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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00895R000100080004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Seeret
Intelligence
Status of the Polish
United Workers' Party
secret
EUR 83-10235
October 1983
Copy 2 7 6
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Status of the Polish
United Workers' Party
This paper was prepared b~
of the Office of Soviet Analysis.
EURA~
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, East European Division,
Secret
EUR 83-10235
October 1983
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Secret
Status of the Polish
United Workers' Party 25X1
Key Judgments Pressure is mounting from party hardliners and the Soviets to restore to the
information available Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) the traditional power and authority
as of I September 1983 it has lost during the last three years. The abolition of martial law has re-
was used in this report.
moved any legal pretext for keeping the party from exercising its constitu-
tionally guaranteed right to lead the state. The easing of the security
situation has brought forward political and economic questions that make
the military's involvement in politics seem less necessary.
Hardliners in the party apparatus and central leadership, disgruntled with
Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski and their exclusion from power, have publicly
pressed for closer adherence to the Soviet model that has the party playing
the "leading role." Although the Soviets are generally satisfied with
Jaruzelski's role in protecting their interests in Poland, we believe they are
uncomfortable with the precedent set by the Polish military's incursion into
governing the state and have pressed for a speedy revival of the party.
The party's political decline beginning in 1980 reflected its longstanding
lack of legitimacy and the instant credibility achieved by the Solidarity
labor union, which quickly usurped the party's claim to speak for workers.
The imposition of martial law in December 1981 accelerated the PZPR's
decline, contrary to the hopes of some party officials that the military
would provide a protective "umbrella" for the party's recovery. We believe
that initially Jaruzelski was too preoccupied with security issues and
reestablishing order to pay attention to the state of the party's health. But
more importantly, he was unwilling, in our view, to return the reins of
power to an organization he regarded as incompetent and corrupt, and he
has relied heavily on military officers to ensure his political control.
As he has been forced by a gradual return to normal political and economic
pursuits to turn his attention to the party, Jaruzelski appears to have
become convinced that it can become an effective ruling organization only
if it improves its style of governing. By no means liberal, Jaruzelski and his
military colleagues are seeking to create a disciplined and competent party
apparatus. He has used military officers to help purge the party bureaucra-
cy, has called for the party to be better informed about society's moods and
attitudes before making policy decisions, and generally has advocated that
party bureaucrats interfere less in the day-to-day running of the country.
At the same time, Jaruzelski seems to be trying to gain control of the
party's leadership and apparatus by filling key positions with loyal
followers.
iii Secret
EUR 83-10235
October 1983
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Hardliners in the party leadership and apparatus have successfully resisted
Jaruzelski's modest efforts to reshape the organization and its role in
society. By all accounts, hardliners are blocking economic reform, resisting
efforts to broaden consultations with society, and gradually returning the
party to its old, inefficient bureaucratic ways.
Jaruzelski, who has always considered himself a military man and not a
politician, appears disinclined to become deeply involved in internal party
politicking. He probably will not be able to overcome hardline resistance to
his efforts to reform the party, but he can delay the party apparatus' return
to primacy. In the near term, however, such a delay will perpetuate
frictions between military and civilian officials and hamper political and
economic decision making. The civilian party apparatus may eventually
regain its traditional political supremacy, but it is unlikely to rule well
enough to break the cycle of instability, worker protest, and repression that
has dominated Polish politics for more than three decades.
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Secret
Status of the Polish
United Workers' Party
As security concerns fade in the wake of lifting
martial law, the question of restoring the Polish
United Workers' Party (PZPR) to its traditional
position in the political system has come increasingly
to the fore. The party suffered a severe political
decline during the last three years, losing by its own
admission more than 25 percent of its membership
since August 1980 and being relegated under martial
law to a secondary role in political and economic
decision making. There has been growing pressure
from hardliners, party bureaucrats, and the Soviets,
however, to restore the party and, in particular, to
return sole power to its civilian apparatus. The pur-
pose of this paper is to explain the reasons for the
party's decline before and during martial law, to
analyze Jaruzelski's modest efforts to reshape the
party and the way it rules the country, and to evaluate
prospects for the party's return to the traditional
position of political primacy.
The Party's Decline
The party's abrupt decline in power and authority
following the rise of the broad-based Solidarity labor
union in August 1980 (see graph) reflected in the first
instance, we believe, the party's longstanding lack of
legitimacy. The party, indeed, has frequently pursued
policies widely regarded as incompatible with Polish
national aspirations, most particularly close ties with
a traditional enemy, the Russians. Revelations in late
1980 of the Gierek regime's mismanagement of the
economy and pervasive corruption within the party-
which extended in
varying degrees even to top party leaders such as
Gierek, Kania, and Jaruzelski-undoubtedly de-
moralized many in the rank and file and further
eroded the party's standing.
Solidarity, on the other hand, enjoyed virtually instant
legitimacy, largely, we believe, because its leaders
came from the populace and had close ties with the
Catholic Church, the traditional wellspring of Polish
nationalism. Moreover, the circumstances of the
union's formation-a grudging concession by the
authorities under threat of strike-gave it great credi-
bility as a representative of workers' interests. The
legalization of Solidarity by the Polish courts in
November 1980 provided official sanction that en-
couraged more people to join, even including some
rank-and-file party members who no longer regarded
the PZPR as the spokesman of the working class.
Moreover, Solidarity had great success in broadening
its appeal by becoming an advocate of major econom-
ic and political reforms
Disagreements within the central party leadership
over how to respond to the political challenge present-
ed by Solidarity prevented the party, in our opinion,
from taking command of the situation and intensified
its disarray. Liberals argued openly that the only way
for the party to take the political initiative away from
Solidarity-and its advocacy of reform-was to im-
plement reforms that would lift the country out of its
deep political and economic crisis. Hardliners in the
party leadership opposed the liberals' reform, largely,
in our judgment, because they wanted to preserve
party privileges and institutional primacy. The party
apparatus at the lower levels, seeking, we believe, to
protect its position, also opposed the decentralization
of decisionmaking and the increased use of expertise
that Poland's difficult problems demanded. First
secretary Stanislaw Kania temporized, apparently
convinced that agreement could be reached with
Solidarity and trying to build support for a moderate
reform program. In the end, the leadership took half 25X1
measures, making minor adjustments in policy that
did not threaten the position of the elite and only
deepened the suspicions of Solidarity leaders that the
regime was not interested in a rapprochement
Adding to the party's disarray, liberals advocated far-
reaching internal party reforms aimed at preventing a
repetition of the corruption and mismanagement of
the Gierek era. They publicly proposed a range of
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Polish United Workers'Party Members and Candidates, 1944-82
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
48 49c 50 51 52 53 54d 55 56e 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 71 74 75 76 77 7R 79 Rn R I
a July and December.
bJune and December.
c April.
d February.
e No data available.
institutional changes intended to give the rank and
file more control over the party leadership and
apparatus. Such reforms as direct election of party
officials, limited terms of office, and allowing direct
contacts among lower levels of the party, they argued,
would lead to a more competent, responsive party
apparatus. The proposed changes, however, drew
heated opposition from conservatives, who considered
them unacceptable departures from traditional,
Soviet-style concepts and, more practically, a threat
to their jobs. Neither side was pleased by the compro-
mise reforms that first secretary Stanislaw Kania was
able to get endorsed at the Extraordinary IX Party
Conference in July 1981, according to the Polish
press. Reformers believed the changes were not
enough-even though the measures were the most
progressive ever passed by a ruling Communist
party-and hardliners considered them too radical,
Jaruzelski's selection as party leader in October 1981
(see box) and the subsequent imposition of martial law
in December accelerated the party's decline, especial-
ly at the lowest levels where, for all practical purposes,
the party ceased to function. Although some hard-
liners probably expected that the party would quickly
regain its political primacy under martial law, mili-
tary men instead moved into many key political and
economic posts, ignored the party apparatus, and took
over many party supervisory, decisionmaking, and
inspection functions at all levels.
Jaruzelski, in our assessment, ignored the party im-
mediately after the imposition of martial law largely
because of his preoccupation with the task of reassert-
ing control. This required heavy reliance on the
security apparatus and, of course, the Army-
Jaruzelski's political power base. Jaruzelski also ap-
pears to have ignored the party out of deep distrust for
its ability to run the country. The depth of this feeling
among military men
was such that Gen. Mieczyslaw Debicki, appointed
governor of the city of Warsaw in early 1982, at one
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Secret
Jaruzelski has had long service in the upper echelons
of the party. He was elected to the Central Commit-
tee in June 1964 and became a full member of the
Politburo in December 1971, three years after his
appointment as Minister of Defense. He began to play
a more prominent role in the leadership with his
appointment as Premier in February 1981. His selec-
tion as First Secretary in October 1981 was unprece-
dented in the Communist world and came as a result
of his predecessors' inability to curb Solidarity.
Jaruzelski enjoyed the advantage of representing the
only government institution in Poland that retained
its credibility throughout the Solidarity era, the
Army. Significantly, Jaruzelski was acceptable to the
Soviets despite their perennial concern with keeping
the military politically subservient.
point called the party a "pigsty.'l
____]Jaruzelski considered disbanding the party and
building a new organization, rejecting the idea only
out of a calculation that Moscow would not tolerate
such a move. After the imposition of martial law,
Jaruzelski relegated the party in his speeches to a
secondary position, paying only lipservice to its "lead-
ing role" in society. He showed little interest in the
details of PZPR activity
and gave subordinates considerable autonomy
in developing socioeconomic policies outside of normal
party channels. Finally, Jaruzelski was unwilling to
involve himself in internal party politicking to the
extent his predecessors did, largely because, in our
view, he considers himself first and foremost a soldier
and not a politician.
Jaruzelski's Policies Toward the Party
As the pressures of long-delayed political and eco-
nomic business have compelled Jaruzelski to give
greater attention to the party, his actions suggest that
he is sympathetic to the moderate viewpoint that the
PZPR needs to improve its governing style dramati-
cally before it can successfully resume its "leading
role" in society. Party moderates have said that
Poland can recover from its crisis only by "creative
application" of Marxism-Leninism that involves not
only political and economic reforms but also a more
limited role for the party apparatus. Complaining that
the distinction between the party and government
bureaucracies had virtually disappeared under
Gierek, some moderates have argued in the Polish
press that the party should shed its traditional involve-
ment in every aspect of policymaking and implemen-
tation and allow government experts responsibility for
the day-to-day running of the country, especially the
economy. In line with this view, Jaruzelski has public-
ly advocated upgrading the qualifications of party
officials and bureaucrats, providing for broader dis-
cussion of policy options, and giving the government
instead of the party a larger role in making lower level
decisions and implementing policy.
Jaruzelski and his closest colleagues-for the most
part from the military-are by no means liberals, but
they publicly advocate the creation of a well-disci-
plined, competent party apparatus that is well attuned
to the popular mood and able to devise and implement
relevant socioeconomic policies. As a first order of
business, Jaruzelski has used military inspection
teams and, more recently, civilian bodies patterned on
the military groups to root out corrupt and incompe-
tent party bureaucrats. By the end of 1982, according
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Communists have historically commanded little pop-
ular support in Poland, largely because of their close
identification with Russia. In the late 19th century,
Communist leaders, such as Rosa Luxemburg and
Feliks Dzierzynski, favored the continued incorpora-
tion of Poland in the Russian Empire and sought to
subordinate Polish independence to the international
class struggle espoused by their Russian comrades.
The Red Army's invasion of Poland in 1920 was
supported by the fledgling Polish Communist Work-
ers' Party, totally compromising the party at a time
of great enthusiasm for Poland's recently gained
independence. The Polish Government subsequently
restricted the activities of the Communist Party and
prevented it from playing any significant role in the
interwar period. Stalin's liquidation of the party and
its leaders in 1938-ironically, for being overly na-
tionalistic and infiltrated by the Polish intelligence
service probably confirmed the popular impression
that the party was little more than a Soviet instru-
ment
The military exploits of the Communist underground
movement during World War II-begun only after
Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union-did little to
make upfor earlier Communist support of the Hitler-
Stalin Pact and the Soviet annexation of Poland's
eastern territories. After the War, much of the Polish
populace viewed the party as an alien body imposed
on them by the victorious Soviet army and adminis-
tered by Moscow's Polish agents. The party reorga-
nized itself in 1948 and took its current name, the
Polish United Workers' Party.
Successive party leaders tried to win support by
creating a more distinct Polish identity for the party.
In 1956 Wladyslaw Gomulka enjoyed popular back-
ingfor a time when he successfully overrode Soviet
objections and moved to create a unique "Polish
road" to socialism that modified the Soviet economic
and political model. Gomulka's support dissipated,
however, as he adopted increasingly conservative
policies, which culminated in his ouster by party
rivals after the shooting of workers in Gdansk in
December 1970. New First Secretary Edward Gierek
promised reforms and presided over a Western-
financed prosperity that appeared to win the support
of the hopeful population. By mid-decade, however,
popular dissatisfaction grew as prosperity ended and
Gierek hesitated to undertake reforms.
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to the Polish press, the Army's inspectorate general
had examined the work of party and government
bodies in 10 of 49 voivodships. These inspections may
have accounted for some of the 6,000 party officials
who, according to the press, were replaced between
September 1980 and July 1983. In their places, again
according to the Polish press, Jaruzelski has sought to
place bureaucrats with administrative and economic
skills. His appointment of a trusted associate, Brig.
Gen. Tadeusz Dziekan, to head the Central Commit-
tee's personnel department should, in our assessment,
take into account the interests of the Catholic, peas-
ant, and democratic groups. Thus far, Jaruzelski has
not followed through on these privately expressed
facilitate implementation of his cadre policy.
We believe that Jaruzelski has taken the advice of his
moderate advisers that the party can adopt well-
considered policies only by being better informed on
popular attitudes and allowing broader discussion of
policy options. He has tried, for instance, to improve
party reporting of the populace's attitudes by having
reports from local organizations sent directly to him
rather than through the intervening bureaucratic lay-
ers, where information in the past has been altered to
reflect favorably on the apparatus.'
Jaruzelski, according to his public remarks, also
wants the PZPR to take into account during its policy
debates the viewpoints of Poland's semiautonomous
political parties-the United Peasant Party, the Dem-
ocratic Party, and the Catholic lay organization, Pax.
A joint meeting of the Communist and Peasant
Parties in January 1983-the first since 1957-was
clearly intended as an example of the consultative
process he favors; although the session
did not allow the Peasant Party to
have significant impact on regime policy. Jaruzelski,
also advocated in 1982
that other social groups hold 30 percent of the seats in
the parliament after the 1984 national elections.
Moreover, Jaruzelski has privately argued
that, while the PZPR should have
the largest number of parliamentary seats, it should
not have an absolute majority. This would force it to
' Jaruzelski apparently remains wary of the party's reporting
abilities. According to a published interview with one of his close
advisers, Jaruzelski maintains several nonparty reporting mecha-
nisms and uses a military data analysis system to process the
information. We believe that he also relies heavily on local defense
committees for assessments of the popular mood.
views.
Jaruzelski has sought to give his new mass organiza-
tion, the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth
(PRON), some inspection and legislative functions
formerly monopolized by the party.' Parliamentary
legislation according the PRON constitutional status
indicates the body will replace the party-dominated
National Unity Front in proposing lists of candidates
for parliamentary elections. Some midlevel party offi-
cials have suggested to US Embassy officers that the
PRON could become involved in hearing citizens'
complaints, inspecting local government and party
activities, and proposing parliamentary legislation.
Jaruzelski has also publicly advocated greater partici-
pation of local self-governing bodies-the municipal
equivalents of worker self-management bodies-in
the formulation and implementation of local deci-
sions.
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Jaruzelski has sought to lessen the day-to-day involve-
ment of party bureaucrats in running the economy
through continued public support for economic re-
form. As outlined in the Polish press in mid-1983, the
reform is aimed at stimulating efficiency and growth
by granting enterprises new freedom to make deci- 25X1
sions on production, investment, and hiring. Workers
would have a voice-although still strictly limited-in 25X1
enterprise decisions through government-sponsored
workers' councils and trade unions. While there would
still be central control of prices and, according to US
Embassy reporting, provincial party officials would
set general guidelines for economic policy, the close
supervisory role of the party apparatus would be
severely curtailed. 25X1
' Jaruzelski founded the PRON in the first months of martial law to
promote support for his policies and to serve as a surrogate for
Solidarity in a dialogue with society. The PRON, while ostensibly
representing "society," nonetheless, according to the Polish press,
has numerous military men among its members. Despite the
expansion of the PRON's national leadership to include nonparty
intellectuals and artists, the Church's refusal to participate appears
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In addition to reshaping the role of the party appara-
tus, Jaruzelski also seems to be trying, in our view, to
gain control of it to implement his own policies. He
has removed from key leadership positions some
hardliners such as Warsaw party head Stanislaw
Kociolek, with whom he has political and personal
differences, and whom he regarded
as committed to perpetuating a form
of government that could no longer be effective in
Poland. He likewise has removed liberal party leaders
such as Politburo member Jan Labecki, whose strong
reformist tendencies, he probably believed, tested
Soviet tolerances and threatened efforts to construct a
system that differs from Soviet practice. Jaruzelski
has promoted competent technocrats and his own
civilian and military followers such as economic ex-
pert Manfred Gorywoda and Gen. Florian Siwicki,
who are, in our view, less associated with a particular
ideological wing or faction of the party than they are
loyal to him. His men,
are pragmatists and moderates who, while
change it enough to make it more efficient.
Jaruzelski's changes in the top party leadership, ac-
cording to US Embassy officers, have not been as
extensive, however, as purges conducted by his prede-
cessors. Since becoming party first secretary in Octo-
ber 1981, Jaruzelski has brought only four of his
followers into the Politburo (see table), although he
undoubtedly can count on some of the holdovers for
support. Jaruzelski brought in three of his trusted men
to the central committee secretariat in 1982 and
expelled three incumbents, two of whom, Stefan
Olszowski and Hieronim Kubiak, are respectively a
noted hardliner and a liberal. Of the nine secretariat
members, Jaruzelski is virtually guaranteed the sup-
port of six.
Jaruzelski has also extended his control over the
central party apparatus. In addition to naming Gener-
al Dziekan to head the personnel department, Jaru-
zelski has appointed Brig. Gen. Czeslaw Dega to head
the PZPR's foreign affairs department. The selection
of Dega ensures that Jaruzelski can monitor party
contacts with the Soviet or other Communist parties.
Earlier in 1983 when his critics threatened to use
ideological questions to criticize him, Jaruzelski suc-
ceeded in having former Foreign Minister Jozef
Czyrek appointed as head of the key Ideological
Commission
Jaruzelski has also purged some lower level party
officials, temporarily suspending the democratic elec-
tion rules enacted at the Extraordinary IX Party
Congress in July 1981 to facilitate changes. The
rules-which include provisions for multiple candida-
cy elections, secret balloting, and limits on the terms
of office-resulted in the election at all levels of the
PZPR in 1981 of officials who primarily represented
rank-and-file opinions and were less responsive to
central party control. The temporary suspension of the
election rules at the beginning of martial law, accord-
ing to a press interview given by a Jaruzelski adviser,
empowered the central leadership to replace noncom-
pliant party officials. In Poznan Province, according
to the party press, Jaruzelski in May 1982 replaced
liberal party first secretary Edward Skrzypczak with
an Air Force brigadier general despite protests of the
provincial party committee and without observing the
1981 election procedures.
Jaruzelski seems to have paid minimal attention to the
party rank and file. The party's Central Control
Commission, a watchdog body headed by Moscow-
trained hardliner Jerzy Urbanski and whose vice
chairman is a military officer, has been the main
instrument of purging those members who, according
to the press, did not maintain party discipline during
the Solidarity era. In the second half of 1982, local
organs of the control commission reportedly initiated
a review of each full and candidate party member to
judge his fitness for continued membership. Since the
imposition of martial law,
have been expelled.
Resistance
Jaruzelski has had only modest success, in our view, in
reshaping the party. The small changes he has made
thus far in redefining the role of the party bureaucra-
cy have been easily circumvented. Party bureaucrats,
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Date of
Secretariat
Date of
Secretariat
Election
Election
Responsibility
Kazimierz Barcikowski
September 1980 Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski
October 1981
First Secretary
Kazimierz Barcikowski a
October 1980
Organizational matters
July 1981
Foreign affairs, ideology,
propaganda
July 1981
Propaganda
July 1982
Economics
July 1981
Agriculture and the food
economy
Stanislaw Kalkus
July 1982
Gen. Miroslaw Milewski b
July 1981
Administrative affairs, security
Hieronim Kubiak a
July 1981
Wlodzimierz Mokrzyszczak
October 1981
Organizational matters
Zbigniew Messner
July 1981
Marian Orzechowski b
October 1982
Ideology
Gen. Miroslaw Milewski b
July 1981
Waldemar Swirgon a
October 1982
Youth affairs
Stefan Olszowski b
August 1980
Stanislaw Opalko
July 1981
Tadeusz Porebski
July 1981
Jerzy Romanik
July 1981
Albin Siwak b
July 1981
a Considered strong supporters of Jaruzelski.
b Prominent Hardliners.
according to US Embassy reporting, have responded
to Jaruzelski's efforts to give more latitude to the new
trade unions, workers' self-management, and local
self-government groups as well as the Patriotic Move-
ment of National Rebirth by seeking direct control of
them. In some cases,
the bureaucrats have ensured that the groups are led
by people who are no threat to the apparatus-
contrary to specific instructions from the central party
leadership that the party apparatus should not play
too prominent a role in setting up the ostensibly
independent bodies.
Jaruzelski's unwillingness to give real independence to
nonparty bodies, for instance, has, in our view, abet-
ted efforts of party bureaucrats to continue wielding 25X1
their traditional powers. Members of the party appa-
ratus, according to US Embassy officers
are trying to supplant technocrats and 25X1
reassert their authority over important management 25X1
positions in key industrial enterprises. They are being
aided, according to US Embassy sources, by en-
trenched factory managers and central government
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Kazimierz Barcikowski tefan Olszowski
Politburo member and olitburo member and
secretary with responsibility oreign Minister.
Sovfoto/Eastfoto
oturCzyrek o member Tadeusz Grabski
Politburo meand Former Politburo member, now
secretary with responsibility a trade attache in East Berlin.
for foreign affairs, ideology,
and propaganda.
Hieronim Kubiak
Politburo member and
university professor.
planners whose positions depend on the maintenance
of the old system. The party bureaucrats fear,
hat soon after economic
decentralization will come political decentralization
and even greater inroads on the power of the party
apparatus.
Resistance to Jaruzelski's efforts to change the party's
role, in our view, is a key part of the hardliners'
opposition to many of Jaruzelski's policies. Former
Politburo member Tadeusz Grabski, in a widely
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circulated letter addressed to his party organization in
October 1982, indicated the range of hardline griev-
ances against Jaruzelski and his policies. According to
published accounts of his letter, Grabski, now exiled
to a trade position in East Berlin, called for the
crushing of all anti-Socialist opposition by force, a
reorientation of the Polish economy toward the
USSR, an end to economic reform, a tougher policy
toward the Catholic Church, and a ruthless purge of
liberal party members. In addition to Grabski, For-
eign Minister Stefan Olszowski and Stanislaw
Kociolek, a former Warsaw party boss currently
serving as Ambassador to Moscow, are prominent
hardliners. Although shunted aside by Jaruzelski,
both continue to oppose him.
Resistance to Jaruzelski and his policies appears to
have intensified in late May 1983. The hardliners,
probably encouraged by Soviet press criticism of
Jaruzelski's moderate advisers, pressed for a debate of
ideological issues-an event that had been repeatedly
postponed over the past year-at the XII Central
Committee Plenum on 31 May 1983. They apparently
hoped it would give them a platform to criticize
Jaruzelski's treatment of the party as well as the
approaching papal visit, something many hardliners
surely opposed. Jaruzelski was able to defer the airing
of ideological issues-now set for 14-15 October
1983-but was unable to overcome hardline resis-
tance to the election of moderate Deputy Prime
Minister, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, to the Politburo. The
hardline opposition to Rakowski was
aided by the fact that the Soviets also
adamantly opposed his promotion. The resulting stale-
mate over ideological and personnel issues, in our
view, illustrates that, as long as Jaruzelski does not
seem willing to engage in intraparty politicking in
support of his policies, he cannot totally ignore hard-
liners who, given favorable circumstances, have
enough clout to challenge him.
The Soviet View
Soviet pressure on Jaruzelski to reinstate the party's
"leading role" in decisionmaking has not meant, in
our estimation, that Moscow fully endorses hardline
opposition to him. The Soviet press did not associate
itself with the criticism of Jaruzelski by Tadeusz
Grabski in October 1982. The unwillingness of Mos-
cow to support internal critics of Jaruzelski is due
primarily, in our view, to his success in suppressing
Solidarity. Moreover, none of Jaruzelski's potential
successors, such as Stefan Olszowski
Although Jaruzelski's role in the maintenance of
internal stability and a pro-Soviet regime appears to
be generally satisfactory from Moscow's point of view,
the slowness of the party's recovery has probably
frustrated the Kremlin. Moreover, the Soviets are
probably uncomfortable with the precedent set by the
Polish military's ascendancy over the party. A
Western scholar with contacts in Poland told US
Embassy officers in Warsaw that Soviet party secre-
tary Rusakov, who is responsible for Bloc affairs,
pressed Jaruzelski in May 1982 to set a timetable for
a return to party rule. The publication of two articles
in Soviet periodicals in May 1983 condemning politi-
cal pluralism and attacking party moderates such as
Vice Premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski reflects, in our
assessment, continuing Soviet impatience with both
the slow pace of the party's recovery and persistent
influence of those they distrust.
cently visited Poland, indicated in his public review of
the situation there that Moscow would be paying close
attention to the issues at the upcoming Polish plenum.
The Soviets probably consider a clearly defined ideo-
logical program essential to rebuilding the party.
Outlook
For the near term, internal party maneuvering, we
believe, will be dominated by frictions between the
regular party apparatus on the one hand and
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Wojciech Jaruzelski and his military appointees serv-
ing in traditionally civilian positions on the other. The
abolition of martial law and resolution of the most
serious security problems have gradually lessened the
need for extraordinary measures, in our view, and in
turn Jaruzelski's claim to be party leader. Even
though he may try to enhance his civilian credentials
by divesting himself of the defense ministry later this
year, Jaruzelski almost certainly will still be regarded
as a temporary figure by many in the party who resent
the intrusion of the military and suspect its intentions.
Similarly, Jaruzelski's reluctance to engage in intra-
party politicking could make it more difficult to cope
with behind-the-scenes maneuvering by the hardline
opposition. If Jaruzelski continues to avoid extensive
personal involvement in party internal affairs, he may
find it difficult to avoid criticism that he is not an
effective party leader. Moreover, if there should be a
dramatic upsurge of opposition activity, or if his
economic policies fail, Jaruzelski will be increasingly
vulnerable to criticism not only from his domestic
critics but also from Moscow
Moscow probably would not object to Jaruzelski's
further gradually consolidating his power if, in so
doing, he also made progress in refurbishing party
institutions. However, the Soviets are unlikely to
approve his efforts to affect major leadership changes
if these changes involve promoting to senior party
posts people they distrust or demoting individuals
attuned to Moscow's thinking. Moscow would be wary
that such changes at the top would increase factional-
ism and adversely affect the regime's stability.
Jaruzelski's position seems relatively secure for the
next several years. He can bask in his success at
having smashed Solidarity, and the Polish party has
not been known to throw out its leaders except under
duress. At the same time, he can argue that the
potential for opposition activity requires that a figure
closely tied to the military/security apparatus be at
the helm. Finally, he can claim to have stopped the
decline of the Polish economy and that a significant
recovery will take place.
Jaruzelski's continued presence on the political scene
will delay the return of the civilian apparatus to its
traditional position of political supremacy. At age 60
Jaruzelski could conceivably stay as party head for
more than a decade. His prolonged occupation of the
post of first secretary will probably intensify the
factionalism that has traditionally plagued the PZPR
and diverted the leadership's attention from problem
solving. In particular, continued infighting over some-
thing as basic as the proper role of the party would
detract from the regime's ability to solve Poland's
pressing political and economic problems. Jaruzelski
may prevent hardline policies from being implement-
ed, but he will in turn find it difficult to secure
approval and implementation of policies advocated by
his moderate advisers. Even if Jaruzelski overcomes
internal opposition, the Polish economy will, at best,
struggle through the rest of the decade, and political
stability will rest on the regime's coercive powers.
If Jaruzelski were forced out, his successor would
most likely be a hardliner, perhaps Foreign Minister
Olszowski. The moderates and liberals, in our view,
simply do not have the power to manipulate the top
leadership and, indeed, are completely dependent on
Jaruzelski for protection. His departure from the
political scene would very likely be accompanied by
the ouster of his military as well as civilian supporters
in the government apparatus and party leadership. A
forced removal of Jaruzelski would, we believe, deep-
en the antipathy of many in the military for the party
apparatus; his successor would probably feel com-
pelled to make major personnel changes in the mili-
tary leadership. While such a step would be likely to
heighten the military's resentment, there is very little
the military could do, in our judgment, to resist.
It is unlikely, in our view, that Jaruzelski will be able
to induce the civilian party apparatus and his critics to
acquiesce in any extensive consultative role for the
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ostensibly independent political and social groups.
The civilian party leadership and apparatus will con-
tinue to argue that they must be the sole holders of
power for ideological reasons and because the Soviet
model demands it. Soviet pressure on Jaruzelski to
conform, combined with a gradual reassertion of
authority by civilian bureaucrats at the middle and
lower levels, will virtually guarantee, in our view, the
party's gradual return to primacy.
Although the civilian party apparatus probably will
regain its preeminent ruling position over the long
term-and probably only after a prolonged stale-
mate-it will probably not, in our estimation, rule
well or efficiently. The apparatus shows few signs, in
our view, of eliminating the mismanagement, faction-
alism, and corruption that contributed to its decline in
1980-81. Nor is there any evidence that the organiza-
tion is able to win legitimacy in the eyes of the people.
The experiences of the Solidarity era and martial law,
when the party stood on the brink of extinction, have
taught the apparatus and leadership that liberal re-
forms threaten not only their own positions but also
the traditional role of the party. Continued party
incompetence and resistance to needed change, com-
bined with a poor economic outlook, in our assess-
ment, will probably mean that, over the long term, the
cycle of instability, worker protest, and repression will
continue.
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