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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00927R000100100003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Bangladesh:
Ershad's Search for Stability
NESA 83-10239
October 1983
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Intelligence
Bangladesh:
Ershad's Search for Stability
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
This paper was prepared b _]office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asian Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 83-10239
October 1983
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o?cI cL
Bangladesh:
Ershad's Search for Stability
Key Judgments Chief Martial Law Administrator Lt. Gen. H. M. Ershad, who assumed
Information available power in March 1982 in a bloodless military coup, is trying to institutional-
as of 1 September 1983 ize his power by becoming Bangladesh's next elected president. To get
was used in this report.
there, he has to appease a highly politicized military constituency, with
widely varying views regarding Ershad's political strategy as well as its
own future role in government and, to a lesser degree, the civilian
politicians, who view the military as usurpers of power.
Although we believe Bangladesh's numerous political parties will continue
to challenge the legitimacy of Ershad's government and to agitate for a
speedier return to civilian rule, we consider them too factionalized to
thwart Ershad's presidential aspirations. We believe the military will not
return power to weak civilian politicians and will remain the country's only
effective political institution-despite a lack of consensus within the
military over the extent of its future political involvement.
Ershad's success in carrying through his strategy is still problematical, but
we believe Ershad has to:
? Persuade the military to accept his.transition to the presidency and to
take a lower profile in a civilian government.
? Establish a political base outside the military, probably through local
government leaders and grassroots popular support.
? Acquire some broad-based support among factions that have split from
the largely urban-based political parties to add legitimacy to his political
aspirations.
? Continue to implement economic reforms that will improve the economy
overall and strengthen his own popular support
We judge Ershad has a good chance of remaining in power at least until
the national elections he has announced for March 1985. We attribute his
staying power to his. being the least controversial and most senior leader
among the other potential military contenders. Although military disunity
has hampered Ershad's ability to consolidate his position, we believe it also
has worked to his advantage by inhibiting the emergence of cohesive
military opposition. Over the longer term, however, we see the highly
politicized- military as a divisive and destabilizing element in Bangladesh
politics.
Secret
NESA 83-10239
October 1983
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Secret
Although internal instability is the primary concern of any government in
Dhaka, Bangladesh's continuing need for outside economic assistance and
stable relations with India are major external pressures. Bangladeshis tend
to view problems in relations with New Delhi as a sign that India is
attempting to undermine their government. We judge that acquiescence to
pressure from New Delhi-such as on the Ganges-Brahmaputra water-
sharing problem-would hurt Ershad's domestic political position. Al-
though India would favor the emergence of a more accommodating
government in Dhaka, we believe it recognizes that instability in Bangla-
desh could affect the stability of the entire region.
Increased Soviet encouragement of the left to agitate against the Martial
Law Administration in Bangladesh concerns the government in Dhaka and
has contributed to the deterioration in relations between the two countries.
Moscow has the largest diplomatic presence in Bangladesh-over a
hundred people-which provides it with the resources to exploit opportuni-
ties inherent in the country's unstable politics. We believe that the
increased level of Soviet activity in Bangladesh is aimed at checking the
military regime's drift to the West and strengthening the leftists' position.
The Soviets probably recognize, however, that local pro-Soviet leftists are
weak, factionalized, and have little chance of bringing down Ershad's
government by themselves.
US interests in Bangladesh and the region will not be significantly affected
if Ershad succeeds in consolidating his power and becoming the country's
elected president. A sharp deterioration in Bangladesh's political stability
or economic conditions, however, would have an impact on US interests:
The. need could develop for even 'larger doses of US economic aid. The
United States already has invested more tham $2 billion in food and
development aid since Bangladesh's independence.
Instability in Bangladesh could add to. US bilateral problems with India,
which pays close attention to the internal situation of its neighbors,
should Bangladesh solicit US support in resolving regional disputes.
Instability could also heighten tension between India and Pakistan if
India tried to assert its regional dominance in Bangladesh.
? Instability in Bangladesh could provide an opportunity for further Soviet
involvement in the subcontinent.
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Bangladesh:
Ershad's Search for Stability
A Legacy of Political Instability
Chief Martial Law Administrator Lt. Gen. Hussain
Mohammad Ershad is striving to stabilize his coun-
try's chaotic politics and institutionalize his position.
During the country's nearly 12 years of political
independence, which followed a bloody nine-month
civil war between East and West Pakistan, three
leaders have been assassinated, and military coup
attempts have been numerous. Bangladesh's founder,
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was killed in 1975 by junior
officers bent on ending what had become a corrupt,
ineffective, and violence-plagued government. Mujib's
immediate successor remained in power only three
days before he was killed in a countercoup.
In our view, the assassination of the popular Gen.
Ziaur Rahman (Zia) in 1981 by a longtime rival in an
unsuccessful coup attempt left a gap in Bangladesh's
leadership from which the country still has not recov-
ered. Although Zia failed to develop strong political
institutions or to resolve the problem of corruption
among senior officials, we believe he changed Bangla-
desh's image from one of hopeless poverty and disor-
der to that of a lesser developed country successfully
attacking its problems
Effective political power has rested with the military
since 24 March 1982, when Lieutenant General
Ershad orchestrated a bloodless coup against elected
President Sattar, declared martial law, and assumed
the position of Chief Martial Law Administrator.
Ershad's assumption of power followed months of
military dissatisfaction with the aging Sattar and his
ineffective handling of Bangladesh's myriad prob-
lems. Parliament was dissolved, the constitution
suspended, and activity by Bangladesh's numerous
political parties banned.
the civilian President, retired judge Abul Fazal
Mohammad Ahsanuddin Chowdhury, is only a fig-
urehead.
Economic Hurdles
Ershad has undertaken bold reforms-which comply
with IMF-guidelines-to halt severe economic decline
caused by a series of poor crops; previous weak
economic management; and a poor climate for foreign
trade, assistance, and investment. As a result, the
Bangladesh Government reports the country's eco-
nomic growth rate rose from near zero in FY 1982 to
3.8 percent in FY 1983. According to IMF and US
Embassy reporting, foreign exchange reserves in the
past year increased from $100 million to $300 million.
The Bangladesh Finance Minister reports food stocks
are 30 percent higher than last year. Further, the
IMF reports the trade balance deficit was cut from an
estimated $1.9 billion to $1.6 billion by a slight
increase in exports and a cut in imports.
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A major factor in Ershad's program is significantly
greater private-sector activity and reduced public-
sector activity. According to the US Embassy, major
reforms favorable to the private sector-including the
divestiture of the key jute and textile industries-have
boosted the confidence of Bangladesh industrialists.
Consequently, new capital investment and improve-
ments of existing factories are beginning to pick up.
The Embassy further indicates that businessmen have
started serious joint-venture negotiations with Ameri-
can manufacturers of food products and equipment.
The Embassy reports that the Bangladesh Govern-
ment recently announced additional steps to consoli-
date FY 1983 gains and to strengthen economic
policies. The government is working to increase prices
paid to local farmers for foodgrains by 8 percent and
to reduce subsidies on foodgrains, energy, water,
transportation, and health care. Also, the government
plans to broaden the national tax base by moving
away from reliance on customs and excise duties
toward income and direct taxes, institute reforms in
the financial sector, and provide incentives to encour-
age savings. We believe that, if Ershad can accom-
plish these measures, he will improve the govern-
ment's domestic financial position, encourage
agricultural production, and bring prices more in line
with actual costs.
Ershad also is trying to tackle economic problems in
the rural areas where they originate. Although Dhaka
is the decisionmaking center, it is insulated from the
countryside, where the World Bank reports nearly 90
percent of the population lives. According to Bank
analysts, poverty and unemployment in rural areas
are reinforced by a stratified social and economic
system dominated by traditional landlord-peasant re-
lationships. Ershad is counting on his ambitious thana
reform plan to bring government closer to the people.'
By subordinating the civil servants to a popularly
elected body of village headmen, Ershad hopes to
promote more responsive rural development projects
and build grassroots political institutions. Land re-
form focusing on strengthening the rights of the
The Population Dilemma
The US Embassy reports that Ershad recognizes that
a solution to the problem of an already large and
rapidly increasing imbalance between the population
and the nation's limited natural resources is critical
to long-term political and economic stability. Some
96.5 million Bangladeshis live in a country the size of
Wisconsin. Growing at a rate of 2.7 to 3.1 percent,
depending on statistical assumptions, the population
will double by the first decade of the next century.
According to the US Embassy, the government has
had little success in implementing its family planning
program. Ineffective and lethargic bureaucratic ad-
ministration of the program, lack of education, deep-
ly ingrained social strictures, and the reluctance of a
traditional Muslim society that considers birth con-
trol against the will of God are the major barriers to
a solution of the staggering population problem.
tenant farmer is.another area in which the govern-
ment is seeking rural improvements. Early implemen-
tation of the proposals is unlikely, however, given the
tenacity of landowners and the difficulties in enforc-
ing policies in remote rural areas without rigorous
supervision and organization.
Despite the government's efforts, the World Bank
forecasts a difficult economic period. The Bank does
not expect significant improvement in the country's
terms of trade or in aid inflows, and the availability of
external and domestic resources will remain tight.
Bank analysts project only modest rates of real GDP
and investment growth and underscore the govern-
ment's need to develop an effective strategy to sustain
the development effort. Economic growth could be
hampered further by Bangladesh's growing foreign
debt. According to USAID, the ratio of repayment
obligations as a percentage of export earnings, worker
remittances, and other service earnings could rise
from 10.2 percent in FY 1982 to 19.1 percent by FY
1987, unless a number of aid donors write off the
debt.
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Ershad's Political Strategy
We believe that Ershad, in seeking to continue as
leader of Bangladesh, sees himself as a middleman
between the military and civilian politicians. He is
attempting to construct a political party, not yet
officially named and still tenuous, that would have
military support and broad-based centrist civilian
backing in order to retain power through the transi-
tion from military to civilian rule. According to
Embassy reporting, he is striving to amass grassroots
support and heighten his public role, campaigning
over the last year as hard as any politician
Ershad's leadership style, still unfolding and some-
what naive, will be another factor in determining his
political longevity. Ershad, who has only begun to
develop a more farsighted political strategy, continues
to react haltingly to problems. Less a charismatic
personality or political tactician than Presidents
Mujib, and Zia, Ershad's strength may lie in his
ability to mediate among the many competing ele-
ments in Bangladesh. Although he has managed so
far to juggle incongruous groups, it is still difficult to
determine how adept Ershad will be over a longer
period because his "better-than-average" perform-
ance so far may be more attributable to circumstance
than skill.
In March, Ershad announced an 18-point political
and economic program that, according to US Embas-
sy reports, closely parallels the 19-point program the
late President Zia issued at the beginning of his
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Most problematic for Ershad, in our view, is whether.
to give the military a formal constitutional role. in a
civilian government. According to the US Embassy,
Ershad knows that maintaining support within all
levels of the military is essential to protect his posi-
tion, and from the start he has advocated strong
political career. To strengthen his image in a country
where symbols are important, Ershad "miraculously"
has acquired a son after 26 years of a childless
marriage, despite the fact that Ershad's wife appeared
noticeably unpregnant a week before the alleged
birth,
The US Embassy reports Ershad is gaining more
confidence and is acting with somewhat more political
savvy in consolidating his authority, to become Ban-
gladesh's next elected president. Following several
months of indecision over how to initiate a political
process-which included an unproductive attempt at
a dialogue with politicians-Ershad publicly has
called for phased local elections between December
1983 and March 1984, with national elections to
follow in March 1985.
To build a base for his still sketchily conceived
political organization, Ershad is figuring on grassroots
support to strengthen his position and counter the
strength that the political parties traditionally have
held in the urban areas. Ershad's emphasis on thana
reform, which appears to us to be a genuine but
monumental effort to eradicate rural poverty, will
military participation in government.
The US Embassy reports that Ershad is now more
conscious of the risks of providing a formal constitu-
tional role for the military. We judge Ershad is most
concerned about its limited experience in running .the
country, its faltering loyalty and disparate views, and
its own susceptibility to the very corruption that
party opposition to the military's political participa-
tion and an attempt to modify the military profile of
his government to Western aid donors also may be
influencing Ershad's thinking.
we believe that Ershad has
raised the expectations of the majority of the military
who may not be satisfied with anything less than a
constitutional role.
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if Ershad can quietly maneuver to assume the presi-
dency prior to national elections, he stands to improve
his credibility and legitimacy. Alternatively, should
he force the issue, particularly before he musters
sufficient rural support, he could encounter consider-
able negative reaction from the political parties. If the
reaction takes the form of overheated demonstrations
and strikes, military opponents of Ershad's political
ambitions are likely to push successfully for continued
martial law and could convince the military to remove
assure his popularity.
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Ershad
To succeed with his strategy, Ershad must counter the
problems of appeasing a discordant military, which
serves as his main power base, and mollifying civilian
political opponents who see the military as having
illegally usurped power. Given Ershad's demonstrated
caution, moderation, and flexibility, in our view, he
has a good chance of holding on to his position.
A Tangle of Military Disunity
In our view, military disunity has worked against
Ershad by preventing him from consolidating his
authority and at times discrediting his image and the
policies he is trying to implement. We judge disunity
to be worst within the officer corps. The US Embassy
reports that Ershad is convinced that President Zia's
neglect of the military led to his assassination. Conse-
quently, Ershad has substantially increased military
salaries and benefits to win support
to counter what Ershad perceives as a
noncommittal attitude among much of the military
regarding his political aspirations, Ershad may carry
his campaign to the military cantonments to reaffirm
himself as the only viable candidate who will run the
country in a manner acceptable to the military and
essentially sell them as well on civilian rule.
,Ershad has moved cautiously to consolidate his au-
thority, and he still needs a consensus among senior
generals to govern. The number and composition of
generals who support Ershad and his policies change
often, in our view, depending on the issues and the
political atmosphere in Dhaka. Even more difficult,
Ershad must satisfy the demands of the junior and
middle grade officers and enlisted ranks in order to
Recently, Ershad has asserted his authority by trans-
ferring two powerful senior generals who have op-
posed his political strategy. The hardline attitudes of
these generals are admired by some military mem-
bers,
the troops are not likely to turn
against Ershad because of these transfers. Maj. Gen.
Mohabbat Jan Chowdhury, formerly the Minister of
Home Affairs who has been demoted to a less influen-
tial position and may eventually be sent out of the
country as Bangladesh's Ambassador to China, had
used his role to propose political and social policies in
keeping with his Islamic conservatism. The abrupt
removal.of the seemingly hotheaded Maj. Gen. Abdur
Rahman, who has been Ershad's most vocal critic and
the most obvious power seeker, will give Ershad some
maneuverability to implement his strategy more effec-
tively.
Although military disunity has hampered Ershad, we
believe it has also worked to his advantage by thwart-
ing any cohesive body of military opposition from
developing and enabling Ershad to be the one person
most acceptable and least threatening to the disparate
elements within the military. The advantage to
Ershad, in our opinion, of strengthening the military's
political involvement is that a body of military repre-
sentatives. could support him in implementing his
policies. But Ershad faces a political risk by further
politicizing a military that lacks unity, whose inten-
tions and loyalty to him are tangential, and whom
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necrer
Military Divisiveness After the
1971 War of Independence
In our view, the military in Bangladesh can make or
break any government, but it is not cohesive, and its
discipline is mediocre. According to one South Asian
scholar, factionalism developed in the military coin-
cidentally with politicization and has weakened its
regular Army, and encouraged military disunity.
With an approximate strength of 30,000, Mujib's
force was supposed to protect villagers against crime.
According to one scholar, villagers were in fact often
effectiveness as a vehicle of stability.
Historians show politicization of the Bangladesh
military is rooted in its initial involvement in the
country's liberation struggle against Pakistan, when
Ziaur Rahman, then a major in the Pakistan Army,
declared independence in Chittagong before slipping
away to help found the poorly armed and ill-trained
mukti bahini, or freedom fighters. Formed in 1971,
this guerrilla force evolved from the paramilitary and
security arm of the Awami League, the East Bengali
political party from which the independence move-
ment sprang. Following independence in late 1971,
the newly formed Bangladesh armed forces consisted
of some 17,000 members of the Army, with the Navy
and Air Force having perhaps 500 men each, accord-
ing to one academic source
After 1971 the military's politicization and factional-
ism increased and led to its eventual intervention in
politics in August 1975 when junior officers and a
small group of enlisted men staged the coup in which
Sheikh Mujib and his family were killed. In the
midst of the chaos following independence and uncer-
tain of the political reliability of many of the former
liberation forces, Mujib in 1972 had formed his own
private army, the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini, or national
security force. This group's heavyhanded methods
aroused resentment among civilians, demoralized the
politicians view as illegitimate usurpers. Ultimately,
Ershad will need to continue to develop broad-based
military support to remain in power. To accomplish
this, he will need to be more assertive in unseating
military opponents and will need to co-opt the youn-
ger officers who are likely to support whomever they
see as beneficial to their own position.
threatened rather than protected by this force.
Although less prominent now, the most basic rift
existed between the freedom fighters who were in
East Pakistan in 1971 and the returnees who were
stationed in West Pakistan, interned there during the
war, and not allowed to return to Bangladesh until
1973. The latter resented the fact that what they
regarded as their rightful positions had been usurped
by freedom fighters who had been granted two years'
additional seniority for their involvement in the war.
Another disunifying factor born during the liberation
war, but which did not make itself felt until 1975,
was the formation of a group of radicalized freedom
fighter officers critical of Mujib. These officers were
allied to political parties of the left-notably the
Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (National Socialist Party-
JSD). According to one South Asian scholar, these
elements sought not merely to advance themselves
within the new political and military structure, but to
rebuild Bangladesh along more radical socialist
lines. They concentrated on infiltrating the enlisted
ranks, where they still maintain some influence.
Civilian Opponents
Ershad's civilian opponents are likely to continue to
push for a return to civilian rule and for earlier
general elections, according to the US Embassy. We
believe Ershad would not advance the date for the
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general elections, however, because he does not have
sufficient support from political party splinter groups
and has not consolidated his power within the mili-
tary. Should Ershad not abide by the election time-
table he has announced, however, he risks incurring
more criticism not only from the politicians, but also
from those factions of the military who are eager to
In our view, Ershad needs some support from estab-
lished political parties in order for the public to view
his regime as legitimate. It is still uncertain whether
any of the significant parties would cooperate with a
successor regime dominated by military and loyal
rural representatives, but we believe that some will be
more opportunistic and jump on an Ershad bandwag-
on, particularly if he fares well in local elections. The
leftist parties and their student organizations are
likely to challenge an'Ershad-led civilian government
and may try to forestall such an outcome with
demonstrations and strikes. According to the US
Embassy, skirmishes between leftist students and the
newly formed pro-Ershad student group have already
occurred at Dhaka University. We do not believe that
the radicals would be able to bring down Ershad
without the support of other political party groups and
a major issue upon which to focus grievances.
It is possible that the major political parties may not
participate in any local or national elections in an
attempt to discredit Ershad. Even if the major parties
do participate in future elections, we believe party
infighting, particularly in the Awami League, which
led Bangladesh to independence, and the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party, President Zia's party, will further
weaken their opposition to an Ershad-led party and
their ability to organize a successful campaign. We do
not believe they are likely to pose a serious obstacle to
Ershad's candidates in the local elections. Even so, in
our view, the military will not allow the pro-Indian
Awami League to regain power.
(See appendix for more
details on the political parties.)
Ershad's political strategy depends on his ability to
manipulate the local elections to predetermine the
outcome of any future parliamentary and presidential
elections. We believe Ershad has a good chance of
drawing his support from the rural areas and using
that base to develop his own party from center-right
politicians. Press reports indicate some civilian politi-
cal opponents recognize this probability and have
begun visiting local districts in an attempt to rally
their own support. Nevertheless, we agree with the
US Embassy's assessment that the civilian political
opposition is so fragmented and disorganized that it
will be unable to pose a credible electoral challenge to
Ershad.
External Sources of Instability
Although internal instability is the major problem
confronting Ershad, actual and perceived vulnerabili-
ty to external pressures heightens Bangladeshis' inse-
curity. Given Bangladesh's military and economic
weakness, its primary objectives are to ensure a
continued flow of outside assistance and to maintain
satisfactory relations with its dominant neighbor,
India. To counteract India's regional political domi-
nance and open more channels to economic assistance,
Bangladesh cultivates its relations with other Islamic
states. The oil-rich Middle Eastern countries are a
valuable employer of Bangladesh migrant laborers
(approximately 150,000 in 1982, according to official
Bangladesh statistics), who send home remittances
that bolster the economy.'
India: A Difficult Neighbor
Most Bangladeshis are deeply suspicious of India and
tend to view problems in relations with New Delhi as
a sign that India is attempting to undermine their
government. According to the US Embassy, Ershad,
while distrusting India, has been forced in his official
role to recognize the reality of Indian dominance and
has, in our view, tried to approach bilateral problems
'According to the US Embassy, Bangladesh foreign exchange
earnings from worker remittances in FY 1983 were US $610
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with moderation-to the point that some Banglade-
shis consider him "soft on India." Probably in an
attempt to counter this perception, Ershad more
recently has publicly criticized New Delhi
In our view, India would no doubt favor a return to
power of the Awami League, which with Indian
assistance led Bangladesh to independence.
ever, India recognizes that this is not likely to occur.
We doubt, however, that India would want the politi-
cal situation in Bangladesh to deteriorate to a point
that would lead to control by radical parties of either
extreme.
We believe several areas of dispute :between Bangla-
desh and India could strain relations and lead to
instability in Bangladesh and regional turmoil on the
subcontinent. The most pressing is the water-sharing
problem.' Seasonal water shortages and floods are
chronic in Bangladesh, and the overpopulated, largely
agrarian society depends heavily on the Ganges and
Brahmaputra Rivers, which flow through the country.
Because both rivers enter Bangladesh from India,
their technical management and control continue to
be a sensitive political issue. India already can divert
the Ganges away from Bangladesh at the Farakka
Barrage. Included in the problem is a controversial
Indian proposal for a canal to direct Brahmaputra
waters to the Ganges. Although India could acceler-
ate pressure for the canal by refusing to extend the
water-sharing agreement, which expires next April,
we doubt India would want to push Ershad so hard as
to destabilize his regime. We believe New Delhi
recognizes that instability in Bangladesh could affect
the stability of the entire region.
trying to exploit the fluid internal situation in Bangla-
desh by encouraging the leftist political parties to
increase agitation against the military regime of
groups.
In our view, Moscow's reasons for dabbling in Bangla-
desh's internal politics stem from its perception that,
because Ershad has not consolidated his control, the
Soviets have an opportunity to check Bangladesh's
drift to the West and the Islamic countries and to
strengthen the leftists' position. The Soviets probably
recognize, however, that local pro-Soviet leftists are
weak, factionalized, and have little chance of bringing
down Ershad's government without some major con-
tributing issue and the support of other political party
In the aftermath of the military takeover in 1982,
both Dhaka and Moscow seemed interested in im-
proving relations that had deteriorated steadily since'
the assassination in 1975 of independence leader
Sheikh Mujib
the Soviets agreed to
provide $76 million in new economic assistance to
expand a Soviet-built power plant and to overhaul
Bangladesh's aging squadron of MIG-21s, according
to US Embassy reports. Soviet efforts failed; however,
to check the Bangladesh Government's pro-Western
attitude, and the Soviets apparently have become
unhannv with General Ershad.
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Soviet connections are primarily with the pro-Soviet
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Party.
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Looking ahead, we judge that Soviet involvement with
Bangladesh will be tempered by the USSR's more
important relationship with India. We believe the
Indians would oppose the creation of a Marxist
regime on their borders, and the Soviets themselves
probably would be unwilling to bear the economic
burden of supporting a pro-Soviet Bangladesh, given
the country's limited strategic location or other signif-
icant payoff for Moscow.
Bangladesh plays a relatively minor role in US policy,
and another government reshuffle or military coup
probably would have little impact on immediate US
priorities in South Asia. Nevertheless, another change
in government, even if favorable to the United States,
would counter what little postwar political and eco-
nomic gains Bangladesh has made and undermine
international confidence in the continuity of any
future Bangladesh Government.
A sharp deterioration in Bangladesh's political and
economic situation could affect US concerns in sever-
al ways:
? A political or economic breakdown could lead to the
need for even larger .doses of economic aid. The
United States already has given more than $2
billion in food and development aid since Bangla-
desh's independence.
? Instability in Bangladesh could foment serious prob-
lems in India-given the tendency of Bangladeshis
to seek refuge in that country's border states-and,
even worse, could heighten regional conflict between
India and Pakistan if India tried to assert its
regional dominance in Bangladesh.
? Instability in Bangladesh could provide an opportu-
nity for further Soviet meddling in the subcontinent.
crease his survivability
We believe Ershad has a good chance of maintaining
sufficient military support over the next year because
he is the least controversial and most senior leader
among other potential military contenders. Disunity
within and among the political parties will preclude a
major opposition movemeni, and even. a slight im-
provement in the still precarious economy will in-
We judge Ershad's popular credibility will be some-
what strengthened as he moves to dismantle the
martial law structure and establish a civilian govern-
ment. If Ershad delays the promised return to civilian
rule, he risks heightened public sentiment against
martial law and confrontation with leftist groups as
well as dissatisfied elements of the military
Although Ershad has fared much better than we and
other observers anticipated and the martial law re-
gime has increased Bangladesh's stability, we believe
his hold on political power could still be undermined,
especially by dissatisfied elements from the military.
Should Ershad be removed from power-due to, a
deteriorating economy, a political blunder, or escalat-
ing violence from the opposition, for instance-we
believe his replacement would be another conservative
general or, less likely, a military-backed civilian poli-
tician. We see the military as continuing to be the
significant element in Bangladesh's future and consti-
tuting the major base of power for Ershad even if he
goes through with his proposed transition to a civilian
leader. He will, however, probably need to play down
the military's role once he is elected in order to
strengthen his own legitimacy as a civilian leader
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Secret
Appendix
Major Political Parties
Of the 50 or more groups that claim to be political
parties in Bangladesh, we believe even the seven
major ones will be unable to make a significant
showing against Ershad in the elections.`
Awami League (Hasina)
The Awami League (Hasina) is the best organized
political party and probably has the funds to cam-
paign the hardest against Ershad. The League bases
its support on its legacy as the party of Bengali
independence and its leftist ideology, which attracts a
number of students. Its well-known links to India,
however, weaken its appeal. A split between moder-
ates and pro-Soviet supporters may further weaken
the party. The moderate faction would be unlikely to
support an Ershad political alliance.
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)
Conservative and formed from various factions by
President Zia, the BNP was the ruling party prior to
the latest coup. The BNP is split into two factions-
one favoring Ershad-each bidding for the support of
Her backing would be a major asset for
Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal
(National Socialist Party-JSD)
The JSD, Bangladesh's major radical leftist party, is
financially strapped, and, according to US Embassy
reports, party members are at odds over whether to
advocate more revolutionary measures or support a
The JSD appears to have insufficien
Muslim League
The conservative Muslim League's strength stems
from its dominance in the politics of East Bengal
during the years of Pakistani rule from 1947 until its
defeat by the Awami League in 1970. Although the
League professes to call for an Islamic state, its
policies appear to be more rhetorical than substantive;
party's support would be more symbolic than real for
Ershad because its influence lies in its history.
Democratic League
This moderate, rightwing party was formed by former
Bangladesh President Khondokar Mushtaque Ahmed
in 1976. In 1977 Mushtaque was jailed by a martial
law court on corruption charges, but the party has
achieved some significance since Mushtaque's release
in March 1980. The party has failed to organize
effectively below the national level, and its following
is based primarily on loyalty to Mushtaque rather
than party affiliation, according to a US Embassy
Jamaat-e-Islami
At the extreme right of the political spectrum, the
Jamaat was formed in 1941 in British India, and sided
with the Pakistanis during the 1971 civil war. The
Jamaat calls for a democratic but strict Islamic state.
According to Embassy reporting, membership in the
Jamaat is small because of the rigid requirements
national strength to make any showing in an election,
but it will continue to incite opposition to Ershad
among students and possibly enlisted personnel in the
military
' Information on the numbers of members and followers is fragmen-
tary and unreliable.
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applicants must meet to demonstrate their commit-
ment to Islam. Bangladesh derives an important part
of its national identity from Islam. Religion plays a
limited role in Bangladesh politics but could be used
by by dissatisfied groups to trigger political opposition.
Communist Party of Bangladesh (Pro-Soviet)
The CPB, one of a half dozen or more Communist
parties in Bangladesh, is of minor importance in
Bangladesh politics or internationally. Before the
martial law takeover, according to Embassy reporting,
the student wing-Chatra Union-was active on the
campus of Dhaka University and was involved in the
campus violence in mid-February. Like the JSD, the
CPB is factionalized and centered in cities.
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