low levels of aid generally do not affect
ties because fishing is a minor part of the relationship.
Third World nations seem unwilling to let these
frustrations lead to diplomatic disputes, much less
ruptures. Some LDCs have terminated fishing ac-
cords when they have broken diplomatic relations over
broader issues-as Egypt did in the mid-1970s when
Sadat expelled Soviet advisers and as Somalia did in
1977 when the Soviets tilted toward Ethiopia. But the
USSR probably calculates that fishing problems will
almost never be the sole cause of broken relations or
even worsening political ties.
Those Third World nations willing to accept Soviet
fishing in their waters usually are at a disadvantage
when the USSR tries to negotiate entry. LDCs lack
the economic resources that would persuade Moscow
to negotiate with them on an equal basis. Unlike
industrialized countries, especially Japan, LDCs do
not manufacture modern vessels or equipment like
electronic fish-finders. Although they have the same
right as other countries to fish in the USSR's econom-
ic zone, LDCs cannot mount such long-distance oper-
ations. Even Soviet allies may find themselves at a
required fee.
an agreement allowing North Korea to
catch 200,000 tons of fish a year near the Soviet
border is meaningless because P'yongyang lacks
enough fishing boats and nets and cannot pay the
disadvantage
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African countries have special problems because most
cannot monitor or police Soviet fishing. Namibia, for
example, has never been able to enforce its rights over
the 200-mile exclusive zone it enacted in 1981 be-
cause it cannot effectively patrol its waters. Similarly,
neither Zaire nor Sierra Leone, which has only one
small patrol boat, can enforce fishing restrictions
against foreign vessels. Latin American countries, on
the other hand, generally are better equipped and
seem quicker to defend their interests. Peru and
Ecuador, for instance, were the first countries to
declare. exclusive fishing rights within 200 miles of
their coasts. The long coastlines of several South
American countries probably help explain their deter-
mination to protect their marine resources.
naval patrols appear to be more effec-
tive in enforcing fishing regulations than in Africa.
Even though Latin American countries often monitor
the locations of Soviet fishing vessels, neither they nor
other LDCs keep track of the quantities of fish
caught.
Prospects
As its fleet depletes stocks in one African coastal
region after another, the USSR is likely to continue
urging West African nations-some of which, like
Guinea, are vulnerable to its economic pressure-to
grant additional fishing privileges. Moscow almost
certainly will take any opportunity to obtain fishing
concessions from these countries. For example, Soviet
officials promised in March 1984 that they would
donate to Mauritius a 3,000-ton ship for ferrying
cargo and passengers, but they implied that the
transfer would depend on Mauritian approval of a
bilateral fishing agreement (as well as Aeroflot land-
ing rights and the establishment of a Novosti office).
Soviet diplomats may try to convince Western-leaning
LDCs-which also want to maintain some links with
the East-to permit Soviet trawlers to fish in their
waters. Some African leaders who are disappointed
with the level of Western aid may respond favorably.
Others may do so because many West African fishing
industries desperately need aid and many Western
companies are reluctant to risk investing capital in
them. In any event, the Soviet fleet probably will
make frequent illegal forays into West African waters
because few of these states have the power to enforce
fishing restrictions or bans. Although several of these
countries would be receptive to Western offers of
patrol vessels, Moscow probably will continue to take
advantage of their inability to defend their fish stocks.
Moscow almost certainly will pursue its campaign for
fishing rights in Latin America as vigorously as it
does in Africa. The USSR will try to obtain addition-
al long-term agreements because it needs ports to
support fishing operations in the South Atlantic and
South Pacific Oceans and off Antarctica. This need
explains Moscow's recent overtures to obtain access to
two ports in Tierra del Fuego at the southern tip of
Argentina. Soviet negotiators will court some Latin
American governments by taking advantage of their
desires for lucrative Soviet contracts
Despite all of Moscow's efforts, most Latin American
nations will continue to be wary of an expanded Soviet
fishing presence in their waters. Countries like Chile
will continue to restrict the USSR's fishing because of
economic nationalism or political antipathy. Moscow
also will face opposition from Latin American fishing
interests and from naval and intelligence officials.
Nicaragua, unlike other Latin American states, will
remain receptive to Soviet overtures because of its
desperate need for assistance.
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Overall, the Soviets are unlikely to repeat the success-
es they enjoyed in the mid-1970s when they negotiat-
ed agreements and joint ventures in dozens of LDCs.
Should Moscow's access to Third World waters actu-
ally decline, it will try to buffer the negative impact
on the size of its catch by intensifying the search for
fish outside 200-mile exclusive zones, especially in the
southern oceans and off Antarctica. The Kremlin also
would redouble diplomatic efforts to boost quotas for
catches off developed countries, especially Japan. As a
result, economic planners could reasonably expect to
soften the effect of any reduced access on their efforts
to improve the Soviet diet. Similarly, the loss of
.fishing rights in several LDCs probably would not
present Soviet planners with an insuperable problem
in terms of hard currency earnings. Because sales of
fish accounted for only $169 million in convertible
currency in 1983 compared to about $15 billion
earned from petroleum exports, a loss of access to
some Third World fisheries probably would only
minimally affect the balance of payments.
In our judgment, many nonaligned LDCs, including
those in Africa, are apt to continue to consider fishing
treaties with the USSR transitional. While Moscow
will continue seeking permanent rights to help main-
tain its own fish supplies and to garner influence in
the Third World, many LDCs probably will try to cut
off Soviet aid after they have developed their own
fishing capabilities. Some already have refused to
negotiate new treaties and joint fishing companies,
have canceled existing arrangements, and have de-
manded that agreements be limited in duration. The
standoffish attitude of many Latin American states
and the tendency of African nations to try to reduce
their dependence on Moscow illustrate the Third
World's cautious view of Soviet aid to fisheries.
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Figure 6
Soviet Fish Catches by Geographic Areaa
W
16
12
10
8
8
Li Soviet inland waters
22
20
27
34
40
^ East Asia
9
15
16
19
19
^ Africa
21
21
24
21
14
101 Europe
South America
5
6
^ Antarctica
? Other marine fishing areas
a comprehensive data are unavailable for catches by foreign fishing fleets
within the 200-mile fishing zones of littoral states. Thus, this figure shows
catches in areas contiguous to the continents, both within these zones and
on the open sea.
b For 1980 and 1982, the amounts shown for Northwest Pacific also include
less than 10,000 metric tons of fish caught in the West Central Pacific.
e For all five years, includes between 26,000 and 47,000 metric tons of fish
caught in the West Indian Ocean.
d Includes 19,000 tons from the Southwest Atlantic in 1982 and 28,000 tons
from the same area in 1980. In 1975, the USSR's only catches off South
America were 9,000 tons from the Southwest Atlantic. The 421,000 metric
tons caught in 1970 came from the Southwest Atlantic rather than the
Southeast Pacific.
Soviet inland waters
Northwest Pacificb
East Central Atlantic
Southeast Atlantic c
Northeast Atlantic
Southeast Pacific d
Atlantic and Pacific
sectors
Indian sector
North American areas-
Other marine fishing
areas f
e During all five years, most of the catches off North America came from
the Northwest Atlantic. Sizable quantities were caught in the Northeast
Pacific, and much smaller amounts in the East Central Pacific and the
West Central Atlantic.
During all five years, almost all the fish caught in "other fishing areas"
came from the Mediterranean and Black Seas. In 1975, 1980, and 1982,
between 45,000 and 70,000 metric tons were caught in the Southwest Pacific.
Source: Various editions of the Food and Agriculture Organization's
Yearbook of Fishery Statistics.
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