(UNTITLED)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T01058R000201660002-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
January 12, 2017
Document Release Date:
April 26, 2010
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 1, 1985
Content Type:
REPORT
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Central intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
1 July 1985
Japan: A Progress Report on Labor Unification
Summary
The drive for labor unification in Japan, always
an elusive goal, gained momentum in 1982 with the
establishment of Zenmin Rokyo, the All Japan Council
of Private Sector Labor Organizations. Zenmin sR okyo
has made a good start, but prospects
limited unless the new national center can bridge
bitter political and organizational divisions that
plagued past unification attempts. With an eye to
labor's potential as an influential interstgroup,
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has stepped
contacts with the moderate Domei (Japanese
onent of the
Confederation of Labor), the original prop
unification movement. These exchanges could
exacerbate friction between Domei and theaioredleftist
r F_
de Unions)-- Y
T
ra
Sohyo (General Council of
critical of Domei's influence within Zenmin Rokyo.
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East.
Asian Analysis. Information as
areywelcomeaand s
used in its preparat o Northeast Asia
may be directed to the
Divison, OEA,
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Unifying the splintered labor movement in Japan would open
the way for labor to play a more active. political role,
especially if the.movement remained unaffiliated. Labor's
political leverage could be particularly important during
.elections, when the LDP, vulnerable to uncommitted voters, might
be willing to bargain for support--especially in urban areas
where it traditionally does less well. According to press
reports, LDP members are already stepping up contacts with labor
officials. A unified labor movement would be in a good position
to win ruling party support on such labor legislation as a
shorter work week. Private-sector unions have advocated fewer
hours for some time, using foreign criticism of this "hidden
subsidy" as an argument.
Background
In 1982 unions from the four major national labor
confederations--Sohyo, Domei, Churisturoren (Federation of
Independent Unions), and Shinsanbetsu (National Federation of
Industrial Organizations)--took a step toward unification by
establishing Zenmin Rokyo. Although participation is currently
limited to private-sector unions, the goal is to include
public-sector unions once a formal confederation is established.
Plans to shift Zenmin Rokyo from an informal working group to a
full-fledged national confederation by the end of 1985 looked
favorable at first, as the council got off to a strong start
(see table).
Zenmin Rokyo's early success was partly the result of a
truce between labor's major rivals--Sohyo and Domei. Sohyo
initially tried to sabotage the labor unification effort. The
predominately public-sector Sohyo and its political ally, the
Japan Socialist Party (JSP), both noted for dogmatic Marxist
positions and opposition to the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), are traditional adversaries of the
more moderate Domei, which is dominated by private-sector unions
and has ties to the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). Sohyo
eventually agreed to allow some of its unions to join Zenmin
Rokyo, however, in an effort to counter Domei's influence in the
new organization and to pacify its private-sector unions, which
were eager to join the unification bandwagon. Sohyo and Domei
-tried to put aside ideological differences that had blocked past
unification attempts. As a result, the.initial Zenmin Rokyo
platform concentrated on common economic issues.
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Japan's Labor Unions
(1984 Ministry of Labor Statistics)
Legend
fZZ Labor Unions
? Member of Zenmin Rokyo*
Zenmin Rokyo
Kokuro (Sohyo) 250,000 future alignment possible.
Sohyo Dome! Churitsu- Shinsan- Ind.
roren betsu
* Zendentsu (Sohyo) 280,000 joined 1 April.
Zensenbal (Sohyo 30,000 oined 1 April.
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Zenmin Rokyo members also agreed not to support any one
political party, partly to avoid arguments between Sohyo and
?Domei.member unions over JSP-DSP ties, but also to encourage an
opposition coalition. According to Embassy reporting,-union
officials believe an opposition coalition backed by a united
labor front could challenge the LDP's hold on government. Wary
of LDP efforts to block progress toward opposition cooperation,
member unions further agreed to discourage their political
allies from striking separate deals with the ruling party. At
first Zenmin Rokyo appeared to be having some success in
encouraging cooperation among labor's political partners:
o During the 1983 lower house election campaign, Zenmin Rokyo
member unions endorsed candidates from opposition parties
other than those they traditionally supported. According
to labor leaders, the endorsements made the difference in
several close races and demonstrated the potential
political clout of a united labor front.
o Thirty-three JSP and 19 DSP Diet members affiliated with
Zenmin Rokyo launched a joint discussion council last year
to coordinate policy on key legislation.
Too Wide a Division
Despite early successes, establishment of a politically
powerful unified labor movement is unlikely in the near term, as
the temporary cooperation between Domei and Sohyo appears to be
unraveling. As chief architect of the current unification
effort, Domei has incorporated some of its views into the Zenmin
Rokyo platform, in spite of the agreement to keep the platform
nonpartisan. For example, Zenmin Rokyo supports the LDP'S
administrative reform program--which threatens several
public-sector unions in Sohyo--and advocates affiliation with
the ICFTU.
The result has been controversy within Sohyo, with some
powerful leftist unions opposed to what they perceive as their
national leaders' acceptance of a Domei-influenced platform.
The Communist-affiliated unions--which fear they will be
excluded from a unified labor organization and their political
ally, the Japan Communist Party (JCP), from an opposition party
coalition--have been most vocal, threatening to pull out of
Sohyo. Concerned that these small but noisy members could
mobilize the entire left wing--the Communist unions have already
formed their own labor unification council--Sohyo officials are
now using stalling tactics to delay further consolidation of
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25X1
25X1 The LDP is likely to encourage Domei's initiative, although
stopping short of an alliance with the Democratic Socialists.
This year Prime Minister Nakasone took an unprecedented step
when he attended a reception marking Domei's 20th anniversary.
We believe the ruling party's interests are twofold: the LDP
sees wooing conservative unions as a way to strengthen its
political position while reaffirming divisions within labor. A
divided labor movement cannot encourage cooperation within the
opposition camp.
and the ruling party. Domei officials' attendance at the
government-sponsored National Founders Day ceremony in early
February was another effort to promote the union's moderate
image and its attractiveness to the LDP as a political ally.
Domei officials are becoming increasingly frustrated over
Sohyo's success in putting a brake on the unification movement.
Although Domei president Usami once hailed Zenmin Rokyo as a
potential political. force, he and other Domei leaders are now
looking elsewhere for political clout. Usami downplayed Zenmin
Rokyo's role in the labor movement at the Domei convention in
December 1984 and instead for the first time endorsed a possible
coalition between Domei's traditional political ally, the DSP,
reevaluated their participation in the council.
Zenmin Rokyo until they have solved internal differences and
Internal Weaknesses
In addition to facing problems posed by the Sohyo-Domei
split, Zenmin Rokyo is experiencing major organizational
difficulties:
o At the 1984 executive council meeting, Zenmin Rokyo members
agreed only to study the question of transforming the
council into a federation, leaving labor officials doubtful
that a more formal organization will take shape soon.
o Loyalty within Zenmin Rokyo is weak, as council officials
share their time with parent unions. The absence of local
organizations to implement policies limits the council's
authority. National unions have blocked efforts to
establish regional chapters, fearing erosion in their
support bases.
o Zenmin Rokyo relies on the other national labor
organizations for financial support. Because labor
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.officials are uncertain of the council's long-term
prospects, however, they are reluctant to increase=-
contributions. Resulting financial difficulties have
limited the organization's'ability to exercise influence in
the labor movement. -
interest in the current unification effort.
Outlook
Although these problems make unification of Japan's
fragmented labor movement appear a long way off, several events
could help put it.back on track. One of Domei's major reasons
for disillusionment with Zenmin Rokyo was the council's failure
to affiliate with the ICFTU. Recently, however, Churitsuroren,
the third largest labor federation, agreed to join the
international organization. According to Embassy Tokyo,
Churitsuroren leaders hope this move will reawaken Domei's
Some political observers have speculated the LDP could be
i i g out of hand, could discredit the
which
bblin
,
g,
squa
party and weaken its support at the polls. At this time we do
not see signs of serious trouble for the LDP, but the
possibility has raised hopes in the opposition camp. Visions of
an opportunity to unseat the ruling party could encourage new
efforts to form an opposition coalition, which in turn could
offer labor an incentive to renew its own unification attempts.
The transfer of major public corporations to the private
sector as part of the government's administrative reform program
could also boost at least private-sector unification. The
return of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) and the Japan
Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation (JTS) to the private sector
has moved their respective labor organizations, Zendentsu
(280,000) and Zensenbai (30,000), into alignment with the
private sector. A stronger private sector could put Zenmin
Rokyo in a better position to ignore Sohyo and move forward on
the unification process. Sohyo, which relies heavily on
public-sector support, clearly sees a threat to its power base.
Sohyo officials and the JSP are already gearing up for a Diet
session this fall, when they hope to block legislation that
would approve privatization of the Japan National Railway,
raising the possibility of an additional uarter of a million
union members' joining Zennmin Rokyo. E: -1 -
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Distribution:
Japan: A Progress Report on Labor
Original -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 - OEA Production Office
1 - D/OEA
1 - DDI
1 - Executive Director
1 - NIO/EA
1 - C/EA/RR-
1 - C/PES
1 - C/DO/PPS
1 -
1 - OCR/ISG
1 - NIC Analytic Group
1 - CPAS/ILS
5 -CPAS/IMC/CB
1 -
1 - Donald Gregg, Office of the Vice President
1 - Thomas Hubbard, Department of State
1 - William Brooks, Department of State
1 - Rea Brazeal, Department of State
Unification
DDI/OED
1 - Glen Fukushima, United States Trade Representative
Office
1 - Byron Jackson, Department of Commerce
1 - Doug Mulholland, Department of the Treasury
(1 July 1985)
25X1
25X1
25X1
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