(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00283R000200130004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of sir
Intelligence
Pockets Full ~ of Problems
The El Salvador-Honduras Border:
An Intelligence Assessment
-!Secret-
GI 83-10262
November 1983
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= j~ Intelligence
The El Salvador-Honduras Border:
Pockets Full of Problems
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared byl of the
Office of Global Issues. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
? directed to the Chief, Geography Division, OGI, on
Secret
GI 83-10262
November 1983
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Secret
The El Salvador-Honduras Border:
Pockets Full of Problems 25X1
Key Judgments A string of disputed pockets of territory-bolsones territoriales-are
Information available major stumblingblocks to resolving the longstanding boundary problem
as of7 November 1983 between El Salvador and Honduras. Not only does the problem sour
was used in this report.
relations between the two neighbors, it complicates efforts to suppress
Salvadoran guerrillas operating in the border region. Left unsolved, the
dispute will be a continual irritant that we believe could eventually lead to
a significant deterioration in political and military relations between El
Salvador and Honduras. The presidents of both countries have publicly
stated that the dispute should be settled quickly, but negotiations appear
stalemated, significant differences remain, and we see little prospect for an
early resolution of the issue. This assessment briefly reviews the history of
the border dispute, describes pertinent geographic factors, discusses the
relationship of the problem to the Salvadoran insurgency, and examines
prospects for settlement.
Secret
GI 83-10262
November 1983
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Secret
The El Salvador-Honduras Border:
Pockets Full of Problems
Background
No agreement has ever delimited the entire El Salva-
dor-Honduras boundary. During the Spanish colonial
period, later while both countries were part of the
Central American Union, and still later in the early
19th century when both were independent, the border
region was of relatively little political interest. The
Letona-Cruz Agreement of 1884 defined the bound-
ary on the basis of property, ecclesiastical, and colo-
nial administration documents. Honduras renounced
that agreement in 1935 when El Salvador, Honduras,
and Guatemala met to establish their triborder point.
In 1955 a joint cartographic survey project acquired
aerial photography of the border region and a ground
survey was initiated, but not completed. A Honduran-
Salvadoran mixed commission drafted a treaty in
1968, but negotiations were curtailed in July 1969
when the so-called Soccer War broke out between the
two countries]
Although violence between Hondurans and Salvador-
ans following World Cup soccer qualifying matches in
both countries ignited the five-day war, a major cause
of the conflict was a long-festering demographic
problem. El Salvador, Central America's most dense-
ly populated country, has traditionally sought to
alleviate overcrowding by encouraging emigration.
Before the 1960s most of the Salvadoran emigrants
went to Honduras, the least densely populated country
in the region. Short of labor, Honduras had encour-
aged immigration, but by the early 1960s the influx of
Salvadorans (variously estimated at 125,000 to
300,000) was becoming a political issue among parti-
san groups in Honduras seeking to promote their
nationalist credentials. Under the guise of land re-
form, which prohibited foreign nationals from owning
distributed lands, many Salvadorans were driven from
areas they had been farming and were forced to
return to El Salvador in 1969.
During the war the Salvadoran Army penetrated
Honduras in several places, capturing the provincial
capital of Nueva Ocotepeque and an area extending
some 20 kilometers along the Inter-American High-
way east of Goascoran. Although the fighting lasted
only five days, more than 2,000 people were killed.
Table 1
Country Statistics
Area (sq km)
21,400
112,150
Population (estimated July 1983)
4,685,000
4,276,000
Average annual growth
rate (percent)
2.7
3.5
Density (persons
per sq km)
219
38
Bolsones as a percentage
of national territory
1.79
0.34
The Organization of American States (OAS) ar-
ranged a cease-fire and a withdrawal of Salvadoran
troops; the San Jose Protocol of 1970 established a
demilitarized zone 3 kilometers wide on both sides of
the border. 25X1
Post-Soccer War Negotiations
Fresh military incidents along the border led to
meetings of the foreign ministers of the guarantor
nations of the San Jose Protocol and to the signing of
the Act and Protocol of Managua in August 1976. A
general peace treaty was negotiated under the media-
tion of a former president of Peru and signed in Lima
on 30 October 1980.
Besides terminating the state of war and normalizing
diplomatic relations, the treaty:
? Delimited seven border sections, amounting to al-
most 60 percent of the boundary.
? Contained provisions by which agreement could be
reached within five years on disputed sections of the
border, including portions of the Golfo de Fonseca.
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? Called for a Joint Boundary Commission to demar-
cate the defined sections and negotiate territorial
claims in "zones of controversy" on the basis of
historical records, including civil and ecclesiastical
documents and maps.
? Provided that, should the commission be unable to
reach agreement on these zones within five years,
either or both countries could submit a claim to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) for binding
arbitration.
The commission has met periodically, but, because of
mutual distrust and the fear of domestic criticism in
both countries, little progress has been made. OAS
observers, deployed along the frontier to ensure peace,
departed in July 1981 after reimbursement for their
expenses could not be arranged with El Salvador and
Honduras
Survey and demarcation work has proceeded very
slowly. According to a US State Department official,
surveys of the boundary along 50 kilometers of the
Rio Goascoran have already taken almost two years
because of continual disagreement over such minor
points as what constitutes the center of a river.
Rugged terrain and occasional heavy rains make field
work difficult in many portions of the border, but the
primary obstacles are political.
Current Status of Dispute
Each country takes a distinctly different approach
toward solving the boundary problem. The Hondurans
favor negotiations to delimit each disputed zone sepa-
rately and insist that their cooperation in establishing
a US-supported regional military training center
(RMTC) in Honduras should have accelerated negoti-
ations. The Salvadorans want one agreement to re-
solve the status of all disputed territories and reject
any linkage to the RMTC. They also want the
demarcation of the undisputed sections of the bound-
ary to precede survey mapping; Hondurans prefer that
the tasks be accomplished in the reverse order. Ac-
cording to the Hondurans, security in the border zone
is not a major problem and they accuse the Salvador-
ans of foot-dragging. The rigidity of both govern-
ments was indicated by the stalemate in negotiations
announced by the Honduran Ambassador in San
Salvador during the October 1983 meeting of the
Joint Boundary Commission.
A Geographic Sketch of the Disputed Territories
Remote from the economic and political core areas of
El Salvador and Honduras, the bolsones remain
beyond the effective control of both governments.
They range from about 8 to 153 square kilometers in
extent and total more than 380 square kilometers,
somewhat more than twice the size of the District of
Columbia.
Except for the disputed area in the Golfo de Fonseca,
the bolsones consist of hilly to mountainous terrain
with elevations ranging from 300 to nearly 2,800
meters. They are covered by grass, brush, pine, and
broad-leaved evergreens; some of the denser stands of
trees provide good concealment for insurgents. Steep
slopes, rocky gorges, and lack of roads make move-
ment difficult through most of these areas and sharp-
ly limit the use of vehicles. Scattered trails are the
primary means of communication. The few natural-
surface roads are probably impassable during much
of the May-to-October rainy season, making rapid
movement of troops and military equipment difficult.
Soils are thin and rocky, and economic activity
consists mostly of subsistence farming and grazing.
The disputed area in the Golfo de Fonseca includes
land near the mouth of the Rio Goascoran (three-
fourths of which is swamp and marsh), two islands,
and nearby territorial waters. In the delta, land that
is not too marshy or swampy is used for farming and
grazing. The homes of peasant farmers are scattered
along natural surface roads. The Isla Meanguera is a
steep-sided volcanic island with ravines and rugged
slopes covered by grass and stands of evergreen trees.
Most of the small population lives in a fishing village,
but there are a few scattered farm settlements
According to officials of the Inter-American Geodetic
Survey (IAGS), the small Salvadoran team assigned
to the Joint Boundary Commission spends much of its
time on other matters, including mapping of parcels of
land for distribution under the land reform program.
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Table 2
The Disputed Territories
The Joint Boundary Commission has requested US
material support and technical aid to speed ma in
and demarcation of the boundary.
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Area
(sq km)
Population
(estimated)
Las Pilas
42
1,250
Arcatao (Zazalapa)
34
1,250
Sabanetas (Nahuaterique)
153
1,500
Monteca
47
500
The Salvadoran Constituent Assembly, currently
drafting a new constitution, has postponed until the
end of their deliberations consideration of the article
dealing with national territory and international
boundaries.
El Salvador recently proposed concessions in two of
the disputed zones, according to the US Embassy in
San Salvador. As part of a larger settlement, El
Salvador is willing to give up the northern portion of
the Arcatao bolson and the disputed lands (mostly
swamp and marsh) at the mouth of the Rio Goas-
coran. It has also offered to formalize the de facto
condominium arrangement for sharing the use of the
river and maritime areas in the Golfo de Fonseca. The
Hondurans have not responded to the proposal, and
one Salvadoran official describes their attitude as
"totally negative."
Honduras devotes more attention to the boundary
question and has a much larger team assigned to the
problem than El Salvador. The US State Department
reports that Honduras is already looking for interna-
tional lawyers to present its case to the ICJ and has
sent a senior commission member to research relevant
historical documents in the United States, France,
England, and Spain. State Department officials famil-
iar with the border question say that both countries
already have large volumes of material-much of it
contradictory
IIn August 1983 Honduras sug- 25X1
gested that the United States appoint a "coordinator"
who could expedite the negotiations and demarcation,
but El Salvador rejected direct US participation. The
IAGS in Tegucigalpa has provided the commission
with tents and other gear to support field survey work.
Helicopters, jeeps, communications equipment, and
financial aid have also been requested by the commis-
Honduras continues to urge El Salvador to resolve
their border differences before the December 1985
treaty deadline. Earlier in 1983, according to US
Embassy reporting from both capitals, the Govern-
ment of Honduras insisted that progress on the border
issue was a prerequisite for the opening of the RMTC.
But El Salvador holds that cooperation in military
training and border control requires no special repay-
ment because ridding the region of leftist insurgents
serves the interests of both countries. The Honduran
Congress debated and eventually approved the train-
ing of Salvadoran Army units, and the first contingent
arrived at the RMTC for training in late June.
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Since the end of the Soccer War, troops from each
country have harassed the other's civilian residents of
the border zone. Occasionally, people have been
wounded or killed. Most of these violent incidents are
probably due to undisciplined soldiers, but some may 25X1
be designed to generate pressure for a settlement or
drive residents from the region, thus weakening their
governments' claim to the territory.
Disputed Territories and the Insurgency
During the early stages of the current turmoil in
Central America, much of the El Salvador-Honduras
border region was free from government military
control. Arms traffic crossed Honduran territory from
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Nicaragua to El Salvador, and guerrillas moved with
ease in and out of Salvadoran refugee camps just
inside the Honduran border. The guerrillas enjoyed
even greater freedom in the bolsones because of their
confused legal status and treaty limits on military
forces in the border region.
Since the inauguration in January 1982 of President
Roberto Suazo Cordova, Honduras has begun to
defend its territorial integrity with more vigor and to
cooperate militarily with El Salvador. Efforts have
been made to interdict arms traffic, and more than
half of an estimated 18,000 Salvadoran war refugees
in Honduras have been moved away from the border.
On several occasions coordinated Honduran-Salva-
doran military operations have been carried out in the
"demilitarized area" near the border. The Honduran
Army has increased its patrols and placed blocking
forces along the border and inside bolsones to stop
fleeing Salvadoran insurgents. These actions limit the
ability of the insurgents to use the border area,
refugee camps, and bolsones as supply bases and
zones of refuge. However, the insurgents continue to
transfer arms and supplies through the region to their
camps inside El Salvador, and the civilian sympathiz-
ers in the bolsones reportedly provide some food and
support
For now, western Honduras near the borders with El
Salvador and Guatemala, including the westernmost
bolsones, is relatively quiet, but the area could be-
come the scene of increased insurgent activity direct-
ed against the Honduran Government.
complicate military operations and delay mapping
and demarcation of the border.
Conclusions and Outlook
Resolution of the border dispute would reduce suspi-
cions and permit much closer cooperation between
Salvadoran and Honduran military forces in their
counterinsurgency efforts. Honduras remains con-
cerned that it is helping to train a potential enemy.
Tegucigalpa will probably continue to try to capitalize
on its agreement to host the regional military training
center in order to gain US cooperation in pressuring
El Salvador for concessions on the boundary problem.
But, given their sensitivity to territorial issues, the
Salvadorans are unlikely to make any appreciable
concessions. Because of the slow pace of negotiations
and the prevailing atmosphere of mutual distrust, we
foresee no early end to the problem. If and when the
dispute is finally settled, we believe it will probably be
as a result of arbitration by the International Court of
Justice.
Serious conflict over the bolsones is unlikely in the
near term because both countries are preoccupied by
leftist threats-El Salvador with insurgents, and Hon-
duras with a growing Nicaraguan military presence
along its southeastern border. The ambiguous status
of the border territories will continue to benefit
guerrillas and be a source of ill will between El
Salvador and Honduras. Left unresolved, we believe
the dispute could eventually cause a serious deteriora-
tion in relations between the two countries.
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