(UNTITLED)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP04T00367R000201060001-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
January 12, 2017
Document Release Date:
April 1, 2010
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 4, 1984
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 136.19 KB |
Body:
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000201060001-4 25X1
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
4 January 1984
South Korea: Weighing Early Elections
support his government.
We believe President, Chun Doo Hwan is seriously considering
advancing by as much as a year the parliamentary elections now
scheduled for March 1985. Chun may calculate that such a move
would strengthen his grip on the political process and improve
his ability to orchestrate succession arrangements in 1988--when
he has promised to step down as president. In our view, Chun
runs the risk of feeding persistent and widespread suspicions he
plans to stay in office beyond 1988, provoking new protests by
dissidents and students, and alienating those South Koreans who
Recent events in South Korea
indicate that President Chun may be preparing to advance
the dam of the 12th National Assembly elections from March 1985
to sometime in 1984.
r
The controlled press has run low-key stories on the legal
provisions for early elections and possible reasons for
accelerating the timetable.
A "secret" purge list of ruling party assemblymen is
circulating, which many South Korean political observers
view as kicking off party preparations for early
elections.
directed to Chief, Northeast Asia Division
This memorandum was prepared byl lof the Northeast Asia Division,
Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
EA M 84-10001
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000201060001-4
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000201060001-4 25X1
In public statements, the Chun government continues to play
down the possibility of early elections. Prime Minister Chin Ie
Chong, for instance, stated to the press on 15 December that
there was no reason for early elections "under present
circumstances."
Chun's Motive and Options
In our view, the chief reason President Chun may move
elections ahead would be to avoid being a "lame duck" during the
last year of his presidency. If elections are not advanced, the
next National Assembly term will run from March 1985 until March
1989, a year after Chun's term ends in February 1988.
Chun could use his discretionary authority under the
national election law to advance elections up to six
months, in this case, to October 1984. Chun could do
this again in 1988, moving elections ahead from October
to March.
Alternately, Chun could invoke Article 57 of the
Constitution to dissolve the National Assembly at anytime
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000201060001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000201060001-4 25X1
within the last three years of its term and hold new
elections within 30 to 60 days. Under this provision,
Chun could advance the 1985 National Assembly election to
early this year and the following election would .
automatically occur four years later in early.1988. The
Constitution, however, requires Chun to give specific
national security grounds for this action.
Costs
Both strategies carry some political risk for Chun, but the
second is considerably greater. Invoking Article 57 without
clear national security grounds,,we believe, would be taken by
many South Koreans as a sign of Chun's low regard for the
Constitution, invite comparisons to the Park regime, and feed
suspicions that Chun intends to remain in office past 1988--
which he cannot do under the present Constitution. Students and
dissidents are certain to assume the worst and protest, and if
Chun calls for new elections within the next few months, liberal
Protestant and Catholic leaders might even ask the Vatican to
cancel the Pope's visit in May. Perhaps more significant, a
poorly managed election scenario runs the risk of alienating
South Koreans who do support the present administration.
Early elections would also require Chun to speed up efforts
to revitalize his own Democratic Justice Party. The recent purge
list amounts to almost half of the DJP's 151 assemblymen. These
individuals will be dropped "to make room for better people,"
according to the DJP Secretary General's candid explanation to US
officials. Chun reportedly is displeased with the party's
inability to cultivate genuine popularity and has been reviewing
ways to strengthen the local party apparatus before the next
We believe Chun is aware of the risks. The recent Christmas
amnesty may in part be intended to allay concerns about Chun's
commitment to constitutional government and soften criticism if
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000201060001-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000201060001-4
SUBJECT: South Korea: Weighing Early Elections
Distribution:
1 - Dave Lambertson, State/EA/Korea
1 - John Nay, State/INR/EAP
1 - Richard Childress, NSC
1 - Commodore Steward Ring, ISA
1 -
1 - Wallace Knowles,
1 - NI0/EA (7E62)
1 - OEA/NA/Korea Branch
1 - OEA/NA/Japan Branch
1 - OEA/NA Division
1 - OEA/China Division
1 - OEA/Southeast Asia
1 - D/OEA
1 - C/Production/OEA
1 - DDI Registry (7E47)
1 -
1 - CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07
1 - C/PES (Boatner) (7F24)
1 - OCR/ISG (1H19)
1 -
1 -
1 -
DDI/OEA/NA/K
(4 January 84)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/11: CIA-RDP04T00367R000201060001-4