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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00556R000100160002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Jordan, the West Bank,
and the Peace Process
An Intelligence Assessment
NESA 83-10082
April 1983
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Directorate of rSecret
Jordan, the West Bank,
and the Peace Process
This paper was prepared b
Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be addressed to
the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
This paper was coordinated by the Directorate of
Operations and the National Intelligence Council
Secret
NESA 83-10082
April 1983
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Secret
Jordan, the West Bank,
and the Peace Process
Key Judgments In our judgment, King Hussein will be unable to move ahead in the peace
Information available process without West Bank cooperation that will be gained only with the
as of 18 April 1983 approval of the Palestine Liberation Organization. We believe Hussein
was used in this report.
intends to pursue his dialogue with the PLO despite the Jordanian cabinet
statement in early April that Jordan was relinquishing all responsibility for
the future of the West Bank and Gaza. We do not believe the King will try
to enter negotiations alone because to do so will invite the anger of the Pal-
estinians and other Arab states, and possibly retaliatory action.
Hussein's lack of authority to represent the Palestinian cause on his own,
given the Rabat Arab summit decision in 1974 naming the PLO the sole
representative of the Palestinians, forces him to coordinate his actions with
the PLO. Hussein, however, has continued to implement policies on the
West Bank that have allowed Jordan to keep a foothold there without
openly challenging the PLO's leadership claim. We believe these policies
are designed to convince West Bankers that their only chance of ending the
Israeli occupation is to allow the Hashemite Kingdom to play a key role.
Jordan's entry into peace negotiations with West Bank cooperation would
bolster Hussein's prestige and authority at home, especially among the
Palestinian community, and gain him recognition throughout the Arab
world. Lack of success, however, would risk diplomatic isolation, akin to
what Egyptian President Sadat experienced, and the loss of key financial
aid that Jordan receives from the Gulf Arab states. It also would expose
Jordan to the wrath of the Arab rejectionist states, particularly Syria.
Hussein will seek additional commitments from the United States in return
for his entry into the peace process. He will want firm evidence of US per-
severance even in the face of Israeli opposition, particularly on the issue of
Jewish settlements on the West Bank. He will also expect increased
financial aid and assurances of US military aid if Jordan is threatened by
one of its neighbors. Moreover, he will expect an end to congressional
opposition to US arms sales to Jordan.
In our view, if Hussein and the PLO fail to agree on a negotiating strategy,
radical movements will gain new prominence in the Arab world and
Hussein's concern for the internal security of the kingdom will grow. Fear
of an increase in the Palestinian population will lead the King to adopt ad-
ditional restrictive measures to check Palestinian immigration.
Secret
NESA 83-10082
April 1983
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The ultimate outcome of a political link between Jordan and the West
Bank ironically might be the transformation of Jordan into the Palestinian
state. Federation could push the Palestinian majority as high as 85 percent,
creating a situation in which they may eventually come to dominate the
economic and political life of Jordan, particularly after Hussein's demise.
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Secret
Jordan, the West Bank,
and the Peace Process
King Hussein has always sought to maintain influence
on the West Bank for political reasons and because of
the strong economic and social ties between the two
areas; he is particularly interested now that over half
of Jordan's population is of Palestinian origin. He has
had a difficult time preserving that influence, howev-
er, since Israel's occupation of the West Bank in 1967
and the Rabat Arab summit decision in 1974, reaf-
firmed by the Fez summit in 1982, that the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) is the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people.
President Reagan's 1982 peace initiative, which re-
jects the idea of an independent Palestinian state and
calls for a Palestinian entity on the West Bank in
"association" with Jordan, has rekindled the King's
interest in joining the two regions. He has initiated a
dialogue with the PLO and has introduced a plan
similar to his 1972 United Arab Kingdom Plan
calling for a federation of the East and West Banks.
Ties Between Jordan and the West Bank
Ties between Jordan and the West Bank existed long
before Jordan's annexation of the region in 1950.
Under the Ottoman Empire, territories east and west
of the Jordan River were considered part of Greater
Syria. This created strong cultural and familial ties
and facilitated the growth of commercial and econom-
ic relations between the two areas that still exist
today. British control, which was foreseen in the
Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 and established after
World War 1, helped to perpetuate this association.
With Jordan's annexation of the West Bank in 1950,
the Palestinians on the West Bank as well as the
refugees on the East Bank were given Jordanian
citizenship. The addition of the West Bank more than
doubled the country's population and greatly en-
hanced Jordan's economic potential. In addition to the
tourist value of the area's numerous holy places, the
generally better educated West Bankers brought with
them valuable technical and administrative skills.
Many West Bankers attained prominent positions in
the Jordanian Government and in business.
Jordan's influence in the West Bank diminished sig-
nificantly following Israel's seizure of the territory in
1967. Under international law, Jordanian law still
applies to the region, but in 16 years of occupation the
Israeli military government has issued over 1,000
administrative decrees that have significantly modi-
fied these laws
Moreover, the founding of the Palestine Liberation
Organization in 1964 has undercut Jordan's position
on the West Bank. West Bank loyalty has fluctuated
between the two depending upon which side had more
prestige and support in the Middle East at any
particular time.
Factors working against Amman include a perception
among West Bankers of insufficient Jordanian de-
fense of the area in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the
expulsion of Palestinian guerrillas from Jordan during
the 1970-71 Jordanian civil war, and Jordan's inac-
tion during the October War of 1973. In 1974 when
Arab displeasure with Hussein was at a peak, the
Arab summit conference in Rabat formally named
the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people, thus stripping Hussein of responsi-
bility for the territory
Despite the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and
the Rabat decision, Jordan has tried to maintain its
influence, hoping to convince West Bankers that their
only chance of achieving Israeli withdrawal is through
a political link with Jordan. Hussein sees the Reagan
initiative as US endorsement of that position.
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BEIRUT
*DAMASCUS
Syria
S
(West Bank
Tel Aviv-Yafo?
Jerusalem
Suez
Canal
r
Gaza Strip Gad/ Israel I
Egypt
Gull of
Boundary representetlon In Aqaba
not necessarily aumodt.nve.
,AMMAN
Saudi
Arabia
J o r d a n
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King Hussein's United
Arab Kingdom Proposal
? The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall become a
United Arab Kingdom and shall be so named.
? The central judicial authority shall be vested in a
Supreme Central Court.
? The United Arab Kingdom shall consist of two
regions:
- The Region of Palestine, consisting of the West
Bank and any other Palestinian territories to be
liberated and where the population decides to
join it.
The Region of Jordan, consisting of the East
Bank.
? Amman shall be the capital of the kingdom and at
the same time shall be the capital of the Region of
Jordan.
? Jerusalem shall become the capital of the Region of
Palestine.
? The King shall be the Head of State and shall
assume the central executive authority assisted by
a Central Council of Ministers. The central legisla-
tive authority shall be vested in the King and the
National Assembly, whose members shall be elect-
ed by direct and secret ballot. It shall have an equal
number of members from each of the two regions.
Motivations
Hussein's concern for recovering the West Bank
reflects both personal and national interests. Most
important is Jordanian national security. Over 1
million Palestinians came to Jordan during and after
the Arab-Israeli wars in 1948 and 1967, first to
escape the newly founded Israeli state and then the
Israeli occupation. Since 1968 the flow from the West
to the East Bank has continued. Although accurate
figures on the flow are unavailable, the US Consul in
Jerusalem believes that it now probably constitutes
several thousand each year. This continuing influx has
created a Palestinian majority in Jordan that is
potentially destabilizing. The King probably sees con-
tinued Israeli settlement activity on the West Bank as
? The kingdom shall have a single armed forces and
its supreme commander shall be the King.
? The responsibilities of the central executive power
shall be confined to matters relating to the kingdom
as a sovereign international entity ensuring the
safety of the union, its stability, and development.
? The executive power in each region shall be vested
in a governor general from the region in a Regional
Council of Ministers also from the region.
? The legislative power in each region shall be vested
in a People's Council, which shall be elected by
direct, secret ballot. This council shall elect the
governor general.
? The judicial power in each region shall be vested in
the courts of the region, and nobody shall have any
authority over them.
? The executive power in each region shall be respon-
sible for all its matters with the exception of such
matters as the constitution requires to be the
responsibility of the central executive power.
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forcing more Palestinians into Jordan, thereby in-
creasing the chances that they might eventually chal-
lenge Hussein's rule. Increased numbers of Palestin-
ians on the East Bank could also encourage
international acceptance of the thesis advanced by
Israeli hardliners such as former Defense Minister
Ariel Sharon that there is no need for a West Bank
Palestinian entity because one already exists in
Jordan.
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In our view, another important factor is Hussein's
deep sense of personal responsibility for having failed
to defend the area adequately during the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war. He seems to be especially chagrined about
the loss of East Jerusalem, which houses major Mus-
lim shrines and is the final resting place for his great
grandfather, Hussein, the Sherif of Mecca.
Jordan's Policies Toward the West Bank
Jordan's principal means of maintaining influence in
the West Bank is through financial support. It gives
subsidies to the West Bank municipalities and pays
the salaries of West Bank residents who were regis-
tered Jordanian Government employees prior to 1967.
In an arrangement with Israel, it maintains an "open
bridge" policy that helps the West Bankers to market
their agricultural and industrial products. The Jorda-
nians also financially support West Bankers working
in Israel who go on strike, as they did last summer to
protest Israel's invasion of Lebanon.
At the Arab summit conference in Baghdad in No-
vember 1978, a Jordanian-PLO joint committee was
formed, giving Jordan a formal role to play in West
Bank affairs for the first time since the Rabat meet-
ing in 1974. Through this committee, Jordan and the
PLO are authorized to administer an Arab aid fund of
$150 million annually for Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza. During 1982, as part of the growing
cooperation between Jordan and the PLO, the mission
of the committee was expanded to include coordina-
tion of all policies and actions taken by the PLO and
Jordan on the West Bank
In addition to maintaining its financial ties with the
West Bank, Jordan has also adopted measures to
emphasize its legal and constitutional status there. In
1976 Hussein dissolved the National Assembly, whose
representation included West Bank Palestinians, be-
cause elections could not be held on the occupied
West Bank. US Embassy reporting suggests that he
did not want to hold elections only on the East Bank
because the Israelis might interpret such a move as
acceptance of their view that Jordan no longer had a
role on the West Bank
West Bankers still hold Jordanian citizenship and
carry Jordanian passports when they travel abroad. In
1980 Jordan reopened passport offices in the West
Bank in an effort to help West Bankers keep their
Jordanian passports current. West Bankers sometimes
had difficulty traveling to Amman to renew these
documents.
The Jordanians have also taken restrictive measures
toward West Bankers in an attempt to counter per-
ceived Israeli efforts to co-opt local residents or to
force Palestinian emigration to Jordan. In March
1982 the Jordanian Government passed a law banning
membership in the Israeli-supported Village Leagues
on the West Bank. The law required Palestinians to
renounce their membership within one month or be
charged with treason. Although the government made
no real effort to implement the law, it blacklisted
several mukhtars (village leaders) for collaborating
with the Village Leagues. According to the Jordanian
Minister of Occupied Territories, the law has had the
desired effect of reducing membership in the leagues.
Reporting from the US Consul in Jerusalem substan-
tiates the claim that membership has been reduced.
the unrest on West Bank campuses.
Another restrictive measure was enforced last fall
when, the
government would not approve residence or labor
permits for newly selected Palestinian professors to
teach in Jordanian universities. They were instead
urged to seek positions in West Bank universities,
even though those jobs were less attractive because of
Similarly, the Jordanian Minister of Occupied Terri-
tories reports that West Bank students who apply to
East Bank universities to get away from the demon-
strations and frequent closures at West Bank universi-
ties are encouraged, principally through payment of
their tuition, to continue their studies on the West
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Bank. Other youths who wish to work in Jordan are
required to serve two years in the military immediate-
ly upon arrival. Such a requirement has deterred some
youths from coming to Jordan.
West Bank Views of Jordan
Despite their long existing ties with Jordan, we believe
many Palestinians on the West Bank remain suspi-
cious of Jordanian intentions. Since the days of King
Abdallah, Hussein's grandfather, the Jordanians have
adopted policies toward the area that West Bankers
view as enhancing Jordan's dynastic interests and
ignoring Palestinian concerns. To illustrate their
point, many Palestinians point out that Jordan has
periodically discussed the possibility of a peace treaty
with Israel, while it has curtailed Palestinian guerrilla
activity from Jordan.
Feelings of neglect fuel the mistrust that Palestinians
have for East Bank Jordanians. According to US
Embassy reporting, many West Bankers complained
that during the period of Jordanian rule King Hussein
ignored the economic development of the West Bank
while lavishing support on development projects in
and around Amman. In our view, West Bankers
particularly resent this because frequently it was their
technical and administrative skills that helped plan
such projects. Some Palestinians have told US Em-
bassy officials that they still believe that such meas-
ures as import restrictions on West Bank-grown
agricultural products, which would compete with East
Bank-grown produce, reveal that the King's primary
concern is to protect East Bank interests.
Although this mistrust continues, we believe most
West Bank Palestinians would nevertheless readily
admit that the Jordanian connection is necessary for
the West Bank's economic and political survival.
Jordan is their link to the Arab world. More than one-
third of the area's exports, particularly agricultural
produce, go to and through Jordan. In addition, a
large number of highly educated West Bankers have
taken advantage of job opportunities in Jordan. Work-
er remittances-an estimated $200-300 million per
year-from these workers and others employed in the
Gulf states flow into the West Bank through Jordan.
A large portion of the funds available to West Bank
municipalities comes from contributions made by
Arab states that also flow through Jordan.
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West Bankers not only see Jordan as the conduit for 25X1
Arab financial aid, but many now concede to US
Embassy officials that only the Jordanian connection
can deter Israel from annexing the area.
trust Hussein because of his previous treatment of the
Palestinians in Jordan, they understand that he is the
only Arab leader who has the backing of the United
States for seeking a Middle East peace settlement.
For these reasons, the West Bank attitude toward
Jordan's potential role in the peace process is general-
ly positive. Many West Bankers still adhere to the
position that the PLO is their sole representative and
that negotiations cannot be held without PLO approv-
al, but they seem to accept the need for Jordan to take
the lead in those negotiations because Israel will not
negotiate directly with the PLO.
A recent poll taken by the moderate nationalist West
Bank weekly, AI-Bavader A-Siassi, indicated an over-
whelming majority of West Bank citizens still support
the leadership of Yasir Arafat. They also favored,
however, the continuation of the Jordanian- Palest in-
ian dialogue and a Jordanian-Palestinian confedera-
tion.
In discussions earlier this year with US officials,
prominent West Bank Palestinians, including leading
lawyers, university officials, and former Jordanian
parliamentary and cabinet members also supported
the concept of a coordinated Jordanian-Palestinian
negotiating role. None advocated restoration of Jorda-
nian sovereignty, however, and many still seem to
cling to the hope of eventually establishing an inde-
pendent Palestinian state, albeit after linking up with
Jordan.
East Bank Attitudes
The attitudes of Jordan's East Bank constituencies-
those from the bedouin tribes and the Palestinians-
also influence Hussein's policies toward the West
Bank. Although both groups have vivid memories of
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the Jordanian civil war in 1970-71 and still continue
to be wary of one another, they have found the
prosperity and stability that they have enjoyed over
the past decade to be attractive incentives to coexist.
The East Bank constituency generally supports
Hussein's current efforts on behalf of the West Bank,
but a "Jordan first" attitude is still evident, according
to the US Embassy in Amman. Those who are
"Jordan first" advocates would like to see the West
Bank back in Arab hands, but they argue that the
Arab states, under the Rabat and Fez decisions,
relieved Jordan of its responsibility for the West
Bank. The King should therefore accept that loss and
concentrate on development of the East Bank. They
also accuse Hussein of ignoring their concerns about
the increased Palestinian presence in Jordan and
risking their country for people who have no vested
interest in Jordan's continued existence.
East Bank Jordanians realize that King Hussein must
work out a solution to the Palestinian problem to
achieve peace for Jordan. They oppose granting the
Palestinians a form of sovereignty over the West
Bank, however, because they view Palestinian sover-
eignty as a potential threat to the stability of the
Hashemite monarchy
East Bank Jordanians are concerned about the effect
a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation would have on
political and economic life in Jordan
East Bank Jorda-
nians believe that Hussein will make concessions to
the PLO, such as allowing more PLO members into
Jordan, that will increase the Palestinian population
and subsequently require an increase in the number of
' After 1971 Palestinian representation in the Jordanian Govern-
ment decreased considerably. Currently only five of the 24 cabinet
ministers are Palestinians, and they make up less than one-third of
the members of the National Consultative Council, the quasi-
legislative body formed in 1978 to replace the dissolved lower house
According to US Embassy officials, the Palestinian
majority in Jordan generally supports the King's
efforts on behalf of the West Bank. They have
expressed concern, however, over the implications of a
confederation for the Palestinian cause. We believe
some Palestinians question exactly what the King
envisions in the union. One Palestinian member of the
National Consultative Council explained this concern
to US Embassy officials by stating that the issue of
confederation becomes a choice between entity and
identity. To him, a confederation would give the West
Bankers a Palestinian entity, but perhaps over time it
would erode the sense of Palestinian national identity.
number
of Palestinian residents in refugee camps in Jordan do
not favor the idea of confederation even though they
have lived in Jordan for years. These camp Palestin-
ians, who make up less than one-fourth of Jordan's
overall Palestinian community, complain that Hash-
emite rule has not improved their social and economic
standing. hey fear that if the
Palestinians do not set up an independent state,
Jordan will regain sovereignty over the West Bank
and Gaza and prevent them from improving their
standard of living.
PLO Influence on West Bank Attitudes
We believe West Bank Palestinians will take their cue
on negotiations from the PLO. Some West Bank
leaders, such as Bethlehem mayor Elias Freij, who is
known for his pro-Jordanian views, have campaigned
in favor of cooperation with Jordan in the hope of
influencing the PLO's position. Freij circulated a
petition late last year that expressed support for a
confederation with Jordan and a Jordanian role in the
peace process, but he reportedly obtained only a few
hundred signatures. The US Embassy in Amman
interprets the failure of the Freij petition as evidence
of the inability of the West Bank leadership to support
a position that might be contrary to PLO wishes.
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PLO approval is, therefore, the crucial factor for
Jordan in its calculations on the peace process. With-
out that approval, Hussein's options concerning
Washington's initiative are severely limited, and the
possibility of Hussein working with West Bankers
alone, as some Embassy reports suggest he might do,
becomes highly unlikely.
Hussein seems to accept, at least for now, the idea
that only by working with the PLO can he possibly
gain the support he needs to allow him to negotiate
with Israel on the future of the West Bank. Since
President Reagan's peace initiative, Hussein has con-
centrated on improving Jordanian-PLO relations in
the hope of gaining PLO approval for a Jordanian
role. Despite his efforts to maintain a foothold on the
West Bank, he acknowledges the PLO's position as
the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people
Hussein and Arafat have met several times since the
President's speech to discuss two main issues: the
establishment of a political link between the West
Bank and Jordan and the creation of a joint Jordan-
ian/non-PLO Palestinian negotiating team.
obtain support from his own Fatah organization for an
agreement with Hussein. Although this resulted in a
Jordanian cabinet statement relinquishing to the PLO
all responsibility for the future of the West Bank and
Gaza and a suspension of direct Hussein-Arafat talks,
continuing Jordanian-PLO contacts indicate King
Hussein intends to pursue his dialogue with the PLO.
Implications for the US and
Middle East Peace Process
In our judgment, the King will be unable to move
ahead in the peace process without West Bank cooper-
ation and that will be gained only with PLO approval.
We do not believe the King will try to enter negotia-
tions alone because to do so would invite the anger of
the Palestinians and other Arab states and possibly
retaliatory action. Jordan's political, economic, and
military vulnerability in the Arab world makes it
highly unlikely that Hussein would take such a risk.
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Jordan's entry into peace negotiations would serve to
bolster Hussein's prestige and authority at home,
especially within the Palestinian community and, if
successful, it would gain him recognition throughout
the Arab world. His efforts to work out a settlement
of the West Bank issue would demonstrate to both the
Palestinian community and to other Arab states,
which have criticized Hussein in the past for his
treatment of Palestinians, that he is concerned about
Palestinian rights and welfare. Some Jordanian Gov-
ernment officials believe Hussein's internal position
would be enhanced regardless of the outcome because
Hussein would be able to say he had tried to achieve
an honorable peace.
Nevertheless, Hussein's participation in the peace
process would carry considerable risks. Without a
clear mandate from the PLO and the support of Arab
moderates, Jordan, like Egypt in 1979, would face
diplomatic isolation and the loss of vital financial aid
that it receives from the Gulf Arab states. In 1982
Jordan received about $900 million in aid from Arab
donors and needs to ensure continued financial aid to
keep the economy afloat.
Participation also would expose Jordan to the wrath of
the hardline Arab states, particularly Syria, with
whom relations have been strained for several years.
The Syrians could try to destabilize Jordan in order to
disrupt peace efforts by encouraging Palestinians in
Syria to infiltrate into Jordan in order to stage attacks
against Israel. This would invite Israeli retaliation
against Jordan. Similarly, Syrian President Assad
could use his influence with pro-Syrian PLO factions
to undermine Arafat's efforts to maintain a PLO
consensus while trying to establish a coordinated
position with Hussein.
A federation or confederation between Jordan and the
West Bank is the answer to the US initiative and
Hussein's own preferred solution to the Palestinian
issue, but such an arrangement ironically could bring
about the realization of the Sharon thesis that Jo:dan
is the Palestinian state. A federation could push the
Palestinian share of Jordan's population to as high as
85 percent. Initially, this linkage may not prove to be
a challenge to the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the Hashemite Kingdom, but the Palestinian ma-
jority may eventually dominate the economic and
political life of Jordan, particularly after Hussein's
demise.
Hussein will seek additional commitments from the
United States for his entry into the peace process. He
will want firm evidence of US perseverance even in
the face of Israeli opposition. To gain the support of
both the PLO and other Arab states, Hussein has told
US officials that he needs evidence of US willingness
to take a firm stand with Israel on the issues of
withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon and a
freeze on Jewish settlements on the West Bank. Signs
of Israeli flexibility in these areas would give Hussein
the ammunition he believes is required to convince
Arafat and the other Arabs that now is the time to
negotiate.
In light of the Sharon thesis, Hussein will look for
personal guarantees of support for the Hashemite
monarchy and assurances of US military aid if Israel
turns its attention to its eastern border--a contingency
the King and many other Jordanians fear--once it has
withdrawn from Lebanon.
Hussein also will expect increased financial aid from
the United States, particularly now that he claims
Jordan is experiencing serious budgetary problems.
Although he may be exaggerating the severity of
Jordan's financial problems, Hussein is well aware of
the money the United States has provided Egypt since
Camp David and will expect similar treatment.
Hussein will also look for an end to Congressional
opposition to US arms sales to Jordan if he enters
negotiations. He has sought US approval to purchase
F-16s and mobile I-HAWK air defense missiles for
some time, but Congress has strongly opposed the sale
because Jordan is still considered a confrontation
state. Hussein insists that such equipment is needed to
defend Jordan from Syria, not Israel, and he will press
even harder now that the USSR h lied SA-5
missiles in Syria
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A formal link between Jordan and the West Bank,
whether in the form of a federation or confederation,
would have a sign cant effect on the political,
economic, and social life of Jordan:
? The majority of the East Bank population is al-
ready Palestinian. Federation would increase that
figure, possibly as high as 85 percent, forcing King
Hussein to be more attentive to Palestinian
interests.
? Pressure will increase on the Hashemite monarchy
to expand Palestinian representation in the cabinet
and other government offices as well as in the
command structure of the military.
In our view, if Hussein and the PLO fail to agree on a
negotiating strategy, radical movements will gain new
prominence in the Arab world, and Hussein's concern
for the internal security of the East Bank will grow.
Fear of an increase in the Palestinian population of
Jordan should West Bankers flee Israeli occupation or
annexation may lead the King to adopt additional
restrictions against Palestinian immigration
? The Palestinians, who have traditionally been polit-
ically active, will also seek a return to popular
participation in the decisionmaking process and will
press for new elections to be held for representatives
to the National Assembly, the lower house of
parliament.
? West Bankers will expect to be included in the
economic development activities planned for the
next five years, but East Bankers will be reluctant
to share the funds designated for development now
that the Arab countries are reducing their contribu-
tions to Jordan.
tighten its hold on the territories.
resuming military action against Israel from Jordani-
an soil, we doubt that he would consider taking so
drastic a measure as closing the bridges. Given the
extensive family and business connections on both
sides, Amman would certainly face serious unrest
within its large Palestinian community if they be-
lieved the Jordanians were abandoning the Palestin-
ians on the West Bank. Closure would also negate all
of Hussein's efforts over the years to maintain influ-
ence there and provide Israel with an excuse to
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84SO0556R000100160002-7
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/07/11: CIA-RDP84SO0556R000100160002-7