(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000302330001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 17, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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central Intelliger-ce Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 December 1985
China: Student Unrest Challenges Reform 25X1
Summary
Although Japanese trade practices and potential militarism provided
the pretext for anti-Japanese student demonstrations this fall, many
protesters probably were motivated more by frustrations over rising prices,
poor student living conditions, and official corruption and favoritism.
Some foreign observers suggested official connivance in the protests to
pressure Japan in trade negotiations, but we believe the .protests were
largely spontaneous expressions of dissatisfaction with continuing
problems in the reform program. Recognizing the volatility of the issues
involved, Beijing undertook a two-month-long effort to co-opt the
demonstrations by sending leaders to visit campuses and by spreading the
word that unauthorized demonstrations would lead to arrests and other
sanctions. Although these efforts succeeded in curbing protests originally
planned to mark the anniversary of the 1935 "December Ninth"
anti-Japanese student movement, the episode typifies the sociopolitical
building under Deng Xiaoping's reform program.
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East Asia. Information
available as of 17 December 1985 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Domestic Policy Branch, China, OEA.~
EA M 85-10225
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Motives Behind Anti-Japanese Student Protests
The anti-Japanese student protests which broke out in at least four Chinese
cities this fall expressed discontent and frustration with a wide range of problems
.generated by .Deng Xiaoping's economic reform program. Triggered in mid-September
by the anniversary of the 1931 .Japanese seizure of Shenyang, the protests expressed
deeply felt resentment of Japan, fueled by charges that the Japanese have sold the
Chinese shoddy goods and by Chinese media treatment of the 40th anniversary of the
end of World War II, which featured accounts of Japanese atrocities. 25X1
As protests spread to Xian, Chengdu, and Wuhan in late September and early
October, indications grew that domestic economic and political issues were also factors
in the protests. Some well-informed Chinese officials privately speculated that such
day-to-day concerns as restrictions on student life, poor food, inflation, and shortages
in the vegetable markets were the main motives for many of the student protesters.
Student subsidies evidently have not kept pace with prices, making students one of the
groups hardest hit by inflationary side-effects of economic reform policies.
~believe~ expressions
of student discontent over their living conditions may have occurred without attracting
outside attention.) I 25X1
The protests also attacked other problems which have emerged under economic
reforms. By attacking the "invasion" of Japanese imports, the demonstrations criticized
the results of Deng Xiaoping's policy of "opening to the outside." Posters also criticized
official nepotism and other signs of high-level corruption that have accompanied Deng's
economic reform program. Some students also used. the protests to attack continued
restrictions on freedom of expression and the lack of "democracy" in universities and
other national institutions.
When the protests began in mid-September, student activists called for
demonstrations to mark the anniversary of the 1935 "December Ninth" anti-Japanese
student movement, in which thousands of students demonstrated and began a
nationwide boycott against Japanese imports. Beijing was clearly concerned that
wide-spread student demonstrations marking the "December Ninth" movement would
rais~ Bring economic and political issues, dealing a blow to the reform program,
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Beijing's Response to the Protests
Beijing's response to the student protests began while they were still in the
planning stage. At least two officials, including a vice mayor of Beijing and an official of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, met with students a day or two before the first
demonstration and urged them to confine the protests to campus and to keep them
low-key. Both officials reportedly were jeered.
Although the reaction was relatively quick, Beijing opted for persuasive, rather
than coercive methods to handle the demonstrations, remembering the volatility of past
student movements. Chinese leaders began a coordinated campaign in late September
to defuse unrest through highly publicized meetings between senior leaders and student
representatives. Vice Premier Li Peng and Party Secretary Hu Qili met with Beijing
student leaders on 28 September, after which campus posters reportedly came down. In
early October, provincial leaders began holding talks with students at local universities
throughout China, usually in informal settings, with students directing questions to the
provincial party boss. PRC media carried reports of these meetings in nearly all
provinces. While reports of the talks usually included references to conveying the
results of the recent party meetings, they often emphasized the provincial leader's
addressing uestions on vegetable costs, student dining halls, and other daily concerns
of students.
Beijing mounted a major effort to place all activities commemorating the
"December Ninth" movement under official guidance and sponsorship. Official
commemorative activities were scheduled for early December, and officials attempted to
dissuade students from holding unauthorized demonstrations by calling for "unity and
stability." Media coverage before the anniversary -- including interviews with surviving
veterans of the 1935 demonstrations and the publication of Mao Zedong's 1939 analysis
of the movement -- was tailored to stress the importance of party leadership.
Beijing also applied low-key pressure tactics to prevent unauthorized
demonstrations. Although China has denied reports of arrests, a Chinese
official told embassy personnel that over 20 ringleaders were detained following a
half-hearted demonstration in Tiananmen Square on 20 November, suggesting Beijing
was taking a harder line against students who continued to protest. Word was also
spread among students that any unauthorized demonstrations to mark the "December
Ninth" anniversary would result in arrests and loss of employment opportunities after
graduation.
Beijing's combination of co-opting the student demonstrations and warning that
unauthorized demonstrations would lead to sanctions succeeded in preventing the
planned "December Ninth" protests. The 20 November Tiananmen Square demonstration
has been the last reported sign of student unrest.
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Beijing initiated, or at least condoned, the demonstrations in order to pressure the
Japanese Government in on-going trade negotiations. Chinese authorities have
repeatedly expressed concern over the growing trade deficit with Japan, and with
Japan's reluctance to sell production technology to China. Some observers have cited
the half-hearted resistance authorities offered to the Beijing demonstrations as evidence
of official support.
conservative Chinese leaders may
have had a hand in the demonstrations, using them to indirectly criticize the reform
policies of Deng Xiaoping. The timing of the protests, which broke out on the eve of
the Party Delegates Conference called to advance the reform program, lends credence to
this theory. Hong Kong's Zhen9 Ming magazine also claimed that children of
high-ranking cadre may have had a role in inciting the demonstrations, suggesting that
they acted on parental orders.
We believe, however, that the protests have been largely spontaneous
expressions of student discontent and that although they have served conservative
political interests, it is unlikely that they were instigated or encouraged by individual
leaders. Given the tradition of student volatility, and the damaging issues that protests
could easily raise, we believe it is unlikely that any present Chinese leader would try to
engineer such protests. As a journalist for a major PRC newspaper recently noted to US
Embassy officers, the issues lying around are like "dry tinder," and student
demonstrations could supply the match. Although the media attention given to
Japanese wartime atrocities and reports of shoddy goods were factors in the
demonstrations, we do not believe these reports were intended to incite student unrest.
There is no direct evidence that senior party leaders had a hand in the demonstrations.
The Protests and the Reform Program
The protests show that party control over student activities is limited and that
the tradition of Chinese student independence and volatility continues. The
demonstrations also indicate that many Chinese perceive a close connection between
reform policies -- such as the opening to the outside -- and day-to-day economic
conditions. As the reform program unfolds, we believe segments of Chinese society will
increasingly feel the impact of such problems as inflation, inequities, and official
corruption and favoritism that the reform process spawns, and frustration is likely to
lead to additional expressions of discontent.
We believe the party's response can be regarded as typical of the way in which
other emergent sociopolitical problems will be handled by the reformist leadership.
Both national and local leaders went to considerable lengths to gather information on
the source of discontent. They predominantly used persuasive methods to co-opt
student leaders and channel student activism in "acceptable" directions, although
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coercive options were clearly evident as a backup. Beijing seemed far more concerned
with avoiding the appearance of a problem -- which would be reported by foreign
journalists and exploited by domestic critics of reform -- than with actually resolving
the problem. The party's prescriptions for containing student discontent -- rallies,
singing contests, and vows of loyalty, for example -- were clearly more satisfying to
party conservatives than to discontented students. We believe the party's large-scale
reaction to a relatively minor student protest movement is evidence of insecurity within
the reform coalition, and growing concern that the negative effects of some economic
reform policies could stall the entire program.
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Subject: China: Student Unrest Challenges Reforms
Distribution:
National Security Council
1 - David Laux, Senior Assistant for China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong,
Room 302, OEOB
Department of State
1 - Richard Williams, Director, Office of Chinese Affairs (EAP/C),
Room 4318
1 ~- Howard Lange, Deputy Director of Economic Affairs, Office of Chinese
Affairs (EAP1C), Room 4318
1 - Richard Ho
warth
, Director
, Office of Economic Policy (EAP/EP),
Room 5321
1 - John Danyl
yk, C
hief, INR/
EC Communist Economic Relations Division
Room 8662
,
1 - G Eugene M
artin
, (EAP/CH)
, Room 4318
1 - Jack Sonta
g, IN
R/EAP/CH,
Room 8840
1 - Brian Evan
s, IN
R/EAP/CH,
Room 8840
1 - Chris Clar
ke, I
NR/EAP/CH,
Room 8840
Department of Defense
1 - James Kelly, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EAP, International Security
Affairs
1 - DIA/JSI
Department of Treasury
1 - James Griffin, Office of East-West Economic Policy, Room 4450
Department of Commerce
1 - Christine Lucyk, Director, People's Republic of China Office, East
Asia and Pacific, Room 2317
1 - Byron Jackson, Office of Intelligence Liaison, Room 6854
Other
1 - Chief B412, Room 25010-2, National Security Agency,
t. Meade
1 - (Chief, B441, Room 1W140, National Security Agency,
Ft. Meade
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Central Intelligence Agency
1 - DDI (7E47)
t - NIC/ Analytic Group
1 - NIO/EA (7E47)
1 - NIO/Eton (7E47)
1 - D/OEA (uF18)
2 - C/OEA/CH (4G32)
1 - SRP (5600)
1 - OEA Production Staff (4Gu8)
1 - C/OEA/SDS (uG32)
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEF (4G32)
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEV (~4G32)
1 - C/OEA/CH/DOM (4G32)
1 - C/OEA/CH/FOff (uG32)
1 - C/OEA/NA (4Gu3)
1 - C/OEA/SA (4F38)
1 - PDB Staff (7G15)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
1 - CPAS/ILS (7G15)
1 - CH/EA~(5D38)
1 - C/PES (7G15)
1 - C/D00 ( 3~ 1 >
1 - D/OLL (7B24)
1 - SRP (5600)
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