(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000300010127-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 127
• Publication Date: June 29, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
Intelligence
Top Sew et
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
29 June 1983
3-152JX
29 June I 25X1
Copy 285
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Top Secret
Contents
France-Egypt-Chad: Foreign Support for Habre ..................
1
Ell Salvador: Military Activity ....................................................
2
Netherlands: Announcement of INF Site ................................
3
Western Europe-US: Concerns About RDF ..........................
4
Sudan: More Opposition to President ....................................
USSR-Iran: Tensions Over Afghanistan ..................................
International: Status of UNCTAD VI ......................................
USSR-Eastern Europe: Summit Statement ............................
9
Poland: Pope's Reaction to Editorial ......................................
9
USSR: Anticorruption Campaign Continues ............................ 10
Turkey: Impending Changes in the Military Hierarchy ............ 10
Chile: More Trouble Ahead .................................................... 11
West Germany-East Germany: Major Loan Approved .......... 12
USSR: Record Meat Production .............................................. 12
Special Analysis
Greece-EC: Assuming the Presidency .....................................13
Top Secret
29 June 1983
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Top Secret
-29 June 1983
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Top Secret
FRANCE-EGYPT-CHAD: Foreign Support for Habre
Foreign support for President Habre's government is increasing.
President Mitterrand yesterday said that Libya is providing
logistic support to dissident leader Goukouni's forces and stated that
France would meet its commitment to provide nilitary ista
Chad under the cooperation agreement of 1976.
Comment: Mitterrand's statements-his most explicit to date
regarding Libyan involvement-put his personal prestige behind
recent French diplomatic efforts to rally African support for Habre.
His remarks probably also are intended to warn Libyan leader
Qadhafi about the risks of continued support for the dissidents. If
Libyan involvement increased significantly or if the safety of French
citizens in Chad were threatened, Mitterrand almost certainly would
seriously consider increasing support for Habre.
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1 29 June 1983
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nente
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Top Secret
EL SALVADOR: Military Activity
Government forces continue to conduct operations in the eastern
and central portions of the country in an effort to establish and protect
the civil action program in the agricultural sectors.
US defense attache reports state the military has decided to
secure the eastern and northwestern portions of San Vicente
Department in order to protect the civil defense groups rather than
pushing north as planned. Two elite battalions continue to sweep
eastern San Vicente while coordinating operations with a third
battalion in western Usulutan. There have been no major clashes with
insurgents, and military casualties have been light.
Meanwhile, government forces have launched an operation in
Cuscatlan to keep guerrillas fleeing from San Vicente from massing
for a large attack. The Army also is moving against insurgent
strongholds in San Miguel and northern Morazan
Comment: The government's campaign evidently has disrupted
the insurgents' plans for large-scale coordinated attacks this month.
Guerrilla forces usually recover quickly from such setbacks, however,
and their supplies of weapons probably remain intact. To regain the
tactical initiative, they are likely to launch new attacks soon in several
areas.
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Top Secret
NETHERLANDS: Announcement of INF Site
The Dutch Government's decision to announce the selection of an
INF base site probably will be approved by parliament.
Defense Minister de Ruiter, in a letter to parliament yesterday,
stated that Woensdrecht Airbase on the southwestern coast is the
preferred location and emphasized that selecting a site is necessary
to maintain Dutch support for NATO's "dual track" decision of 1979.
He asked the US not to suggest that the announcement means the
Netherlands has made a decision to accept INF deployment.
Comment: Identification of a basing site is the minimum step
required of the Dutch to allow preparations to proceed without delay.
The current plan is to place 48 cruise missiles in the Netherlands in
1987.
Although the announcement will provoke considerable domestic
opposition, government spokesmen will emphasize that a decision on
deployment still depends on progress in the Geneva arms talks. They
also will stress that the site selection was required by the Christian
Democratic-Liberal coalition agreement in order to encourage
progress in Geneva.
A parliamentary vote on the issue will test the strength of dissent
in Prime Minister Lubbers's Christian Democratic Party. Continued
basing preparations are a specific part of the coalition program,
however, and the government should win the vote. Victory on the
site question would not guarantee a parliamentary majority for
deployment, but it would be encouraging to supporters of INF.
The early announcement of the site, which until recently had been
expected to coincide with publication this fall of a long-term study of
Dutch defense policy, evidently is designed to fend off NATO pressure
for a decision on INF. Lubbers probably hopes the announcement can
be used to induce Liberal support for reductions in current Dutch
nuclear tasks, a tradeoff the US Embassy reports the Liberals thus far
have rejected.
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Top Secret
Most West European Allies are concerned that US plans for a
large Rapid Deployment Force will create unrealistic demands on
them to increase their own forces.
A British official said this week that West European governments
are worried that, if they commit themselves now to help meet
contingencies in Southwest Asia, they will be giving an open-ended
endorsement to US plans. He said the Allies believe the planned
seven-division RDF is being created to respond to the unlikely
possibility of a full-scale Soviet attack in Southwest Asia. They also
believe focus on a larger force ignores the more likely threats to
NATO security arising from regional instability or internal subversion.
In the West Europeans' view, the deployment to Southwest Asia
of such a large US force, including some units committed to reinforce
NATO, would leave gaps in Alliance defenses they would be unable to
fill. The Allies also are concerned that a confrontation between the US
and the USSR in Southwest Asia would spread rapidly to Europe. As a
result, NATO-with fewer available reinforcements from the US
would have to use nuclear weapons against the Warsaw Pact.
Comment: The Allies prefer to base out-of-area planning on the
current four- to five-division RDF. Although they share Washington's
view that events in Southwest Asia affect Western security, they will
remain reluctant to provide forces to compensate for out-of-area .
deployments by US forces that have NATO assignments.
Several NATO members face economic constraints, and they
already are having difficulty meeting existing Alliance force goals.
Moreover, some Allies-notably the West Germans-will soon suffer
shortages of military manpower as a result of declining birth rates.
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4 29 June 1983
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Central
African
Republic
Top Secret
Too Secret
29 June 1983
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Lake
Rudolf
Ethiopia
Nile
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Top Secret
SUDAN: More Opposition to President
President Nimeiri's recent actions have resulted in growing
criticism of his regime and increased antigovernment activity in the
south.
The US Embassy reports mounting disenchantment with Nimeiri
because of his recent decisions to divide the southern region and to
dismiss several senior officials, military commanders, and judges.
More than 200 judges have resigned to protest the summary firing
earlier this month of 40 of their colleagues for alleged corruption.
The situation in the south remains unsettled, and the Embassy
has noted reports of increasing sympathy for southern rebels in the
Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal Regions. One insurgent faction late last
week seized several Westerners-including two Americans-as
hostages, demanding money, supplies, and the broadcast of a
statement publicizing its cause. Some southern critics of the regime
also are trying to establish a central organization to coordinate
opposition activities in the south.
Comment: Nimeiri's opposition in the south includes politicians
resisting division of the area, a number of insurgent groups-some of
which are Libyan-backed-and recent Army mutineers. Any attempt
to unite these diverse foes will be hampered by tribal and personal
rivalries. Nonetheless, there are indications that some of these
elements are beginning to cooperate to a limited extent.
For now, Nimeiri's position seems secure. The situation in the
south is not yet out of control, and his other opponents show little
inclination to try to overthrow his regime.
The military is the only group with the power to oust the
President. Although it is increasingly dissatisfied over a variety of
issues, it still appears to support Nimeiri.
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6 29 June 1983
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USSR-IRAN: Tensions Over Afghanistan
The Soviets' increasing concern about Iranian support for Afghan
insurgents is putting new strains on bilateral relations.
For the first time, the Soviets also are openly criticizing the
Khomeini regime in their official media for its aid to the guerrillas. An
article in Izvestiya late last month alleged Tehran is allowing the
insurgents to use Iranian territory as a base for raids into Afghanistan.
Comment: Moscow's irritation over Iranian support for the
insurgents may prompt it to stage a border incident as a warning to
Nevertheless, the Soviets probably want to avoid major trouble
with Tehran over Afghanistan. Moscow's restrained reaction to Iran's
dissolution of the Tudeh Party and expulsion of 18 Soviet diplomats in
May
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stabilizing relations with Tehran 2bAl
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7 29 June 1983
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Top Secret
Representatives of developing countries and some industrial
nations attending the UNCTAD VI meeting in Belgrade appear ready
to press the US to become more involved in discussions of an
international monetary conference.
The EC may propose a resolution on such a conference that is
similar to the Williamsburg Summit declaration. The draft language
mentions the possibility of a high-level conference to be held in the
framework of the IMF, but it does not specify the participants. The UK
and West Germany have indicated that they will propose the EC
language only as a last resort and with US concurrence.
Comment: France and the Nordic countries probably will urge the
US to agree to some mention of an international monetary conference
as a way to placate the developing countries. The industrial countries,
however, are unlikely to agree to a conference outside the IMF, which
they dominate through weighted voting.
The developing countries probably would argue that a resolution
on an international conference issued by UNCTAD-an organization
with universal participation and equal voting-means that the
monetary conference should be open to all states and use the one
state-one vote principle.
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Top Secret
USSR-EASTERN EUROPE: Summit Statement
Party and state leaders of the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact
countries who met in Moscow yesterday called on the West to
cooperate in halting the arms. race and pursuing detente. Their joint
statement, which was published in Izvestiya today, reiterates that they
seek an accord precluding any new US missile deployments in
Western Europe and that they will not allow the West to gain military
superiority. The statement, however, does not allude to any specific
countermeasures to NATO INF deployments.
Comment: The Soviets evidently were not able to secure
unanimous endorsement of their threat of 28 May to renounce their
moratorium on SS-20 deployments, undertake new missile
deployments with their Warsaw Pact allies, and take measures directly
threatening US territory if planned NATO deployments proceed.
The Soviets probably will portray the
statement to West German Chancellor Kohl in Moscow next week and
to other West European leaders as proof that the Warsaw Pact is united
in opposition to NATO's INF plans.
POLAND: Pope's Reaction to Editorial
the Pope
objected strongly to the recent editorial in L'Osservatore Romano that
said Solidarity leader Walesa is no longer a political force in Poland as
a result of the papal visit. The Pope demanded and received the
author's resignation and has sent letters to the Polish Episcopate and
Walesa disavowing the editorial.
Comment: The Pope's quick response clearly suggests he did not
strike a deal with Premier Jaruzelski to withdraw the Church's support
for Walesa or his goals. The Polish Government will continue to use
the editorial to try to demoralize and discredit Walesa and to create
divisions between the Church and the regime's opponents. Walesa,
who probably was advised by the Pope to be careful in choosing his
tactics, may conclude he has to show publicly that he is not ready to
quit.
Top Secret
9 29 June 1983
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Top Secret
USSR: Anticorruption Campaign Continues
former Krasnodar First Secretary
Medunov is awaiting trial for corruption, and press reports indicate
former Minister of Internal Affairs Shchelokov is facing similar
charges. The two men-both former proteges of Brezhnev-were
expelled by the Central Committee two weeks ago in a rare action
that cleared the way for their prosecution. Pravda yesterday charged
the police chief of a city in.Georgia with covering up numerous crimes.
Comment: A decision to prosecute Medunov and Shchelokov
would indicate General Secretary Andropov intends to make clear
that Central Committee members are not above the law. Publicly
announced sentences and dismissals of lower level officials could
backfire by rallying support for party secretary Chernenko or others
who might want to impede Andropov's consolidation of power.
TURKEY: Impending Changes in the Military Hierarchy
President Evren will retire from the military on Friday, according
to the US defense attache. General Ersin, the Ground Forces
Commander, will replace Evren as Chief of the General Staff. General
Urug, the Secretary General of the ruling military council, reportedly
will assume command of the Army.
Comment: The changes suggest the generals are preparing for
the resumption of the normal promotions and retirements cycle,
which has been frozen since 1980, either in the traditional month of
August or after the general election on 6 November. Urug had been
favored to succeed Evren, but the generals apparently decided not to
break with the tradition that calls for the Army commander to assume
the post. The changes may be designed to put Urug in position to
move up to the top military job in a few months. If so, Ersin probably
will join the Presidential Council, a civilian advisory body to the
President to be established after the election.
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10 29 June 1983
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CHILE: More Trouble Ahead
The national strike last week failed to draw widespread support,
but both opposition and government leaders are preparing for new
protests in July. The response to the strike was limited by extensive
government censorship, the arrest of union leaders, tactical
differences among labor and political coalitions, and short
preparation time. President Pinochet on Monday reiterated that
further protests would not be tolerated. Representatives of the
political parties claim another "day of national protest" is inevitable
next month, however, if the government does not respond to calls for
dialogue.
Comment: Pinochet is likely to continue to mix firm policies with
some concessions in an effort to split opposition forces and buy time.
He probably hopes that the economy will improve and that this will
undercut much of the opposition's support. Unless he agrees to
restore some democratic processes before 1989, however, he is likely
to face a series of strikes and other protests.
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Top Secret
WEST GERMANY-EAST GERMANY: Major Loan Approved
Bonn has decided to approve a five-year loan of 1 billion marks-
about $400 million at current exchange rates-from West German
banks to East Germany. If it fails to make scheduled principal or
interest payments, East Berlin agreed to forego billing the West
German Government for transit services. A West German official told
the US Ambassador the agreement would bring West Germany no
political concessions.
Comment: The loan will ease East Germany's financial problems.
It also will tend to confirm many Western bankers' belief in a West
German financial umbrella and thus will encourage them to resume
lending to East Berlin. Although Bonn may be criticized for failing to
demand political concessions, the government can argue that East
Berlin bears final responsibility for guaranteeing the loan.
Meat production on collective and state farms reached a record
level during the first five months of this year-about 7 percent above
the comparable period last year and 6 percent above the previous
high achieved in 1978. Good weather is largely responsible for the
increase, which has improved the feed supply situation.
Comment: Herd sizes are at record levels, and substantial growth
in meat production is likely after three years of stagnation. Output this
year could approach a record high of 16 million tons if grain
production reaches about 210 million tons and if there are grain
imports of 30 million tons and ample supplies of forage crops. Even at
this production level, however, 400,000 tons of meat would have to be
imported in order to maintain per capita meat consumption at the
level of 1982. Imports of 400,000 tons would be roughly half of the
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Special Analysis
GREECE-EC: Assuming the Presidency
Top Secret
This week Greece begins its six-month term as president of the EC
amid some concern in the Community about the commitment of the
Papandreou government to EC membership and its ability to handle
the demands of the office. Prime Minister Papandreou, who previously
opposed Greek accession, now seems to believe the prestige and
benefits of membership outweigh the disadvantages. EC financial aid,
for example, has been largely responsible for alleviating Greece's
balance-of-payments worries this year. The responsibilities of office,
pressure from other EC governments, and a desire to perform well will
discourage Athens from taking extreme positions on EC political
issues. Nonetheless, these factors will not prevent the Greeks from
occasionally dissociating themselves from Community policy or
seeking to give prominence to issues of special concern, such as
Cyprus.
The entry of Greece into the EC in 1981 marked a political turning
point for the country. President Karamanlis, the main architect of
membership, saw it as ensuring stability and democracy in Greece by
cementing the country's ties to the West. At the same time,
membership provided a painless way for Greece to assert its
independence from the US.
Economically, however, Greece was and still is the weakest
member of the EC-with a large agricultural population, a weak
industrial base, and a per capita income of around $4,000. Despite
government efforts over the past two years, inflation is still over
20 percent, unemployment has grown to about 8 percent, and private
investment and industrial growth remain stagnant.
So far, Community membership has been a mixed blessing.
Before accession, Athens enjoyed regular agricultural trade surpluses
with the EC. After accession, the increase in agricultural imports from
the other EC countries and hi h EC prices D u h e Greek farm
trade balance into deficit.
At the same time, however, Athens has benefited from
Community aid, which reached about $950 million in net transfer
payments and European Investment Bank loan commitments in 1982.
This aid helped cover a balance-of-payments deficit of some
$2.1 billion. It probably also was the most important factor in allowing
Greece to avoid application to the IMF and thus to carry through on
some of its more important social programs.
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Top Secret
"Special Needs"
Since coming to power, Papandreou gradually has backed away
from his call for a referendum on membership and his demand for
"special status" that would give Athens many of the advantages of
membership but require little in return. Instead, Athens has tried to
convince the EC of Greece's need for more aid and for an extension
of the period during which Greek industries would be protected from
competition within the Community. Most EC governments now admit
that Greece's accession to the EC was economically premature and
that its terms of entry were overly ambitious.
In response to a Greek request, the EC Commission in March
completed a special study that recommends granting Greece about
$2.2 billion in aid between 1985 and 1991, including $1 billion for
agriculture and $900 million for general economic development. The
Commission, however, refused to bend on the question of industrial
competition. It probably wanted to avoid the precedent the Greek
example could set for Spain and Portugal.
Although EC members are unlikely to act on the Commission's
recommendations until after Greece completes its term as president,
they probably will accept the proposals as part of the inevitable cost
of continued Greek membership. Papandreou is likely to settle for the
promise of more EC aid, even though he still insists publicly that
continued membership will depend on the EC's willingness to help
protect Greece's infant industries.
Prospects for Community Consensus
Greek officials have told their EC and US counterparts that
Athens will work toward Community consensus on political issues,
and Greece's partners will be likely to prod their newest member in
that direction. As EC president, Greece will be expected to represent
Community views in the UN and other international forums.
Although the responsibilities of office will discourage Athens from
taking extreme positions, the Papandreou government probably will
deviate on occasion from common EC positions. For example, the.
Greeks will be likely to have differences with their EC partners on INF
deployment, Middle East policy, and possibly Central American
affairs.
Athens has promised not to use the EC as a forum to air its
disputes with Turkey over the Aegean. At the same time, the
Papandreou government has indicated that it wants the EC to play a
more active role on the Cyprus issue, which it considers an
international problem. Community members, however, almost
certainly will avoid Greek efforts to draw them into the dispute.
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Top Secret
As spokesman for the EC, Greece will be the key interlocutor with
the US and other third parties. A government official in Athens has
assured the US Ambassador that Greece will "do no less than
previous presidents" in sharing information with the US on issues of
mutual concern-a pledge Papandreou later confirmed. Nonetheless,
US relations with the EC may become less certain under Greek
stewardship, as inexperience and the state of Greek-US relations are
likely in part to color cooperation.
Outlook
Greece's tenure as EC president will be difficult for all involved,
including the Papandreou government. The antiquated bureaucracy
in Athens will face the demands of overseeing some 200 EC
committees and working groups-a monumental task for a country
whose own policy toward the EC remains ill-defined
The Papandreou government, however, will be anxious to turn in
a respectable performance. The presidency will bring responsibility as
well as prestige and power. In the long term, Greece's commitment to
the EC and the West in general could be strengthened by its
experiences over the next six months.
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15 29 June 1983
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