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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00556R000100170003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Egypt: Regional Issues
Directorate of
Intelligence
and Relationships
Aa Ida Amemmeg
NESA 83-IOM
,Ora 1983
' 307
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Egypt: Regional Issues
and Relationships
Near East-South Asia Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
This paper was prepared byl Office of
Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Operations and the National Intelligence Council_~ 25X1
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Secret
NESA 83-10084
April 1983
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Secret
Egypt: Regional Issues
and Relationships
Key Judgments The Mubarak government's top foreign policy priorities are to broaden
Information available Arab participation in the Middle East peace process and to achieve rapid
as of I April /983 progress toward a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement. Only if these
was used in this report.
goals are met can Egypt resume what it regards as its rightful Arab
leadership role while maintaining its peace agreement with Israel.
Cairo considers peacemaking an urgent task. It believes that Israeli
settlement activity is leading to de facto annexation of the West Bank, and
that US attention soon will be diverted from the Middle East by the
Presidential election campaign. Egypt has been encouraging Arab support
for the Reagan initiative, which it regards as the most promising basis for a
settlement.
Egypt will not return its Ambassador to Tel Aviv without an agreed
timetable for withdrawing Israeli troops from Lebanon. Egyptian leaders
are concerned that a stalemate regarding Lebanon might delay an overall
settlement, but they recognize that the Gemayel government cannot afford
to flout the Arab majority by making major concessions to Israel
In addition to the Lebanese issue, Egyptian-Israeli disagreements include
the Taba border dispute and Israel's complaints about Egyptian unwilling-
ness to increase trade, tourism, and other bilateral exchanges. The current
low level of economic and cultural relations partly reflects the decisions of
individual Egyptians not to deal with Israel.
The recently resumed Egyptian-Israeli talks on Taba and trade are
unlikely to show significant results unless there is progress toward solving
the Lebanese and Palestinian problems. In the meantime, we believe the
Mubarak government will cooperate with Israel only to the minimum
extent required by the peace treaty.
Egyptian-Arab relations have improved, but Egypt's full reintegration into
Arab ranks will depend on further progress in resolving Arab-Israeli
problems and thus probably is at least several months away. Moderate
Arab governments generally favor normalization of relations with Cairo
but are unwilling to move without the support of a clear Arab consensus.
Most of the moderates are deferring on this issue to Saudi Arabia, which is
reluctant to normalize ties in the face of strong radical opposition
iii Secret
NESA 83-10084
April 1983
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Mubarak rejects any preconditions to reintegration and will wait for the
other Arabs to take the first step to restore relations. Cairo is in no hurry to
resume formal diplomatic ties because it already has substantial political,
economic, and military links with most Arab countries and the PLO. Iraq
has moved especially far in repairing relations with Cairo because it
depends heavily on Egyptian arms in its war against Iran.
Public opinion in Egypt generally supports Mubarak's regional policies.
Like their government, most Egyptians are disillusioned with Israeli
policies, want to stay out of war, and intend to return to Arab ranks only on
Egyptian terms. At the height of the Lebanon crisis, however, Mubarak
was under pressure to take even stronger action against Israel than he did.
The US role is critical to the achievement of Egypt's regional goals.
Although the Mubarak government is pessimistic about Washington's
willingness to coerce Israel into making concessions, it nevertheless is
counting on such pressure as the key to a comprehensive peace.
We believe that Egypt will continue the main lines of its regional policy
during the next few months even with continued stalemate with Israel.
Mubarak realizes that to abandon the US-led peace process would
jeopardize economic and military aid from the United States. Another
provocative Israeli action, such as an armed attack against an Arab state,
probably would lead Cairo to break diplomatic relations with Israel but not
to give up all hope for a comprehensive peace. Other Egyptian options
would be to interrupt oil shipments to Israel, bar Israeli ships from the
Suez Canal, or move armed forces into the demilitarized zones of the Sinai,
but the risk of an Israeli military response makes these steps unlikely. If
Mubarak fell from power, his most probable successor would be a military
leader who would favor a continued search for a negotiated settlement in
partnership with Washington
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Secret
Egypt: Regional Issues
and Relationships
The Arab-Israeli Peace Process
The government of Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak is trying to reconcile two different roles for
Egypt in the Middle East. One is that of Arab leader,
a position to which Egypt has long laid claim by virtue
of its size (as the home of one-fourth of all Arabs),
strength, and location. The other is that of partner to
Israel and the United States in an effort to settle the
Arab-Israeli dispute. These two roles have conflicted
ever since Egypt's agreement with Israel resulted in
its ostracism from Arab ranks.
Cairo's aspiration to Arab leadership is strong, but so
is its commitment to the Egyptian-Israeli peace trea-
ty. Mubarak has never wavered from his position that
Sadat's historic agreement with Israel must be the
cornerstone for any comprehensive Arab-Israeli
peace. Mubarak has publicly stressed that Egypt must
abide by the treaty and the Camp David accords
because they are the only documents that commit
Israel to respect Arab interests. Thus, he argues, they
provide the only viable option-in the face of Israel's
military superiority-for pressing Tel Aviv to make
One way Egypt has tried to bring other Arabs into the
peace negotiations has been to promote a US-PLO
dialogue. Egypt has been serving as a conduit for
transmitting the PLO's views to Washington, most
recently during Mubarak's visit to the United States
in January. Last November Mubarak began publicly
urging the PLO to recognize Israel in order to make
possible a direct dialogue with the United States.
Mubarak has dropped this advice, although he still
says the PLO must play the "trump card" of recogni-
tion at the "appropriate moment."
Cairo's other effort to broaden the peace process has
been to encourage Jordan and the Palestinians to
agree on a formula for jointly entering negotiations
with Israel. Mubarak consistently supported the
Hussein-Arafat talks and to this end dispatched his
adviser, Usama al-Baz, on repeated missions to Am-
further concessions
The Mubarak government is counting on progress
toward a comprehensive peace to remove the tension
between these different strands of its regional policy.
Such progress would show the Egyptian people that
Camp David was a success and not a separate peace.
It also would increase moderate influence in Arab
politics by facilitating Egypt's reintegration into Arab
ranks, defusing the Palestinian issue, and reducing the
USSR's opportunities for gaining influence in the
region.
Although Egyptian leaders probably still hope that
the PLO can be brought directly into negotiations,
lately they have been looking more toward non-PLO
figures as the most likely negotiators for Palestinian
recent visits to Egypt by moderate West Bank and
Gaza Arabs (such as Bethlehem mayor Elias Freij,
who met with Mubarak in February) reflect a deliber-
ate Egyptian effort to strengthen these Arab leaders
and to provide visible backing for any agreement they
may be able to work out with Jordan.
process. Without such participation, Egypt refuses to
resume the talks on autonomy in the West Bank and
Gaza.
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Crete
*Amman
Alexandria_ ~jrusalem
Cairo
} SINAI I Ar
EGYPT
Aswan
SU D A N
0 200 Kilometers
0 200 Nautical Miles
Egypt believes that President Reagan's peace initia-
tive is the most promising basis for a comprehensive
settlement.
alsraeli occupied -
status to be determined
Boundary r,presenlalion is
not necessarily authorilaliae
Palestinians' right to self-determination. Neverthe-
less, Mubarak has publicly stressed the positive as-
pects of the plan and has stated that the negative ones
can be discussed over the negotiating table.
Cairo has
pointed to several shortcomings in the US initiative,
particularly its failure to recognize explicitly the
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Mubarak said in a November speech that other peace
proposals-notably the Arab League's Fez declara-
tion and the Egyptian-French UN initiative-agree
with the Reagan plan in their general approach and
can furnish useful ideas. Mubarak has indicated that
the Fez plan is unobjectionable but does not go far
enough. It is a statement of principles that provides no
mechanism for implementation; in Mubarak's words,
As for the Egyptian-French initiative, Egyptian offi-
cials occasionally allude to it as a backup that could
be activated should the US initiative bog down. In
meetings with UN officials in late January, however,
Mubarak described the Egyptian-French proposal as
only a "psychological gesture" and showed no interest
in pursuing it.
once the Palestinians are in the negotiations, they will
need Egypt's help even more than Jordan's, at least
initially. Foreign Minister Ali has told US officials
that Egypt will have the job of tutoring both Jordan
and the Palestinians in how to negotiate with Israel.
Despite its pessimism about the peace process, the
Mubarak government has emphasized the need to
achieve visible progress soon. According to numerous
public and private statements by Egyptian officials,
the chief reasons for urgency are:
? Israeli settlement activity, which Mubarak has re-
peatedly warned is accomplishing a de facto annex-
ation of the West Bank.
? The US Presidential election campaign, which
Egyptian leaders have said will make an energetic
US role in the peace process increasingly infeasible
after this autumn.
keep Israeli forces there indefinitely.
Lebanon
Egypt refuses to return its Ambassador to Tel Aviv-
and, by implication, to resume bargaining with Israel
over the future of the West Bank-in the absence of
an agreement on withdrawing Israeli troops from
Lebanon. In January Mubarak expressed doubt to
UN officials in New York that such an agreement
would soon be achieved and worried aloud that Israel
would use Syria's presence in Lebanon as an excuse to
Despite their concern that a stalemate in Lebanon will
delay a solution to the Palestinian problem, Egyptian
leaders do not favor major concessions by Lebanon
solely for the sake of getting the Israelis out. Mubarak
has told US officials he agrees with Lebanese Presi-
dent Gemayel that Lebanon, being weaker than
Egypt, cannot afford to flout the Arab majority at this
time by making a full peace with Israel. Mubarak
further stated, however, that to obtain a troop with-
drawal Lebanon must take some limited steps toward
normalizing its relations with Tel Aviv. Moreover, as
al-Baz recently remarked to US Ambassador Ather-
ton, Egypt would welcome the company of another
Arab state moving toward normalization with Israel.
Cairo realizes it has only marginal influence on the
Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, but it is providing what
help it can to the Gemayel government. Al-Baz and
Minister of State Butrus Ghali have visited Beirut
twice since December. Al-Baz later informed US
diplomats that the purpose of these trips was not to
tell the Lebanese how much they should concede but
instead to offer "technical advice" on negotiating with
Israel. According to al-Baz, the Lebanese seemed
receptive but had not yet accepted this offer
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Egypt anticipates that Lebanon's predicament will 25X1
lead to substantially closer Egyptian-Lebanese rela-
tions. A senior Egyptian diplomat recently told US
officials that his government believes full diplomatic
ties can be restored this year, although not before
foreign forces are withdrawn from Lebanon. There
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are good grounds for such optimism: the US Embassy
in Beirut reports a broad consensus in Lebanon, both
inside and outside the government, in favor of expand-
ing relations with Egypt. Several of the Embassy's
contacts argue that the absence of Egyptian influence
as a counterweight to Syria was one of the major
causes of Lebanon's recent troubles.
Lebanese-Egyptian relations already have warmed
appreciably during the past several months. In several
meetings with senior Egyptian officials, President
Gemayel has voiced strong support for a resumption
of Egypt's Arab leadership role. Lebanese and Egyp-
tian diplomats each have pointed out to US officials,
however, that to move too fast toward normal rela-
tions could elicit a negative reaction from Syria and
complicate efforts to get Syrian forces out of Leba-
Discord With Israel
The Egyptian-Israeli relationship has rebounded only
slightly from the low point it reached last summer. It
is still, in Butrus Ghali's words, a "cold peace." The
occupation of Lebanon is the most immediate impedi-
ment to improved ties, but each side has a litany of
complaints it has voiced in diplomatic channels, in the
media, and in the United States. Egypt's principal
grievances, apart from Lebanon, have been:
? Continued Israeli settlement activity in the West
Bank.
? Israel's rejection of all recent peace initiatives.
? The territorial dispute over Taba on the Sinai
border.
? Annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan
Heights.
? The Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in
June 1981.
Cairo contends that each of these violates the spirit of
the Camp David accords. Moreover, Mubarak has
asserted that the invasion of Lebanon violated both
the spirit and the letter of Article III of the peace
treaty, which obligates the parties to observe the UN
Charter and other principles of international law.
Israel's complaints against Egypt include:
? The Egyptian Ambassador's absence from Tel Aviv
? Attacks against Israel in the Egyptian press.
? The moribund state of most joint committees and
commissions.
? The low level of Egyptian-Israeli commerce (other
than oil sales) and the discrimination against Israeli
firms by publicly owned Egyptian companies.
? Military and security violations in the Sinai.
? The failure to invite Israeli participation in several
international events in Egypt.
Egypt and Israel disagree even on the extent of their
disagreement and on the reasons for it. Foreign
Minister Ali recently charged that Tel Aviv is por-
traying the relationship as worse than it really is. He
said Israel is attempting to show that barebones
normalization is insufficient to achieve peace and that
Israel thus needs even more extensive agreements
with Lebanon than it obtained from Egypt. For their
part, some Israeli leaders disbelieve Mubarak's asser-
tion that withdrawal of his Ambassador was the least
he could do in the face of strong Arab and Egyptian
revulsion over events in Lebanon. Foreign Minister
Shamir has contended to US officials that Cairo's
desire for rapprochement with the Arab states and the
PLO would have led it to downgrade relations with
Israel even without a Lebanese crisis.
Underlying the current discord are differing Israeli
and Egyptian conceptions of normalization. Israel's
complaints suggest a view of normalization that in-
cludes active cooperation in political, economic, cul-
tural, and other fields. By contrast, Egyptian leaders'
public statements on normalization interpret it to
mean only mutual recognition, the establishment of
embassies and other mechanisms for negotiating
agreements, and treatment comparable to that ac-
corded other states. Egyptian officials have repeatedly
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Excerpts from the Protocol Concerning Relations of
the Parties, annexed to the Egyptian-Israeli peace
treaty of March 1979.
The Parties:
? Agree to establish diplomatic and consular rela-
tions and to exchange ambassadors upon comple-
tion of the interim withdrawal.
? Agree to remove all discriminatory barriers to
normal economic relations and to terminate eco-
nomic boycotts of each other upon completion of
the interim withdrawal.
? Recognize a mutuality of interest in good neighbor-
ly relations and agree to consider means to promote
such relations.
? Will cooperate in promoting peace, stability, and
development in their region.
? Shall seek to foster mutual understanding and
tolerance and will, accordingly, abstain from hos-
tile propaganda against each other
stated that the peace treaty is a foundation on which a
friendship can be built only through the gradual
evolution of good will and trust, and they frequently
criticize what they see as Israel's proclivity to spell out
every detail of a relationship in advance. These offi-
cials deny that their relationship with Israel is "spe-
cial." Egyptians have never accepted the Israeli view
that one of the major decisions reached at Camp
David-to omit explicit linkage between the bilateral
treaty and the negotiations on the West Bank and
Gaza-means that Egyptian-Israeli relations should
be insulated from regional events that affect the
prospects for a comprehensive peace.
Israeli actions over the past four years-and particu-
larly last year's invasion of Lebanon-have virtually
destroyed Egyptian confidence in the Begin govern-
ment as a credible and willing negotiating partner,
even though they have not overturned Cairo's com-
mitment to the peace treaty. They also have damp-
ened Mubarak's hopes for Egypt to mediate between
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believe the Mubarak government still judges that Tel
Aviv can be led to adopt more flexible policies but
that this will require greater pressure from the United
States and world opinion.
Cairo seems resigned to working indefinitely with the
current Likud government. Early Egyptian hopes that
Sharon's surrender of the defense portfolio would
strengthen Israeli moderates quickly cooled when it
became apparent that Sharon would remain in the
Cabinet and its key committees, another hardliner
would become Defense Minister, and Begin would
remain firmly in power.
Israeli-Egyptian economic and cultural relations
showed signs of improvement after the return of the
Sinai in April 1982 but have stagnated since the start
of the Lebanese crisis. Apart from the nearly $500
million per year in Egyptian oil sales to Israel,
bilateral trade-which never was large-has dwin-
dled to a trickle. Tourism in both directions has
dropped sharply since June. There still are many
fewer Egyptians visiting Israel than Israeli tourists
coming to Egypt.
Tel Aviv accuses the Egyptian Government of deliber-
ately curtailing commercial contacts for political rea-
sons. Cairo replies that the low level of nonoil trade
and tourism reflects the choices of individual Egyp-
tians and Egyptian enterprises and is not the result of
governmental manipulation. We believe there are
elements of truth in both arguments. Except for oil,
Egypt has few products that meet Israeli needs. Israel
produces a much greater range of items that could be
used by Egypt but has been frustrated by Egyptian
unwillingness to replace previous suppliers. As for
tourism, as one Egyptian diplomat recently noted,
Egyptians have little reason to travel to Israel when
they have plenty of ruins to see at home. Anger over
the events in Lebanon has further reduced the inclina-
tion of Egyptians to visit or trade with Israel
In any event, the curtailment of contacts has suited
the Egyptian Government's purposes as a signal of its
opposition to Israeli policies. Cairo has considerable
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latitude under its economic agreements with Israel to
facilitate or discourage commerce through such dis-
cretionary actions as the granting of visas and import
licenses. We believe that, for the most part, senior
Egyptian leaders have not issued explicit directions to
reduce intercourse with Israel but have quietly per-
mitted or encouraged actions by lower level officials
having this effect.
The line between business and politics blurs when
publicly owned Egyptian companies decide not to
trade with Israel. The Egyptian Government denies
Israeli charges that it has directed such companies to
boycott Israeli firms. We believe this denial to be
substantially correct, but it is unclear whether the
antiboycott provisions in the peace agreements apply
to the companies' own decisions. In the most contro-
versial recent case, an Israeli shipping firm failed to
receive a contract to ship wool from New Zealand
even though it had submitted the low bid. An Egyp-
tian official cited various technical reasons for this
decision but also acknowledged that the Egyptian
companies involved did not want to become targets of
the Arab boycott.
We believe that criticism of Israel in the Egyptian
press-like the low level of nonoil trade-has been
condoned but not orchestrated by the government.
Egyptian journalists need little prodding to write
harsh things about Israel. We believe the virulent
attacks, sometimes with anti-Jewish overtones, that
have appeared in Egyptian newspapers during the
past year would have been even more extreme if the
Egyptian press were completely free from government
influence. The opposition weeklies generally are con-
tinuing their venomous comments about Israel and its
leadership, but since October the establishment dai-
lies-evidently with government guidance-have
toned down their attacks.
We believe that military and security violations along
the Egyptian-Israeli border are not deliberate provo-
cations by Cairo. The multinational observer force in
the Sinai reports that both sides-particularly
Israel-have committed numerous infractions of the
peace treaty's terms, but that neither has seriously
violated its intent. The incidents of terrorist infiltra-
tions reported by Israel are almost certainly the result
of Egyptian inability to police the border adequately
because of the large area involved and because some
of the guard force may be inept or bribable. It is in
Cairo's interest to try to prevent terrorist incidents in
order to demonstrate that Israel can enjoy security
within its pre-1967 boundaries.
Israel and Egypt resumed negotiations on Taba in
early March. The dispute concerns a small parcel of
land at the northern end of the Gulf of Aqaba that
Israel refused to relinquish when it withdrew from the
rest of the Sinai a year ago. There is little prospect for
settling this dispute soon. The Israelis consider Taba
to be one of their few remaining levers against Egypt.
Tel Aviv probably will withhold concessions unless
there is movement in the Egyptian-Israeli trade nego-
tiations that opened later in March. Cairo agreed to
the trade talks in return for Israel's willingness to
discuss Taba, but it refuses to make an explicit
linkage between the two sets of negotiations. The
Egyptians are convinced that their claim to Taba is
valid and that the issue is one of sovereignty and of
Israel's willingness to fulfill its commitments. Egyp-
tian officials have said that a favorable settlement of
the dispute is needed to demonstrate to other Arabs
the efficacy of negotiating with Tel Aviv.
The Mubarak government has tried to keep the door
open to better relations. For example, its decision to
allow Israel to open a pavilion at the Cairo interna-
tional trade fair in March was a gesture to improve
the atmosphere in the bilateral relationship
Cairo sees little
political advantage, however, in being significantly
more cooperative with the Israelis than the peace
treaty obligates it to be.
Iraq and the Persian Gulf War
Next to the set of issues involving Israel, Lebanon,
and the Palestinians, the Iraq-Iran war is Egypt's
chief regional concern. Cairo is providing substantial
support to Iraq (see box) partly to counter the danger
it believes the Shia revolutionary regime in Iran is
posing to Arab governments throughout the Persian
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Since early 1981 Egypt has sold as much as $1
billion worth of military equipment to Baghdad.
Although these sales are excluded from official
Egyptian data, they represent Egypt's largest export
commodity after oil. We believe they have provided
foreign exchange to the Egyptian military for its own
overseas purchases of arms. In addition, the exports
to Iraq have increased economies of scale in the
Egyptian arms industry and have enabled Cairo to
dispose of some of the Soviet-made arms it is replac-
ing with Western equipment
In addition to weapons, Egyptian support for the
Iraqi war effort includes Egyptian advisers in Iraq,
instruction in Egypt of Iraqi staff officers,
Numerous public and private state-
ments by senior Egyptian officials indicate that Cairo
has resolved not to send its own combat forces to
Iraq, even though Baghdad requested troops, accord-
ing to Mubarak. Some Egyptian citizens, however,
are serving in the Iraqi armed forces. Most of these
probably were civilian workers already in Iraq when
the war began. There are indications that the Iraqi
Government pressured some of these workers into
joining the war effort,
genuine volunteers, most of whom evidently are at-
Gulf area. In addition, support to Baghdad is easing
Egypt's reentry into the Arab world by ingratiating
Egypt both with Iraq and with the other Gulf states,
which share the concern about Iran
Egypt evidently does not expect-and probably would
not want-the Iraqis to achieve a clear military
victory. An Egyptian diplomat recently told US offi-
cials that Egypt's assistance was intended only to
stave off an Iranian victory until Tehran realized it
would have to accept a mediated settlement. Cairo
also may hope that its aid will lessen Baghdad's
dependence on the USSR. Mubarak said to UN
officials in February that he believed Iraqi President
Saddam Husayn would be willing to pay a heavy price
to Moscow as long as he needs Soviet help in the war.
Egyptian-Iraqi political relations have warmed con-
siderably over the past year. There have been several
high-level contacts, as well as such steps toward
normalization as resumption of the sale of Egyptian
newspapers in Iraq. Egyptian-Iraqi friendship is tenu-
ous, however, because it depends so much on Iraq's
need for help in the war. Egypt and Iraq historically
have been rivals for Arab leadership, and the rivalry
could reemerge if Saddam gets out of his current
plight or is deposed. Nonetheless, the friendly gestures
that Iraq already has made have special significance
because they come from a state that led the outcry for
anti-Egyptian sanctions after Camp David.
Reintegration Into Arab Ranks
The political climate in the Arab world gradually has
become more favorable for ending Egypt's isolation,
as Cairo's diplomatic strategy succeeded in regaining
the Sinai, alternatives to the US-led peace process
have failed to develop, and the Arabs have acknowl-
edged Egypt's necessarily important role in the re-
gion. Inter-Arab divisions, however, so far have pre-
vented the emergence of a consensus in favor of
resuming full diplomatic relations and readmitting
Egypt to the Arab League. The radical Arab position,
expressed most forcefully by Syria, is that the sanc-
tions against Egypt should continue (see appendix A).
Moderate Arab governments generally favor normal-
izing relations with Cairo, but each one is hesitant to
take the lead and thereby become vulnerable to
charges of fracturing Arab unity, violating Arab
League decisions, and being disloyal to the cause of
Palestinian self-determination.
Cairo pins much of the blame for its continued
isolation on Saudi Arabia.
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We agree that Saudi Arabia is a key player in
determining when Egypt reenters the Arab world.
The smaller Persian Gulf states are inclined to follow
Riyadh's lead on this matter, and the dependence of
Morocco, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon on Saudi assist-
ance makes these states reluctant to get very far out
of step either.
The Mubarak government sees no particular urgency
in restoring diplomatic relations with the Arabs,
largely because it enjoys considerable cooperation
with most Arab states even without formal ties (see
appendix B). Egyptian leaders have stated publicly
that they would welcome renewed ties but that it is up
to the states that broke relations to take the initiative
to restore them. Mubarak and his advisers have made
clear that Egypt will not renounce Camp David or
accept any other preconditions to reintegration. We
believe that, despite the difficulties Egyptian leaders
have encountered in the peace process, they judge that
events since 1978 have shown that Egypt was right
and the Arabs who opposed accommodation with
Israel were wrong. Egyptian leaders can see the Arab
states already moving in Egypt's direction, and we
believe that they consider it unnecessary and unjusti-
fied for Egypt to change its policies now.
Furthermore, the Mubarak government believes that
to press the issue of reintegration could be counterpro-
ductive. Egyptian leaders, despite their annoyance
with Saudi Arabia, share some of Riyadh's concern
The Egyptian Government believes, and we agree,
that Egypt's formal acceptance into Arab ranks de-
pends above all on future progress in negotiations with
Israel and that this means reintegration probably is at
least several months away.
Domestic Politics and Opinion
Involvement in wars, employment in foreign coun-
tries, and exposure to the electronic media have
sensitized Egyptians to major developments in their
region, even though most of them lack detailed knowl-
edge of the issues involved. Several themes in Egyp-
tian public opinion set general limits to the policies
the government can adopt toward Israel and the
Arabs.'
Most Egyptians perceive Egypt as the center and
leader of the Arab world. This concept is grounded in
nationalist pride and has been reinforced by years of
official propaganda, particularly during Nasir's rule.
The estrangement of Egypt from other Arab states
thus causes some resentment, at least among intellec-
tuals. Unsophisticated segments of the population are
less concerned, but they do not understand why
Egyptian-Arab relations have not returned to their
pre-1979 status. Most Egyptians look forward to
reintegration not only as a means of restoring Egypt's
' There is no scientific polling of public opinion in Egypt. Evidence
of the opinions discussed in this section comes mainly from informal
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regional leadership role but also as the key to obtain-
ing Arab petrodollars in exchange for Egyptian skills
and expertise.
peace and probably never did. A widespread percep-
tion is that Israel duped Egypt into demilitarizing
most of the Sinai in order to give the Israelis a free
Like their government, however, most Egyptians do
not seem eager to press the issue of restoring relations.
They believe that the Arabs need Egypt more than it
needs the Arabs, and that it is up to the Arabs to
make the necessary conciliatory moves. Moreover,
there is a residue of bitterness against the Arab states
for having adopted anti-Egyptian policies in the first
place.
Egyptian unwillingness to make sacrifices on behalf of
other Arabs is apparent in attitudes toward the
Palestinian problem. Egyptians believe that they al-
ready have borne more than their fair share of the
fight for Palestine by leading the Arab side in four
wars against Israel. Although some members of the
Egyptian military favored taking in some of the
Palestinians who were driven out of Beirut, most
Egyptians show little enthusiasm for admitting a large
new Palestinian contingent into Egypt. They seem to
believe that such a presence would mean added
competition for jobs and housing and a potential for
the same sort of trouble the Palestinians brought to
Lebanon.
Egyptian attitudes toward Israel turned sharply nega-
tive after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June
1982, and again after the massacre in the refugee
camps. The public mood during these crises almost
certainly would have supported severe anti-Israeli
measures, including a severing of diplomatic relations
with Tel Aviv. Most Egyptian anger was directed at
the Israeli Government and particularly at Prime
Minister Begin and Defense Minister Sharon. The
blistering anti-Israeli commentary in the Egyptian
press, however, may have lingering effects on how
Egyptians perceive all Israelis
The invasion of Lebanon made Egyptians markedly
more pessimistic than before about the future of the
peace process. Even most Egyptians who have sup-
ported the Camp David accords now believe that the
Begin government does not want a comprehensive
hand in Lebanon.
Despite the gloom about prospects for an overall
Middle East settlement, Egyptians do not want anoth-
er war with Israel. This sentiment is particularly
evident among military officers, some of whom still
are disappointed by the outcome of the 1973 war
despite the official Egyptian portrayal of it as a great
victory. Even Egyptians who have been highly critical
of the peace treaty with Israel and of its failure to
lead to a broader peace seem to accept and appreciate
that the treaty has brought Egyptian-Israeli fighting
to an end.
Egyptians also want to stay out of wars elsewhere in
the region, including the Iraq-Iran conflict. Most
Egyptians sympathize with Iraq but would oppose
sending combat troops. There are still strong memo-
ries of the Yemeni civil war, in which Egyptian forces
sustained heavy casualties. Some Egyptian intellectu-
als also fear that to fight against Iran could rile
Islamic fundamentalists within Egypt.
The political opposition in Egypt has been unable to ^
use regional issues effectively to weaken Mubarak's 25X1
popular support, largely because the opposition itself
is divided. Leftist parties tried to exploit revulsion
over the events in Lebanon last summer by organizing
pro-Palestinian demonstrations and demanding with-
drawal of the Egyptian Ambassador from Tel Aviv.
As on many other issues, however, the effects of the
leftists' activity was limited by their inability to join
forces with the Islamic right.
The secular parties themselves have divided over the
US peace initiative. The moderate Liberal Party has
noted positive aspects of the US plan and seems
satisfied with the government's response to it. The 25X1
leftist Socialist Labor Party initially took a similar
approach but later said it could accept no plan that
was unacceptable to the PLO. The Socialist Labor
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leadership may have calculated that it could score
political points by keeping its distance from the
government on this issue and also that it could not
afford to be outflanked by the other leftist party, the
National Progressive Unionist Grouping, which has
consistently opposed the US initiative.
Despite their divisions, the opposition parties will
continue to serve as a modest check on Mubarak's
regional policies by focusing and articulating popular
sentiment on issues on which the government could
become vulnerable. The Palestine National Council's
endorsement of Egyptian "national forces" gave at
least short-term encouragement to the opposition.
Domestic politics and opinion so far have not had a
major independent effect on the Mubarak govern-
ment's regional policies. For the most part, domestic
sentiment has tended to reinforce what would have
been the inclinations of Mubarak and his advisers
anyway, since they share the Egyptian public's disillu-
sionment with Israeli policies, its desire to avoid war,
and its intention to return to the Arab world only on
Egypt's terms. In the one instance in which the
mainstream of Egyptian public opinion diverged sig-
nificantly from government policy-at the height of
the Lebanon crisis-Mubarak resisted considerable
pressure to take stronger action against Israel and
stuck to his strategy for a negotiated peace
Mubarak's political standing will depend less on
foreign policy than on his ability to resolve Egypt's
economic and other domestic problems. Foreign set-
backs could cause Mubarak trouble, however, if they
coincide with internal crises and help to catalyze
popular frustrations. Conversely, progress on Middle
East issues would pay him domestic dividends. We
believe the limited rapprochement that has already
been achieved with other Arab states, including
Mubarak's highly publicized meetings with Arab
leaders at the Nonaligned Summit, has strengthened
somewhat his position at home. Any breakthrough in
negotiations with Israel would be a major boost for
Mubarak and would rekindle some of the hopes for a
comprehensive peace that were prevalent in Egypt
immediately after Camp David.
The US Role
The Mubarak government is relying heavily on the
United States to help it attain its regional objectives,
particularly by inducing Israel to be more flexible.
Despite the Egyptian leaders' pessimism about what
the United States will do to pressure Tel Aviv,
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hey
remain convinced Washington can and should exert
more leverage on the Israelis in order to move the
peace process ahead.
The Egyptians realize there is a limit to US influence
over the Begin government and that direct Israeli-
PLO negotiations probably lie beyond that limit.
pressure on the Israelis would be most timely and
effective on the issues of withdrawal from Lebanon
and settlement activity in the West Bank.1
Egyptian leaders have indicated that they also want
the United States to influence Saudi Arabia to con-
tribute more to moderate objectives in the Middle
East. Mubarak told US Ambassador to the UN
Kirkpatrick in March that the United States should
persuade the Saudis to urge Hussein and the Palestin-
ians to agree to negotiations. Other Egyptian officials
have said they would like Washington to persuade the
Saudis to use their clout with Syria as well in order to
get Assad to be less obstructionist regarding the peace
process and the situation in Lebanon.
Cairo believes that a more energetic US diplomatic
effort in the Middle East would complement, not
replace, a regional leadership role for Egypt.
intentions in the Middle East.
that US-Egyptian military cooperation be strictly
limited, not only to avoid domestic political repercus-
sions but also to reassure other Arab governments
that Egypt is genuinely nonaligned and not a stalking-
horse for Washington. Moreover, US economic and
military aid serves as an indicator to the Arabs of US
willingness to support Arab interests. Egyptian lead-
ers tend to assess US aid to Egypt in terms of how it
compares with aid to Israel, interpreting both pro-
grams together as a barometer of US sympathies and
Prospects for Change in Egyptian Policy
Mubarak has strong reasons to continue the main
lines of his regional policy, despite his frustrations in
dealing with Israel and the setbacks that Egypt has
suffered since Camp David. Abandonment of the US-
sponsored peace process would jeopardize Egypt's
large economic and military aid relationship with the
United States. Moreover, Mubarak currently sees no
alternative policy capable of achieving a Middle East
settlement. He has argued in recent interviews that
disagreement between Egypt and other Arab states is
not the main issue so long as the other Arabs disagree
strongly among themselves. Arab disunity, he con-
tends, is preventing them from gaining influence with
the United States and from formulating a workable
strategy to achieve peace.
The perceived lack of alternatives underlies the mix-
ture of hope and pessimism in the Mubarak govern-
ment's dealings with the United States and Israel.
Mubarak acknowledged to US Ambassador Habib
earlier this year that Egypt is committed to negotia-
tions as the only way to resolve the Arab-Israeli
conflict, even though he expressed in the same breath
his fear that Israel will "only drag things out."
Mubarak's cautious temperament reinforces his incli-
nation not to make sudden or drastic changes. He
often has argued that Egypt needs stability, not more
Sadat-style shock treatment. In Mubarak's domestic
policies, stability has meant a tendency to muddle
through and to avoid hard decisions as long as
The nature of the US-Egyptian bilateral relationship
significantly affects Cairo's ability to achieve its
regional goals. The Mubarak government is insisting
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possible. We believe that this also will characterize
Mubarak's regional policy during the remainder of
this year, even if little progress is made toward
solution of the Palestinian problem. Neither the US
election campaign nor Israeli settlement activity-the
principal reasons for Mubarak's sense of urgency-
will compel him to make new decisions by some
specific date. If domestic problems seriously eroded
Mubarak's political standing, however, he might be
tempted to make some bold stroke in foreign policy in
an effort to shore up his popularity.
Regardless of Mubarak's domestic standing, we be-
lieve that he again would come under domestic and
Arab pressure to impose severe sanctions on Israel if
Tel Aviv took some dramatic and provocative action,
such as an armed attack against an Arab state or
formal annexation of the West Bank. Given the
current state of Egyptian-Israeli relations, there are
only a few responses Cairo could make-such as
intensifying media criticism of Israel or terminating
the trade talks-that would not be clear-cut violations
of the peace treaty and the Camp David accords. We
believe that Mubarak would feel compelled to do
more than this, even though he has argued repeatedly
that to break the treaty would play into the Begin
government's hands by enabling it to argue that
Arabs do not want peace. His most likely response
would be to sever diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv,
which is what many Egyptians-and moderate Arab
leaders, including King Hussein-urged him to do
last summer. Other, less likely, options would be to
interrupt oil exports to Israel, bar Israeli ships from
the Suez Canal, or move substantial armed forces into
the demilitarized zones of the Sinai. These latter
steps-particularly any violation of the Sinai demili-
tarization agreement-would carry the risk of an
Israeli military response. Whatever measures he took,
Mubarak probably would issue a statement of regret
that Israel had forced his hand and of hope that the
peace process could be resumed and the treaty fully
observed once Tel Aviv changed its policies.
If Mubarak fell from power, change in Egypt's re-
gional policy would depend on who replaced him and
under what circumstances the transfer of power oc-
curred. If Mubarak were toppled in an atmosphere of
frustration and failure, any new ruler probably would
want to put distance between himself and Mubarak's
foreign policies. We believe, however, that military
officers who generally share Mubarak's objectives
would have the greatest influence in the succession.
The most likely successor, Defense Minister Abu
Ghazala, is at least as strongly pro-US as Mubarak
and presumably would be no more inclined than he to
discard the US-led peace process. Moreover, any
Egyptian regime would have to live with Israeli
military superiority and with the fact that the Sinai is
under Egyptian control today by virtue of negotia-
tions, not military victory.
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Appendix A
Relations With Radical Arabs
Egyptian leaders have had the satisfaction of seeing a
significant weakening of the once-solid front of radi-
cal Arab regimes (and the PLO) that led the opposi-
tion to Camp David. The enmity that Iraq and the
PLO leadership once directed at Egypt has been
dissolved by their needs for Egyptian military or
diplomatic assistance. Egypt's relations with the
Bendjedid government in Algeria show signs of nor-
malization, such as the recent resumption of commer-
cial air service between Algiers and Cairo. Egypt still
lacks any relations with the Marxist South Yemeni
regime, but it is peripheral to Egypt's principal re-
gional concerns. Only Libya and Syria remain signifi-
cant Arab adversaries of Egypt in the sense that they
are effectively vetoing Egypt's reintegration into Arab
ranks and taking other actions that jeopardize Egypt's
regional goals.
Even the Libyan regime-evidently trying to break
out of its domestic and foreign isolation-has been
indicating it wants to bury the hatchet with Cairo.
Since late 1980 Qadhafi has sent several emissaries,
including two of his cousins, on secret missions to
Egypt to propose such measures as a reopening of the
border and the resumption of commercial air links.
The Egyptian response to Qadhafi's overtures, as
reported by Mubarak and other Egyptian officials,
has been to listen but to make no commitments.
Libya does not pose a significant direct threat to
Egypt, but Egyptian leaders frequently have indicated
concern about Libyan subversive and military activi-
ties elsewhere in North Africa, particularly in Sudan
and, to a lesser extent, Chad. In the exchanges with
Qadhafi's emissaries, the Mubarak government has
stressed that it would not allow Libyan-sponsored
subversion to threaten Nimeiri's regime. The coup
plot that was exposed in February dimmed what little
chance there was for improvement in Libyan-Egyp-
tian relations, since it led the Libyan media to resume
abusive criticism of Mubarak for the first time in
several months. In a conversation with a senior US
official in late March, Mubarak harshly criticized
Egypt's relations with Syria are even worse than with
Libya. Syrian media have incessantly criticized Egyp-
tian leaders, and Damascus so far has remained
implacably opposed to Egypt's policy of continuing
and broadening the peace process. Syria has declared
that Cairo must discard the "shackles" of its ties to
the United States and Israel before it can be accepted
back into Arab ranks.
had tacitly agreed to divide up Lebanon.
Mubarak's references to Syria indicate that he consid-
ers the Assad regime to be virtually incorrigible.
Mubarak says that Assad has two incentives for
preventing a peace settlement and promoting contin-
ued tension in the region: first, conflict with Israel is
the justification for Arab financial subsidies to Da-
mascus; and second, Assad fears the impact on Syria's
domestic stability if Syrian troops return home from
Lebanon. As a result, according to Mubarak, Assad
would rather stay in the Bekaa than regain the Golan.
Mubarak has repeatedly claimed that Syria and Israel
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Appendix B
Cooperation With Moderate Arabs
Despite severed diplomatic relations, Egypt's political,
economic, and military ties with most Arab countries
are significant and growing. Egypt has interest sec-
tions in all Arab capitals except Aden, Damascus, and
Tripoli. Diplomatic contact is maintained through
these missions, through the Arab states' interest
sections in Cairo, and through official visits. Mubarak
has communicated with other Arab leaders indirectly
by special envoy and has met them personally at
Saudi King Khalid's funeral in June 1982 and at the
Nonaligned Summit in New Delhi this March. At
New Delhi he held talks with Hussein, Gemayel,
Qaboos, and the amirs of Bahrain, Kuwait, and
Qatar.
Arab economic assistance to Egypt remains suspend-
ed, but trade and tourism have decreased only moder-
ately since the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Accord-
ing to the International Monetary Fund, Egyptian
exports to Arab League countries in 1981 totaled
$148 million, down from $201 million in 1978, the
year of Camp David. Imports from the Arab countries
during the same period declined from $153 million to
$149 million. Egypt has coped with the Arab boycott
by designating one trading company and one bank to
handle most dealings with Israel.
Expatriate Egyptian workers, most of whom are in
Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula countries, are an
important economic and human link between Egypt
and other Arab states. A senior Egyptian official
responsible for economic statistics recently estimated
to US diplomats that Egyptians in other Arab coun-
tries total well over a million. Foreign employment of
these workers has helped Egypt to export surplus
labor and to earn foreign exchange and has enabled
the host countries to meet labor shortages in oil,
construction, and other industries. The demand for
their services may be declining, however, as the
economies of the oil-producing countries contract.
Iraq recently reduced the proportion of earnings that
foreign workers can send home, and Kuwait tightened
up on the issuance of residence permits.
Egypt's closest Arab ally is Sudan. President Nimeiri
broke away from the Arab League's ostracism of
Egypt when Qadhafi's move into Chad in 1981 made
an Egyptian security role in northeast Africa appear
increasingly important. During the past year
Mubarak and Nimeiri have been meeting at least
monthly. Last October the two presidents signed a
"charter of integration," which establishes an integra-
tion council, a Nile Valley parliament, and a fund for
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will go to considerable lengths to bolster Nimeiri, as
demonstrated by the military measures it took in
February to foil a Libyan-sponsored plot to overthrow
him.
Oman and Somalia are the only other Arab League
members that have full diplomatic relations with
Egypt. The Egyptian-Omani relationship centers on
security cooperation, which has included Egyptian
training and advisory assistance to Omani forces and
joint military exercises in Oman last autumn. In
return for Egyptian military help, Sultan Qaboos has
been trying to broker Cairo's return to Arab ranks,
such as by attempting (unsuccessfully) to set up a
meeting between Mubarak and King Hussein in
Oman last year
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Egypt has been furnishing limited military aid to
Somalia, including used Soviet-made arms. We ex-
pect such aid to continue, although Cairo's main
efforts in the Horn of Africa currently are directed
toward mediating a settlement of the Ethiopian-
Somali conflict. Egypt is trying to improve its own
relations with Ethiopia-the source of most of the
Nile water that flows through Sudan and Egypt-and
to draw the Mengistu regime away from the Soviet
orbit.
Among the Arab states that lack formal diplomatic
ties with Egypt, Jordan and Morocco are those that-
in addition to Lebanon and Iraq-are cooperating
most closely with Cairo. The rapid development of
Jordanian-Egyptian relations over the last few months
is an outgrowth of efforts to bring Amman into the
peace process. Warmer Egyptian-Jordanian relations
have become apparent in several ways, in addition to
the frequent consultations on peace-related issues.
Jordan permits the sale of Egyptian books and has
agreed to share television broadcasts. A bilateral
trade agreement also has been reached, with Jordan
dropping restrictions on all Egyptian firms that do not
trade with Israel.
Morocco has been one of the most vocal supporters of
closer Arab-Egyptian ties, partly because it values
Egyptian support on the Western Sahara question and
because it would welcome additional moderate influ-
ence in Arab councils. Egyptian-Moroccan political
Saudi Arabia cooperates with Cairo on several mat-
ters of mutual interest. The Saudis provide most of
the financing for Iraqi arms purchases from Egypt.
Saudi Arabia also paid for 20 of the
Mirage 2000's that Egypt bought from France last
year, although Mubarak denied to US Ambassador
Atherton that there was any such financing for the
bia has relaxed restrictions on investment in Egypt,
and the flow of private funds has resumed to some
extent.
The Saudis probably still harbor some resentment
over the insults that Sadat threw at them after the
Arabs split with Egypt in 1979. The public tone of
Saudi-Egyptian relations, however, has improved over
the past few months. Since December the Saudi press
had been under government orders not to criticize
Egypt, according to sources of the US Embassy in
Jidda. Accordingly, Saudi newspapers have been em-
phasizing Egypt's support for the Iraqi war effort, and
they favorably portrayed Mubarak's trip to the Unit-
ed States. At the Nonaligned Summit, Saudi Foreign
Minister Saud noted the Egyptian-Arab contacts that
already were taking place and expressed hope for a
further improvement in relations.
The smaller Persian Gulf states clearly favor closer
relations with Cairo, partly because they are interest-
ed in obtaining Egyptian help to counter Iranian or
other threats to Gulf security.
We believe, however, that Egyptian aid to
the Gulf states probably will remain limited to advis-
ers and that the Gulf states would be unlikely to
request Egyptian combat troops unless these states
Trade and investment ties between Egypt and the
Persian Gulf countries are gradually being restored,
particularly in the private sector. Businessmen from
the Gulf states have formed an Arab Gulf Investment
Company, which has headquarters in Cairo and is
intended to stimulate Arab investment in Egypt.
Egyptian officials warmly received company represen-
tatives last June and presented a long list of projects
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for possible Arab funding. Official financial ties with
Egypt have not been repaired so rapidly. F-
(Gulf state
officials have expressed interest in resuming partici-
pation in the Arab Organization for Industrialization,
the Egypt-based arms manufacturing consortium
from which they withdrew after the Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty
Relations between Egypt and North Yemen have
visibly improved in recent months. Egypt agreed in
January to send about 400 military instructors and
The Lebanon crisis caused Egyptian-PLO relations to
become warmer than at any time since the Camp
David accords. The PLO leadership appreciated the
tangible assistance that Egypt provided, such as a
communications link between Beirut and Cairo.
Arafat has said that he will never forget the "compas-
sion" he felt from Egypt at the height of the crisis.
Although Cairo refused to accept any of the Palestin-
ian fighters trapped in West Beirut
Cairo believed
that to have taken in the Palestinians without progress
toward an overall peace settlement would merely have
perpetuated their status as refugees. Mubarak has
told US officials that he also did not want to expose
Egypt to the charge that it had colluded with Israel in
the invasion of Lebanon
The principal impediment to further development of
Egyptian-PLO relations is Arafat's need to avoid an 25X1
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implacably oppose the Mubarak government. Radical
influence was reflected in the statement on relations
with Egypt that the Palestine National Council issued
in Algiers in February. The Council called on Cairo to
abandon the Camp David accords and spoke of
nurturing relations with Egyptian "national forces,"
an apparent reference to Egyptian opposition groups.
The statement infuriated Mubarak, who publicly
denounced the PLO leadership for interfering in
Egypt's internal affairs and avoided contact with PLO
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dampened speculation that Arafat might soon visit
Cairo and probably added to Egyptian doubts about
the PLO's ability to reach agreement with King
Hussein. According to US Embassy sources, PLO
spokesmen who came to Cairo after the Algiers 25X1
meeting were harshly criticized by Egyptian officials.
We do not believe, however, that these frictions will
lead Cairo to abandon hope of bringing the PLO at
least indirectly into the peace process
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