(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00553R000200010004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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South Korea:
President Chun's Opponents
EA 83-10072
April 1983
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Intelligence
South Korea:
President Chun's Opponents
This paper was prepared bye Office
of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
Northeast Asia Division, OEA
Intelligence Council
Secret
EA 83-10072
Apri11983
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Secret
Summary
Iry~ormation available
as of 5 April 1983
was used in this report.
South Korea:
President Chun's Opponents ~~ 25X1
During the turbulent period following the assassination of President Park
Chung Hee in 1979, an articulate minority in South Korea argued that the
far-reaching social and economic changes brought about during the 18
years of Park's rule made the Korean people ready for a more open and
democratic political system. Such views did not prevail, however, as Army
units put down the 1980 civil disturbances at Kwangju and as Gen. Chun
Doo Hwan and his military backers moved to consolidate power.
Using a combination of intimidation and enticement, President Chun has
restored a fair degree of political stability in the South over the past three
years. Uprisings like the one at Kwangju have not recurred. Nonetheless,
we believe that the desire for political liberalization-fed by rapid
economic development-remains strong in South Korea. The Chun govern-
ment itself appears to recognize the need for at least incremental political
modernization, although it remains wary of sharing real power.
South Korea's dissidents are not likely to present a significant challenge to
Chun's rule over the coming year or so at least. Memories of the Kwangju
fighting have continued to dampen broad support for dissident activity, as
does continuing concern about North Korean intentions. In recent months,
moreover, Chun has carried out a series of liberalization gestures and
promised again that he will step down at the end of his term in 1988-
moves that have put his militant critics further off balance. Chun's difficult
task in the future appears to be to pursue a political strategy that both re-
assures the Korean Army and at the same time holds out some hope of re-
form for the country's more responsible opposition forces.
This study is the first of two examining South Korea's political dynamics at
the close of Chun's third year in power. It will focus on the opposition
scene-students and intellectuals, Christian activists, opposition politi-
cians, and the industrial work force.
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EA 83-10072
April 1983
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South Korea:
President Chun's Opponents
? The death sentences of two Christian dissidents who
masterminded the firebombing of the American
Cultural Center in Pusan in March 1982 were
South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan restored a
fair degree of political stability since coming' to power
three years ago but continues to face unceasing
opposition from student dissidents and militant Chris-
tian activists. Dissident groups saw President Park's
death as an opportunity to press for political reform,
but Chun and his military backers were intent on
consolidating their own power.
Faced with growing political turmoil, Chun resorted
first to heavyhanded intimidation-using the military
to put down the civil disturbance in Kwangju in May-
June 1980. Scores of civilians were killed or injured in
violent clashes with South Korean troops before the
uprising in that southern city was broken. Kwangju
has since become the rallying cry for dissidents of all
stripes, but the government's forceful response at that
time has discouraged activists from inviting a second
demonstration of the iron fist
Since then, student demonstrations have been met
with a show of police force from the outset, and
violent incidents have been held to a minimum.
Educational reforms in 1981 have further dissuaded
student activism by making higher education more
competitive and sharply reducing the time students
can spend away from their studies.
In recent months, Chun has put his opponents off
balance by moving toward political liberalization and
defusing several human rights issues:
? Kim Dae Jung, South Korea's best known dissident
politician, was released from prison last December.
? Amnesty was also proclaimed in December for
Kim's codefendants and some 40 other dissidents.
? Some of Chun's more widely disliked policy advisers
were dismissed.
? Political rights were restored to 300 politicians
banned from political activity until 1988-and
Chun promised to lift the bans on some 200 others
prior to the 1985 National Assembly elections.
commuted.
Social Setting
Chun has been aided by the generally conservative
nature of South Korean society. Korea is ethnically
and culturally homogeneous; the society's cultural
values generally reinforce conformity and group har-
mony and foster the pursuit of personal and family
advancement within the existing system rather than
rebellion against it.
The regime's most persistent opponents-mainly stu-
dent and Christian activists-constitute a relatively
small minority of the broader communities they repre-
sent. Although many South Koreans are sympathetic
with the dissident demands, in our assessment neither
student activists nor Christian dissidents are widely
viewed as being legitimate forces in partisan politics.
The majority of South Koreans, including the growing
urban working and middle classes, accept the govern-
ment's argument that political unity and cooperation
are necessary to sustain economic development and to
avoid a renewed North-South conflict. We believe
most Koreans also calculate that active opposition will
be futile and costly as long as the regime retains the
support of the military and the domestic intelligence
network is intact and loyal.
Potential for Trouble
Through his own actions and an understanding of
Korean society, Chun has succeeded in quieting his
opponents. There will undoubtedly be student demon-
strations this spring, as always, but they are unlikely
to get out of hand.
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Over the longer term, however, the possibility of
destabilizing opposition activity remains. Urbaniza-
tion and industrialization are gradually shifting the
political balance toward urban groups, which have
been the main supporters of opposition political par-
ties in past elections. We believe that expanding
higher education and greater awareness of foreign
political values and institutions-fostered in part by
the rapid growth of Christianity and the presence of
Western missionaries-are increasing the demand for
political participation and lowering the tolerance for
repression of dissent. Given his own and the military's
conservative predilections, Chun is unlikely to be fully
responsive to this growing pressure
The real test will come when Chun reveals his politi-
cal intentions for 1988, when his term in office
expires. He has steadfastly maintained that he will
step down at that time. If so, it will be the first
peaceful transferral of.power in modern times but
many Koreans doubt it will happen.
Should Chun seek to retain power, his opponents will
find it much easier to attract the popular support they
now lack. Such a move would also present the United
States with the choice of reaffirming support for
Chun-which might well foster a sharp increase in
violent anti-Americanism-or censuring him and
risking a deeper entanglement in South Korean poli-
tics.
Student dissidence is rooted in the Confucian ideal of
scholarly protest and in nationalist movements against
Japanese colonial rule. Students touched off the mass
demonstrations that were instrumental in unseating
President Syngman Rhee in 1960. Student demon-
strations were also an unceasing annoyance to the
Park government; they triggered the riots in Pusan
and Masan that prompted Park's assassination in
October 19791
Student opposition to Chun began in the confronta-
tion between student protestors and the Martial Law
Command during the spring of 1980 as Chun moved
to solidify his support in the military and transform
himself into a civilian president. Street demonstra-
tions led Chun to declare nationwide martial law in
May 1980 and to arrest Kim Dae Jung, his leading
civilian opponent, for fomenting civil unrest. Harsh
military actions taken against pro-Kim demonstrators
in Kwangju resulted in scores of civilian deaths and
triggered violent demonstrations throughout the city.
approximately 4,300 students-less than 1 per-
cent of all students-are hardcore dissidents, resent-
ment toward Chun is widespread, even among stu-
dents who avoid participating in protest activities.
Other than the ever present issue of Chun's legitima-
cy, protest themes include:
? Demands for the restoration of human rights and an
end to press censorship.
? The alleged torture of political prisoners and sus-
pects in political cases.
? Government suppression of worker-oriented Chris-
tian social action organizations.
? Criticism of the United States for supporting
Chun's rise to power and its tacit agreement in the
use of regular South Korean Army troops to put
down the Kwangju disturbances.
Although South Koreans are generally tolerant of
student protests, the country's political culture does
not endorse the participation of students in organized
partisan politics. Because students view themselves as
pure-minded "guardians of the national conscience"
and see politics as inherently tainted by corruption
and compromise, they rarely identify openly with a
specific party or candidate. The sentiment of pro-
test-not ideological commitment-is the wellspring
of South Korean student activism. Consequently,
there are no significant factional divisions among
students based on ideological disputes
While student demonstrations focus public attention
on political issues, they rarely play a major role in
shaping public attitudes toward these issues.
even less
well-educated South Koreans view campus protestors
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as naive. Nonetheless, students are respected for their
success in a highly competitive educational system
and recognized as the nation's future social and
economic elites.
Chun's tools for dealing with student dissidence in-
clude the Korean National Police (KNP), the Agency
for National Security Planning (NSP-formerly the
Korean Central Intelligence Agency), and the Defense
Security Command (DSC-the military security serv-
ice). All are involved in countering campus unrest, but
interservice rivalries result in limited cooperation.
Most campus disturbances last year were small, aris-
ing from students handing out leaflets and demon-
strating during campus festivals or athletic events.
Two street demonstrations in downtown Seoul last
year were quickly dispersed. Strict surveillance has
prevented the prestigious Seoul National University,
Korea University, Yonsei University, and Ehwa
Women's University-all in Seoul-from taking their
traditional lead in mounting larger student demon-
strations-although these campuses remain the most
politically active
The government typically depends on large numbers
of combat police with riot gear to confine student
demonstrators while plainclothes officers round up the
At the same time, Chun's antipathy toward university
students and intellectuals generally has resulted in
stricter application of judicial and administrative
sanctions against demonstrators than during the Park
era:
? Regular imposition of jail sentences.
? Immediate military conscription of demonstrators.
? Blacklisting activists to prevent major firms from
hiring them.
? Banning extracurricular student organizations.
? Trying to force professors to grade students on their
reins further.
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Educational reforms have also dampened campus
political activities. The government's decision in 1981 25X1
to expand freshman enrollments sharply and to im-
pose amandatory 20- to 30-percent failure rate before
graduation has harnessed students more tightly to 25X1
academic pursuits. The Ministry of Education's re-
cent proposal to replace midterm and final examina-
tions with more frequent exams would tighten the
Although these measures have inhibited students
from protesting, they have also deepened their resent-
ment toward Chun and appear to be counterproduc-
tive on several other counts. South Korean professors
have told US Embassy officials that strict campus
controls have alienated politically inactive students,
radicalized others, and encouraged some to form
small tightly knit "student circles" to discuss banned
political readings. Dissident students reportedly now
bait professors with politically sensitive questions and
berate them for not following the example of profes- 25X1
sors who have been dismissed for their criticism of the
government.
ward the government
We believe that over the longer term the recently
enacted educational reforms increase the risk that the
social and economic aspirations of significant num-
bers of university students will not be met. In particu-
lar, students forced out of universities under the quota
system probably will feel humiliation and anger to-
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stu ent issi ence as inter-
twined with alleged Communist conspiracies or espio-
nage cases that have periodically been exposed and
prosecuted since the 1950s. This linkage is very
The March 1982 firebombing of the American Cul-
tural Center in Pusan provided the government an
opportunity to step up efforts to discredit both student
activists and Christian dissidents. Government prose-
cutors portrayed the arsonists-members of a student
circle at a little-known conservative Protestant school
of theology-as revolutionaries under the direction of
committed older radicals with known ties to Christian
dissidents.
The arrest of a Catholic priest, Father Choe Ki-sik,
for harboring the suspects provided a link to alleged
revolutionary clergymen. The government's effort to
discredit student and Christian activists as dangerous
radicals was met with widespread public skepticism
and an indignant reaction from the Christian commu-
nity. The support of the Catholic leadership for the
accused, coupled with allegations that torture has
been used to extract incriminating ideological state-
ments, further convinced many South Korean and
foreign observers that the incident was little more
than a student protest that went too far-not, as the
government claimed, a terrorist attack by student
Such concepts are an important element in the think-
ing of modern Korean intellectuals, a result of long
exposure to intellectual trends in Japan and the strong
socialist and Communist dimension of Korea's anti-
Japanese independence movement.
Korean educators and authorities are also concerned
about several other nationalist or anti-American
trends among student activists:
? Growing disenchantment with Western-style
democracy.
? Declining sensitivity to the North Korean threat.
? A growing belief that Korea's continued division
serves US interests.
? Closer identification with Third World issues.
South Korean public opinion polls repeatedly rank the
United States at or near the top of a list of countries
most liked and most respected. Nevertheless, even
Western-educated academics admit there is some
resentment of the United States among Korean intel-
lectuals. Such sentiments, the academics explain, are
based on deep-seated misgivings about US intentions
toward and commitments to South Korea and per-
ceived US hypocrisy in supporting repressive regimes
and encouraging one-sided economic arrangements.
Shortly after the Pusan arson incident, the govern-
ment sponsored a series of faculty seminars on coun-
tering student radicalism through ideological educa-
tion. The government has since relaxed the ban on
some nonpolemic political writings and has promoted
university research institutes to develop critical as-
sessments of leftist thinking for use in ideological
training programs.
revolutionaries
Changing Student Attitudes
A poll of university students taken in July 1982
disclosed that although three-fourths of the 900 stu-
dents questioned endorsed the need for basic social
and economic reforms, the overwhelming majority
also rejected Communism as "ineffectual and unreal-
istic." Nonetheless, there appears to be a resurgent
interest among students in socialist economic and
political models and in neo-Marxist historical studies.
Prospects
Using tight surveillance and manipulative educational
reforms, the Chun regime has so far succeeded in
managing and containing student dissent. Adminis-
trators at several universities have stated that the
fatal beating of a businessman by police interrogators
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in late March may serve as a catalyst for widespread
Unless the government overreacts in suppressing cam-
pus protests, we expect antiestablishment university
students to continue the pattern of becoming more
moderate and pragmatic as they approach graduation
and seek employment---often in the government or
one of the country's large corporations.
The rapidly growing Christian churches in South
Korea are likely, we believe, to continue to provide the
safest ground for political dissent. Like student activ-
ists, Christian dissidents claim a long tradition of
political protest and close ties to the anti-Japanese
independence movement. Unlike students, however,
the Christian community is divided on whether the
church should be involved in social and political
affairs.
For the most part, Christian dissident organizations
have avoided directly challenging Chun's legitimacy
and have focused on issues that most Christian activ-
ists accept as legitimate extensions of the church's
pastoral responsibilities:
? "National reconciliation" to heal the wounds left by
the Kwangju civil disturbances.
? Human rights-particularly the use of torture by
the security services.
? Government harassment or suppression of Christian
social action programs among young urban workers
and poor farmers
The memory of Kwangju still evokes deep-seated
anger among many South Koreans and, in our view,
has made even politically moderate Christians more
sympathetic to the actions of government critics.
Awareness that clergymen and foreign missionaries
assisted Kwangju fugitives has further legitimized the
activists' position on Kwangju. At the same time,
recollections of Kwangju have placed limits on Chris-
tian militancy; we believe many church members see
government, have shown repentance.
the need for restraint by both the government and
opposition to avoid repetitions of such confrontations. 25X1
Chun, without implying personal culpability, has 25X1
sought to assuage bitterness over Kwangju by gradu- I
ally releasing demonstrators who, according to the
Christian dissent is also closely associated with hu-
man rights issues. Protests by liberal church groups
against alleged incidents of torture and against the
confinement of an estimated 300 to 400 "prisoners of
conscience" have been instrumental in bringing inter-
national attention to human rights issues in South 25X1
Korea 25X1
The government has repeatedly denied that the use of
torture is authorized. Senior South Korean officials, 25X1
for example, have asserted in private discussions with
US officials that Chun has forbidden the violation of
suspects' rights during interrogation.
political suspects have been subjected to
harsh treatment-although perhaps without the 25X1
knowledge of senior officials. The Human Rights
Committee (HRC) of the Korean National Council of
Churches (KNCC) was established in.1974 as a 25X1
response of concerned-generally younger-church- I
men to reports of torture and other repressive actions
under President Park.
The Chun government from its beginning was partic-
ularly concerned by the connections between Chris-
tian activists and Kim Dae Jung, who for many years
was the Korean human rights movement's most prom-
inent symbol.
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(Although ~
Kim's press statements in the United States have 25X1
caused Chun some concern, we believe Kim now has
little influence among South Korean dissidents.
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Chun also has allowed a limited revival of the HRC
prayer meetings, which were the leading human rights
forum until they were banned in May 1980. The
HRC is still not allowed to provide legal services in
human rights cases, however.
Church sponsorship of worker-oriented social action
programs is perhaps the most serious source of con-
flict between the government and Christian activists.
Chun and many of his top advisers appear sincere in
their belief that these activities are Communist in-
spired and provide radicals an opportunity to foment
unrest among workers. Although only a small propor-
tion of Christians support these programs actively,
many Christian leaders publicly reject the govern-
ment's assertion that the programs are pro-Commu-
nist or foment social instability. They point out that in
September 1979 a government report affirmed the
legitimacy of such Christian social programs as the
Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) and the Catholic
Farmers Association and found no evidence of pro-
communist sympathy.
Nonetheless, both Chun and his predecessor assigned
high priority to discrediting and eradicating these
relatively small program
We believe the government fears that social
action programs could lead to broader church involve-
ment in political activities. Indeed, activities such as
assertiveness training programs and labor counseling
by the UIM and several worker-oriented Catholic
organizations-if left unchecked-probably would
work to undercut the government's paternalistic ap-
proach to labor-management relations. The govern-
ment's apparent concern with programs that compete
with its own efforts has even led it to restrict the
activities of church-sponsored rural credit unions.
Activists in the Minority
In general, the Christian community in Korea is not
politically active. A poll by the militant Korean
Christian Research Center on Social Affairs acknowl-
edges that only 5 percent of the responding clergy
strongly favored church participation in politics, while
more than half of the clergy and laymen opposed
participation. The rest gave only limited support to
church involvement.
The six Protestant denominations that belong to the
Korean National Council of Churches encompass
approximately one-third of Korean Protestants and
represent more moderate and liberal Christian groups.
According to the US Embassy, the current president
of the Korean National Council of Churches is more
liberal and politically committed than his predecessor,
but apparently more cautious than the leading radical
Protestant clergymen. There is strong conservative
opposition to church political involvement even within
some KNCC member denominations.
these groups have begun look-
ing to their pastors recently for more socially relevant
pastoral messages.
support for the
Urban Industrial Mission is concentrated in a few
congregations, rather than broadly endorsed by the
sponsoring denominations. Although the most mili-
tant congregations consist largely of young workers,
according to knowledgeable sources the majority of
small churches in poor districts-many representing
splinter evangelical denominations-remain political-
ly inactive even though their clergy are regularly
called on to help church members in trouble with the
police or other government agencies
The few activist congregations are, nonetheless, ap-
parently able to marshal considerable financial re-
sources.
Several foreign church organizations have been
strongly supportive of Christian dissident organiza-
tions. For example, most of the Human Rights Com-
mittee's annual budget of $100,000 to $150,000
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comes from foreign sources-primarily British and
German-and is transferred in part through the
World Council of Churches, according to US Embas-
sy officials in contact with the Christian groups. The
UIM reportedly also is directly funded by US and
West European church bodies. US Embassy officials
report that late last year the West German Evangeli-
cal Church threatened to withhold support of its
counterpart Korean denominations unless the Korean
church continued to sponsor the UIM
Although Korean Catholics are outnumbered 5 to 1
by Protestants, they form the largest single Christian
denomination. South Korean and foreign observers
alike note that the Korean Catholic Church has taken
an increasingly prominent role in dissident activities
Increased Catholic activism appears to have been the
result of younger Korean priests moving into positions
of leadership, the sympathy of South Korea's three
foreign bishops to dissident concerns, and the
Church's more tolerant attitude in recent years to-
ward the involvement of priests and nuns in secular
affairs. Although a loose organization of about 100
older "Priests of the Fatherland" opposes the
Church's involvement in political affairs, two of the
most influential church leaders have spoken openly on
human rights and other dissident issues: Cardinal
Kim Su Hwan, the widely respected and moderate
titular leader of the approximately 4,800 Catholic
clergy, and the more liberal second-ranking prelate,
Archbishop Yun Kong Hui.
Such statements from the highest level of the Korean
Church hierarchy have lent some legitimacy to dissi-
dentconcerns and have probably undercutgovern-
ment efforts to depict all criticism of the regime's
political agenda as aiding Pyongyang. Nonetheless,
Catholic militants appear to have a long way to go to
build an effective challenge to Chun's power. The
progressive Catholic Justice and Peace Commission
claims the support of approximately 800 clergymen,
including several hundred more openly active mem-
bers of the Kwangju-based Priests for the Realization
Government Tactics
After the Kwangju disturbances, Chun's Martial Law
Command began to take the offensive against the
Christian dissident communit articularl the Cath-
olic Church, Many
clergymen and lay activists were rounded up and
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questioned. Such moves evidently were prompted by '
reports that priests were involved in hiding Kwangju 25X1
fugitives, a firebombing attack on the American 25X1
Cultural Center in Kwangju in late 1980 by members
of the Catholic Farmer's Association, and the out-
spokenness of the Catholic leadership on human
rights. The government campaign was reinforced
when it became known that a Catholic priest had
provided refuge to an individual involved in the arson
attack on the American Cultural Center in Pusan
The series of liberalization gestures that Chun has
made in recent months have eased pressures on
Christians as well as other dissidents. Even so, the
government almost certainly remains concerned that
the Christian community as a whole may move
gradually toward broader support for church involve-
ment in human rights issues and social action pro-
grams as younger, better educated, and more politi-
cally aware laymen and clergy become influential in
church affairs.
Shortly after moving into the presidency, Chun ex-
tended his sweeping "purification campaign" to the
leadership of the civilian political parties, charging
that they were self-serving, ineffectual, and corrupt.
As a result, all existing political parties were disband-
ed and 567 former progovernment and opposition
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figures were banned from political activities until
30 June 1988. Early in 1983 Chun lifted the ban on
some 250 of these individuals.
These politicians face an uphill
struggle, owever, to rebuild their careers. The ban
effectively silenced nearly all well-known political
figures and government critics during the first three
years of Chun's rule.
Following the ban, the Democratic Justice Party
(DJP) was organized under Chun's leadership as a
new government party. The regime also promoted the
formation of two new opposition parties to run against
Chun in the presidential elections in February 1981
and to act as opposition parties in the National
Assembly.
The Korea National Party (KNP), the smaller of the
newly created opposition parties, draws most of its
membership from the late President Park's Democrat-
ic Republican Party and from former appointed mem-
bers of the National Assembly. The new regime
initially expected the KNP to support the govern-
ment's position in the National Assembly because of
the KNP's origins and the government's role in
promoting the political fortunes of those opposition
politicians it prefers to deal with. However, the KNP
has sought to shed its image as a refuge for Park
loyalists who were not accepted into the DJP and has
pursued an independent posture in the National As-
sembly.
The KNP's 13.3-percent share of the popular vote in
the 1981 National Assembly election gained the party
18 of the 184 elected seats and seven of the propor-
tioned seats.Z At present the party's base is narrow
and scattered. Most KNP lawmakers represent dis-
tricts in small and medium cities, and the party has
little strength in the major metropolitan areas or the
Cholla region-the principal centers of opposition
support in the past.
As the intended core opposition, the Democratic
Korea Party (DKP) was created by bringing together
' The proportioned seats are allocated according to a formula that
gives 61 seats to the leading party and 24 seats and seven seats,
the shell of the disbanded New Democratic Party
(NDP~the former opposition party-and a number
of longtime independent professional politicians. Its
21.6 percent of the vote in the National Assembly
election gave the party 58 elected and 24 proportioned
seats. The DKP, like the NDP before it, gets most of
its support from the Seoul metropolitan area, Pusan,
and the Cholla region; it only has a toehold in the
Kyongsang region from which Chun and many cur-
rent military and civilian leaders come.
Several splinter parties emerged independently at the
time the three major parties were being organized.
Some have been pressured by the government into
disbanding, and several others dissolved for lack of
support. None carry any significant political influ-
ence.
The KNP and DKP-which together control about
two-fifths of the National Assembly-share essential-
ly the same legislative goals: reduced government
control of the press and political activities, enactment
of local autonomy, revision of the election laws, and
restoration of the National Assembly's investigative
powers. Although these parties seek some of the same
reforms demanded by dissidents, neither party has
sought dissident support
Despite their inauspicious beginning, the leading op-
position parties have had some success in creating the
image of a vocal opposition. The constitution ostensi-
bly protects lawmakers against prosecution for re-
marks made in the National Assembly. And since the
financial scandal last spring involving relatives of
President Chun's wife, both parties have been more
willing to criticize the government's proposed legisla-
tion and to embarrass officials with pointed questions.
Lesser crises subsequently allowed the opposition to
broaden its criticism as the regime apparently sought
to repair its image by relaxing constraints on debate.
The government's failure to gain its own party's
support for an important financial reform bill and the
subsequent rejection of a controversial emergency
mobilization bill may have convinced Chun that the
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government needed better means for tapping public
opinion on proposed legislation. Shortly after the
government's second failure in the National Assem-
bly, Chun announced that future bills-except those
relating to security matters-would be discussed at
public hearings.
Despite Chun's promise to revitalize partisan politics
gradually, the opposition parties are unlikely to chal-
lenge the DJP's preeminence in the National Assem-
bly. Without a larger block of National Assembly
seats, the opposition has little power to negotiate
compromises on government proposals.
The government has also fostered rivalries within and
between the KNP and the DKP that effectively
obstruct any real coordination between the two oppo-
sition camps. Regionalism and past conflicts between
KNP members once belonging to the former ruling
party and their previous opponents in the DKP also
deeply divide the two parties. The US Embassy
believes party factionalism will heighten as the politi-
cal bans are lifted from more important politicians.
There is no precedent in South Korean politics for the
peaceful transfer of power through the electoral pro-
cess. We do not foresee the opposition parties soon
overcoming the constitutional, cultural, and organiza-
tional obstacles they face and becoming near-equal
participants in the legislative process or contenders for
power. Even so, a government decision to restrict the
DJP to unequivocal defense of the regime's policies
may well bring the opposition parties wider support
among voters who, while not fundamentally anti-
Chun, wish to signal that the regime is ignoring their
particular concerns.
In the months following Park's assassination, South
Korea witnessed more widespread labor conflict than
at any time since the early 1970s. Even though the
unrest was generally low level and localized, the
relative press freedom at the time permitted detailed
coverage of direct job actions, fostering the impression
of serious social unrest. Worker grievances were
almost entirely economic, however, and there was no
significant labor involvement in the May 1980 student
demonstrations against Chun. After the declaration of
martial law the military authorities tried to assuage
immediate worker grievances while at the same time
taking action to curtail activities. Nonetheless, Chun
and his core group of supporters clearly remain
concerned about the potential power of organized
labor.
As a result, the government forced industries to meet
minimal obligations to workers and purged the nation-
al unions both of corrupt officials and those unlikely
to cooperate with the Chun government. The regime
also promulgated new labor laws that left the national
labor organization nearly powerless by putting strict
limits on permissible job actions and making local
company unions the sole representatives in wage and
contract negotiations. Of some 2.5 million wage work-
ers in manufacturing and mining, nearly 1 million (40
percent) belong to such company unions. The remain-
ing workers in these categories are not organized into
any unions.
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The labor laws prohibit outside labor activists from
organizing unions or participating in labor negotia-
tions. This provision has been used to contain the
labor activities of Christian social action groups. The
most influential of these, the Urban Industrial Mis-
sion, focuses on raising social consciousness and ap-
peals most strongly to young women workers. The
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fears it could draw workers into an antigovernment
coalition with student and Christian dissidents.
The Agency for National Security Planning (NSP)
has characterized the UIM as the only organization
capable of mobilizing workers for an antigovernment
struggle. Dismantling the UIM was set as an NSP
objective for 1982 and was largely effective. The
government has arrested activist workers under the
labor and assembly laws, blacklisted union members
and sympathizers, and mobilized other workers to
demonstrate against the UIM. The media have also
been instructed to carry articles that blame UIM
activists for the closure of the Control Data Korea
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facility-although the company's own problems were
largely responsible-for bankrupting several domestic
firms, and for eroding the confidence of foreign
investors in South Korea's business climate.
Economic insecurity and the government's unrelent-
ing hard line on church-related unions appear to have
seriously undercut worker support for labor protests.
The UIM has been reduced from seven to four
branches and operates under tight government restric-
tions that have prohibited even health-related pro-
grams. Nonetheless, both UIM-affiliated clergy and
priests associated with the young Catholic workers
continue to provide moral support and advice to
worker activists.
We believe workers remain fundamentally dissatisfied
with the ineffectual company unions and unha
with government labor policies.
lthough DSC officials as-
sess that there is only minimal contact between
student groups and labor organizations and do not
expect this to become a problem this year, counter-
measures against efforts by student activists to politi-
cize workers remain an important priority.
Many fundamental labor grievances remain unre-
solved and have long-term implications that go be-
yond the issue of labor unrest. Despite continuing
gains in real earnings in South Korean industries, the
government's failure to ensure reasonably safe work-
ing conditions, to require timely payment of delin-
quent wages, or to permit workers to improve their
bargaining power through collective action could rein-
force the notion that industrial wage employment
offers little long-term job security.
Employers in Korea-faced with increasing competi-
tion from other developing countries-seem likely to
attempt to keep wages down by relying on a relatively
young labor force and providing only limited career
advancement opportunities. While manufacturing em-
ployment expanded rapidly in both scope and sophisti-
cation during the 1970s, the growth of opportunities
that foster the development of a stable class of skilled
blue-collar workers has been much slower
A harsh national labor policy that focuses primarily
on curtailing political activity and fails to establish a
framework for effective negotiation could be counter-
productive. Such a policy would, in our judgment,
curtail rather than foster the development of the
skilled, experienced, and committed workers needed
for a technically advanced manufacturing sector. In
time, insufficient skills and strained labor-manage-
ment relations could also discourage foreign invest-
ment. These long-term consequences may be the most
costly potential outgrowth of policies aimed at essen-
tially keeping labor quiet.
Better educated, more politically aware industrial
workers will almost certainly demand a more respon-
sive system of labor-management relations. We be-
lieve some of Chun's leading economic advisers are
sensitive to this issue and envisage incremental
changes in labor relations in the longer term. A main
concern of South Korean authorities clearly would be
to prevent discontented workers from adding a power-
ful voice to church-based demands for broad social
and political reform
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