(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000200750001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Inter-Korean Proposals
and Dialogue:
An Analytical Chronology
EA 85-10094
May 1985
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Inter-Korean Proposals
and Dialogue:
An Analytical Chronology
This paper was prepared byl
Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments
the Chief, Northeast Asia Division, OEA,
and queries are welcome and may be directed to
Secret
EA 85-10094
May 1985
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Secret
Overview
hdormation available
as of 22 April 1985
was used in this report.
Inter-Korean Proposals
and Dialogue:
An Analytical Chronology
North and South Korea will be no closer to their respective goals for a re-
unified nation as they mark the 40th anniversary of their division this year.
The gap between the two societies and political systems continues to widen,
making most outside observers view "peaceful reunification" as unrealistic.
Emotional and political. attachment to the idea; however, remains strong on
both sides of the Demilitarized Zone. The two Koreas held unsuccessful
talks during 1972-73 and 1980; last year, they embarked on their third
round of direct public discussions. It is a halting dialogue so far and
progress is elusive
Motivations in Pyongyang
Kim 11-song's determination to reunite the peninsula under his leadership
has been the prime objective of North Korean foreign and domestic policy.
The record attests to P'yongyang's considerable efforts, ranging from the
outright attack on the South in 1950 and attempts on the life of two South
Korean presidents to a fitful dialogue with the South during the 1970sF_
A number of considerations appear to be behind P'yongyang's current 25X1
interest in negotiations. North Korea has been trying over the past year to
engage the United States in direct contacts through a tripartite formula
involving South Korea. The North Koreans want to negotiate an end to the
US troop presence in South Korea-long viewed as the key deterrent to a
North Korean attack on the South. The North takes the view that on
military matters the United States exercises ultimate authority in the
South, hence the need for direct discussions with Washington:
nonmilitary issues.
? North Korea reads into Washington's position the prospect for tripartite
discussions in the future if the inter-Korean dialogue gets under way on
In our view, other considerations play a role in P'yongyang's thinking as
well, including developments that appear to be working against the North's
interests:
? Seoul's economic success and close ties to the United States give it most
of the economic and political cards, and P'yongyang may feel compelled
to renew discussions in an effort to.regain some initiative.
Secret
EA 85-10094
May 1985
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? P'yongyang may also feel it is losing ground in the region, particularly as
China improves its ties with Japan and the West. Greater flexibility in
the Sino-Soviet relationship is another new element in North Korea's
operating environment.
As Kim 11-song, 73, moves ahead with his 12-year campaign to groom his
son, Kim Chong-il, to replace him, internal developments appear to be
playing a role as well.
the elder Kim may feel obliged
to implement potentially controversial foreign policy changes before pass-
ing the baton. On the economic side, North Korea ended its 1978-84
Seven-Year Plan considerably short of its goals. This can'only aggravate
P'yongyang's concern over the growing economic gap with the South.
... And in Seoul
South Korea has been far more willing to meet North Korean initiatives
head-on since President Chun took office in 1980. Once North Korea
indicated its interest in discussions during the delivery of flood relief in
September last year, Seoul almost immediately produced three proposals of
its own. President Chun appears to have a good grasp of the emotional at-
tachment to the idea of a reunified Korea and of the political advantages
that accrue to him when he leans forward on the issue:
Seoul's positive approach toward opening up a dialogue with the North
helps strengthen Seoul's standing among allies and friends, especially in
Washington and Tokyo.
? South Korea undoubtedly has its eye on other considerations, including
international gatherings such as the 1986 Asian Games and 1988
Summer Olympics, which it wishes to stage with broad participation. To
the extent that Seoul appears forthcoming toward P'yongyang, it dimin-
ishes potential Communist obstacles to attending those events in Seoul.
Even so, Seoul fears that the risks in fostering dialogue may be greater
than the potential gains:
? It is particularly concerned that a North Korea that is seen as less
threatening will parlay talks with the South into direct contacts with the
United States.
Secret iv
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Secret
? Seoul both fears a lessening of the US security commitment and opposes
any warming of US-North Korean relations without something in return
from P'yongyang's Communist allies in Moscow and Beijing.
? Recently he has proposed a more modest beginning in which Japan and
China initiate overt and reciprocal trade links with the two Koreas.
Cross =Recognition Proposals
South Korean concern that efforts to reduce tensions not benefit North
Korea disproportionately, in our view, underlies Chun's interest in cross-
recognition-a plan calling, for Chinese and Soviet recognition of Seoul in
exchange for US and Japanese recognition of P'yongyang. Chun seems to
realize that full diplomatic recognition of the two Koreas by the major
powers is an unrealistic objective at this stage and is advocating a two-
tiered process beginning with Japan and China, bringing in the United
States and the Soviet Union later:
In focusing first on China and Japan, Chun is seeking to capitalize on
China's unofficial contacts with South Korea and at the same time to slow
Japanese moves toward North Korea:
? China's growing contacts with South Korea are especially evident in
nonpolitical areas. In 1984, trade between Seoul and Beijing-most of it
still indirect-rose to an estimated $675 million. The two sides have dealt
on an official level to handle hijacking incidents over the past two years,
and South Korean athletes and officials now regularly attend internation-
al gatherings in China.
? Opposition parties and business interests in Japan have increased unoffi-
cial contacts with North Korea over the past six months, and there are
signs of behind-the-scenes efforts that could lead to an exchange of
private trade offices between the two countries.
Outlook
Both sides held preliminary discussions in November 1984 on potential
economic and humanitarian exchanges. The defection of a Soviet diplomat-
ic trainee to the South at Panmunjom in late November prompted the
North to postpone the next set of discussions scheduled for December. In
January, P'yongyang again postponed contacts using the pretext of the
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annual US-South Korean military exercise Team Spirit. With the winding
down of Team Spirit in early April, P'yongyang indicated its willingness to
resume the dialogue:
? Official economic talks,.which could lead to some low-level trade, are set
for 17 May in Panmunjom.
? Semiofficial Red Cross talks, due to convene on 28 May in Seoul, and
thereafter to alternate between the two capitals, will focus on issues
regarding divided families.
The months since the current round of talks began have brought changes in
South Korean domestic politics that could affect the way Seoul and
P'yongyang negotiate. With the emergence of a confrontational opposition
in South Korea, domestic politics have entered a new period of tension and
uncertainty. The leadership in Seoul probably will develop a more defen-
sive mentality and heighten its suspicion about P'yongyang's intentions.
For its, part, the North will be carefully reading developments in the South
for any openings it might exploit:
? North Korea's proposal early this month for interparliamentary contacts,
which would embrace South Korean opposition politicians, is an early
indicator of this approach.
? Seoul may yet respond favorably, if only to be seen as flexible, but it will
view such talks as having no utility and chiefly increasing the likelihood
of polarizing domestic debate over its approach to the inter-Korean
dialogue.
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Secret
Chronology
1945-66: Emergence National division, abortive efforts to reunify the peninsula under UN
and Consolidation of formulas, and finally Kim I1-song's bid to reunify Korea by force during
Separate Governments '1950-53 give way to a period during which the two Korean states
consolidate themselves politically and economically. South Korea, empha-
sizing "economic construction first, reunification later," lacks as fully
articulated a reunification policy as North Korea. P'yongyang floats
proposals for a confederation of the two Koreas and pursues a strategy of
strengthening North Korea's political, economic, and military might while
attempting to build an underground Marxist-Leninist political organiza-
tion in the South.
Inter-Korean Developments
Operating Environment
15 August 1945
Korea liberated from Japanese rule; Soviet forces
occupy area north of 38th Parallel, US forces
occupy area south
1945-47
Five-power trusteeship plan and US-Soviet Joint
Commission on Korea founder in face of opposi-
tion by non-Communist elements.F__1
14 November 1947
UN Resolution to hold elections throughout Ko-
rea in May 1948; UN Temporary Commission
on Korea is set up to supervise the elections, but
Soviets deny access to North Korea
10 May 1948
Elections held in South Korea to select a Constit-
uent Assembly, which convenes on 31 May,
elects Syngman Rhee speaker, and drafts a
constitution that it promulgates in JulyF 25X1
24 July 1948
Syngman Rhee inaugurated South Korean Presi-
dent
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Inter-Korean Developments Operating Environment
15 August 1948
Republic of Korea proclaimed.F__1 25X1
9 September 1948
North Korean Communists establish the Demo-
cratic People's Republic of Korea in Pyongyang.
11 December 1948
UN General Assembly declares the Republic of
Korea the sole legitimate government on the
Korean Peninsula.)
30 May 1950
General elections held in the South for the 2nd
National Assembly.F__-]
7-19 June 1950'
North Korea floats series of peaceful proposals
regarding joint meetings and assemblies with
South Korea; in retrospect, a "peace offensive"
prior to the military offensive the subsequent
week. ~~ .
25 June 1950
North Korea launches an invasion of the South.
UN Security Council calls for immediate end to
hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean
forces.
7 July 1950
UN Security Council establishes unified UN
command under a US commander in chief; 16
UN members contribute forces to the command.
2 November 1950
China intervenes on the North Korean side]
27 July 1953
Armistice ends Korean war. Seoul fails to sign.
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Secret
Inter-Korean Developments Operating Environment
27 October 1953
US-South Korean mutual defense treaty signed
in Washington.0 25X1
April-June 1954
Geneva Conference on Korean Question ends
without progress (see appendix A for proposals).
19 April 1960
South Korean student protests spark ouster of
1954-57
P'yongyang issues series of proposals on steps
toward reunification that are packaged together
in August 1960
President Rhee
14 August 1960
Kim 11-song proposes North-South Confedera-
tion (see appendix A). Elements parallel North Ko-
rean proposals made during 1954-57.
14 August 1960
South Korean students call for united front to
pave way for "nationwide" general elections;
they urge new Prime Minister Chang Myon to
pursue a positive unification policy.
24 August 1960
Prime Minister Chang calls for UN-sponsored
elections to unify Korea. (see appendix A) F_
5 May 1961
South Korean National Student League for Uni-
fication of the People calls for march to Panmun-
jom on 20 May for North-South student confer-
ence.
16 May 1961
South Korean Maj. Gen. Park Chung Hee seizes
power in military coup.
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Inter-Korean Developments Operating Environment
23 October 1962
Kim 11-song repeats 1960 confederation proposal.
January-July 1963
North and South Korean sports delegates discuss
joint team for the 1964 Olympics without suc-
cess.
15 October 1963
Park Chung Hee elected President in South
Korea.
10 December 1963
P'yongyang proposes nonagression pact, standing
committee for cultural exchanges, conference of
North-South representatives
3 June 1964
South Korean normalization talks with Japan
spark student protests; Park declares period of
martial law
3 November 1964
Park Chung Hee states opposition to any unifica-
tion formula except UN-sponsored elections. E
22 June 1965
South Korea-Japan Basic Treaty signed
8 September 1966
P'yongyang calls for North-South conference of
political parties and social organizations to dis-
cuss unification without outside interference; de-
mands nullification of UN resolutions]
25X1
2 November 1966
President Johnson visits South KoreaF__1 25X1
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Secret
1967-69: North Korea shifts to more militant tactics, pursuing"a military buildup in
Confrontation earnest while seeking to generate political instability and guerrilla warfare
in the South. DMZ incidents rise from 50 in 1966 to 629 in 1968. The
North launches its unsuccessful raid on the Blue House and seizes the USS
Pueblo.F----] 25X1
Inter-Korean Developments Operating Environment
3 May 1967
Park reelected in South Korea. 25X1
21 January 1968
North Korean commandos attempt to attack the
presidential mansion in effort to assassinate
Park
23 January 1968
North Koreans seize USS Pueblo. F__1 25X1
1 March 1968
Seoul establishes the National Unification Board
to handle North-South relations.
4 November 1968
North Korean commandos infiltrate east coast
and terrorize a village.)
15 April 1969
North Korean fighters down US EC- 121 recon-
naissance plane. F__]
25 July 1969
President Nixon states intention to reduce US
military presence in Asia.
21-22 August 1969
Nixon-Park summit in San Francisco. F 25X1
20 September 1969.
UN General Assembly passes pro-South Korean
resolution on Korean unification.F__1
21 November 1969
President Nixon, Japanese-Prime Minister Sato
note common "vital interest" in South-Korean
security in joint communique
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Secret
Inter-Korean Developments Operating Environment
math of Cultural Revolution.
5-7 April 1970
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visits North Korea,
repairs Sino-North Korean relations in after-
12 June 1970
The New York Times reports plans to reduce US
troops in Korea; plan is officially announced
4 July; US-South Korean discussions open 11
July.
1970-73: Era of As detente unfolds, both Koreas exhibit concern that improving relations
Dialogue among the major powers might lead to some form of political arrangement
imposed from the outside. The two sides float initiatives leading to
humanitarian contacts through the Red Cross societies, while secret
political talks in both capitals culminate in the joint communique of 4 July
1972. Deep distrust and differing goals cause the dialogue to peter out
after several more sessions in the fall of 1972. Lower-level contacts,
however, continue within the Red Cross channel until 1978 and the South-
North Coordinating Committee channel until 1975.
Beyond merely seeking to head off an outside settlement, both sides see the
dialogue as a means to pursue their own ends:
? For P'yongyang, the talks allow it to showcase its reunification policy,
both to the South Korean people and the world at large. The contacts also
hold out the prospect that reduced tensions might induce the United
States to withdraw its troops from the South. Meanwhile, P'yongyang
keeps its options open by engaging in a secret military buildup and
digging infiltration tunnels.
? Seoul, by contrast, approaches the dialogue seeking to limit damage to its
position-externally by not ceding the reunification field to North Korea
and internally by preventing domestic opponents from exploiting the
issue. Park Chung Hee ultimately uses the dialogue to consolidate and
then extend his power at home under the Yushin Constitution.
Inter-Korean Developments
15 August 1970
Park Chung Hee calls for peaceful North-South
competition; asks P'yongyang to renounce use of
force as prelude to North-South contacts (see
Operating Environment
appendix A).
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Secret
Inter-Korean Developments
11 January 1971
Park's New Year's address warns South Koreans
of dangers of public discussion of reunification.
12 April 1971
P'yongyang issues eight-point proposal for
"peaceful reunification" that calls for a North-
South political consultative meeting involving,
representatives from political parties and public
organizations (see appendix A)
8 July 1971
Seoul announces willingness to have direct con-
tacts with Pyongyang and diplomatic relations
with nonhostile Communist states, including
China and the USSR
Operating Environment
24 December 1970
South Korean National Assembly legalizes trade
with nonhostile Communist countries.F___-] 25X1
countries to enter United Nations
18 January 1971
UN Secretary General U Thant calls on divided
3 February 1971
South Korean opposition leader Kim Dae Jung
visits Washington; proposes four-power agree-
ment to guarantee security of peninsulaF-1 25X1
troop reduction.
6 February 1971
South Korea and the United States agree to US
fraud.
27 April 1971
Park elected to third term; narrowly defeats Kim
Dae Jung amid allegations of widespread voting
1972.
16 July 1971
President Nixon announces plans to visit China in
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Inter-Korean Developments.
6 August 1971
Kim-11-song announces : willingness to :meet with
Park and hold North-South. meetin of political
parties ans, social organization
12 August 1971
South Korean Red Cross proposes talks to dis-
cuss separated families. North Korean Red Cross
accepts proposal in principle
20 September 1971
North and South hold first session of preparatory
Red Cross talks, which lead to 37 more contacts
through June 1972
27 October .19.71
North Korean Red Cross delegation proposes
agenda for full-dress talks, including mutual
visits, letter exchanges, and notification and re=
unification, of divided family. members. South
responds with own six-point agenda proposal on
3 December
Operating Environment
North-South dialogue.
6 December 1971
Park declares state of national emergency in
South owing to "changing international and do-
mestic situation," particularly developments in.
10 January 1972
Kim 11-song tells Japanese press that a peace
treaty between North and South should be con-
cluded to replace armistice agreement and that
armed forces on both sides should be cut if US
troops are withdrawn. Kim also calls for political
negotiations to resolve the unification question.
25X1
17 February 1972
Red Cross delegations agree to hold working-
level meetings to finalize agenda and procedures
for full-dress talks.
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Secret
Inter-Korean Developments
May 1972
North and South Korean presidential envoys ex-,
change secret visits in P'yongyang (2-5 May) and
Seoul (29 May-1 June)
5 June 1972
Red Cross working-level talks produce agreed
agenda for full-scale meeting
4 July 1972
Joint communique between the two Koreas re-
veals secret visits, agreement to pursue unifica-
tion independently and peacefully, to avoid slan-
dering each other or launching armed
provocations, to undertake various exchanges, to
install a Seoul-Pyongyang hotline, and to estab-
lish a South-North Coordination Committee
(SNCC).
19 August 1972
North Korean political parties and public organi-
zations call for conference of political parties and
people of North and South to broaden discus-
sions on reunification)
August-September 1972
Seoul-P'yongyang linked by phone on 18 August;
ceremonial full-scale Red Cross meetings held in
P'yongyang on 30 August and Seoul on 13 Sep-
tember.
October-November 1972
Full-scale Red Cross meetings continue in
P'yongyang (24 October) and Seoul (22 Novem-
ber). North and South hold SNCC contacts in
Panmunjom (12 October) and P'yongyang (2-4
November); these lead to first full-fledged meet
ing in Seoul on 30 November and agreement to
set up a permanent SNCC secretariat
Operating Environment
unveils restrictive Yushin Constitution
17 October 1972
Park declares nationwide martial law in South;
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Inter-Korean Developments Operating Environment
31 October 1972
Kim 11-song makes secret visit to China.F_~ 25X1
21 November 1972
South Korean referendum held on draft Yushin
Constitution.
13 December 1972
Park lifts martial law in South Korea
27 December 1972
Yushin Constitution promulgated in South. North
also announces new constitution, establishing post
of president as head of state and designating
P'yongyang the national capital, vice Seoul. F_
5-7 March 1973
Seoul announces the first infiltration of North
Korean agents since the 4 July communique and
unprovoked North Korean shooting of two South
Korean soldiers in the DMZ.
15-16 March 1973
Chilly atmosphere pervades 2nd SNCC meeting
in P'yongyang; South Korean proposal for step-
by-step approach toward reunification and North
Korean alternatives for a peace treaty and mutu-
al force reductions reveal widening gulf. F___]
March-May 1973
5th full-scale Red Cross session held in
P'yongyang (21-22 March), 6th session held in
Seoul (9-10 May).
6 April 1973
North Korean assembly adopts letter to US
Congress and other governments calling for end
to US obstruction of dialogue, withdrawal of US
troops, and end to military aid to South Korea.
25X1
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Secret
Inter-Korean Developments Operating Environment
18 May 1973
North welcomes proposal by South Korean oppo-
sition party to reorganize SNCC into all-nation
consultative organization. P'yongyang reiterates
call for political consultative conference.
12 June 1973
3rd SNCC meeting held in Seoul
1973-79: Competing As the dialogue stalemates, each side floats proposals intended to engage
Proposals the other's allies. Park declares an open-door policy of pursuing contacts
with Communist nations and proposes dual entry into the United Nations.
North Korea rejects Park's proposals, instead bidding for US attention by
proposing a peace treaty with Washington. A US proposal for cross-
recognition of the two Koreas by the major powers makes no headway. The
Carter administration puts troop withdrawals in the picture, Park on the
defensive, and North Korea hopeful of a breakthrough. Chinese-US
normalization is the backdrop to a new but ultimately fruitless exchange of
competing proposals from North and South. The United States and South
Korea float a proposal for tripartite talks, only to be rejected by the North
a few months before Park's assassination.
Inter-Korean Developments
Operating Environment
23 June 1973
Park Chung Hee declares special foreign policy
for peace and unification; endorses dual member-
ship in international organizations and an open-
door policy toward nonhostile Communist coun-
tries)
23 June 1973
P'yongyang charges that Park's statement over-
rules North-South joint statement of 4 July 1972.
North rejects dual UN entry; announces Kim 11-
song's five principles for reunification:
? Withdrawal of US troops, end to arms race.
? Conclusion of North Korea-US peace treaty.
? North-South cooperation and conference of
political and social organizations.
? Establishment of unified Koryo Federal
Republic.
? Entry into United Nations as single entity.
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Inter-Korean Developments
11 July 1973
Red Cross talks stagnate after North Korea
rejects proposal for reciprocal visits to grave
sites.
28 August 1973
P'yongyang withdraws from SNCC meetings, cit-
ing Park's 23 June statement and Kim Dae Jung's
kidnaping. Intermittent working-level contacts in
SNCC channel continue until 1975-and in Red
Cross channel until 1978-but no substantive
progress results.
16 November 1973
P'yongyang demands suspension of special for-
eign policy and release of imprisoned Communist
sympathizers as precondition for resumption of
SNCC talks.F___1
18 January 1974
Park proposes North-South nonagression pact;
rejected by North on 26 January.
29 May 1974
Red Cross representatives agree to resume
working-level sessions on 10 July.
Operating Environment
naped in Tokyo.
8 August 1973
South Korean dissident Kim Dae Jung is kid-
disrupting the economy (14 January).
January 1974
Park declares emergency measures Nos. 1 and 2,
prohibiting opposition to constitution (8 January),
and emergency measure No. 3 against actions
23 March 1974
P'yongyang proposes peace treaty between the
at controlling student unrest.
4 April 1974
Park proclaims emergency measure.No. 4 aimed
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r
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Secret
Inter-Korean Developments
21 June 1974
International Red Cross on behalf of South
Korea proposes that senior Red Cross delegates
resume meetings in Geneva. North rejects out-
side interference
22 June 1974
Park states four-point proposal for reunification:
? Normalization of SNCC and Red Cross talks.
? Conclusion of North-South nonagression pact.
? Mutual admission to the United Nations.
? Seoul to pursue open-door policy without
regard to ideology
10 July 1974
First working-level Red Cross meeting at Pan-
munjom. North calls for reaffirmation of five
principles in North-South joint statement, and
rejects outside interference.
15 August 1974
Park narrowly escapes assassination attempt by
North Korean agent at Liberation Day ceremo-
ny; Mrs. Park is killed.
15 August 1974
Park's Liberation Day speech includes three-
point proposal for reunification:
? Conclusion of North-South nonagression pact.
? Dialogue and exchanges to build mutual trust.
? Korea-wide democratic elections to achieve
reunification.
15 November 1974
Seoul announces discovery of North Korean
infiltration tunnel)
29 May 1975
P'yongyang says it will not participate in 11th
SNCC vice cochairmen's meeting scheduled for
30 May.
Operating Environment
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Inter-Korean Developments Operating Environment
June-November 1975
North takes harsher tone in Red Cross working-
level meetings. On 14 November North Korean
Red Cross publishes statement accusing South of
actions aimed at "completely wreaking" the
talks. Rallies in South Korea call for mutual
visits to ancestral graves (14-24 November).
3 July 1975
North demands, on anniversary of 4 July joint
statement, that Seoul reject US interference,
demand US troop withdrawal, and eliminate
political control measures. P'yongyang also
states that sincere dialogue will be possible only
when a "patriotic democratic figure" takes office
in South, but in subsequent statement on 14 July
North claims that door is not closed to negotia-
tions with Seoul authorities.
27 December 1975
Park revokes emergency measure No. 3 on eco-
nomic stability.
31 March 1976
Seoul proposes meeting of chief delegates to
discuss deadlocked Red Cross talks. P'yongyang
rejects proposal on 7 April
22-23 July 1976
US Secretary of State Kissinger proposes four-
way talks to discuss Korean question. Seoul
urges P'yongyang and Beijing to accept.
18 August 1976
North Korean soldiers attack UN Command tree-
cutting squad at Panmunjom, killing two US
officers.
30 August 1976
P'yongyang severs North-South hotline.
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Secret
Inter-Korean Developments Operating Environment
30 September 1976
Secretary Kissinger in UN speech proposes
North-South meeting in preparation for four-
way talks.
12 January 1977
Park offers food aid to North, states nonopposi-
tion to US troop withdrawal if nonagression pact
is concluded
1 February 1977
North rejects proposal by South's SNCC co-
chairman to discuss nonagression agreement.
11 February 1977
P'yongyang rejects Seoul's offer to hold eighth
full-dress Red Cross meeting in Panmunjom if
P'yongyang cannot agree to meeting in Seoul.
19 March 1978
P'yongyang postpones working-level Red Cross
talks indefinitely.F---]
23 June 1978
Park proposes civilian consultative body on
North-South economic cooperation.F - - - ]
23 October 1978
Japan-China Peace Treaty signed
1 January 1979
US-Chinese relations normalizedF-l 25X1
19 January 1979
Park calls for resumption of North-South talks
without preconditions.
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Inter-Korean Developments
23 January 1979
North Korea proposes four-point program for
opening a National Congress.
February-March 1979
P'yongyang's fielding of Democratic Front for
the Unification of the Fatherland representatives
to hold discussions with Seoul's SNCC delegates
shows North Korea's lack of interest in negotia-
tions; discussions fail.
21 December 1979
South Korean Interim President Choi Kyu Ha
calls for resumption of North-South dialogue.[
11 January 1980
South Korean Amateur Sports Association pro-
poses sports exchanges with North and joint
teams for international competitions
Operating Environment
resume Red Cross talks.
1-10 July 1979
During summit meeting in South Korea, the
United States persuades a reluctant South Korea
jointly to propose tripartite discussions with
North Korea; Park also calls on the North to
tor Kim Jae Kyu.
26 October 1979
Park Chung Hee is assassinated by KCIA Direc-
12 December 1979 . ,
South Korean Maj. Gen. Chun Doo Hwan leads
successful coup against Army command.F--]
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Secret
1980: A Short-Lived North Korea sees Park's departure as a new opportunity and tests the
Thaw waters.by proposing prime-ministerial talks as well as a conference on
reunification. This marks the first time either Korea uses the official name
for the other side. As Chun Doo Hwan emerges as the South's new
strongman, P'yongyang clearly loses interest in dialogue and working-level
meetings grind to a halt in September
Inter-Korean Developments
Operating Environment
12 January 1980
North Korean Premier Yi Chong-ok proposes
meeting with South Korean Prime Minister Shin
Hyon Hwack; first use of official title for Repub-
lic of Korea; North Korean Vice President Kim Il
sends letters to South Korean leaders proposing
conference on reunification.
24 January 1980
South Korean Prime Minister Shin proposes
working-level meetings to arrange prime minis-
ters' conference; first working-level session held
at Panmunjom on 6 February_~
12 September 1980
South Korean Red Cross chairman urges North
Korean counterpart to resume plenary meetings.
24 September 1980
North Korea unilaterally suspends working-level
contacts for prime ministers' meeting.
quells riots in Kwangju.
17-27 May 1980
Nationwide martial law is declared in South
Korea following demonstrations against military
government; Kim Dae Jung is arrested; the Army
27 August 1980
Chun Doo Hwan retires from South Korean
Army, is elected President by National Assembly.
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1980-83: The Battle Kim I1-song launches a new campaign for a confederal republic at the
for the Initiative on Sixth Korean Workers' Party conference in October 1980, and an assertive
Reunification Chun moves quickly to eclipse the North Korean initiative by proposing a
summit meeting the following January. Chun elaborates on this proposal
and a year later offers 20 confidence-building measures. For both sides,
these proposals remain the keystone of their unification policies.
From P'yongyang's perspective a number of developments erode its
position during this period: the return of South Korean political stability
and economic performance; stronger US-South Korean relations; and
Seoul's diplomatic successes-extending even to growing informal contacts
with China and the Eastern Bloc. Chun's visit to Burma in October 1983
presents the North with an opportunity to remove the South Korean
leadership, but the assassination attempt in Rangoon fails and North
Korean culpability becomes evident
Inter-Korean Developments
10 October 1980
Kim 11-song presents proposal at Sixth Party
Congress to form a Democratic Confederal Re-
public of Koryo (see appendix B) but refuses to
discuss idea with Chun government.
12 January 1981
Chun's New Year's policy statement proposes
North-South summit without preconditions,
P'yongyang rejects proposal.
6 February 1981
P'yongyang rejects UN Secretary General Wald-
heim's support for Seoul's proposed North-South
summit proposal.
5 June 1981
Chun repeats summit offer; suggests sports, aca-
demic, and cultural exchanges as "trustbuilding
measures."
Operating Environment
Washington.
2 February 1981
Presidents Reagan and Chun hold summit in
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Secret
Inter-Korean Developments Operating Environment
19 June 1981
South Korean Olympic committee proposes
forming joint team for 1984 games.
6 August 1981
North Korean political parties and social organi-
zations propose conference with counterparts to
accelerate unification. South Korean Govern-
ment leaders are not invited.
30 September 1981
International Olympic Committee selects Seoul to
host 1988 Summer Olympics. 25X1
25 November 1981
Asian Games Federation selects Seoul as site for
1986 games; Pyongyang withdraws candidacy
shortly before voting.
22 January 1982
Chun's New Year's policy statement unveils for-
mula for North-South reconciliation (see appen-
dix B); invites P'yongyang to participate in con-
sultative conference for national reunification to
draft a unification constitution.
1 February 1982
Seoul proposes 20 pilot projects to build trust
between South and North. Pyongyang rejects
idea on 10 February
12 August 1982
South Korean Red Cross urges North to resume
Red Cross meetings on problem of separated
familiesF___1
15 August 1982
Chun announces that Koreans living in any
Communist country can freely travel to and from
South Korea.
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Inter-Korean Developments
Operating Environment
13 October 1982
Soviet press, cultural officials visit South Korea
for first time to attend international conference.
1 January 1983
Kim 11-song tells Japanese reporter it is incon-
ceivable that China or the Soviet Union could
recognize the "illegitimate" .authorities in Seoul.
and defects to Taiwan.
19 October 1982
Chinese pilot flies his MIG-19 into South Korea
18 January 1983
P'yongyang proposes "working-level" meeting
between North's political parties and social orga-
nizations and counterparts in the South, includ-
ing the ruling Democratic Justice Party
1 February 1983
Seoul proposes North-South conference of repre-
sentatives of government, political parties, and
social organizations to discuss summit meeting
and "other issues."
Nakasone.
11 January 1983
Chun and Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone
hold summit in Seoul; announce agreement on
Japanese economic assistance package to South
Korea; Chun raises cross-recognition issue with
reducing measure.
6 February 1983
South Korean Foreign Minister Lee and Secre-
tary of State Shultz discuss cross-recognition.
Secretary Shultz on 8 February moots four-
power cross-recognition as possible tension-
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Secret
Inter-Korean Developments Operating Environment
26 February 1983
Asian press carries reports that the United States
is to relax diplomatic guidance on contacts with
North Koreans.
11 March 1983
South Korean Unification Minister states South
and North must compete in development race
"to win the right" to decide unification issue. F
26 April 1983
Seoul announces preparation of draft constitu-
tion for a unified Korea.
27 April 1983
Seoul says P'yongyang's teams welcome to play
at 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics.
nese reporter
5 April 1983
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen
rejects cross-recognition idea in remarks to Japa=
sone.
9 April 1983
Kim 11-song asks Egyptian President Mubarak to
convey P'yongyang's desire for direct dialogue
with the United States to Prime Minister Naka-
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12 April 1983
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa publicly
rejects cross-recognition idea.F____-] , - 25X1
ing in Seoul in October
1 May 1983
Interparliamentary Union confirms annual meet-
jacking of Chinese airliner.
9 May 1983
South Korean and Chinese officials conclude
unprecedented direct negotiations to resolve hi-
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Inter-Korean Developments Operating Environment
July 1983
South Korea broadcasts monthlong program to
reunite South Korean families separated since
6 July 1983
South Korean Red Cross proposes resumption of
North-South talks on divided families
24 July 1983
P'yongyang agrees to reconvene Red Cross meet-
ings if South Korean Red Cross demands US
troop withdrawal and Chun's resignation. F__1
7 August 1983
Chinese pilot flies his MIG-21 into South Korea
and defects to Taiwan
1 September 1983
Soviets shoot down Korean Airlines jet over
Sakhalin Island.)
28 September 1983
Deng Xiaoping meets with Secretary Weinber-
ger in Beijing; discussions touch on Korea
9 October 1983
Chun narrowly escapes North Korean assassina-
tion attempt in Rangoon; 17 South Korean offi-
cials killed.
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Secret
1984-Present: A North Korean bid for tripartite talks with Washington and Seoul
Tripartite emerges through the Chinese virtually at the same time as the Rangoon in-
Talks and a cident. Over the next year, North Korea presents an image of flexibility on
Fitful Dialogue the question as it presses for a favorable response and seeks to repair
damage to its international image. The goal, to engage the United States
directly and remove US troops from the South, remains constant.
North-South dialogue resumes when P'yongyang proposes discussions to
field a joint team to the Los Angeles Olympics. The short leadtime and
South Korean distrust of North Korean motivations work against progress
during the three meetings held. North Korea announces it will join the
Soviet-led boycott of the 1984 Summer Olympics as Kim 11-song is on a
trip to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, presaging greater attention
by P'yongyang to its relations with Moscow. A few months later, a North
Korean offer of flood relief and Seoul's acceptance of that offer set the
stage for a new round of economic and Red Cross contacts. P'yongyang
carefully paces the two sets of talks with an eye on the larger goal of tripar-
tite talks. Seoul's attention, meanwhile, is increasingly distracted by
domestic political problems and tensions in its relations with Washington
that could make it less willing to take political risks in its dealings with the
North.
Inter-Korean Developments
Operating Environment
ditions
11 October 1983
China forwards to the United States a North
Korean proposal for talks with Washington on
Korea; proposal is billed as being without precon-
6 November 1983
China reports both Burma's announcement
blaming the North Koreans for the Rangoon
bombing and P'yongyang's official denial of the
charges. Moscow reports only the North's denial.
Korean officials.
7 November 1983
Washington retracts more relaxed guidance is-
sued 30 September on US contacts with North
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Secret . .
Inter-Korean 'Developments,
6 December' 1983
Chinese pass to US off'icials' a North Korean
proposal 'for tripartite talks.~
10 January 1984
P'yongyang publicizes its 'talks' proposal after it
is leaked in the South Korean press
11 January 1984
Seoul and Washington indicate two Korean sides
must resolve'inter'-Korean questions directly.
Seoul does not reject tripartite publicly but pre-
fers broader multiparty format that would in-
clude China
24 January 1984 '
North Korean Premier Yi Chong-ok sends letter'
to "Seoul'authorities" urging participation in
three-way talks
14 February 1984
South Korean Prime Minister Chin lee-Chong
calls on P'yongyang to apologize for Rangoon
bombing and urges summit, meeting.
7 March 1984'
P'yongyang passes letter at Panmunjom; claims
it is not wedded to particular talks format, but
language casts Seoul as a junior partner. F
10 March 1984_ ?,.?
South Korean' Prime.Minister Chin restates
Seoul's support for North-South talks or an
expanded multiparty formula
Operating Environment
our participation."
9 February 1984
Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang at press confer-
ence says, "China has not thought about partici-
pation in talks and the DPRK has not suggested
25X1
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Secret
Inter-Korean Developments
19 March 1984
South Korean news agency Yonhap cites a For-
eign Ministry source that Seoul will not take part
in three-way talks even if North Korea apolo-
gizes for Rangoon and promises to treat the,
South as an equal
30 March 1984
P'yongyang proposes joint team for Los Angeles
Olympics in letter passed at Panmunjom. Seoul
agrees, but raises Rangoon incident
9 April 1984
North and South Korean Olympic committee
representatives meet for two hours, break up after
South raises Rangoon, 1978 kidnaping cases.
10-28 April 1984
Both sides accuse other of scuttling sports talks.
P'yongyang demands that Seoul not raise politi-
cal issues. Sides finally agree to resume discus-
sions on 30 April.
Operating Environment .
China;. Chinese previously had permitted a small
number of Chinese to visit relatives in Korea. Hu
Yaobang urges development of Japanese-North
Korean ties, with China as possible go-between;
Nakasone offers only "humanitarian contacts."
23-26 March 1984
Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone visits China.
Premier Zhao Ziyang tells Nakasone that South
Koreans will be allowed to visit relatives in
he will visit North Korea in early May.
27 March 1984
Hu Yaobang tells North. Korean press delegation
visit the Soviet Union in late May.
29 April 1984
P'yongyang, Moscow announce Kim II-song will
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Inter-Korean Developments
30 April 1984
North and South Korean representatives trade
charges at second round of sports talks.
25 May 1984
North and South Korean sides again trade accu-
sations at third meeting to discuss joint sports
team.F__1
2 June 1984
On final day for applications to Los Angeles
Olympics, P'yongyang announces it will not par-
ticipate; cites concern over safety of athletes and
stalled North-South sports talks; does not refer
directly to Soviet boycott. F_~
Operating Environment
4 May 1984
Hu Yaobang arrives in P'yongyang.
8 May 1984
Moscow announces it will boycott Los Angeles
Olympics.
and seriousness about tripartite talks
22 June 1984
Japanese press reports Kim 11-song's message to
Nakasone via Sihanouk on 31 May. Kim states
intention to reduce tensions, not invade South,
attack.
25 June 1984
Zang Xianshan, Vice President of China-Japan
Friendship Association, tells Japanese Socialist
Party delegation that China would be in no
position to support North if it launches attack on
South, but would intervene if South launched the
absence.
1 July 1984
Kim 11-song returns from six-week trip to Soviet
Union, Eastern Europe; heir-apparent Kim
Chong-il achieves new visibility during father's
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Secret
Inter-Korean Developments Operating Environment
5-10 August 1984
North Korean Premier Kang Song-san visits
China on his first venture abroad as Premier;
focus is on economic relations and media treat-
ment suggests some differences existr_~
6 August 1984
Seoul circulates aide-memoire that all but rejects
any talks' format other than two way.
13 August 1984
President Chun releases to Taiwan the hijackers
of a Chinese civil aircraft that landed in South
Korea in May 1983.
17 August 1984
Seoul proposes sports talks be resumed.
20 August 1984
Chun, in annual press conference, proposes inter-
Korean trade talks get under way.F__1
24 August 1984
South Korean Unification Minister presses
Chun's proposal for trade; says a North Korean
apology for Rangoon not a prerequisite for inter-
Korean talks; emphasizes South Korean desire
for two-way discussions.
25 August 1984
North Korea rejects Chun's call for trade talks.
27 August 1984
P'yongyang rejects Seoul's proposal to renew
sports talks; insists on South Korean apology for
failure of discussions during the spring.F-1
6-8 September 1984
Chun visits Japan; says Tokyo would be an
acceptable venue for his 1981 proposal to meet
Kim 11-song.
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Inter-Korean Developments
8 September 1984
In wake of torrential rain in South Korea, North
Korean Red Cross offers relief to flood victims in
the SouthJ
14 September 1984
South Korea accepts North's offer of flood relief;
details are ironed out during contacts on 18-20
September.
25 September 1984
South Korean media, days before the flood relief
transfer, leak news of North Korean Army rede-
ployments closer to DMZ
29 September-4 October 1984
Transfer of flood relief goods from North to
South takes place without incident; both sides
agree to reactivate hotline (active 1972-76; 1980).
Operating Environment
year.
12 September 1984
South Korean dissident Kim Dae Jung announces
he will return to South Korea by the end of the
South Korea.
18-22 September 1984
Japanese Socialist Party leader Ishibashi visits
P'yongyang; Kim 11-song transmits messages of
flexibility on tripartite talks, suggests flood relief
contacts could lead to other exchanges with
since 1977
19 September-9 October 1984
North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam
travels to the United Nations; first such trip .
status.
24 September 1984 .
P'yongyang reports meeting between Kim
Chong-il and Soviet Ambassador; first sign that
Moscow acknowledges the younger Kim's special
25X1
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Secret
Inter-Korean Developments
4 October 1984
South Korean Red Cross proposes both sides
resume humanitarian contacts suspended since
1973; Seoul also proposes sports talks be re-
sumed.
6 October 1984
Hotline between the two Koreas resumes opera-
tion.
9 October 1984
South Korea unveils monument to victims on
first anniversary of Rangoon bombing; Chun's
statement calls for North Korean apology.
12 October 1984
South Korean Deputy Prime Minister sends letter
to North Korean counterpart proposing trade,
joint ventures.
16 October 1984
P'yongyang agrees to Seoul's trade proposal; sets
15 November as date for first session of economic
talks. FI
30 October 1984
North Korean Red Cross accepts proposal to
resume humanitarian contacts; proposes 20
November as meeting date to iron out arrange-
ments for full plenary session in P'yongyang.F-
Operating Environment
P'yongyang.
15 October 1984
North Korea and Japan sign fisheries pact in
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Inter-Korean Developments Operating Environment
12-27 November 1984
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa visits
North Korea to conclude border treaty; Soviet,
North Korean media acknowledge his meetings
with Kim 11-song on 20th and with Kim Chong-il
on 23r
15 November 1984
First session of economic talks allows both sides
to showcase their approaches: P'yongyang wants
joint ventures and trade to proceed simultaneous-
ly; Seoul prefers trade contacts broadening into
cooperative efforts.
20 November 1984
Preliminary Red Cross contact occurs at Pan-
munjom; both sides working toward next plenary
in Seoul.
23 November 1984
Soviet diplomatic trainee visiting North Korea
succeeds in defecting to South Korea but sparks a
DMZ firefight. North Korea, South Korea trade
recriminations in ensuing days.
27-29 November 1984
P'yongyang radio announces postponement of
economic talks, set for 5 December, inevitable
because of tense atmosphere, but holds out some
hope that discussions could resume in January.
30 November 1984
P'yongyang, Beijing announce Kim II-song made
an unofficial visit to China during 26-28 Novem-
ber; issue of resuming the inter-Korean dialogue
high on the agenda; some differences emerge in
media treatment.
25X1
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Secret
Inter-Korean Developments
Operating Environment
by suggesting Beijing as a venue.
11 December 1984
China relays a letter from North Korean Foreign
Minister Kim to Secretary Shultz; letter at-
tempts to inject new life into tripartite proposal
14 December 1984
P'yongyang radio broadcasts North Korean pro-
posals that economic discussions resume on 17
January and Red Cross plenary meeting be held in
Seoul on 22-25 January.
1 January 1985
Kim II-song's New Year's statement emphasizes
progress in North-South talks; pledges patience
in awaiting favorable response to tripartite pro-
posal.
nese to observe.
4 January 1985
Seoul, through UN Command, notifies North
Korean side of dates for annual US-South Kore-
an Team Spirit military exercise; reiterates long-
standing invitation for North Koreans and Chi-
guese Communist leaders.
7 January 1985
P'yongyang media campaign condemning Team
Spirit reaches authoritative level when Kim 11-
song characterizes the exercises as an affront to
peace in a banquet he hosts for visiting Portu-
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Inter-Korean Developments Operating Environment
7 January 1985
Coordinated US-South Korean response to I 1
December proposal passed to Chinese in Wash-
ington; Chinese Ambassador eventually accepts
the response, which takes form of letter from
South Korean Foreign Minister to Chinese coun-
terpart. In essence, the response emphasizes in-
ter-Korean contacts progressing further before
multiparty talks ensue.
9 January 1985
P'yongyang uses Team Spirit to postpone Red
Cross plenary; hints it will suspend next economic
contact set for 17 January unless both sides hold
vice ministerial meeting to overcome the Team
Spirit "obstacle."
9 January 1985
Chun's New Year's address calls for progress
toward high-level political discussions between
two sides; establishment of liaison offices in
respective capitals
16 January 1985
North Korean Vice Premier postpones economic
meeting set for the next day; blames United
States, South Korea
3 February 1985
Diversion of US-manufactured helicopters to
North Korea is revealed, creating new tensions in
US-South Korean relations.
8 February 1985
Dissident Kim Dae Jung returns to South Korea.
Airport fracas involving Americans leads to re-
sentment against US interference.?
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Secret
Inter-Korean Developments
25 March 1985
Seoul urges resumption of economic talks on 18
April, convocation of Red Cross session in Seoul
on 15 April.
Operating Environment
treme unpopularity.
12 February 1985
South Korean parliamentary elections give oppo-
sition leadership to New Korea Democratic Party
(NKDP) backed by Kim Dae Jung and Kim
Young Sam; campaign underscores Chun's ex-
early resignation.
6 March 1985
Seoul lifts remaining political bans, including
that on Kim Dae Jung, and releases Kim from
house arrest. NKDP president calls for Chun's
ship, solidarity.
12 March 1985
Kim 11-song's message to new Soviet leader
Gorbachev praises North Korean-Soviet friend-
fect.
22-28 March 1985
South Korea negotiates with Chinese over return
of Chinese naval vessel taken over by two muti-
neers in South Korean territorial waters. Seoul
returns vessel and crew in exchange for official,
properly addressed apology; South Koreans fi-
nesse whether mutineers were attempting to de-
since KAL shootdown.
27 March 1985
Soviet skaters tour South Korea. First Soviet visit
25X1
25X1
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Inter-Korean Developments
4 April 1985
North Korea proposes to hold Red Cross talks in
Seoul on 28 May and resume economic talks on
17 May. Seoul accepts.
9 April 1985
North Korea proposes interparliamentary talks
with South Korea to work out a nonaggression
pact outside tripartite forum; sends letters to
speaker of the National Assembly and all party
presidents.
19 April 1985
Seoul calls for resumption of North-South sports
talks.
Operating Environment
efforts to strengthen ties with Moscow.
16-23 April 1985
North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam
visits Soviet Union. P'yongyang takes lead in
publicizing joint communique; break with long-
standing practice of not issuing joint communi-
ques provides further evidence of North Korea's
dent.
18 April 1985
North Korean press delegation visits Japan at
invitation of JSP; first visit since Rangoon inci-
to attend international conference
22 April 1985
South Korean diplomats visit China for first time
Washington.
25-27 April 1985
Chun Doo Hwan makes official working visit to
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Secret
Appendix A
Historical Proposals
- April 1954 Post-Armistice Geneva Conference (ended without progress).
North Korea
? Establish All Korea Commission (AKC); equal representation for P'yong-
yang and Seoul.
? Elections for All Korea National Assembly supervised by AKC.
? All foreign troops to withdraw within six months.
South Korea
? Establish elected national legislature; representation proportional to
population.
? Supervision of elections in North by United Nations; in South under
existing South Korean Constitution.
? Chinese forces to withdraw before elections.
? UN forces to remain until political stability is restored.
? UN guarantee for integrity and independence of unified Korea.
August 1960 North Korea (14 August-eve of 15th anniversary of liberation)
? Loose confederation based on all-Korea elections; alternately, with full
autonomy for both sides.
? Establishment of Supreme National Committee to coordinate cultural
and economic development; alternately, lower-level Joint Economic
Committee.
? Withdrawal of US forces; mutual force reduction to 100,000 men each.
South Korea (24 August)
? Unification through free and democratic elections under UN supervision.
? Creation of unified committee after elections.
? Economic and cultural exchanges after elections.
? Unified Korea must preserve democracy and civil rights.
North Korea (12 April 1971)
? Conference of all political parties, North and South, to discuss
confederation.
? Confederation as transitional step, leaving separate social systems intact
prior to complete reunification.
? Offer to begin North-South talks at any time at Panmunjom or in third
country.
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? Resignation /ouster of Seoul government headed by Park Chung Hee as
precondition to negotiations (dropped after President Nixon visited
China).
? Withdrawal of US troops.
South Korea (15 August 1970-25th anniversary of liberation)
? Gradual removal of North-South barriers.
? Peaceful competition in various fields.
? Nonopposition to North's presence at UN debate on Korea issue if
P'yongyang accepts UN authority.
? Dialogue conditional on end to North Korean provocations and P'yong-
yang's renunciation of efforts to overthrow Seoul government.
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Appendix B
Current Proposals
North Korea Formation of a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK),
announced by Kim 11-song at the Sixth Party Congress of the North
Korean Workers' Party, October 1980.
Initial Steps
? Democratization of South Korean politics.
? Repeal of South Korea's anti-Communist laws.
? Conclusion of a US-North Korea peace treaty and withdrawal of US
troops from the South.
? A North-South conference of representatives of political parties and
social organizations to discuss formation of the DCRK.
Organization of the DCRK
? Creation of a Supreme National Federal Assembly with equal represen-
tation for North and South.
? Creation of a Standing Committee under the assembly to serve as a
united government of the confederal state.
? Recognition and acceptance of the ideologies and systems of North and
South.
? Separate regional governments in. North and South with local autonomy
within the limits of the interest and demands of the entire nation.
Administrative Guidelines for the DCRK
? Adherence to independent national policies.
? Pursuit of democracy and great national unity.
? Economic cooperation toward an independent national economy.
? Cultural and educational cooperation.
? Traffic and communications between North and South.
? Pursuit of economic well-being for the entire people.
? Creation of a combined national army.
? Coordination of foreign activities.
? Peaceful, nonaligned foreign policy; friendly relations with all countries.
South Korea Peaceful Reunification Through National Reconciliation and a Democrat-
ic Process (Chun Doo Hwan's New Year's policy statement, January 1982).
Initial Steps
? A North-South summit meeting to discuss reunification issues without
preconditions.
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Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations
? North-South relations to be based on equality and reciprocity, pending
unification.
? North and South to renounce violence and resolve problems through
dialogue and negotiation.
? North and South not to interfere in each other's political order and social
institutions.
? North and South to maintain existing armistice arrangements pending
measures to end military confrontation.
? North and South to open their societies to each other progressively-
including free travel and cooperation in technical, cultural, and economic
fields.
? North and South to respect each other's treaties until unification is
achieved.
? North and South to appoint plenipotentiary envoys to deal with liaison
issues.
Unification Formula
? Formation of a Consultative Conference for National Reunification
(CCNR) to draft a unified constitution.
? Democratic referendum throughout North and South to ratify the
constitution.
? Democratic general elections under the constitution to form a unified
government.
? Establishment of a unified democratic republic pursuing the ideals of
nationalism, democracy, liberty, and well-being.
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Secret
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