(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000201200001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 7, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
7 February 1985
South Korea: The Parliamentary Elections
Summary
National Assembly elections on 12 February will be
the sharpest test of public support for President Chun
since he came to power in 1980. The mechanics of the
election guarantee that the ruling party will retain
its parliamentary majority, but the government's share
of the popular vote probably will decline. A newly
organized opposition party -- the New Korea Democratic
Party -- running on an anti-Chun platform has
challenged the established opposition, contributing to
unusually vigorous and confrontational campaigning.
Concern about Seoul's international image will prevent
Chun from taking tough postelection measures to control
what will be a feistier opposition, but Chun probably
will be less willing to* move forward on political
This memorandum was prepared by (Korea Branch,
Northeast Asia Division, Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be addressed to Chief, Korea
85-10027
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The Mathematics of the Election
South Korea's election virtually ensures the Democratic
Justice Party (DJP) of President Chun Doo Hwan a comfortable
majority in the 276-member National Assembly. Two-thirds of the
legislature -- 184 seats -- is directly elected and will be
filled by the top two vote-getters in each of 92 election
districts. The remaining 92 seats are awarded by a formula that
gives 61 seacs to the party winning the largest number of
elective seats and divides the remaining 31 seats among other
parties that win at least five elective seats.
Such election mechanics give the DJP an overwhelming
advantage. With the unofficial help of the government
bureaucracy and plentiful campaign funds, the DJP can count on
winning a seat in nearly every district. Competition among
several opposition parties and the independent candidates assures
the DJP an overall first place finish plus the 61 appointive
seats that go to the victor. In the parliamentary elections of
1981 -- the first test of the present system -- the DJP won 90
elective seats even though it obtained only 36 percent of the
popular vote.
Composition of the Current National Assembly
Ruling Party
Opposition Parties
-DJP-
-DKP-
-KNP-
-Others-
Total Seats
152
81
25
16
(percent)
(55)
(29)
(9)
(6)
Elective Seats
91
58
18
16
-- urban areas
(39)
(30)
(3)
(6)
-- rural areas
(52)
(28)
(15)
(10)
Appointive Seats
61
24
7
--
Percent of-Vote (1981)
35.6
21.6
13.4
29.4
*includes shift of one independent to the DJP, the shift of one
independent to the DKP, and the resignation of one DKP member.
We believe the DJP will win about 85 elective seats this
time.
The DJP needs only 78 elective seats to retain its
parliamentary majority.
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Three major and several minor opposition parties and
independents are fielding some 350 candidates. While trying to
bump DJP candidates into second place in many electoral
districts, they are also engaged in a struggle for control of the
opposition camp. The two leading opposition parties -- the
Democratic Korea Party (DKP) and the Korea National Party
(KNP) -- are being challenged by the recently organized New Korea
Democratic Party (NKDP).
The NKDP, a tenuous coalition of staunch Chun foes,
independents, and disaffected DKP members, includes supporters of
longtime rival opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam and
Kim Dae Jung. The party has gained surprising momentum since its
organization last December. Despite this late start and a
serious shortage of funds, the NKDP appears certain to supplant
the KNP as the second opposition party as well as cut into the
DKP's strength, especially in urban areas. The NKDP also will
probably win many of the seats now held by independents and minor
parties. Although one-fourth of the
races are too close to call, we estimate that the KNP may win
10 to 15 seats, and the NKDP 30 to 40 seats.
The Tone of. the Election
With its parliamentary majority in little danger, the ruling
party has focused on broader objectives in crafting its election
strategy. These include:
Trying to increase the party's overall share of the
popular vote to a demonstrate popular support for
President Chun.
Ensuring that the DKP remains the major opposition
party.
Electing ruling party members who will respond to
tightened ruling party discipline under Chun's
lieutenants.
The unexpected vigor shown by the NKDP will probably make it
difficult for the DJP, to win even the 36 percent share of the
popular vote it received four years ago. In an apparent effort
to boost the figures, Seoul has heightened efforts to mobilize
the DJP's million-plus rank and file, the security services, and
the government bureaucracy behind the campaign.
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After four years of tight government controls, the
established opposition parties -- the DKP and KNP -- are widely
seen as mild-mannered, government-manipulated entities that have
accomplished little. Their political stature was further damaged
when:
-- Most of the political heavyweights who had been
previously banned by Chun regained their political
rights last November and decided to join the newly
organized NKDP or sit out the election.
-- More than a dozen important members, including incumbent
assemblymen, defected from the KDP to the NKDP.
Only heavy-handed intervention by the security services
prevented further defections, according to embassy officials.
The DKP's slate consists chiefly of career politicians and
middle-scale businessmen who lack the economic campaign resource
or respected professional backgrounds of their DJP opponents --
as well as the proven anti-Chun credentials of their NKDP
competitors.
The Election as a Challenge to Chun
The two-month-old NKDP has capitalized on the desire of many
Koreans for a more combative alternative to established
opposition, and with no issue or constituency uniquely their own,
both the DKP and KNP candidates also have resorted to campaigning
on an anti-Chun platform. This has helped make the election both
a fiercer competition for seats and a freer debate on the issue
of Chun's rule. NKDP rallies have drawn highly enthusiastic
crowds, with speakers vigorously denouncing the legitimacy and
credibility of the Chun government and demanding the "end of
military dictatorship" and "the restoration of democracy".
Student demonstrations and dissident efforts to challenge
the legitimacy of the elections, as well as to support the NKDP's
challenge to Chun have heightened preelection tensions. They
also have increased the potential that in some areas clashes
between police and protestors might disrupt the balloting.
The return of Kim Dae Jung from the United States only days
before the voting boosts the tension. Although Chun's advisers
.have persuaded him that the domestic and international costs of
sending Kim back to prison are unexpectedly high, Seoul opposes
letting Kim play an active role in politics.
Ensuring Against a Symbolic "Defeat"
Although the government has never believed it would win a
share of the popular vote much above that of 1981, we believe the
prospect of slipping a few points has been a shock. Boosted by a
strong economy, a string of diplomatic successes, and an enhanced
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image resulting from a somewhat modified approach to handling
student dissent, Chun in mid-1984 was optimistic that the
election would reflect public acknowledgment of his
That mood of optimism has dissipated, however, following
setbacks on the campuses, the formation of the NKDP, and the
return of Kim Dae Jung. The government reaction to the prospect
of a poor showing and the resulting headaches from a more
aggressive opposition, has included attempts to,manipulate the
election by harassing the competition.
The government has tried, for example, to impede the NKDP
from renting office space and meeting sites, and has virtually
embargoed reporting on NKDP activities by the broadcast media.
Opposition candidates also have complained to US officials about
illegal censorship of their campaign posters by the Election
Management Committee. These activities notwithstanding,
independently owned newspapers have been permitted to report
opposition party news, as well as to carry editorials favorable
to the NKDP -- albeit under a formula that allocates three times
more space to ruling party activities than to all of the
opposition.
The Postelection Mood
In failing to offer a myriad of campaign regulations that
could be used to strait-jacket or even disqualify the most
influential opposition candidates, Seoul has paid attention, we
believe, to the need to underwrite what most South Koreans will
view as an acceptably fair election. Concern about South Korea's
international stature and the desire, in particular, to keep
Chun's scheduled trip to Washington in April on track will
probably inhibit Seoul from taking tougher measures to prevent
the emergence of a more combative opposition line-up. Chun and
his political advisers want to avoid a blemished election that
would add fuel to expected antigovernment demonstrations when the
universities reopen late this month. Still, the support of NKDP
candidates by student demonstrators could open the door for later
accusations that the opposition actively fomented political
In. the face of evidence of his widespread unpopularity,
however, we believe that Chun will probably be less confident
over prospects for managing the politial. scene, will retreat
farther behind the protective shield of conservative advisers,
and become less willing to venture long-promised political reform
measures. In dealing with international affairs also, such as
pending talks with the North Koreans, Chun will probably be less
inclined to risk taking any positions that he believes might
further undermine his domestic position.
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Subject: South Korea: The Parliamentary Elections
1 - Mr. William Sherman, State/EAP
1 - Mr. James Kelly, DoD/ISA/EAP
1 - Mr. Norman Levin, Policy Planning Staff, State
1 - Mr. Richard Childress, NSC
1 - Ms. Harriet Isom, State/EAP/K
1 - Mr. Jay Taylor State/INR/EAP
1 - DIA/DI0
1 - Mr. Wallace Knowles, DoD/ISA/EAP
1 - Doral Cooper, USTR
1 - NI0/EA (7E-62)
1 - NIC/Analysis Group
1 - OEA/NEA/Korea Branch
1 - OEA/NEA/Japan Branch
1 - OEA/NEA/Division
1 - OEA/China Division
1 - OEA/Southeast Asia Division
1 - D/OEA (4F-18)
1 - C/Research/OEA
1 - FBIS/Analysis Group
1 - DDI (7E-44)
1 - Executive Director (7E-12),
1 - PDB Staff (7F-30)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CG (7G-07)
1 - CPAS/ILS (7G-50)
1 - C/PES (7F-24)
2 - OCR/DSG (1H-19)
1 - DDO/EA
DDI/0EA/NEAJ
(7 February 1985)
C
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