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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000201080001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of fir
Intelligence
South Korea:
Warning Signs
of Political Change
EA 85-10224
December 1985
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
South Korea:
Warning Signs
of Political Change
This paper was prepared by
Office of East Asian Analyse
ft was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Northeast Asia Division, OEA,
Secret
EA 85-10224
December 1985
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secret
South Korea:
Warning Signs
of Political Change
Key Judgments Over the past 10 months, the political opposition to President Chun has be-
Information available come more vigorous, student protests more radical, and South Korea's
as of 6 December 1985 economy more troubled than at any time in the last several years.
was used in this report. Opposition behavior since parliamentary elections last February has
provoked Chun-after a brief period of greater tolerance-to return to an
aggressive posture toward dissent. This has led to a cycle of political action
and reaction reminiscent of the late 1970s, and causes us concern about
stability in South Korea.
concerns, and almost certainly remove Chun in the process.
Broad-based opposition that involved antigovernment demonstrations, with
workers joining students in the streets, would pose the greatest danger to
Chun. In the current climate, we believe a controversial action by Seoul-
for example, harsh measures to quiet the campuses or martial law-could
bring these groups and other antigovernment elements together. So, too,
could developments beyond Chun's direct control, such as a protracted
economic slowdown or a major corruption scandal. If such developments
emerged to unify the opposition in a violent, large-scale confrontation with
the government, historical precedent argues that some element of the
Army leadership would step in to restore order, citing national security
We believe the possibility of serious trouble will increase with the approach
of 1988, when Chun has promised to step down. In our view, any
widespread perception that Chun is reneging on his promise
successors.
or pursuing an
obviously flawed succession strategy, could bring an early test of strength
with the opposition and perhaps a preemptive power grab by would-be
Despite the growing number of warning signs, we still believe that massive
civil strife or succession-by-coup can be avoided:
? In the short run, Chun has considerable strengths and some advantages,
including his powerful internal security apparatus, public recognition of
the threat that political instability poses to continued economic progress,
and the reluctance of senior military leaders to intervene except in the
most extreme circumstances.
Secret
EA 85-10224
December 1985
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? Chun also has some political and policy options that could ameliorate the
destabilizing effects of the political competition facing him and his
opponents over the next two years. In particular, a more constructive
approach to student dissent and efforts to defuse the tensions of the
succession process would help prevent further polarization
We are not optimistic, however, that Chun will display the flexibility and
conciliation needed to ease political tensions and to fashion a leadership
transition that his opponents, the populace, and the Army can accept.
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Selected indicators of prospects for political stability
in South Korea have deteriorated over the past year.
In mid-1984, only five of 24 indicators, associated
with an increased risk of political instability in a
number of cross-national studies, were assessed to be
of moderate concern (yellow in the accompanying
chart). At present, half of the indicators fall into this
Indicators Legend
warning category, and one-prospects for demonstra-
tions, riots, or strikes-is deemed to be of serious
concern (red). No combination of indicators is a
certain predictor of political instability, but the over-
all trend in South Korea is grounds for concern about
such developments over both the medium and the
longer term.
0 Not of concern
e Low concern
0 Moderate concern
Q Substantial concern
? Serious concern
1983
II III IV
1984
I II III IV
1985
I 11 111 IV
Social change/ Ethnic/religious discontent
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
conflict Demonstrations, riots, strikes
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors General deterioration
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Decreased access to foreign funds
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Capital flight
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Unpopular changes in economic policies
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Food/energy shortages
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inflation
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Opposition activities Organizational capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition conspiracy/planning
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Terrorism and sabotages
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Insurgent armed attacks
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O.
0
0
0
Public support
o
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Military attitudes/ Threat to military interests/dignity
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
activities Discontent over career loss, benefits
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Discontent over government policies
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Reports/rumors of coup plotting
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors External support for government
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External support for opposition
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Threat of military conflict
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Regime actions/ Repression/brutality
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
capabilities Security capabilities
o
_o
o
O
-
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
Political disunity/loss of confidence
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Loss of legitimacy
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Prospects for major During next six months
u
e
e
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
Q
regime/policy change During next six months to two years
o
e
0
0
0
0
0
O
O
Q
Q
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South Korea:
Warning Signs
of Political Change
Growing Concern
Analysts tracking threats to political stability have
ceased describing South Korea as among the most
stable of the developing countries. Early indicators of
an increased risk of instability have accumulated over
the past year (see the figure), reflecting progressively
deepening confrontation between the government of
President Chun Doo Hwan and a more vigorous
opposition movement. The unexpectedly strong show-
ing of the newly formed, vehemently anti-Chun New
Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) in parliamentary
elections last February exposed the depth of popular
antipathy toward Chun and set the stage for bold
attacks on the ruling Democratic Justice Party and on
the government in the National Assembly and in-
creasingly radical student protests in the streets-
frequently including anti-US themes.
In the last few months-following a brief period of
greater tolerance of dissident activities-Chun has
gone on the political offensive, moving to isolate
radicals and intimidate moderate critics. Although
Chun's retraction in August of a campus stabilization
bill-which called for controversial reindoctrination
centers for dissident students-briefly renewed hopes
of a more tolerant attitude toward the opposition,
Chun has shown no sign of reversing his current
hardline approach:
? The police are back on campus with orders to break
up the almost daily protests, leading dissident
groups to rely increasingly on small-scale, hit-and-
run street demonstrations or seizures of off-campus
targets.
? Seoul has greatly expanded the use of the tough
national security law, previously aimed mainly at
espionage cases, to control dissidents, and has
played up the arrest of student activists allegedly
involved with North Korean agents.
a dissident leader arrested in September; three
senior newsmen were beaten for violating govern-
ment news guidelines; and the press law has been
used for the first time to arrest an author and close
down a publishing firm.
detained for participating in illegal protestsr
The worst economic slowdown in South Korea in four
years provides a troublesome backdrop to the political
tensions engendered by the nearly continuous student
protests and Chun's hard line. Thus far, the economic
slump that began in mid-1984 has chiefly increased
criticism of both government economic policies and
perceived US protectionism. But we believe it could
bring on widespread labor unrest if recently adopted
stimulative measures do not reinvigorate exports and
reverse rising unemployment. Both Embassy and
press reporting indicates layoffs are on the rise in light
and heavy manufacturing industries, and the recruit-
ment of new university graduates is at its slowest pace
in years. Even the seriously flawed official statistics
have begun to show an upswing in the unemployment
rate, and some observers contend that around 30
percent of young blue-collar workers are jobless in the
southeastern industrial zone around Pusan, which has
a particularly high concentration of export industries.
High unemployment there in 1979 aggravated the
crisis that led up to President Park's assassination.
The combination of intractable campus unrest, unpop-
ular efforts to control the opposition, and uncertain
economic conditions is reminiscent of the first stages
of past political crises in South Korea and obviously
? Human rights activists re ort increased abuse of
political offenders:
police interrogators tortured
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The lessons of recent history have led most observers
of South Korea to expect that a domestic political
crisis would unfold in the following progression:
Protests by students and young workers would
gain momentum ... security forces would over-
react ... the public would be galvanized into join-
ing demonstrations ... Army leaders would fear
domestic instability was undermining defenses
against a North Korean threat ... tight-knit Army
clique would remove the existing govern-
ment ... the coup group would transform itself
into the new "civilian" leadership.
Although the dynamics of South Korean politics
strongly suggest that the opening and closing scenes
of a crisis would be like those described above, the
intermediate stages are much less predictable. For-
mer President Park's assassination by his own intelli-
gence chief provides a dramatic example of the
potential for surprise.
Death at the Dinner Table-
A Lesson in Expecting the Unexpected
Park's assassination by Korean Central Intelligence
Agency Director Kim Chae Kyu in October 1979
came without warning when the domestic political
situation was rapidly deteriorating. Although the
degree to which personal ambition motivated Kim
remains open to debate, he apparently believed Park's
removal was essential to resolving the national crisis
precipitated by deepening labor strife in Pusan and
Masan. Kim's decision to take matters into his own
hands was at least partly a consequence of the
defenses Park had set up to protect himself from an
Army coup. Brig. Gen. Chun Doo Hwan's subsequent
usurpation of the Army leadership brought the crisis
to its anticipated conclusion political intervention
by a strong military clique to fill the power vacuum
created by Park's death.
represents ammunition for Chun's opponents. Al-
though the opposition's unity continues to be fragile-
government manipulation of factional rivalries among
opposition politicians has taken its toll-the NKDP is
pressing to open parliamentary discussions on consti-
tutional reform to restore direct presidential elections.
The NKDP-apparently hoping a display of bravado
will translate into greater credibility as a genuine
political force-has vowed to take its fight into the
streets next spring unless the government sets a
timetable for dealing with constitutional revision and
other political reform issues.
Chun's Strengths
Notwithstanding the factors that in our view repre-
sent dangerous political tinder, Chun has the tools to
keep his individual challengers off balance, at least in
the short term. He is willing to use tough measures,
and there are few operative limits on his presidential
powers. The large security services have virtually
unlimited scope for action and work almost unchecked
under presidential directives. And Chun can still
count on widespread popular as well as military
concern that North Korea could take advantage of
political instability to move south. Finally, press and
Embassy reporting indicates many South Koreans
remain worried that political unrest will undermine
their hard-won economic progress.
Moreover, even when tensions have been high, Chun
has not faced the kind of mass opposition that could
overwhelm the security forces. Most Koreans have
remained on the sidelines when government and anti-
government forces have clashed. During the Kwangju
incident in 1980, for example, when Army comman-
dos killed scores of civilians while suppressing riots
touched off by Chun's arrest of opposition leader Kim
Dae Jung, other major cities remained quiet. During
recent student protests as well, widespread public
sympathy with the demonstrators' demands has not
translated into active participation in antigovernment
actions
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Given the pivotal role of the Army in Chun's tenure,
Chun has been careful to watch and attempt to
control the military's senior leadership.
f lthough the
Army has intervened twice-in 1961 and 1979-the
very real security threat from North Korea gives it a
sense of mission that US military officers in Seoul
believe works against involvement in politics. Senior
military leaders have repeatedly told US officials of
their concern that the North would exploit any falter-
ing in the South's preparedness that accompanied
political instability. Close association with US forces
in Korea reinforces the spirit of professionalism.
We have observed episodes of increased military
grumbling about Chun's performance over the past
ten months, but we believe conditions would have to
deteriorate considerably before there would be suffi-
cient support in the officer corps for a coup. Wide-
spread recognition that high-level corruption or exces-
sive repression had irreversibly undermined respect
for the government and weakened national security,
or a belief that a new leadership hostile to the
military's basic interests was positioned to replace
Chun, represent problems of the magnitude necessary
to impel the Army to act.
Developments That Would Make Matters Worse
As was the case with President Park's assassination
and Chun's subsequent takeover in 1979, dramatic
political events in Korea tend to occur with little
forewarning. But a careful look at recent domestic
political and economic trends as well as at Chun's
behavior and policies suggests that a variety of devel-
opments in months ahead could rapidly increase
political tensions and undermine Chun's grip on the
security apparatus, thereby raising the odds of a
major crisis.
Foremost among these developments would be inci-
dents stemming from the student challenge. The
government's greatest concern appears to be that
student activists, playing their traditional role as the
voice of the "national conscience," may succeed in
galvanizing campus moderates and elements of labor
into antigovernment activity. The worry is well found-
ed: South Korean observers both inside and outside
the government note that rapid social and economic
change over the past two decades has greatly expand-
ed the number of students as well as workers who are
politically alienated and see South Korean society in
polarized "have" and "have not" terms.
The government's roundups of known student orga-
nizers and tighter campus security this fall have made
it more difficult for dissident groups to coordinate
large-scale actions. The recent resurgence of smaller,
often violent protest actions, however, suggests that
new radical student leaders have begun to emerge.
Embassy contacts on the most turbulent campuses
report that many professors believe the network of the
militant student movement will be fully rebuilt by
next spring, when the constitutional reform issue
could come to a head.
A continuation of harsh measures to curb student
protests also carries risks for the government, particu-
larly if such measures alienate a large segment of
South Korea's middle class. The most radical student
leaders are from working-class families, according to
Korean security officials, but families of the upper
and middle classes already feel threatened by tougher
government sanctions that would mean that their sons
and daughters could be expelled, blacklisted, jailed, or
worse. Antigovernment actions also have involved the
children of the political establishment. Several offi-
cials in the government, ruling party, and military-
including a senior ruling party adviser-have been
demoted or forced to resign because their children
were involved in protest activities.
In our view, government excesses in dealing with the
students-more than any actions of the political
opposition-have the potential to galvanize broadly
based public protests. Several possible actions already
on the horizon could give student leaders and the
other political activists the "cause" needed to mobilize
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large-scale demonstrations, increasing the risk of vio-
lent clashes with riot forces:
? Passage of special measures to control campus
unrest remains a red flag to the parliamentary
opposition, which has vowed an all-out fight if such
legislation is forced through the National Assembly.
? Reimprisonment of opposition leader Kim Dae Jung
on unconvincing charges-or worse, Kim's death
under circumstances that raised questions about
government involvement-could unify the various
anti-Chun groups.
? Cooperation among the government's political and
popular opponents could be precipitated by declara-
tion of martial law followed by a political crack-
down, or dissolution of the National Assembly
(Chun must wait until April to dissolve it legally)
followed by cancellation or gross manipulation of
required elections
Other less blatant government moves could raise
political tensions to the danger point. These include:
? Harsher government treatment of young blue-collar
strikers, which would antagonize their working-class
or rural families; increased harassment of moderate
proreform religious and social groups; or increased
manipulation of nonpolitical organizations to pro-
mote the government's antidissident campaign.
? A general purge of government employees who
publicly or privately criticize government policies.
(The firings of teachers and government-appointed
trade union officials that occurred last summer
could develop into a broader campaign against
government employees whose loyalty to Chun is in
doubt.)
? Introduction of emergency economic recovery mea-
sures that are perceived as bailing out wealthy
businessmen at the expense of workers and the
middle class,
Developments outside of Korea-and thus beyond
Chun's direct control-could also impact heavily on
confidence in the government. All groups, including
the military, would be sensitive if:
? The US troop presence in South Korea, or other
aspects of the US security commitment to Seoul,
resurfaced as a political issue in the United States.
? Allies and sponsoring organizations were becoming
cool toward allowing South Korea to host interna-
tional events-especially if the 1988 Olympics ap-
peared in danger.
? International bankers appeared to lose confidence in
the economy-as demonstrated, for example, by
serious difficulty in securing foreign loans.
Risks to Chun's standing also clearly accompany the
North-South dialogue. Although Chun has long
called on North Korean President Kim II-song to
meet him in an inter-Korean summit, this initiative
could result in a no-win situation for Chun. Several
political insiders in South Korea have criticized his
role in the expanded North-South contacts since last
spring as diplomatic grandstanding, according to the
US Embassy.
popular sentiment is likely to further
harden against Chun if he is perceived as manipulat-
ing the emotion-laden North-South issue to enhance
his image or justify tighter domestic controls. Ironi-
cally, however, Seoul's waning interest in advancing
the dialogue in recent weeks-possibly reflecting
greater sensitivity to such criticism by Chun and his
advisers-leaves Chun open to popular criticism for
impeding progress toward broader North-South ties
and eventual detente.
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Developments That Could Improve Chun's Standing
Despite the clear potential for trouble and the likeli-
hood that Chun will face serious challenges in the
coming months, Chun can still reduce political ten-
sions. The aftermath of President Park's assassination
in 1979 demonstrates how cautious the majority of
South Koreans are when confronted by a political
watershed. We doubt Chun would concede to any of
the most highly publicized opposition demands, such
as those for direct presidential elections or an amnesty
for Kim Dae Jung that would allow Kim to run for
office. Nor do we believe that Chun's opponents-
handicapped by an absence of firmly institutionalized
opportunities to contribute to the decisionmaking
process-will fundamentally alter their confrontation-
al political style. But Chun could take the initiative in
less sensitive areas that are important to many South
Koreans. In our view, the "man in the street" would
be likely to read such actions as signs that the
President was moving toward the long-promised polit-
ical transition and transfer of power officially set for
1988J
We have doubts about Chun's inclination to take such
steps, but he has choices that could help defuse the
domestic scene. None of these measures alone would
offer an easy solution, but taken together these and
others could ease tensions and reduce the risk of a
crisis. They include:
? A return to the earlier policy of benign neglect
toward nonviolent on-campus protests. Although
this would probably result in larger demonstrations,
it would at least ease popular discontent with the
current hardline policy and help stem the radicaliza-
tion of the student movement. Further gestures,
such as establishment of a credible blue-ribbon
commission to set guidelines for effective university
autonomy over academic matters and reduce or
eliminate the role of the university in policing
student antigovernment activities, would go far
toward restoring professors' influence on the major-
ity of students who are chiefly concerned with their
studies.
? Measures to broaden opportunities for political par-
ticipation through previously promised public hear-
ings on draft legislation, public forums on locally
important issues, and more visible cooperation with
the opposition in the National Assembly on bread-
and-butter legislative issues.
? Announcement of a timetable for implementation of
specific reforms, such as the limited local govern-
ment autonomy Seoul has promised to begin during
1986.
In our view, Chun also has room in coming months to
defuse some of the tensions that are built into the
presidential succession process. Although he obviously
does not want to become a lame duck by unveiling the
ruling party's presidential candidate too soon, he
could implicitly testify to his intentions by having the
party sponsor public discussions of 1988 campaign
issues. The ruling party could also be encouraged to
tap its local rank and file about possible successors to
broaden participation and consensus building in the
selection process. And Chun could alleviate at least
some of the skepticism about his intentions if he
began to talk openly about his postretirement plans or
encouraged discussion about the appropriate political
and social role of former presidents
As 1988 Draws Nearer
Chun's control of the security services and the relative
weakness of the opposition may enable the govern-
ment to ride out the next year or so, but we still see a
good chance for the succession issue to devolve into a
political debacle. For Chun, the key to a crisis-free
transition remains concessions on his part-both to
popular aspirations for representative elections and to
Army leaders who want a transfer of power without
polarization and with protection for their position in
the ruling establishment.' These hurdles are difficult
for Chun
' The prognosis of serious conflict between Chun and the Army over
the succession issue has emerged as one of the most likely outcomes
of a series of computer-assisted exercises, conducted jointly with the
Political Instability Branch of the Office of Global Issues, designed
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We believe Chun's explicit promise to step down in
1988 ironically has added to the potential for a crisis.
The setting of a deadline has raised the odds of a
preemptive test of strength. In our view, the catalyst
for such a move could be provided by signs that Chun
was moving to retain power personally or through a
surrogate after 1988. Signs that Chun in fact was
attempting to retain power would include:
? An increased emphasis on the need for political
"continuity" to safeguard the 1988 Olympics.
? Movement in pro-Chun political circles to lengthen
the presidential term and to build broader support
for Chun's personal leadership in the ruling party.
? The demotion of influential establishment figures,
such as ruling Democratic Justice Party chairman
Roh Tae Woo, who could challenge Chun's plans, or
the promotion of an apparent surrogate candidate
into this or some other key "on deck" succession
position.
Indications that Chun's succession strategy was fail-
ing to jell also could lead to a perception of a
vulnerable President. We would expect Chun to be
seen as weakening if he rescinds plans to unveil the
ruling party's candidate at its national convention in
1987. A recognition that the government was prepar-
ing to use massive election fraud to ensure victory for
Chun's candidate-virtually guaranteeing postelec-
tion turmoil-could also encourage an early political
run at Chun by his opponents.
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