(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000301800001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 9, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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9 May 1986
Central Intelligence igence Agency
Cuba: Focal Point for Political
Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean
Summary
Cuban President Fidel Castro has not stopped selectively supporting
revolutionary activity in Latin America despite his attempts to portray himself publicly
as a responsible third world leader. Cuba has developed a two-pronged revolutionary
strategy:
Establishing diplomatic relations where possible while
simultaneously encouraging a broad front coalition of leftists
and moderates to strive for political power.
Maintaining contact with radical groups, providing training
and other support to ready them for violent activities should
conditions become propitious for a revolutionary push.
This memorandum was prepared by the Counterterrorism. Center,
of the Office of Africa and Latin America nalysis,`with a--coritribution by
the Office of Central Reference. Comments may be directed to
the Chief, Policy Support Branch of the Counterterrorism Center,
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4. Cuba also curries the favor of regional subversive groups by providing
safehaven to individuals. For example, following the M-19 seizure of the Dominican
Republic's Embassy in Bogota, the M-19 guerrillas, together with some of the
hostages and the Cuban Ambassador were flown to Cuba and given asylum. Cuba
also has provided refuge for numerous airline hijackers affiliated with Cuban-
supported terrorist groups and abrogated its anti-hijacking agreement with
Washington in 1977. In fact, Castro's 26th of July Movement conducted one of the
first airline hijackings in the 1950s, although Havana to this day charges that the US
"
invented" such operations to subvert Castro's regime.
5. On the question of terrorism, we believe Castro views it as a legitimate
weapon in his efforts to promote the revolutionary conditions needed to destabilize a
regime. During the 1950s, Castro's July 26 Movement bombed civilian targets and
employed assassinations to provoke the Batista government to become repressive, to
polarize Cuban society, and to attract recruits to armed struggle. Drawing on this
strategy, Castro encourages rebel groups to use terrorism when he perceives th
revolutionary conditions are ripe.
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A. Evolution of Revolutionary Strategy
6. An analysis of Cuban policy indicates that Cuba's revolutionary strategy
appears to have evolved through three phases, from 1959 to the late 1960s from the
mid-1970s to the US action in Grenada (1983), and post-Grenada. 25X1
7. Initially Castro attempted to replicate his own success elsewhere but failed.
In 1959, Castro aided armed expeditions against the Dominican Republic, Panama, and
Haiti. During the early and mid 1960s, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, and
Peru all faced Cuban-backed attempts to instigate guerrilla movements. In seeking
indigenous groups with which to cooperate, the Cubans rejected the orthodox Latin
American Communist Parties, instead they lent their support to more militant groups
dedicated to armed violence even when their ideology was not fully developed. 25X1
8. Following these failures, Castro began to pursue normal government to
government relations in the hemisphere. By the mid-1970s, Cuba's isolation in the
Americas had eased, OAS sanctions were dropped, and full diplomatic or consular
relations were established with a number of countries. The successes of Cuban
conventional military forces in Angola and Ethiopia in the mid 1970s strengthened the
hand of. the hardline element in Cuban policymaking circles and led to enhanced
support of the Sandinistas in their struggle against Somoza in 1979 and 1980. The
victory in turn opened up a new era in which su ort for armed struggle again
became a major trend of Cuban foreign policy. 25X1
9. In the wake of the Grenada setback in 1983, Havana reassessed its regional
strategy Apparently Castro believes conditions in 25X1
most target countries are generally unfavorable at this time for the promotion of
widespread terrorist and insurgent activity. Many leftist groups such as those in
Uruguay and Brazil are splintered and weak after years of repression under military
regimes. Cuba also fears jeopardizing recently established diplomatic relations with
new civilian regimes, leading Havana to counsel moderation to many groups it
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supports. Moreover, the Grenada affair almost certainly has made Havana more
cautious in pursuing its revolutionary strategy. F__~ 25X1
10. A study of Cuban revolutionary policy indicates the extent of support
Cuba provides to any revolutionary group is governed by a number of factors,
including the conditions in the particular country and the likely impact of Cuban
backing on the movement's chances for success. Havana also must take into
consideration whether a seizure of power by the rou it is supporting will advance
Cuban goals without hindering Soviet policy aims.
provocation.
11. In our view, Cuba is now focused on a strategy that emphasizes long term
goals, including rebuilding and unifying regional leftist groups, and encouraging
some to participate in the political process while at the same time maintaining their
military and terrorist capabilities. In the near term, however, Havana apparently
believes that radical elements within the region should remain calm and not react to
II. High-Level Cuban Support
13. Cuba's special interest in Chile dates back to the Allende years and has
persisted during the Pinochet era. Following the overthrow of the Allende
government in September 1973, Castro promised those Chileans who opposed the
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military takeover all the aid in Cuba's power to provide, and offered maintenance
assistance for about 10 years without expecting in the near term that the radical left
would engage in violence. Only recently has Castro acted to increase his support to
Chilean terrorist groups, apparently viewing the time as propitious for an escalation
14. Of special interest to Cuba has been the Movement of the Revolutionary
Left (MIR). Havana reportedly has supported the MIR by providing substantial training
15. Cuba also supports the Manuel Rodriquez Patriotic Front (FPMR), a radical
leftist terrorist group affiliated with the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) and
responsible for the bulk of terrorist incidents to date. The precise relationship
between Cuba and the FPMR remains unclear, but Cuba has provided training and
material assistance since the group first announced its existence in December 1983.
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16. Cuba has a longstanding relationship with several Colombian guerrilla
groups, particularly the 19th of April Movement (M-19). Relations between Colombia
and Cuba have not improved significantly since March 1981 following a Cuban-
supported guerrilla boat landing in Colombia, despite signs of warming after
President Belisario Betancur's inauguration in 1982. We believe President Betancur
would encounter substantial political and military opposition if he tried to reestablish
full diplomatic relations, chiefly because Havana has, continued to provide extensive
support to Colombian guerrillas. The leading contender for the presidency in the
elections this spring--a Liberal Party member--is unlikely to be receptive to Cuban
diplomatic overtures
17. Although a change in diplomatic relations is unlikely, we believe that
Castro will increase the level of Cuban assistance to Colombian terrorist groups.
Havana may have attempted to revive the sagging fortunes of the M-19 and may have
encouraged it to take the lead in uniting the various smaller terrorist groups into a
larger guerrilla coalition. Cuba" could attempt to establish contact with the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the only group that has nominally
honored the 1984 peace accords, and could encourage the group to return to
violence.
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M. Low-Level Cuban Support
18. In addition to offering support to terrorists in Chile and Colombia, we
believe Castro will continue to provide low-level assistance to radical leftists in
several other Latin American countries. In some of these countries, Argentina, Bolivia
and Uruguay, Cuba may seek to establish toeholds or bases of regional support to
facilitate the funneling of assistance to subversive groups in the region. Elsewhere,
such as the Caribbean, Cuba appears to be tempering its policy of revolutionary
violence while encouraging political organizing, recruitment of new members, and
exploitation of labor unrest. Cuba probably will maintain its ties to radical leftists
and former terrorists throughout Latin America, preserving for some future date the
possible return to violence. 25X1
19. Cuba's relationship with Alfaro Vive, Carajo (AVC), the most prominent and
active terrorist group in Ecuador, is difficult to assess. A number of AVC members
have received guerrilla training in Cuba. We believe that this training, coupled with
operational support from the Colombian M-19, has enabled the group to grow from a
weak, ineffective organization, to one that has been able to spring prisoners from jail
and conduct raids on Ecuadorean police weapons arsenals. AVC's operations,
although not entirely bloodless, have focused for the most part on efforts to gain
maximum media publicity for its views while minimizing damage and casualties. The
group has thrived in large measure because of the ineptitude of Ecuador's security
services. Although in our judgment the AVC poses no serious threat to the stability
of the. Ecuadorean Government, it could become a more dangerous and lethal force if
it continues to recruit new members and if the Ecuadorean security services fail to
develop the capability to counter it.
20. The Revolutionary Socialist Party of Ecuador (PSRE)--one of the most
radical political parties in Ecuador--has advocated the use of terrorist tactics
er rejoining the legally certified ied Socialist Party of Ecuador (PSE) in 1985, the PSRE
appears to be moving the mainline Socialist Party toward a more radical stance.
Several former PSE leaders have been replaced with more hardline PSRE members,
thereby opening the way for implementation of the PSRE's far more radical policies.
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21. Honduras has in the past been the target of Cuban destabilization efforts.
In July 1983, about 100 Cuban-trained Honduran nationals reportedly were infiltrated
from Nicaragua into eastern Honduras. About a year later, another group of Cuban-
trained guerrillas entered Honduras. Both groups were annihilated by the Honduran
Army. Since then Havana has appeared to be cautious in its use of violence in
22. The destabilization of Honduras clearly would enhance the position of the
Salvadoran and Guatemalan insurgencies. Havana also probably sees in Honduras a
chance to intimidate or destabilize the major base for anti-Sandinista insurgents
fighting in Nicaragua. Although Havana is not providing as much support to
Honduran terrorist groups as it has been to the established Central American
insurgencies, we believe Castro may attempt to bolster the divided Honduran left
with financial and training assistance. Given the failure of insurgency attempts,
Havana probably sees terrorists as its only mechanism in Honduras for pursuing its
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23. During the tenure of former President Siles, there was a great deal of
Cuban activity in Bolivia. Since the election in August 1985 of Paz Estenssoro,
however, both the Cubans and the Soviets have been kept at arm's length. Paz
Estenssoro probably hopes to gain greater access to US aid by adhering to US-
encouraged reforms.
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E. Argentina
26. The Cubans have a long history of association with terrorists in Argentina.
The Cubans gave financial and logistical support to Montoneros and the People's
Revolutionary Army (ERP)--the two groups responsible for unleashing the wave of
leftist terrorism which swept Argentina in the 1970s. Cuba provided them with
training in Cuba in urban and rural guerrilla warfare. These terrorist groups were
virtually eliminated as a result of the Argentine military's brutal counterinsurgency
campaign, and Castro allowed the remnants of their leadership to relocate in Havana.
Since then, the radical left has remained extremely weak and factionalized and
Argentina has been free from leftist terrorism.
27. We do not foresee Cuba, encouraging any indigenous radical groups to
pursue a path of terrorist violence because it would be reluctant to jeopardize its
newly-established relationship with the government of Raul Alfonsin. In fact, Cuba
probably is encouraging the Montoneros to attempt to acquire a measure of political
legitimacy. Cuba, may, however, at some future point begin to view the generally
relaxed environment for leftists as conducive to a renewal of subversive support. In
that event, Cuba might. seek to take advantage of its links to the Montoneros to
renew subversive operations.
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29. More than two years after its setback in Grenada, Cuba is struggling to
recover its political influence in the Caribbean. Our analysis indicates Castro
continues to support leftist political groups and promote political coalitions among
Cuban policy is to offer Caribbean leftists
political advice, organizational assistance and limited financial aid as the basis for a
foothold in the region.
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2. French Departments
32. Cuba has long viewed the French Caribbean as falling within its legitimate
sphere of influence, and we believe it would be reluctant to lose any leverage to the
Libyans who have become increasingly active in the region. Cuba reportedly has
responded to Libyan inroads with warnings to local leftists about the risks of
involvement with Qadhafi and Havana probably will step up its offers of training
3. Dominican Republic
33. In the early 1980s, Cuba encouraged leftist radicals in the Dominican
Republic to unite and prepare for armed actions
Cuba and other
Communist countries mounted extensive training programs for Dominican students.
Cuba also provided military instruction to members of small extremist splinter groups
such as the Social Worker's Movement and the Socialist Party as well as to the pro-
Moscow Dominican Communist Party and the Dominican Liberation Party.
34. Cuba has encouraged some of these
radical leftist groups, in particular the Dominican Liberation Party, to engage in civil
disturbances and strikes. Havana is maintaining or, in some cases, restoring contacts
with opposition elements, ranging from moderate left to radical. Cuba believes that
the economic and political situation will continue to deteriorate, placing the radical
elements--and by association, Cuba--in a favorable position. Although the elections
scheduled for May 1986 could provide a focus for Cuban encouragement for the
leftist violence, we believe that Havana will be deterred from doing so because the
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. 35. The Cubans have had a relationship with Los Macheteros, the Puerto Rican
separatist group, for the past several years. Recent activity includes:
On 30 August in San Juan, Puerto Rico, US FBI agents seized
approximately $60,000, a small plane used to take aerial photographs of US
military installations on the island, and a number of weapons in raids of
several Machetero safehouses. Investigations into the weapons supply
routes indicate that the confiscated weapons may have been supplied by
-- In addition, these raids netted 11 suspects in the $7 million 1983 Wells
Fargo robbery in West Hartford, Connecticut. The key figure in that
robbery received sanctuary in Cuba and may have provided the Cuban
Government with up to $2 million.
IV. Cuban Support for Insurgents
36. Throughout Latin America, many radical leftist groups seek at some point
to become insurgent or guerrilla organizations and maintain both rural and urban
fronts. Cuba has supported many of these groups in the past, and in some cases
has maintained the relationship over the years. Cuba generally provides these
groups with guerrilla and military training, rather than specific tactical or operational
support.
Guatemala have been on the defensive and have adopted the tactics of urban
terrorism. Although Cuba has provided many of these insurgents with training in
urban tactics--and likely will continue to do so--we see little evidence of Cuban
37. Over the past two years, many of the insurgent groups in El Salvador and
operational direction or sponsorship of specific urban terrorist acts.
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of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN).
38. Prior to 1979, Cuban support to Salvadoran radicals involved training small
numbers of guerrillas, providing modest financial aid, and serving as a political
conduit between Salvadoran extremists and leftists outside the hemisphere. During
the Nicaraguan civil war, Cuba concentrated on support for the Sandinistas. After the
fall of Somoza, Cuba began intense efforts to help pro-Cuban guerrillas come to
power in Ell Salvador. In fact, Cuba played a critical role in bringing together the
various fragmented elements of the Salvadoran left leading ultimately to the forging
39. As Cuba saw the level of violence escalate, it increased the flow of
weapons and financial support to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Larger numbers of
Salvadoran guerrillas went to Cuba to receive political and military training and
returned to El Salvador to augment the guerrilla ranks. Cuban training increased
sharply in 1980 as Cuba concentrated on building a trained army capable of mounting
major offensives. A typical three month training program included courses in
uerrilla tactics, marksmanshi and use of artillery.
support for the. Salvadoran insurgency and has attempted to temper Salvador
40. Over the past few years, however, Cuba has been more cautious in its
We suspect that Cuba will continue to exert a
dissuade them from mounting indiscriminate terrorist attacks.
moderating influence on the plans of the Salvadoran insurgents, especially if the
groups continue to suffer both military and political losses, and will attempt to
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engage in joint terrorist operations.
41. Guatemala serves as an example of Cuban attempts to form a union of
disparate guerrilla groups. In November 1980, the four major insurgent organizations
signed an agreement to establish the National Revolutionary Union (URNG). Following
the signing ceremony, held in Managua, representatives traveled to Cuba and
presented the document to Castro. Despite the show of unity, however, the
Guatemalan groups have not. become a cohesive organization and only occasionally
mechanism and political front.
42. At present, we believe the revolutionary groups seeking power in
Guatemala are far from achieving their objectives. The successful counterinsurgency
and civic action programs and the progress of the democratization process have
undercut their domestic support and give them little hope of success in the near
future. The URNG seems to have little real power, serving only as a propaganda
legitimacy.
43. We believe Havana will maintain its political and military training programs
but is not likely to encourage an increase in violent activity. Most probably, Cuba will
stress the importance of negotiating and seeking to achieve a measure of political
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VI. The Soviet Factor
47. The USSR and Cuba share a broad range of goals in Latin America and are
in general agreement as to policies concerning the use of subversion and terrorism.
At present we believe the shared strategy focuses primarily on unifying leftist groups
and strengthening regional cooperation among radicals in preparation for opportune
revolutionary conditions.
48. Throughout the 1960s, the Soviet Union was suspicious of Cuba's policy of
inciting armed violence, preferring to work through established Moscow-line
Communist Parties. Disagreement over this issue was a serious point of friction for
several years. Cuba denounced the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" as a fraud
arguing that it implicitly undercut the legitimacy of aiding "national liberation"
struggles. At the 1966 Tricontinental Conference, Cuba sought to enlist North
Vietnam and North Korea and create a more aggressive revolutionary internationalism.
None of these Latin American insurgencies fomented by Havana, however, aroused
much popular support and they all failed.
49. At present, Moscow and Havana appear to favor a more active policy of
subversion in Chile, while guarding against damaging their political objectives
elsewhere. Unless Castro decides to promote armed revolution in countries such as
Argentina or Peru, where Moscow has important economic and political stakes--a
development we view as unlikely in the next few years--Moscow and Havana
probably will continue to work along parallel tracks in the region.
50. Despite this general confluence of goals, however,
the two countries occasionally work at cross purposes. For example, Havana has
maintained only formal ties with the Soviet-sponsored moderate elements of the
Bolivian Communist Party (PCB), the result of the PCB's refusal to support the efforts
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51. In our judgment, Castro will continue to selectively sponsor Latin American
terrorist activity as part of his commitment to the revolutionary struggle, while being
careful not to endanger his own regional interests or to come into conflict with
Moscow. Cuba will remain intent on maintaining deniability in order not to reverse
the diplomatic and political inroads it has made in several countries in Latin America
nor to forestall future breakthroughs on the diplomatic front.
53. Cuba probably will continue to place high priori
on assistance to
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terrorists in Chile during the coming year.
As the moderate and center left political parties view
accommodation with President Augusto Pinochet as increasingly unlikely, they may
become more tolerant of leftist violence and perhaps even offer support to radical
54. In our view, Castro will continue encouraging the Chilean radical left to
reach a rapprochement with the moderate opposition in order to lessen its political
isolation and to strengthen prospects for the radical left to play a role in efforts to
oust Pinochet, as well as in a future, post-Pinochet period. However, Castro also will
continue to stress to the Chilean terrorist groups, especially the Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR) that they must remain committed to armed struggle and
political violence as part of their overall strategy to maintain pressure
Pinochet government,
55. Havana probably will increase its support to Caribbean leftist groups,
possibly in an attempt to mitigate any decline in Cuban influence resulting from the
growing Libyan presence.* Havana is increasingly concerned that Libya's courtship of
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well as increased provision of scholarships and training.
56. Libya's growing involvement with leftists, both in the Caribbean and
elsewhere in Latin America, may spur Castro to step up his support to various
guerrilla groups, especially if these groups, effectively use their ties to Tripoli as
leverage in an attempt to gain greater financial support from Havana. Cuba could
also make more effective use of what it has to offer--a logistical support base to
Caribbean leftists that is far more useful that what Libya can offer in the region--as
regime.
57. Although Havana's ideological animosity toward the United States may
make targeting US installations and personnel tempting, we believe Castro fears
retaliation and would be responsive to likely Soviet urgings that he avoid a
confrontation with Washington. It is nevertheless important when making
calculations on Castro's likely mode of behavior, to remember the "wild card"--
Castro's own ego needs and his propensity for emotional responses when suddenly
confronted by actions he perceives as embarrassing to himself or hostile to his
to mount "liberation movements" in nations unfriendly to Cuba.
Vlll. AD Officers
58. The AD, which was established in 1974, is largely made up of officers who
came over with Manuel Pineiro from the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI),
where they had been Latin American specialists. AD officers are Cuban Communist
Party functionaries who implement government policy regarding Latin America and
have a broad spectrum of responsibilities: to extend and strengthen bilateral
relations with foreign governments; to maintain liaison with Communist Parties and
other sympathetic organizations; to establish contacts in cultural, intellectual,
political, and press circles as channels for promoting pro-Cuban views; and, to
provide logistic support and training to foreign revolutionary groups operating in
country and to third country exiles residing in Havana and overseas, who are willing
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