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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00556R000200010003-1
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• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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w?"P Directorate of
Intelligence
ER
1
OR MARK Q
1 _ . .
Bangladesh-India
Water Sharing:
An Inequitable Flow
Secret
NESA 83-10087
April 1983
Copy 3
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Bangladesh-India
Water Sharing:
An Inequitable Flow
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near East-South Asia
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be addressed to the Chief, South Asia Division,
NESA,
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and the National Intelligence Council.
Secret
NESA 83-10087
April 1983
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Bangladesh-India
Water Sharing:
An Inequitable Flow
Key Judgments Water sharing, a longstanding controversy in the Indian subcontinent, is
Information available likely to be the most pressing regional economic issue over the next two
as of 1 April 1983 decades, given the ever increasing need for developing irrigation to help
was used in this report.
feed a booming population. The water issue is particularly acute for
Bangladesh because India is increasing its upstream use of Ganges river
water and also has the power to divert the flow of the Ganges river at the
Farakka Barrage. Bangladesh, for which the potential human and political
impact of this issue is great, must depend on Indian good will to reach an
equitable solution to the problem.
Notwithstanding the immense technical problems in the management of
the region's water resources, political differences are the major obstacle to
resolving the long-term water sharing dispute. Bangladesh's suspicions that
India seeks to reduce Dhaka's sovereignty and India's preoccupation with
maintaining its predominance in the subcontinent tend to work against
bilateral cooperation and a political compromise.
The two sides hold sharply divergent views on augmenting the Ganges'
flow. India, with the dominant political and economic leverage, will
continue to press its controversial proposal for a canal linking the Ganges
and Brahmaputra rivers over Bangladesh's counterproposal for a series of
storage dams along the tributaries of the Ganges river in Nepal. Both sides,
however, agreed in October 1982 to extend current water sharing arrange-
ments for an additional 18 months
In our view, Chief Martial Law Administrator Ershad's willingness to
study New Delhi's link canal proposal in return for the interim agreement
and minor Indian concessions has increased the political risks to his
leadership. His unsteady hold on power cannot survive further perceptions
of caving in to Indian pressure. Ershad does not appear to have prepared a
strategy to soften his constituents' opposition to the canal-particularly
among the military-and he has few, if any, options but to deal coopera-
tively with his far stronger neighbor on the water sharing issue.
iii Secret
NESA 83-10087
April 1983
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Bangladesh has in the past and again could appeal for US support in its
water sharing dispute, despite India's refusal of outside participation. A
severe drought in either country, which could upset the already delicate
water sharing balance, or a complete breakdown in the negotiations, which
would leave Bangladesh even more vulnerable to Indian domination of the
issue, could prompt such action by the government in Dhaka. Although the
United States has avoided becoming directly involved in the issue, US
policy concerns, besides humanitarian, are keyed to maintaining the
political and economic stability of this highly populated region.
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Bangladesh-India
Water Sharing:
An Inequitable Flow
Seasonal water shortages and floods are chronic in
Bangladesh, and the overpopulated, largely agrarian
society depends heavily on the Ganges and Brahma-
putra rivers, which flow through the country. Because
both rivers enter Bangladesh from India, their techni-
cal management and control is made particularly
difficult for Bangladesh by adding a sensitive political
dimension; India already has the power to divert the
flow of the Ganges away from Bangladesh at the
Farakka Barrage. Hence, water sharing is a major
point of controversy between the two neighbors and a
potential source of regional instability. This paper
examines the water sharing issue primarily from the
viewpoint of Bangladesh, which has the least political
leverage and fewest negotiating options and whose
persistently unstable economy is the most vulnerable. 2
US policy interests in the water sharing issue between
Bangladesh and India are keyed to humanitarian
concerns and to preserving the political and economic
stability of a region that houses a substantial portion
of the world's poor. For instance, an economic disaster
in Bangladesh brought about by a severe drought or a
political change in the delicate water sharing balance
could send a tide of refugees into India and destabilize
that already overpopulated country. In spite of Ban-
gladesh's appeals for US involvement, the United
States has chosen not to become directly involved in
the politically sensitive issue, insisting that the prob-
lems of the area can best be solved without outside
interference)
Background
The equitable distribution of the waters of the Ganges
and Brahmaputra river systems has been a major
point of controversy since 1947, when the mutual
suspicions of India and Pakistan were the primary
stumblingblock to harnessing the waters. Prior to the
partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, little was
done to manage the waters of the eastern region,
while the western side of the subcontinent had a
complex, working irrigation system. India's proposal
in 1961 to build a dam on the Ganges at Farakka in
West Bengal undoubtedly reinforced Pakistan's fears
and aggravated the dispute.
Following the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, the
climate of cooperation seemingly improved, given
India's support for Bangladesh independence. In 1972
Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and Bangladesh Presi-
dent Sheikh Mujib established a Joint Rivers Com-
mission as a vehicle for formal negotiations. Although 25X1
the Commission continues to handle bilateral water-
related issues, such as its most recent task to discuss
prefeasibility studies for augmenting the dry season
flow of the Ganges and to complete arrangements on
sharing the flow of the Teesta River-a Brahmaputra
tributary-its effectiveness has been curtailed by
political problems. Bangladesh's suspicions that India
continually seeks to diminish Dhaka's sovereignty and
India's preoccupation with maintaining its predomi-
nance in the subcontinent work against bilateral
cooperation and compromise.
The water sharing dispute intensified in 1975 when
India began operation of the controversial Farakka
Barrage, ignoring complaints from Bangladesh. The 25X1
Calcutta Port.
barrage is 18 kilometers upstream from Bangladesh's
northwestern border and diverts part of the Ganges
River that would normally flow through Bangladesh
to a channel wholly within India to flush silt from
In 1977 under the more flexible political atmosphere
of India's Janata government, Bangladesh and India
signed a five-year agreement governing sharing of the
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76dorl Ourgapur
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Figure 1
Ganges and Brahmaputra Drainage Basins
- Selected state (India) or
district (Bangladesh) boundary
0 100 200 300 Kilometers
0 100 200 do 300 Miles
f, Howralu' ?Calcutta n?V?'. Chittagong
Ganges at the Farakka Barrage. India agreed to a
division of dry season waters so that two-thirds went
to Bangladesh and one-third to India. The agreement
also called for the preparation of long-range augmen-
tation studies which, according to US Embassy re-
porting, India perceived as agreement by Bangladesh
to eventually permit study of a link canal between the
Ganges and Brahmaputra.
Prime Minister Gandhi's return to power in January
1980 signaled a more rigid Indian position regarding
the water sharing problem, however, as Gandhi had
criticized the Janata government for allowing itself to
be "bullied" by India's smaller neighbor
India's insistence on dominating regional relations has
prevented a multilateral solution to the water sharing
problem favored by Bangladesh and Nepal. For sever-
al years, Bangladesh has advocated including Nepal
in discussions with India, but this has been consistent-
ly vetoed by New Delhi, which insists on treating the
water sharing issue with each neighbor separately.
India believes, in our view, quite rightly, that a
cooperative approach could divert some benefits India
wishes for itself and dilute its regional supremacy
Mastering the Waters: Technical and Economic
Considerations
No comprehensive technical survey of possible ap-
proaches to developing the Ganges-Brahmaputra riv-
ers has been performed, although international ex-
perts agree that harnessing the rivers would require
monumental scientific and engineering efforts. An
ideal program must ensure that local projects would
not impair the future development of a regional water
system.
The urgent problem is regulating the waters of the
Ganges, which has too little and of the Brahmaputra,
which has too much. During the lean season from
February to May, the water level of the Ganges is
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insufficient to meet the growing needs of both Bangla- Silting, shoaling, and salinity complicate an already
desh and India. On the other hand, the major problem difficult situation. While the silting restores agricul-
with the Brahmaputra is annual flooding, which tural land, it also increases the problem of flooding on
coincides with the Ganges' high water level during both rivers by reducing river depths and causing
August and September and causes considerable loss of channels to shift. Further, heavy silt deposits at the
life and damage to property (see figure 3).
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There is too little water in the Ganges to fully satisfy
the needs of an increasing population. About 3.6
million hectares of land in the Ganges basin are
dependent on Ganges water. Before the opening of the
Farakka Barrage in 1975, Bangladesh received the
entire downstream flow of the river. Rising in the
Himalayas and flowing generally eastward, the Gan-
ges enters Bangladesh 18 kilometers below the
Farakka Barrage, joins the Brahmaputra at Goa-
lundo in central Bangladesh, and then meets the
Meghna, where the combined flows of the three rivers
empty into the Bay of Bengal.
Glacial snow melts from the Himalayas, which raises
the downstream levels of the Ganges from late May
to early June, and runoff from the monsoon rains of
July to September comprise the high water season
and 80 percent of the river's total annual flow. The
rate ofjlow during this peak period is about 3.3
million cubic feet per second (cusecs) but is usually
reduced to 50,000 to 60,000 cusecs during the critical
dry months of March and April.-
mouth of the Ganges interfere with Bangladesh's vital
river communications network. According to US Em-
bassy reporting, Bangladesh also claims that the
continued dry season withdrawal of Ganges water
from the Farakka Barrage has increased sedimenta-
tion and shoaling so much that a major irrigation
project at the junction of the Ganges and Brahmapu-
tra has had to nearly cease operation.' To the west,
the Indian port of Calcutta is being increasingly
affected by the silting of the Hooghly river, a Ganges
' Although the project has not worked well from its inception,
Bangladesh claims, according to a US Embassy report, that dry-
season withdrawal of Ganges water from the Farakka Barrage has
Figure 3
Average Monthly Inflow of Brahmaputra
and Ganges Rivers
Bangladesh charges that the decreased flow of the
lower Ganges during the dry season decreases the
availability of water for drinking and irrigation and
causes damage to crops, fishing, and forestry. When
the Farakka Barrage began operating in 1975, Ban-
gladesh claimed in official reports to have lost large
areas of cropland from increased salinity due to the
northward encroachment of salt water tides from the
Bay of Bengal. World Bank and other international
experts disagree, however, about whether this effect is
due to the Farakka Barrage or to normal river shifts.
Disagreement Over a Solution
India and Bangladesh are far apart. on their approach
to the long-term problem of increasing the supply of
usable water. Because Bangladesh is too flat for major
dams, India favors construction of a link canal con-
necting the Brahmaputra with the Ganges to augment
the Ganges' dry season flow. Dhaka opposes this
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Indian-Bangladesh Proposals for Water Management
Brahmaputra-Ganges Link Canal
As part of an ambitious plan to satisfy its long-term
water needs, India favors a canal to link the Brahma-
putra and Ganges rivers. The canal would be con-
structed from the Indian city of Dhubri, situated on
the Brahmaputra, across northwestern Bangladesh to
a point on the Ganges just above the Farakka
Barrage. Depending on the precise route selected, the
canal would be some 290 to 320 kilometers long. The
Indian proposal also considers construction of large
storage dams on tributaries of the Brahmaputra (the
Dihang, Subansiri, and Barak rivers) as well as the
building of a barrage at Goalpara above Dhubri. F_
To support its proposal, New Delhi claims in the
Indian press that at least 2 million hectares in
Bangladesh would benefit from flood relief and that
construction of the storage dams would protect an
equally large area in Bangladesh's northeastern dis-
trict of Sylhet, where nearly 82 percent of the land is
flooded every year. The Indians further argue their
scheme would enable use of the virtually unexploited
Brahmaputra, which begins rising in February, to
supplement the Ganges lean period flow in March and
April. New Delhi claims that, given the current
underutilization of the Brahmaputra and its annual
flooding, exploitation of the Brahmaputra would not
deprive Bangladesh of water required for other pur-
poses, such as irrigation and drinking.
Bangladesh opposes the link canal proposal, arguing,
according to US Embassy reporting, that it would
displace 200,000 people in an already overcrowded
country; would involve considerable expense and
because it entails the loss of valuable agricultural land
and the displacement of perhaps as many as 200,000
people and because, depending on the canal's location,
India might still control the flow of water. According
to US Embassy reports, Bangladeshis view the pro-
posal as an Indian attempt to exploit Bangladesh's
territory and increase Indian political dominance over
Bangladesh. According to Embassy reporting, India
believes that since 1975 the Bangladesh Government
has intentionally encouraged such popular views.
substantial loss of cultivable land in Bangladesh; and
would be energy inefficient if water has to be pumped
uphill. More important, Bangladesh is unwilling to
accept Indian control of the headworks at both ends
of the proposed canal.
Bangladesh's counterproposal calls for the
construction of 12 dams in Nepal to augment the dry
season flow of the Ganges at Farakka by an addition-
al 120,000 cusecs. The Bangladesh scheme calls for
linking the proposed dams in Nepal, the outflow of
which would serve all three countries. Coincidentally,
this plan would benefit Nepal by providing a more
direct water route for the transit of Nepalese goods.
Bangladesh's proposal, however, ignores the problem
with the Brahmaputra waters; like India's plan, it
also ignores the problems of huge initial costs as well
as the loss of agricultural land and population
displacement, which the Nepalese probably would not
sanction. Further, the Indians in their official studies
doubt whether the Ganges has sufficient water for
both users, even with the addition of upstream stor-
age facilities, and question whether enough water
would even reach the Farakka Barrage during the
critical dry season, given high evaporation loss and
increased use for irrigation in India. This plan would
also require trilateral cooperation, which runs
counter to India's regional political emphasis on
bilateral agreements
India rejects Dhaka's counterproposal for a system of
storage reservoirs in Nepal, whose rivers, as Bangla-
desh points out, account for the bulk of the Ganges'
flow during the dry season. Either approach would
require immense expenditures lasting more than a
decade.4
' Preliminary cost estimates, according to US Embassy and State
Department reports, range from a minimum of $7 billion for partial
development to more than $100 billion for comprehensive develop-
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Renewed Negotiations: The October Bangladesh-
Indian Summit
In early October 1982, one month before the expira-
tion of the Farakka agreement, Chief Martial Law
Administrator Ershad and Prime Minister Gandhi
met in New Delhi to discuss the issue of water
sharing. Based on US Embassy reports, months of
difficult negotiations at lower ministerial levels pre-
ceded the session. Despite India's stronger position at
the negotiating table, Ershad appears to have made
some temporary gains in the memorandum of under-
standing signed by the two leaders. Most important
for Ershad is Gandhi's agreement to a new 18-month
interim water sharing arrangement only moderately
different from the previous one signed in 1977. Re-
assuringly for Ershad, this period will cover Bangla-
desh's next two dry seasons. Although the understand-
ing did not include a key clause that formerly
protected Bangladesh's share of water during the
severest droughts, it was far more generous to Dhaka
than we initially expected. In the case of exceptionally
low flows, haka and
New Delhi have agreed to hold immediate consulta-
tions to decide how to minimize the burden to both
countries, although Bangladesh must depend on In-
dia's good will to follow through with such discus-
sions. Embassy reporting indicates Bangladesh has
been trying unsuccessfully over the last six months to
induce India to assure a guaranteed minimum alloca-
tion of 27,600 cusecs of water. Recent unconfirmed
Bangladesh press reports attribute an alleged drought
in northwestern Bangladesh to reduced flows from the
Farakka Barrage caused by increased withdrawal of
water by India from the Ganges farther upstream.
Ershad, in return, had little choice, in our view, but to
agree to a prefeasibility study of India's plan for the
link canal between the Ganges and Brahmaputra
rivers. Ershad was able to include in the prefeasibility
studies Bangladesh's counterproposal to build storage
dams in Nepal, although this may amount to little
more than a face-saving measure for Ershad because
New Delhi is likely to insist that the canal will prove
the more feasible solution.
According to Embassy reporting, the Joint Rivers
Commission, composed of representatives of both
countries, will attempt to settle the problem of long-
term augmentation of dry season water flow within
the 18-month extension period-a process that will
entail some tough bargaining. At the late December
meeting of the Commission, an Embassy report indi-
cates that Bangladesh's Minister of Agriculture em-
phasized that the two sides had committed themselves
to considering one another's proposals. Whether these
remarks are more rhetorical than substantive is uncer-
tain, as the Bangladesh position appears to have
hardened since that meeting and a serious impasse
has developed, according to US Embassy reporting, as
Bangladesh faces the realities of negotiations. A
prolonged stalemate could stifle the cooperation,
which initially marked the first serious appraisal by
Dhaka and New Delhi of possible long-range solu-
tions.
Bangladesh
officials believe New Delhi's flexibility at the summit
meeting may have been due to its preoccupation with
its own foreign relations, such as the Nonaligned
Movement summit held in Delhi in March and con-
tinuing problems with Pakistan. India no doubt also
recognizes that further instability in Bangladesh,
where water sharing is a sensitive and potentially
explosive issue, could spread across the border and
may view the current regime in Dhaka as more willing
than a likely successor government to address Indo-
Bangladesh issues.
Political Implications
For Bangladesh. At present, Ershad does not appear
to have formulated any strategy for dealing with the
issue of water sharing once the 18-month period
expires in April 1984. By agreeing to a study of the
link canal, Ershad has upped the political ante on his
unsteady leadership, as he cannot afford to be seen by
his constituents, particularly his fellow generals, as
caving in to Indian pressure. Conversely, he has few,
if any, alternatives but to deal cooperatively with his
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stronger neighbor on the water sharing issue
For India. Although repercussions of the water shar-
ing issue are more politically costly for Bangladesh
than for India, Prime Minister Gandhi still must
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the Bangladesh Govern-
ment would like to complete exploratory investiga-
tions of the link canal proposed on its side of the
border but fears the public would interpret such
action as de facto approval of India's proposal.
To forestall presummit opposition, Ershad declared
that he would not "adopt a policy of submission even
if the entire north Bengal turns into a desert."
Privately, however, in our judgment, he and his
civilian advisers apparently realize that a tough stance
would only harden India's position. According to
Embassy reporting, a senior Bangladesh Ministry of
Foreign Affairs official claims that Bangladesh in-
tends to follow with "reasonable conscientiousness"
an "objective" outcome from the augmentation stud-
ies. On the other hand, the officials say the govern-
ment will do everything it can to resist the link canal,
which India confidently expects to be the most feasi-
ble solution)
Bangladesh is counting on India's will-
ingness to extend the 18-month interim agreement
until a final one is signed, which Bangladesh esti-
mates will take an additional two years. If Bangladesh
continues to evade the problem as New Delhi per-
ceives it has in the past, however, India's seemingly
conciliatory attitude is likely to sour and further ad
hoc arrangements cut off.
Ershad, by including the storage canal proposal in the
prefeasibility studies, apparently hopes that a multi-
lateral cooperative approach can be found and that
India will wish to make concessions to project a
favorable international image. This may be the stron-
gest point Bangladesh has on which to base its
bargaining strategy. Dhaka
interest in developing communications and transpor-
tation links across Bangladesh and in eventually
purchasing its natural gas as economic incentives for
India to take Bangladesh concerns into consideration.
consider the political reactions and internal squabbles
of several Indian states. According to US Embassy
reporting, former Indian Irrigation Minister Panday
pledged last May that there would be no future 25X1
arrangements with Bangladesh "at the cost of Calcut-
ta port." Just prior to Ershad's visit, according to the
American Consulate in Calcutta, Prime Minister
Gandhi summoned West Bengal's Communist Chief
Minister Jyoti Basu to New Delhi for consultation on
the water sharing issue. West Bengalis, long con-
cerned with the continuing silting problem in Calcut-
ta's port areas and the shortage of irrigation water,
want an additional 15,000 cusecs of Ganges water.
For now, according to the Consulate, the West Ben-
gali response to the Ershad-Gandhi agreement is
muted, given the state's poor financial condition and
its dependence on loans and food grain allocations
from the national government. Gandhi's failure to 25X1
obtain the extra water, according to the same Consul- 25X1
ate report, came as no surprise. Basu is avoiding a
confrontation with Gandhi on as many fronts as 25X1
possible and also wants to avoid assuming responsibil-
for the outcome of subsequent negotiations be-
ity I
tween Gandhi and Ershad.
India also has increased upstream offtake to northern I
agricultural states and must consider future water
requirements there while balancing the states' bicker- 25X1
ing over the amount each receives. For instance, in an
article in the Indian publication The Statesman, the
West Bengal irrigation minister in 1980 complained
that the states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Haryana
were drawing large quantities of Ganges water for
agriculture and thereby reducing the downstream
flow to West Bengal 25X1
Regional and International Implications
Regional Cooperation. Although India has insisted on
a bilateral approach to the water sharing problem,
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Bangladesh would like to involve Nepal in the negoti-
ations. US Embassy reports indicate Bangladesh and
Nepal favor a regional approach to cooperation on
water issues because of the trilateral nature of the
problem, and more important, the desire for each
other's support against India. Although the Ganges
itself does not flow through Nepal, many of its
tributaries rise in the Himalayas on its northern
border. Thus, the lack of a comprehensive program to
harness the water leaves all three countries vulnerable
to crop failure from insufficient rains or to devastat-
ing floods in years of strong monsoons.
Nepal's position in dealing with India on water shar-
ing is somewhat stronger than that of Bangladesh as
India has more reason to treat Nepal favorably. As a
potentially vulnerable lower riparian in its own right,
India has an immense stake in controlling the waters
flowing out of Nepal. Increased runoff caused by
deforestation of Nepal's hills has greatly exacerbated
flood damage on the Gangetic Plain in Nepal and
India and has hampered the abilities of both countries
to increase agricultural production. New Delhi is
intent on reducing Nepal's leverage by insisting on
joint control of Nepalese hydroelectric projects locat-
ed on rivers that ultimately flow into India.
For a period, the prospect for a simultaneous
approach to Nepal by Bangladesh and India for
participation in the prefeasibility studies appeared
promising. A recent report from the US Embassy
indicates India now views such action as too near to
trilateralizing the issue. If true, India appears to be
blocking Bangladesh's proposal to study the feasibility
of storage dams in Nepal, which could force Bangla-
desh to reject India's reciprocal feasibility study on
Bangladesh territory for a link canal. In the short
term, Ershad could be relieved of the political pres-
sure that permission to conduct such a study on
Bangladesh soil would incur. If each side blocks the
study of the other's proposal, however, the progress
made last October for seeking a long-range solution
will have broken down.
The International Factor. At first Pakistan and subse-
quently Bangladesh have tried unsuccessfully to draw
outside actors into the water sharing dispute, and we
believe Bangladesh again may appeal for internation-
al involvement. India's hypersensitivity and resent-
ment of external participation have muted interna-
tional political and aid donor interest, although
outside financing and expertise will be necessary to
construct whatever project Bangladesh and India
finally agree to. Although the idea of involving the
World Bank was raised by Bangladesh as recently as
1978, the Bank presumably recognizes that outside
initiatives would only stiffen India's intransigence and
has stated officially that it would play a role only if
both sides concurred. Even with mutual concurrence,
outsiders may be reluctant to become involved, given
the enormous technical problems and high political
risk that the agreement may be short lived
The United States, the United Kingdom, and the
USSR have had only passing involvement in the
dispute. In 1977 a US Government interdepartmental
group quietly undertook an internal review of the
scope and potential of the region's water resources.
The group concluded that US participation would be
worthwhile but noted the regional political complica-
tions and the possible difficulties in getting Congres-
sional and domestic public support for a large finan-
cial commitment. President Carter, during his visit to
New Delhi in early 1978, offered US support when
the regional states request such a study, but the
Indians allowed this offer to pass without comment.
Along with the United States, the United Kingdom
has expressed its support for a study of long-term
solutions to make the most effective use of water
resources. Much earlier, in 1968,
the USSR offered to assist the Indians and
Pakistanis in reaching agreement on the Farakka
Barrage issue. The Indians rejected the proposal,
partly in view of a Soviet offer to sell arms to
Pakistan, and partly in keeping with India's negative
attitude toward external involvement. As far as we
know, the USSR has not repeated the offer.
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to create an international public
corporation under the auspices of an organization
such as the World Bank or the United Nations to
oversee administrative and financial control of the
project and thus eliminate the political infighting. The
directorship of such a corporation could consist of
international nominees, in addition to representatives
from Bangladesh, India, and Nepal. In the develop-
ment stage the corporation would manage the plan-
ning and financing; subsequently, it would operate
facilities, receive revenues (from power sales and
irrigation fees), and distribute dividends to the three
countries according to a prescribed formula. India has
not endorsed this approach and, we believe, probably
will not change its stance.
Outlook
With domestic opinion in both countries overstimulat-
ed by the water sharing issue, both Ershad and
Gandhi will have to bear responsibility for any unpop-
ular position if a major agreement is concluded.
Nevertheless, Bangladesh has few, if any, options to
weaken India's leverage and its push for the link
canal. Bangladesh's ability to engage in long-term
planning of its water requirements is hampered by its
need to concentrate on the urgent short-term problem
of depletion of low-season Ganges flows by the
Farakka Barrage, its shortage of human and technical
resources for planning, and the significant factor that
upstream flows are out of its control.
In our view, the limited extension of the water sharing
agreement amounts to only a short reprieve for
Ershad, by postponing briefly his need to make a
tough decision on the complex problem. For the time
being, India got what it wanted-a promise of serious
consideration of the link canal; Ershad got what he
needed-extra time to soften public opposition to the
controversial project. The success of whatever strate-
gy Ershad undertakes to deal with the problem will
depend on his ability to consolidate and legitimize his
political authority over the next year, particularly
over other generals in the Martial Law Administra-
tion who represent a potent political threat. If the
water sharing talks break down completely, India
could accelerate pressure for the canal by withholding
another short-term extension once the 18-month
period expires, although India probably would be
reluctant to allow such an abrupt deterioration in
relations between Dhaka and Delhi. India probably
will not agree, however, to a new water sharing treaty
without Bangladesh concessions on augmentation
Although Nepal's participation would heighten Dha-
ka's political leverage and reduce Bangladesh's isola-
tion, India is likely to continue to stifle Bangladesh's
efforts to secure outside support until Dhaka agrees to
a viable water sharing solution-which India per-
ceives is the link canal. Without trilateral cooperation,
however, water management projects will continue on
a piecemeal basis
The realities of regional politics are such that the
water sharing dispute is likely to continue to compli-
cate bilateral relations between Bangladesh and In-
dia. Prime Minister Gandhi's narrow definition of
those multilateral issues pertinent to India's interests
and Bangladesh's inability to rise much above its
domestic political instability to address external prob-
lems will be the major factors in prolonging the issue.
Even if both countries can overcome the political
hurdles, the technical, financial, and management
problems in bringing about a long-term water aug-
mentation program will command considerable
Bangladesh-Indian attention for the remainder of this
century.
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Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/08: CIA-RDP84SO0556R000200010003-1