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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000600260001-6
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• Publication Date: July 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
New Soviet Crop Strategy:
Problems and Prospects
Secret
GI 86-10049
July 1986
Copy 273
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Problems and Prospects
New Soviet Crop Strategy:
Resources Division, OGI,
This paper was prepared by I (Office
of Global Issues. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Strategic
Secret
GI 86-10049
July 1986
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Summary
Information available
as of 15 May 1986
was used in this report.
Secret
GI 86-10049
July 1986
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New Soviet Crop Strategy:
Problems and Prospects F__] 25X1
shrink by the mid-1990s.
The Soviet Union is pursuing a new strategy that could have a major
impact on Soviet agriculture in the next decade. By expanding the
cultivation of high-yielding livestock feed crops, the Soviets hope to
increase both the quality and quantity of domestically produced feed. This
would improve meat production and, at the same time, control the need for
grain imports. If Moscow succeeds in overcoming a number of significant,
but not insurmountable, obstacles along the way, the United States could
see its prospects for continued large grain exports to the Soviet Union
source of protein for livestock, should quadruple.
The new strategy-recently endorsed by Gorbachev-is, in our judgment,
an attempt to exploit the Soviet Union's agricultural resources by shifting
land out of low-yielding wheat into corn and sorghum grains, and
soybeans-three high-value concentrated feed crops. According to Soviet
plans, by 1990 the combined output of corn and sorghum grains should
more than double from the 1976-80 average-a much larger gain than
planned for overall grain output-and the output of soybeans, an important
in grain production will still be 5 million tons by 1990.
We believe that actual Soviet performance will show significant gains but
fall short of the 1990 plan targets. Production of corn and sorghum grains
will probably reach about 20 million tons-roughly double the 1976-80
average-although sorghum will remain a minor grain crop. Soybean
output, as well, will double to 1 million tons but will reach only about half
of the plan target. Although there will be a small loss of wheat, the net gain
These gains, while important, are only a small part of the longer term
potential of this program. Our analysis suggests that moisture and
temperature conditions on 60 million hectares of cultivated land in the
southern USSR make cultivation of corn and sorghum feasible where
wheat and other lower yielding small grains are now grown. If Moscow
decided on fuller exploitation of a change in the crop mix in these regions,
our analysis shows that annual Soviet grain output could increase by up to
30 million tons by the year 2000, as compared with the present crop mix.
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To achieve these gains, the Soviets must overcome a number of technologi-
cal and institutional obstacles:
? Appropriate seed supplies will be limited because the Soviet Union
seriously lags in breeding suitable corn, sorghum, and soybean varieties
tailored to its unique agroclimatic conditions, and major improvements
will take upward of 10 years.
? Agrochemicals to increase yields and control weeds and pests are in short
supply.
? The development and manufacture of machinery specifically designed to
cultivate and harvest row crops effectively is lagging behind farm needs.
? Economic incentives are still not strong enough to overcome local farm
officials' preferences for producing traditional crops with lower yields.
Moscow will need to devise more effective policies to spur the domestic
agrotechnology industry and to encourage greater willingness at the farm
level to shift production into the new crops.
The great potential of this program and the early gains Moscow seems
positioned to achieve have a number of significant implications for the
United States:
? The program poses a serious threat to US interests in continued large US
grain exports to the Soviet Union. With the USSR traditionally short of
domestically produced concentrated feeds and protein supplements and
the United States traditionally the world's leading exporter in these
areas, the United States has been in a strong position to capture a big
share of the Soviet import market. If Moscow succeeds in dramatically
raising domestic production of these feed grains, US exports will suffer
and any US influence derived from this trade linkage would be seriously
diluted.
? The program has the potential for important gains in agrotechnology
trade. Moscow recognizes that the ultimate success of changes in the
crop mix during the next 10 to 15 years will depend heavily on aggressive
application of improved agrotechnology and is already looking to the
West for help. Efforts have been under way for some time to acquire bet-
ter seeds from Western firms, and an initial agreement on corn seed and
technology was signed in 1985. The most sophisticated agrochemicals are
already obtained from the West and crop volumes are likely to grow
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substantially. Moreover, Moscow has looked to the West to obtain
advanced machinery to improve cultivation and reduce harvest losses in the
new crops.
Because of the potential impacts the crop mix program can have on US
trade prospects with the Soviet Union-large possible losses in grain
exports partially offset by smaller gains in technology exports-the success
Moscow has in this program and the priority given it will be major
harbingers of US-Soviet trade prospects in the 1990s.
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Contents
Soviet Strategy and Prospects
Corn, Sorghum, and Soybeans: Key Advantages
2
Sorghum Production
7
Soybean Production
7
Technological and Institutional Constraints to Expanded Production
8
Agrotechnology Problems
8
Efforts To Introduce Western Agrotechnology
13
Agrochemicals
13
Machinery
14
Significant Short-Term Gains Likely
14
Long-Term Potential Gains Great
15
Implications
16
A.
Growing Corn, Sorghum, and Soybeans in the Soviet Union
19
B.
USSR: Historical Statistics Showing Area, Yields, and
Production of Corn, Sorghum, and Soybeans in 1913, 1940, and
1950-85
C.
General Methodology for Estimating Potential Gains
1.
USSR: 1990 Production Goals and Outlook for Corn, Sorghum,
and Soybeans
2
2.
USSR: Imports of Grain and Soybeans From All Sources, 1980-84
4
3.
USSR: Imports of Grain and Soybeans From the United
States, 1980-84
2
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5. USSR: Sorghum Grain Area, Yields, and Production
6. USSR: Soybean Area, Yields, and Production
1. USSR: Current Grain Mix Compared With 1990 Preferred Levels 1
2. USSR: 1980 Grain Production on Irrigated Land
5. USSR: Sorghum Grain Trends
6. USSR: Distribution of Sorghum Grain Cultivation
7. USSR: Soybean Trends
8. USSR: Distribution of Soybean Cultivation
9. USSR: 1990 Planned and Estimated Production-Increases Over 14
1976-80 Annual Average
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USSR's Feed Crops in Perspective
The most important concentrated feeds in the USSR
are small cereal grains such as wheat, barley, oats,
and rye-instead of corn, sorghum, and soybeans,
which are the mainstays of the US livestock program.
Concentrated feeds increased as a share of all feed
energy in the USSR from 22 percent in 1960 to 36
percent in 1979. Since then, forage (hay, silage, straw,
and pasture) output-still the principal source offeed
energy for Soviet livestock-has increased somewhat
faster than the use of grain for feed. Corn-the
primary grain for providing energy in US livestock
feed-has made a significant contribution in the
Soviet Union to the overall feed supply, not as a
grain, but as a forage crop.
The Soviets want to further increase output and
improve the quality of forages because they are a
necessary ingredient in livestock feed management.
Better forages are essential for maximizing returns in
the use of cereal grains and in feeding certain live-
stock such as cattle and sheep. When properly man-
aged, forages also offset vitamin and protein deficien-
cies found in some cereals. US farmers typically use
forage and pasture as the principal feed for young
cattle prior to fattening in livestock feed lots with
concentrated feeds.
As in the United States, both cultivated and unculti-
vated lands contribute to Soviet feed supplies for
raising livestock. Three-fourths of the crop produc-
tion grown on the 227 million hectares of cultivated
Secret
land and all of the output from the 373 million
hectares of natural meadows and pastures are used
for livestock feed in the USSR:
? Grain crops currently occupy about 60 percent of
the cultivated lands (including fallow), and over
half of all the grains produced from this area is
directly allocated to feed. The remainder of the
grain, except that used for seed, provides grain for
the food products industry-flour milling, starch
extraction, and brewing and distilling alcohol, for
example. The residuals from this processing-or
the byproducts, such as bran-are also fed to
livestock. In addition, straw and chafffrom the
grainfields provide forage for feed.
? Almost a third of the cultivated land is devoted
exclusively to forages-alfalfa, clover, corn for
forage, and the like.
? The remainder of the cultivated lands-some 10
percent-also provides some feed in the form of
surplus and waste products, and the nonfood by-
products of potatoes, vegetables, sugar beets, and
oilseeds.
Finally, the uncultivated lands-the 373 million
hectares of natural meadows and pastures provide
hay, green feed, and grazing. In total, over 90 percent
of Soviet farmlands-cultivated and uncultivated-
contribute some form of livestock feed.
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New Soviet Crop Strategy:
Problems and Prospects [-
Soviet Strategy and Prospects
The USSR Food Program ' for the 1980s, formally
adopted by Moscow in May 1982, focuses on agricul-
tural organization, management, and investment is-
sues. The goal is to improve the Soviet diet by
providing consumers with larger supplies of meat,
milk, eggs, and other scarce foods, and to reduce the
imports of grains and other feeds needed to produce
livestock products.
Soviet strategy to improve both the quantity and
quality of domestically produced livestock feed de-
pends in part on substantial boosts in output of corn,
sorghum, and soybeans-an objective stressed by
Gorbachev during 1985. The strategy is keyed to
replacing lower yielding traditional crops with higher
yielding feed crops like corn and sorghum (see
figure 1). In general, the strategy calls for a sharply
lower share of wheat-from 49 to 28 percent of grain
output. According to official Soviet plans, corn grain
production should more than double by 1990 and
output of soybeans is to more than quadruple, com-
pared with the 1976-80 average annual level. Sor-
ghum grain production should increase substantially.
By comparison, all feeds (see inset, USSR's Feed
Crops in Perspective) are to increase only by about a
third.
Our analysis suggests that the Soviets will make
important strides in their efforts to restructure the
crop mix but plans are not likely to be met (see table
1). By 1990 the production of corn and sorghum will
be about twice the 1976-80 levels, and this shift in
' The Soviet Communist Party considers food the central economic
and political problem of the decade. USSR food consumption
overall is adequate in calories but deficient in livestock products,
fruits, and vegetables compared with Western diets.
Figure 1
USSR: Current Grain Mix Compared
With 1990 Preferred Levels
Barley
38.0 25X1
a Based on average annual statistics on grain output during 1976-80.
b While pulses (edible legume seeds such as beans, peas, and lentils) are
not grains, the Soviets include them along with seeds from grass crops in
grain output statistics. Soviet estimated requirements for pulses apparently
include soybeans, usually grouped with oil seeds.
c Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 5, April 1983, pp. 79-87. Translated in JPRS,
L/11513, USSR Agriculture (FOUO), 14/83, 9 August 1983, pp. 6-16.
d The Soviets prefer to reduce spring wheat grown in the northern areas-
replacing it largely with barley since it outproduces spring wheat.
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Table 1
USSR: 1990 Production Goals and Outlook
for Corn, Sorghum, and Soybeans
9.5
13.7 c
20.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
and are unclassified. Soviet statistical yearbooks have given no data
for all-USSR production of corn or other grain since 1980 and for
explained that compre ensive data would not be published until the
USSR became self-sufficient in grain output.
b CIA estimates.
e In late November 1984, the former Soviet Minister of Agriculture
generalized that corn grain output in the last few years "reached a
stable level of 13-14 million tons."
d The Soviets have not published 1990 production goals for sor-
ghum grain. We assume, however, the planned rate of increase is
the same as that for corn.
e Soybeans are not grains, but oilseeds high in protein content.
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crop mix-with a small loss in wheat-will probably
add about 5 million tons to total grain supplies.
Substantial increases should also be made in soybean
production. We believe, however, that the potential
for gains from further shifts toward corn, sorghum,
and soybeans is much greater than the gains we
expect the Soviets to achieve during the near term. In
fact, analysis developed in this paper indicates that
net gains of 20-30 million tons in grain output are
feasible by 2000 through crop mix changes alone.
Corn, Sorghum, and Soybeans:
Key Advantages
Our analysis suggests that the Soviets-even by
1990-will realize several important advantages by
restructuring their crop mix to produce more corn,
sorghum, and soybeans. Moreover, these gains will be
achieved economically. Because corn, sorghum, and
soybeans have greater yield potential, substantial
gains can be made by simply substituting these crops
for the more widely grown traditional crops such as
wheat:
? Increased yield. In regions best suited for their
cultivation and with proper tillage, corn and sor-
ghum significantly outproduce other grains. Even in
the southern part of the USSR, with less than ideal
agroclimatic conditions for these feed crops, average
corn yields, for example, are roughly 30 percent
more than winter wheat (see inset, USSR's Agrocli-
matic Conditions).
? Improved feed quality. The nutritional value of
corn, sorghum, and soybeans substantially outranks
the crops they would replace:
- Corn and sorghum are especially valuable for
concentrated energy; soybeans are superior for
protein content, although they yield less energy
per hectare than either corn or sorghum.
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USSR's Agroclimatic Conditions
The USSR's agroclimatic conditions are relatively
unfavorable for corn, sorghum, and soybeans. Only
limited regions of the southern USSR parts of
Moldavia, the western Ukraine, the North Caucasus
foothills, and a few places in the Transcaucasus-
plus the Far East regions approach the favorable
combination of temperature, moisture, and soils of
the US corn belt. The main corn grain regions in
Europe and North America generally have longer and
warmer growing seasons because of their more south-
ern locations and also enjoy more and better distrib-
uted precipitation than most corn grain regions in the
USSR.
Under current Soviet practices, a short growing sea-
son is the prime climatic impediment to expanding
output of these feed crops, though better varieties and
tillage practices can significantly expand their range
of adaptation. The best areas-or areas of longer
growing seasons-are the southern regions, but many
of these areas are most deficient in annual precipita-
tion. About half of all the USSR's tilled land receives
less than 305-356 millimeters (mm), and only a small
share has more than 610 mm, compared with 762-
1,016 mm for large portions of the US corn belt.
Irrigation and moisture-conserving practices, there-
fore, will be the key to increased production of these
feed crops in the southern USSR, which otherwise
has considerable potential to grow them.
- Because of good mixing qualities, blends of corn
or sorghum and soybeans make excellent live-
stock feed rations that are ideal for maximizing
livestock productivity. In contrast to forage
crops, concentrated feeds are suitable for all
classes of livestock and are necessary for feeding
poultry and swine, for intensive fattening of
cattle and sheep, and for yielding maximum
milk production. They are also more easily
transported and stored than bulky forage crops.
? Higher returns from irrigation. Increased plantings
of corn, sorghum, and soybeans would help the
Soviets take better advantage of their investments in
Figure 2
USSR: 1980 Grain Production on
Irrigated Land
(including household
plots)
16.1
Other grains
24.0
Corn
18.0
f
Technical crops
(mostly cotton)
20.5
Wheat
38.0
Rice
20.0
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Figure 3
USSR: Corn Grain Trends, 1950-858
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I t I I
0 1950 55 60 65 70 75 80 85
Table 2 Table 3
USSR: Imports of Grain and Soybeans USSR: Imports of Grain and Soybeans
From All Sources, 1980-84 From the United States, 1980-84
Million Tons
Billion US $ a
1980-84 b
1984
1980-84 b
1984
Total
38.0
45.0
6.0
6.8
Corn
11.7
12.5
1.6
1.7
Sorghum
2.5
2.0
0.3
0.2
Soybeans
and meal c
2.5
0.7
0.6
0.2
a Values are converted from rubles to dollars using the official
exchange rate for each year.
b Crop year averages.
c In soybean equivalent, assuming 78 percent yield of meal.
Million Tons
Billion US $
1980-84 b
1984
1980-84 b
1984
Total
10.8
17.3
1.60
2.60
Corn
6.3
9.4
0.70
1.30
Sorghum
0
0
0
0
Soybeans
and meal
0.3
0.1
0.09
0.04
Other
4.2
7.8
0.81
1.26
a Values are converted from rubles to dollars using the official
exchange rate for each year.
b Crop year averages.
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the Land Reclamation Program.' The program calls
for major outlays for irrigation, especially in the
southern portion of European USSR where climatic
conditions for these three feed crops are relatively
good. The Soviets intend to expand irrigation, princi-
pally in these areas, to 23-25 million hectares by 1990
and to 30-32 million hectares by 2000, compared with
about 18 million at the present. Furthermore, even for
the near term, we believe that the Soviets could
allocate proportionally more of their existing irrigated
land to these three crops than to the less productive
traditional crops (see figure 2). In 1980 more than 60
percent of all irrigated grainlands was devoted to
wheat and other lower yielding grains as compared
with only 18 percent for corn.
In general, these three crops would boost productivity
of cropland if planted on a larger share of the roughly
60 million hectares of cultivated land in the southern
USSR, where small grains predominate-including
Central Asia with almost 8 million hectares of irrigat-
ed land and a 260-day frost-free growing season.
Throughout the southern USSR, only 40 to 60 per-
cent of the growing season is used with the current
crop mix. Since most small grains are harvested by
midsummer, they do not use the full growing season
as do corn, sorghum, and soybeans. Furthermore, in
Central Asia it would be possible to increase the
amount of irrigated land that is double-cropped-two
crops grown per year-with increased plantings of
corn, sorghum, and soybeans. Because irrigated crops
suffer less from the vagaries of weather, this would
permit Moscow to reduce somewhat the large annual
swings in grain production that tend to characterize
Soviet agriculture
' In Soviet terminology, reclamation is the improvement of lands,
primarily through drainage or irrigation.
The Soviets attribute
three-fourths of the increase in crop output during 1976-80 to
reclaimed lands. They refer to land reclamation as "a decisive
factor for the further increase in agriculture and steady growth in
the country's food resources." In a special 23 October 1984 Central
Committee plenum of the Soviet Communist Party, the Soviets
reaffirmed their support for costly, continuing land reclamation
projects and extended investment and production plans to 2000.
Chernenko specifically urged planting more corn to improve returns
Recent Trends in Production
and Imports
While domestically produced livestock feeds supply
the bulk of Soviet requirements, Moscow must still
import grain as a major source of livestock feed
because of frequent shortfalls in grain production
goals (see tables 2 and 3). Soviet imports of corn and
sorghum grain during the crop years from 1980 to
1984 averaged 37 percent of all grain imports and 58
percent of grain imported from the United States. In
recent years poor sunflower and pulse crops forced the
Soviets to import soybeans and soybean products
amounting to several times the level of domestic
production to cover protein shortages (see
appendix A).
Corn Production
Corn received a major push during the Khrushchev
era, and some impressive gains were made. After
Khrushchev's program was discredited, however, the
area sown to corn grain has remained roughly 60
percent of the record 1960 levels (see figure 3). Of the
21.8 million hectares of corn area in 1984-principal-
ly in southern USSR (see figure 4}-only about 3.9
million hectares were harvested for 13.3 million tons
of grain, according to official Soviet statistics and our
estimates. The rest of the area planted to corn was
used for forage. The corn grain figure is considerably
short of the record year of 1961, when 17.1 million
tons of corn grain were produced from 7 million
hectares.
Whereas output has fallen well below the record level
of 25 years ago, yields in 1984-85 were about 45
percent higher, reflecting in large part a higher
percentage of production on irrigated land. Our anal-
ysis shows that 40 percent of the corn grain produced
in 1984-85 was from irrigated land compared with
only 5 percent in 1966-70. Nonetheless, Soviet yields
are still less than half the average US corn yield.
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Figure 4
Distribution of Corn Cultivation
Kazakhstan 1.8-
Central Asia 3.2
Transcaucasus 5.0
Moldavia 11.7 -
North Caucasus
17.1
Moldana SSR is not part
of any economic .eg,oo.
- Volga 0.1
Far East 0.2
Northern limit for growing grain
Economic region boundary
0 1000 Kilometers
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A Soviet machine for separate but simultaneous
harvesting of husked corn ears and chopped
cornstalks. While the Soviets are generally in
need of farm machinery, they have some unique
harvesting equipment for corn, and most of the
Soviet cornfields that are harvested for grain are
also harvested for forage. Unlike the United
States, where fields harvested of corn grain are
later grazed by cattle, the Soviets prefer to bring
forage to the farmsteads-reflecting a different
approach to livestock rearing, a more critical
need to utilize available forage, and a general
lack offences to facilitate grazing on the USSR's
On the basis of an analysis of geographical regions
suitable for growing corn grain, we estimate that at
least 10 million more hectares could be planted with
corn. The potential is especially good on the irrigated
lands in southern regions where a high proportion of
corn is still harvested for forage and a large percent-
age of irrigated land is used for other lower yielding
crops.
Sorghum Production
According to official Soviet statistics, the best sor-
ghum grain harvest-219,000 tons-was in 1974 (see
figure 5). Yields over the past 15 years have remained
relatively constant, averaging 12.3 centners per hect-
are-no more than half of US yields. The area
planted to sorghum has fluctuated considerably, how-
ever, as sorghum has often been used as a backup
when more traditional spring grains (barley and
wheat) failed to get a good start during the early
stages of the growing season.
On the basis of an analysis of agroclimatic conditions,
we estimate that 2-3 million additional hectares could
readily be planted to grain sorghum. It would be an
ideal grain crop for the large semiarid regions of
Central Asia and Kazakhstan because of its resistance
to drought (see figure 6). However, until better variet-
ies-especially hybrids-are introduced that are
adapted to regional agroclimatic conditions, present
yields will remain much below potential.
Soybean Production
During 1981-83, soybean output averaged 497,000
tons per year, according to official Soviet statistics,
about 35 percent less than the 1975 record level of
780,000 tons. Most of the reduction was due to
unfavorable weather (see figure 7). The area sown to
soybeans-mainly in the Soviet Far East (see figure
8)-has remained relatively constant during the past
two decades. Soybean yields overall are very poor-
less than one-third of US yields-largely because of
inferior varieties and a shortage of agrochemicals. In
1984 soybean output from irrigated and drained lands
reportedly doubled, according to Soviet press reports,
yet production overall was only 51 percent of plan.
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Figure 5
USSR: Sorghum Grain Trends, 1960-85a
75
Soviet plans call for soybean production to reach 2.2-
2.3 million tons by 1990. Since the planted area is
roughly to double, yields per hectare also must double
if output by 1990 is to more than quadruple the 1976-
80 level as planned by the Soviets.
Technological and Institutional
Constraints to Expanded Production
For the Soviets to make significant gains in produc-
tion of corn, sorghum, and soybeans, they will have to
overcome several major constraints. We judge the
Soviets are at least 10 to 15 years behind the West in
applying advanced agrotechnologies. Moreover,farm-
i'ng preferences are strongly oriented to traditional
crops and cultivation practices.
80
1
85
Agrotechnology Problems
In our judgment, the lack of appropriate high-yielding
hybrid seed of corn, sorghum, and soybean varieties is
the most important technological restriction to in-
creased Soviet production of these three feed crops.
Despite' considerable capability in breeding small
grains, especially wheat, the Soviets lag in developing
and introducing varieties of these three feed crops
tailored to agroclimatic zones that would make their
production more reliable and more profitable.
the Soviets are at east 10
years behind the United States in corn-breeding
research. In our view, inadequate incentives have
encouraged crop breeders to take shortcuts-especial-
ly in developing better corn varieties-rather than
conduct fundamental research. Twelve or more years
often are required to create, test, and introduce a new
variety in any country, and the Soviet emphasis has
been on wheat and not corn. Moreover, a shortage of
hybrid corn seed is a perennial problem.
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Figure 6 a
Distribution of Sorghum Grain Cultivation
Moldavia 0.8
Central Chernozem 3.1
Kazakhstan 6.7
Volga 9.8
Moldavia SSR s not part
of any economic region.
Northern limit for growing grain
Economic region boundary
0 1000 Kilometers
Pf0
a Data were not available to precisely map the geographic distribution. The shaded area
is estimated on the basis of 1956 hectarage data by ablest.
.
Central Asia 32.1
North Caucasus 27.6
Far East 0.3
1
Transcaucasus 0
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Figure 7
USSR: Soybean Trends, 1950-858
Another key technological problem is the lack of
agrochemicals, as the Soviets admit in press reports.
Fertilizers and herbicides are in great demand to
increase yields and control weeds and pests. Corn
grain planted on irrigated land receives 25 to 30
percent less fertilizer than the Soviets believe would
be the optimum, according to press reports. Soviet
research also indicates that soybean yields in the
Soviet Far East-where most of the soybeans are
grown-could be increased 50 to 100 percent by
applying more herbicides, fertilizers, and lime to
existing varieties. Excessive soil acidity, cited as the
main reason for low yields in Amur Oblast, could be
corrected by applying lime. Moreover, special agro-
chemicals tailored to soybean production are required
I I I I I I I I I I 1 1
75 80 85a
to control weeds and pests, which reportedly reduce
soybean yields on nonirrigated fields by 20 to 30
percent. The reduction is even greater on irrigated
The Soviets also need more and better farm machin-
ery to help cultivate these row crops and to reduce
harvesting and handling losses.
a lack of suitable equipment restricts
application of tillage techniques needed to help con-
serve moisture and prevent soil erosion. The Soviets
need more up-to-date combines to reduce losses dur-
ing harvest, and, ac-
cording to press reports, the Soviets are seriously
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Figure 8
Distribution of Soybean Cultivation
ran
auc s
Central
Central -j
LChernoze
' ' Nbrthc
Caucasus
SovietSUnion
- Other
regions
16
- R.S.F.S.R.
84
East Siberia
Economic region boundary
0 1000 Kilometers
0 1000 Miles
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lacking in dryers to process these crops so that they
can be stored for indefinite periods. Currently, much
of the corn grain left on Soviet farms for feed is not
dried, resulting in losses of 20 to 25 percent. Similar
problems reportedly occur in handling sorghum grain
and soybeans.
Institutional Obstacles
We believe that increased production of corn, sor-
ghum, and soybeans will also be limited by institu-
tional problems. Although optimal soil and climatic
conditions should determine the kinds of crops grown
in various regions, the choice of crops in the USSR is
heavily influenced by planner directives and, in turn,
by the political leadership. Khrushchev's agrarian
policies illustrated these influences. In addition, the
desire by Moscow for national autarky in most types
of production has led to the commercial production of
some economically marginal crops. Sugar beets and
cotton, for example, are grown in areas of the USSR
better suited for the production of corn, sorghum, and
soybeans and could be imported for less than the cost
of producing them.
At the local level, ineffective pricing policies are
obstacles. Farm officials are resisting expansion of
corn grain on grounds that the yield advantage over
small grains does not offset the increased cost of
producing row crops. Small grains post up to a 65
percent profit that, according to some Soviet farm
officials, cannot be matched by row crops under the
current pricing policy. The high priority placed on
harvesting corn for forage also will probably continue
to limit expansion of corn grain production unless
incentives can be changed. The Soviet planners, more-
over, insist that expansion of corn must not reduce the
area of winter grains (primarily wheat)-in part be-
cause of their concern for the supply of high-quality
flour for breadmaking-but instead must replace
lower yielding spring grains. Given Soviet agrotechno-
logy and agroclimatic conditions, however, it is diffi-
cult to grow corn and winter grains in a crop rotation.
Our analysis shows that few regions have a long
enough growing season-given current Soviet corn
varieties-to permit corn grain to be harvested in time
to plant winter grains.
Resistance by farm officials is, in our view, also
hindering the expansion of sorghum and soybeans.
Farm officials in regions where these crops are being
expanded are not, as a rule, familiar with correct
growing practices, according to Soviet press reports.
As a result, farmers in the Central Asian republics-
where soybeans have considerable potential-report-
edly show little enthusiasm for expanding soybean
production.
Moscow is aware of these problems and has taken
some steps to overcome them. On 1 January 1983
regional base procurement prices were increased
slightly for wheat (5 to 12 percent) and substantially
for barley, oats, and corn (18 to 39 percent). These
price changes clearly work to encourage the desired
shift in the crop mix, but it is still too early to know if
they will have substantial impact at the farm level.
In an effort to demonstrate to farm managers that
yields can be increased and that costs of production
can be reduced, the Soviet campaign to "industrialize
agriculture" initially has been focused on corn and
other row crops. Farms participating in the campaign
are to receive preferential allocation of the best land,
workers, machinery, and fertilizers and other agro-
chemicals-with the understanding that these re-
sources will be utilized to obtain the highest returns.
Part of the approach is to organize farm workers into
"collective contract teams." Wages of team workers
ostensibly are based on the level of output, the
increase in labor productivity, and the reduction in
cost of production they achieve on the lands that are
assigned to them. On the basis of Soviet press reports,
we judge, however, that off-farm officials currently
interfere too much in team management, wages are
still primarily based on job performance rather than
on the size of harvest, and the necessary agrotechno-
logy inputs-new hybrid varieties, fertilizers, and
herbicides plus better machinery-are generally not
available to improve overall yields and growing prac-
tices rapidly.
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Efforts To Introduce Western
Agrotechnology
In June 1985, General Secretary Gorbachev an-
nounced that one of the most serious problems in the
Soviet economy, including the agro-industrial sectors,
is the difficulty of putting science and technology into
practice. While the Soviets have been monitoring
global developments in corn, sorghum, and soybean
technology and making selective purchases of seeds,
agrochemicals, and machinery for some time, recent
evidence suggests Moscow will look even more to
Western agrotechnology for help with these and other
crops in the future.
Genetics and Seed Varieties
During the period 1974-77, the Soviets actively nego-
tiated for corn, sorghum, and soybean germ plasm
and other crop technologies from US, Canadian, and
other Western commercial seed firms in an effort to
acquire better seeds, At
that time, however, they were unwilling to enter long-
term agreements that Western companies require in
order to develop and produce higher yielding seeds
specifically tailored to Soviet conditions. Instead, the
Soviets purchased small quantities of US seed for
testing and breeding stocks. More significant, in our
view, in 1977 the USSR Ministry of Agriculture
contracted with a US firm for joint Soviet-US experi-
ments to demonstrate US-type soybean technology,
including machinery and seed varieties, in the south-
ern Ukraine (Crimea) and Krasnodar Kray,
The Soviets judged the project
results as outstanding, and the findings provided
additional rationale for expanding soybean
production.
Under pressure from General Secretary Gorbachev,
the Soviets are now going to negotiate more aggres-
sively for the purchase of US and other Western
agricultural technology and consultative services,=
They are interested in
obtaining professional assistance in farm management
and joint research ventures in genetics and biotechnol-
ogy. The Soviets told then US Secretary of Agricul-
ture Block, during his visit to the USSR in August
1985, that they wanted to buy foreign corn varieties.
In addition, from late 1984 through 1985 the Soviets
were asking US firms to propose projects for improv-
ing their production and utilization of soybean seeds
and other oilseeds, including feeding trials to demon-
strate the use of high-moisture corn grain and soy-
bean meal in livestock rations,
Soviet trade officials looked for
soybean-processing technology, and hinted that funds
intended for soybean imports might be diverted to buy
Western feed-mixing equipment. Under the US-
USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of
Agriculture, Soviet scientists have received seed of
US soybean varieties.
Agrochemicals
The Soviets regularly import more than half of their
agrochemicals from Western multinational firms and
Eastern Europe. Many of these multinational firms
are US based, and up to half of the agrochemicals
that their West European subsidiaries sell to the
Soviets is actually delivered from the United States.
Since 1984 the Soviets have made special efforts to
increase purchases of the most sophisticated forms of
Western herbicides, insecticides, and fungicides,
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tial for corn and other row crops in order to apply
modern cultivation practices-stubble mulch tillage
rather than plowing. This practice helps prevent ero-
sion, conserves moisture, reduces costs, and allows
growing more than one crop per year.
Figure 9
USSR: 1990 Planned and Estimated
Production
1976-80 average annual production = 100
Planned
Estimated
Corn grain
Sorghum grain
Soybeans
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The Soviets have also purchased better cultivation
equipment. In 1984,
they bought a US line of machinery for ridge-row
tillage-an adaptation of conservation cultivation for
poorly drained lands such as those used for soybeans
in the Far East. According to Soviet press reports,
they lack equipment capable of properly cultivating
the soil and simultaneously placing seeds, fertilizer,
and other chemicals in the soil.
We judge that the Soviets will make significant
production gains by 1990-although still not up to
plan-mainly as a result of slightly larger plantings of
corn, sorghum, and soybeans in those areas agrocli-
matically suitable for growing these crops. In the
longer term, restructuring the crop mix will represent
the most cost-effective option open to the Soviets to
limit grain imports through greater domestic produc-
Significant Short-Term Gains Likely
Assuming trend-level weather, we estimate that corn
grain production will reach 20 million tons by 1990,
short of the planned goal by 2 million tons, but more
than double the 1976-80 level (see figure 9 and inset,
Basis for Estimating 1990 Production). We expect the
corn grain area in 1990 will be about 5 million
hectares-an increase of about 2 million hectares over
the 1976-80 level, but far short of the 14 million
hectares suitable for corn grain. Average yields will
probably be somewhat higher than historical trends,
but still short of potential, given lags in applying
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Basis for Estimating 1990 Production
Corn and sorghum production estimates are a combi-
nation of yield and area projections. Estimates for
corn and sorghum yields conform to a previous CIA
study
which projects the likely total
Soviet grain production in 1990 on the basis of an
analysis of weather and technology trends. We pro-
jected about 2 million more hectares of cornland over
the 1980 area of 3 million hectares because corn area
was already expanded by about I million hectares
during 1980-85. For sorghum we project an increase
to about 200,000 hectares from a very small base of
about 150,000 hectares-on the basis of the expan-
sion of sorghum area since 1980. The production
estimates for the two crops for 1990 were then
derived by multiplying the estimated yields-about
15 and 40 centners for sorghum and corn respective-
ly-by their projected areas.
The estimate for soybean production by 1990 was
based on past record levels for area and yield. We
assumed that the Soviets would achieve a yield of 10
centners-about the record yield of 9.6 centners
achieved 10 years ago. And, assuming a small in-
crease in area over the 1972 record year of about
900,000 hectares, we project that the cultivation of
soybeans could reach 1 million hectares by 1990,
resulting in I million tons of production.
advanced agrotechnologies. We estimate that, as a
result, average corn yields on all lands-irrigated and
nonirrigated-by 1990 will increase to 40 centners
per hectare from the officially reported 32.7 centners
in 1981-85.
We estimate that production will substantially in-
crease by 1990 for the other two feed crops as well.
Although we believe the 1990 soybean goal of 2.2-2.3
million tons is far beyond what the Soviets will
achieve, production may reach as much as 1 million
tons because of slight increases in expanded plantings
and yields. We expect output of grain sorghum to
triple by 1990, but it will remain minimal as a share
of all grain production.
Overall Soviet grain production will rise somewhat
less than the estimated increased production of corn
and sorghum. Because these crops will replace lower
yielding traditional crops, production of wheat will
fall at the same time. Nonetheless, the higher yields
of the new crops will generate a 5-million-ton net gain
in total grain output by 1990.
Long-Term Potential Gains Great
We believe the long-term potential for increasing
Soviet production of corn and sorghum grains and
soybeans far exceeds Soviet near-term goals and
prospects for these crops. Even at existing levels of
agrotechnology, expansion of corn and sorghum areas
to levels projected by Soviet researchers on both
irrigated and nonirrigated lands could increase overall
grain output over present cropping patterns by rough-
ly 17-19.5 million tons, as compared with the 5
million tons we expect the Soviets will actually gain
by 1990 (see appendix Q. This potential represents
about 10 percent of our most likely estimate of grain
production for 1990.1 By the year 2000, the planned
expansion of irrigated land would permit further
increases in corn and sorghum areas, which could
boost annual Soviet grain output by up to 30 million
tons:
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16-18 20-25
1-1.5 4-5
17-19.5 24-30
Jwe concluded that the USSR will still need grain imports in
1990. This conclusion is based on estimates that there is a
95-percent probability that Soviet grain production during 1986-90
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will average between 180 and 210 million tons, given weather 25X1
conditions close to long-term averages (past 40 years) and applica-
tion of fertilizers at levels slightly higher than during the last four
to five years. The study also concludes that the Soviets have at least
two options for boosting grain output substantially above this most
likely estimate: grain yields could be raised significantly by import-
ing more and better agrochemicals and improving application
techniques; and overall production could be increased by changing
the crop mix-especially the substitution of corn for wheat and
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If this additional grain were efficiently rationed to
livestock herds, meat production could increase as
much as 20 percent above the average level for the
period 1976 to 1980. The potential gain by 2000 is
equivalent to about 80 percent of average annual
grain imports in recent years.
In the case of added soybean output, increases possi-
ble in soybean production would improve the supply of
protein in livestock feeds, although the displaced
cereal grain would mean a loss of feed energy. For
example, our analysis shows that increased production
of soybeans close to plan would result in a net increase
of roughly 1 million tons of protein content by 2000,
while displacing corn from about 1.5 million hectares
of existing cropland (see appendix Q. This net in-
crease in soybean output greatly exceeds average
annual imports of soybeans and meal-some 0.3
million tons-from the United States during the
period 1980-84 (see table 2).
The program to shift the Soviet crop mix is clearly
good news for Soviet agriculture and, ultimately, the
Soviet consumer. It is designed to increase Soviet
domestic production of the very crops the United
States is best positioned to supply-the crops that
have driven the growth in US exports to the Soviet
Union over the last 10 to 15 years. The program,
moreover, would help stabilize production during
however, will give a bit of a boost to livestock
productivity. We estimate that by the end of this
decade the net increase in corn, sorghum, and soy-
beans, if devoted to meat production, could provide an
additional several hundred thousand tons, worth more
than a half billion dollars at current prices if bought
in the West. Requirements for US grain exports
should be lessened a bit on average since corn repre-
sents a large portion of US exports to the Soviet
Union. The general scale of US exports to the USSR
of corn, sorghum, and soybeans will still be more
dependent on such factors as weather fluctuations and
bilateral relations.
Over the longer term, our analysis suggests that the
Soviets could substantially reduce their need for
Western grain should they decide to take fuller
advantage of this program to restructure the crop mix.
The potential net gain of up to 30 million tons in total
grain output compares favorably with our projected
Soviet import requirements for grain during the next
five years and is larger than the record US exports to
the Soviet Union of 22.3 million tons during the
marketing year 1984/85. With a potential this large,
shifting the crop mix to increase production of corn
and sorghum would work against a general expansion
of US grain exports-the bulk of which is corn to the
Soviet Union.
If the Soviets decide to accelerate efforts to change
the crop mix, we might expect over the next one to
three years to see Moscow:
years of bad weather.
The impact of the program over the next five years,
however, will be modest in our view. The net increase
of approximately 5 million tons of grain that we
expect the Soviets to achieve is only 10 to 15 percent
of the grain we estimate Moscow will need to import
on average to meet its livestock production goals
during the next five years-about 40 million tons
annually.' The somewhat larger amount of concen-
trated feeds than would otherwise be available,
? Increase purchases of agrochemicals and hybrid
seeds from the West to improve yields substantially.
? Begin to make more serious efforts to improve crop-
breeding research to better tailor corn, sorghum,
and soybean varieties to specific agroclimatic condi-
tions (as has been done more successfully in develop-
ing and introducing high-yielding wheat varieties).
? Increase procurement prices of these three crops
relative to traditional grains substantially more than
they did two years ago in an effort to help overcome
farm officials' resistance to increased plantings.
meet 1990 meat production targets, assuming average weather and
.a continuation of recent trend in fertilizer deliveries.F___-]
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Perhaps the strongest indicator of a serious shift in
Moscow's agricultural management strategy would be
the lifting of the prohibition on direct contact at the
working level between foreign suppliers of agrotech-
nologies and Soviet farms. This has traditionally been
the major limiting factor in the effectiveness of
technology transfers to the Soviet system regardless of
the economic endeavor. Any move in this direction in
programs affecting grain production could pay big
dividends during the 1990s.
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Appendix A
Growing Corn, Sorghum, and
Soybeans in the Soviet Union
Under Khrushchev's program, the Soviets increased
plantings of corn substantially for both grain and
forage.6 From only 4.3 million hectares in 1954, corn
plantings reached an alltime high of 37.1 million
hectares in 1962, although only 7 million hectares
were harvested for corn grain. Subsequently, the corn
area declined, reflecting the discrediting of the Khru-
shchev program and a policy shift to wheat and other
grains. The drought in 1963 and the new leadership's
desire to distance itself from Khrushchev's policies
discouraged these early efforts, and corn output failed
to approach the levels of the early 1960s again until
20 years later. (See appendix B for historical statistics
on various aspects of corn, sorghum, and soybean
production in the USSR.)
The Khrushchev corn program, while a victim of
swings in political fortunes of the time, was successful
in giving the Soviets an excellent source of forage they
badly needed. Soviet farms previously had been great-
ly dependent on poor-quality wheat straw and pas-
tures to supplement limited supplies of grain for
livestock feed. Corn stalks are much more nutritious
than wheat straw and chaff as livestock feed.
Currently, four-fifths of Soviet corn area, including
1.2 million hectares of irrigated land, is planted
exclusively for forage. Corn for grain is presently
limited to the southern regions, where agroclimatic
conditions are better suited; the European regions
account for three-fourths of the output. The Soviets
have steadily increased the amount grown on irrigated
land, contributing to increased yields and reliability of
production. In 1984 irrigated land provided about 40
percent of all Soviet corn grain, compared with 5
percent in the period 1966-70.
`The corn is harvested as a chopped green mass; some is fed to
livestock immediately, but most is stored as silage and fed later.
Corn stalks or stover, from which mature ears have been removed,
are more nutritious than small grain straw and also are commonly
A 1959 Soviet study by P. M. Zemskiy' assessing the
potential to grow more corn concluded that 33 million
hectares of corn could be planted in the USSR, of
which 14 million could be harvested for fully mature
grain. The Soviets exceeded the projection for total
area planted to corn by a considerable margin in 1962
and 1963-37.1 and 34.2 million hectares respective-
ly-but they have always failed to achieve the projec-
tion for corn grain.
The area under sorghum cultivation has always been
small and is usually the least favorable land, accord-
ing to Soviet press reports. Sorghum for both grain
and silage is generally limited to corn grain regions.
The distribution of sudan grass and other forage
sorghum is much wider and similar to corn for forage.
In 1956 the Soviets grew 1.9 million hectares of all
sorghum, but only 73,500 hectares for grain. Current-
ly, the total area is only half as large, but the area for
grain has doubled.
In our view, the potential USSR sorghum area is
much larger because of its unique adaptation to
certain unfavorable moisture, soil, and temperature
conditions. The crop is particularly resistant to
drought. Zemskiy projected a potential grain sorghum
area of only 178,200 hectares, of which 83 percent
would be in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. But in
1973 the Vavilov All-Union Scientific-Research Insti-
tute for Crop Raising projected an eventual sorghum
area of 4-5 million hectares, terming this a large
reserve for grain and forage output in semiarid and
and regions. In 1985, Soviet scientists claimed it is
possible for grain sorghum cultivation to reach 1
million hectares in "the near years" and 3 million
hectares "over the longer term."
' Rasvitiye razmeshcheniye zemledeliya po pirodno-khozyazstven-
nym rayonam SSSR, Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences, 1959.
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Since 1960 the area planted to soybeans has remained
relatively stable, averaging about 830,000 hectares
per year, although it declined in 1984 to 772,000-
considerably below the planned 890,000 hectares. As
of 1982, 84 percent of the soybean area was in the
Russian Federation (RSFSR), of which 80 percent
was in the Far East region.
According to Soviet press reports, soybeans are now
planted on 30 to 35 percent of all sown area in the
Soviet Far East, which in the Soviet view exceeds the
optimum share. Hence, the Soviets plan to expand
soybean area on irrigated lands in Central Asia,
southern Kazakhstan, the Transcaucasus, Moldavia,
North Caucasus, and the Ukraine steppe, and to
introduce soybeans to the lower Volga and Central
Chernozem regions. During the period 1976-81, the
total soybean area increased 13 percent, with no
increase in the total RSFSR area but more than a
tenfold increase in the Ukraine and North Caucasus
areas, nearly a fourfold increase in Kazakhstan, and
more than a twofold increase in Moldavia. The Far
East area apparently declined about 5 percent. Soviet
projections for 1990 call for roughly doubling soybean
area to about 1.7 million hectares.
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Appendix B
USSR: Historical Statistics Showing Area,
Yields, and Production of Corn, Sorghum,
and Soybeans in 1913, 1940, and 1950-85
Table 4
USSR: Corn Area, Yields, and Production
Area
(thousand
hectares)
Area
(thousand
hectares)
Yield per
Hectare
(centners)
Production
(thousand
tons)
Area
(thousand
hectares)
Yield per
Hectare
(centners)
Production
(thousand
tons)
1955
17,917
6,176
18.7
11,574
11,741
49
58,117
1956
23,931
6,604
14.9
9,861
17,327
60
104,060
1957
18,272
3,256
14.2
4,621
15,016
67
101,297
1958
19,725
4,402
23.2
10,226
15,323
134
209,772
1959
22,414
3,547
15.9
5,653
18,867
125
236,749
1960
28,165
5,086
19.3
9,823
23,079
132
314,657
1961
25,645
7,145
24.0
17,113
18,500
122
231,741
1962
37,105
7,005
22.1
15,474
30,100
80
242,963
1963
34,195
6,995
15.9
11,143
27,200
70
190,503
1964
27,414
5,114
27.1
13,849
22,300
124
279,075
1965
23,404
3,177
25.3
8,030
20,227
88
181,157
1966
23,109
3,229
26.1
8,416
19,880
108
217,268
1967
23,045
3,485
26.3
9,163
19,560
114
225,012
1968
22,351
3,350
26.4
8,828
19,001
104
200,531
1969
22,629
4,167
28.7
11,954
18,462
121
226,271
1970
21,363
3,353
28.1
9,428
18,010
117
212,046
1971
21,167
3,332
25.8
8,597
17,835
117
210,862
1972
21,908
4,012
24.5
9,830
17,896
112
206,136
1973
20,958
4,031
32.8
13,216
16,927
163
281,744
1974
21,082
3,955
30.6
12,104
17,127
129
226,464
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Table 4
USSR: Corn Area, Yields, and Production (continued)
Area
(thousand
hectares)
Area
(thousand
hectares)
Yield per
Hectare
(centners)
Production
(thousand
tons)
Area
(thousand
hectares)
Yield per
Hectare
(centners)
Production
(thousand
tons)
1975
19,998
2,652
27.6
7,328
17,346
108
192,981
1976
21,417
3,303
30.7
10,140
18,114
149
277,136
1977
18,919
3,362
32.7
10,995
15,557
155
246,803
1978
19,230
2,535
35.1
8,900
16,695
147
250,656
1979
19,465
2,667
31.2
8,320
16,798
133
229,852
1980
19,935
2,977
31.7
9,437
16,958
154
266,168
1981
19,769
3,545
30.4
10,785
16,224
139
232,085
1982
21,002
4,161
35.1
14,600
16,841
169
293,613
1983
21,476
3,984
32.7-
12,750-
17,492
163
297,884
1984
21,763
3,919
34.0 f
13,320 f
17,844
162
296,000
1985
21,893
4,482
35.7 f
16,000 f g
17,411
165 f
295,000 f
a Fully mature grain.
b For green mass fed immediately or stored as ensilage.
c Harvested exclusively for forage.
d Including forage from areas also harvested for corn grain and
double-cropped.
Output reportedly a third above 1976-80 annual average.
Estimated.
8 According to a Soviet deputy minister, "output in 1985 reached
16-18 million tons."
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Secret
Table 5
USSR: Sorghum Grain Ares, Yields,
and Production
Area
Yield per
Production
Area
Yield per
Production
(thousand
Hectare
(thousand
(thousand
Hectare
(thousand
hectares)
(centners)
tons)
hectares)
(centners)
tons)
1913
NA
NA
NA
1967
42.0
11.9
50.0
1940
NA
NA
NA
1968
46.0
12.6
58.0
1950
54.9 a
NA
NA
1969
56.0
13.4
75.0
1951
68.2
NA
NA
1970
39.0
13.9
54.0
1952
61.2
NA
NA
1971
35.0
16.0
56.0
1972
45.0
11.1
50.0
1973
90.0
10.9
98.0
1974
132.0
16.6
219.0
1975
77.0
13.8
106.0
1976
196.0
8.0
157.0
1958
NA
NA
NA
1977
90.0
15.2
137.0
1959
NA
NA
NA
1978
88.0
10.9
96.0
1960
NA
NA
NA
1979
80.0
11.1
89.0
1961
70.0 a
8.6 a
60.0-
1980
98.0
12.1
119.0
1962
90.0,
6.7a
60.0a
1981
92.0
10.9a
100.0a
1963
70.0 a
9.3 a
65.0 a
1982
132.0
7.6 a
100.0 a
1964
99.0 a
8.7 a
86.0 a
1983
151.0
12.6 a
190.0 a
1965
64.0
9.5
61.0
1984
143.0
14.0 a
200.0 a
1966
47.0
12.3
58.0
1985
187.0
13.4 b
250.0 b
a Data reported in UN/FAO Production Yearbooks. Also reported
were average annual data for 1948-52 as follows: area, 63.0; yield,
8.9; and production, 56.0. Production and yield data for 1981-84
are FAO estimates.
b Estimated.
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Table 6
USSR: Soybean Area, Yields,
and Production
Area
Yield per
Production
Area
Yield per
Production
(thousand
Hectare
(thousand
(thousand
Hectare
(thousand
hectares)
(centners)
tons)
hectares)
(centners)
tons)
1913
1967
850.0
6.4
543.0
1940
289.0
8.1
233.2
1968
854.0
6.2
528.0
1950
383.3
4.3
166.0
1969
851.0
5.1
434.0
1951
335.7
4.3
145.0
1970
860.0
7.0
603.0
1952
327.9
4.3
142.0
1971
868.0
6.2
535.0
1955
269.7
5.6
151.0
1974
822.0
4.4
360.0
1956
318.9
3.6
114.0
1975
811.0
9.6
780.0
1957
389.0
4.2
162.0
1976
762.0
6.3
480.0
1958
387.0
5.9
229.0
1977
786.0
6.9
540.0
1959
455.0
4.9
224.0
1978
815.0
7.8
634.0
1960
423.9
3.9
167.5
1979
838.0
5.6
467.0
1961
702.0
4.9
344.0
1980
854.0
6.1
525.0
1962
825.0
5.8
475.0
1981
864.0
5.2
450.0
1963
885.0
5.1
450.0
1982
876.0
5.5
480.0
1964
886.0
3.3
293.0
1983
842.0
6.6
560.0
1965
852.8
4.9
420.6
1984
772.0
6.5
500.0
1966
854.0
6.9
586.0
1985
738.0
6.8 a
500.0-
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Appendix C
General Methodology for
Estimating Potential Gains
Our assessment of the potential for a restructured
crop mix to increase feed grain production in the
USSR starts with the selection of geographic regions
agronomically suitable for these crops. With the
potential increases in areas defined, our methodology
then accounts for increases in yields that could be
achieved, taking into account the traditional crops
displaced and the degree to which irrigation would be
used. Our calculations of potential gains assume that
agrotechnology improvements continue the existing
trend,' given the numerous problems and lags the
Soviets experience in getting new technologies imple-
mented at the farm level.
Furthermore, the calculations are based on a total
cultivated area that is similar in size to that of today.
For the Soviets to add substantial amounts of new
arable land suitable for these crops by 2000, they
would have to complete much of the planned work to
bring water from Siberian rivers into Central Asia.
While the Soviets eliminated reference to these river
reversal programs in their official statement of the
plan at the 27th Soviet Communist Party Congress
held in March 1986, they did not alter their earlier
proposals to increase irrigated land area for 1990 and
2000. Our estimate of potential gains, therefore,
reflects only increases in irrigated land coming from
existing nonirrigated arable land. Most of these gains
in irrigation by 2000 will be in the European part of
the USSR, where construction has begun on river
diversion projects to increase the supply of irrigation
water.
Corn and Sorghum
We calculated that larger plantings of sorghum and
corn grains could result in net increases in grain
production of roughly 17-19.5 million tons by 1990
and 24-30 million tons by 2000. Corn grain expansion
Agrotechnology improvements are reflected in changes over time
of the yields of various crops. For example, increased application of
would represent more than 80 percent of this poten-
tial. However, we expect the Soviets to actually
achieve substantially less by 1990. Our projected net
gain of only about 5 million tons by 1990 reflects a
considerably smaller area-only about 5 million hect-
ares-devoted to corn and sorghum grains than poten-
tially warranted:
? To estimate the potential by 1990, we postulated
that corn and sorghum grain areas together could
occupy about 14 million hectares-Zemskiy's pro-
jection-as compared with 3 million hectares har-
vested on average during 1976-80 and 4 million
hectares during 1981-85. About half of this expan-
sion was allocated to irrigated areas, as Soviet farm
officials currently prefer to grow other crops, espe-
cially winter wheat, on irrigated land. From 1990 to
2000, we assume an additional increase of 2 million
hectares in total area of corn and sorghum grain.
Half of this would be on additional arable land the
Soviets plan to bring under irrigation in the south-
ern USSR.
? We expect that, by 1990 and 2000, the difference in
corn yields over other grains will have widened a bit
because of moderate improvements of agrotechno-
logy. We expect that on irrigated land corn will
outyield winter wheat-the most competitive of the
small grains-by as much as 25 to 28 centners per
hectare by 1990 and 28 to 34 centners per hectare
by 2000. On nonirrigated land the differences would
be considerably smaller-about 8 to 9 centners per
hectare in 1990 and 9 to 11 centners in 2000. For
grain sorghum, we expect the gains in yields will be
roughly 20 percent of the incremental gain in corn
yield, as the Soviets have placed greater emphasis
on corn cultivation in the past.
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? Net increases in grain production are derived by
simply multiplying net increases in area times net
increases in yields. This gives potential net gains of
roughly 17.0-19.5 million tons in 1990 and 24-30
million tons in 2000.
Soybeans
We used a somewhat different procedure to illustrate
the potential impact of increasing soybean production
on total Soviet livestock feed supplies. Our calcula-
tions assess the impact on both feed energy and
protein available in the event that Soviet future plans
for area, yield, and production of soybeans are ful-
filled. This approach was necessary since soybeans-
like other leguminous kernel crops-do not compete
directly with grain crops because, as a rule, they yield
less tonnage and less feed energy but more and better
feed protein than the cereal crops they displace. For
this reason, we calculated the trade-off in increased
production of feed protein from a larger area of
soybeans and reduced production of feed energy by
hypothetically displacing corn-the most competitive
of cereal grains because of its high yield potential.
The balances relative to feed energy and protein
content are, therefore, based on the difference in corn
production losses and production gains from increased
plantings of soybeans:
? To reach the planned areas of 1.7 million hectares
by 1990 and 2.0-2.5 million hectares by 2000, the
Soviets will have to at least double the amount of
land planted to soybeans in 1980-0.85 million
hectares. We obtained net increases in area by
subtracting the 1980 area from the areas planned
for 1990 and 2000.
? In calculating net potential increases in soybean
production, we assumed yields will increase from
about 6 centners in 1980 to the planned goals of
12.9-13.5 and 20 centners by 1990 and 2000, re-
spectively. The product of the net increase in the
area and the net increase in yield results in potential
increase in soybean production of 1.7-1.8 million
tons by 1990 and 3.5-4.5 million tons by 2000.
? We assumed that the additional soybean production
would be at the loss of corn output because corn and
soybeans compete for land in similar agroclimatic
regions. The loss in production of corn was derived
by multiplying losses of corn grain area-0.85 and
1.5 million hectares-and expected corn yields for
1990 and 2000. This calculation resulted in an
estimated loss of 3.4-3.6 million tons in 1990 and
4.9-6.8 million tons in 2000.
? Thefeed energy and protein content balances from
soybeans displacing corn show losses in terms of
feed energy. However, there would be a significant
increase over time in the protein content of livestock
feed, which is in short supply in the USSR. Digest-
ible nutrients-a standard measure of feed ener-
gy-would be down by 1.6-1.7 million tons in 1990
and 1.6-2.5 million tons in 2000, but digestible
protein content would be up by 0.3-0.4 million ton in
1990 and 0.9-1.1 million tons in 2000.
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