(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00447R000200900001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
The Policy Views of
China's Hu Yaobang
From Out of Deng's Shadow:
Seeret
EA 85-10146
August 1985
Copy 2 61
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
From Out of Deng's Shadow:
The Policy Views of
? China's Hu Yaobang
This paper was prepared byl Office
of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, China
Division, OEA
Secret
EA 85-10146
August 1985
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Secret
Summary
Information available
as of 15 July 1985
was used in this report.
The Policy Views of
China's Hu Yaobang
From Out of Deng's Shadow:
significance.
Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, is
China's most controversial leader, though by no means its most powerful.
Outspoken, impulsive, aggressive, he has aroused opposition among the
party's elders-civilian and military alike-both for his unconventional
personal style and for his policy views. Although regarded since 1980 as
Deng Xiaoping's chosen successor for political leadership of the party, a
combination of objections to Hu's leadership and dissatisfaction with
reforms he has advocated appears to have dampened his prospects of
stepping directly into Deng's leading role on the Politburo. Nevertheless,
Hu will remain a key figure in Chinese politics for the next several years,
and his views on issues confronting the leadership will be of major
Hu is indeed a complex and contradictory figure:
? He is strongly identified with political reform and the movement to
rejuvenate the party with younger, more capable technocrats.
? He is not an orthodox Marxist in the economic sphere and clearly sees
radical reform as necessary to solve China's massive economic problems
and to win popular support for a party badly tarnished by a residual
"leftist" image, corruption, and poor bureaucractic performance. Hu
seems particularly concerned that China not follow the Polish example.
? Hu is the leader most identified with promoting "liberal" trends in
China, ranging from encouraging peasants to "get rich" to loosening
restrictions on literary expression to wearing Western-style clothing.
? He is, nonetheless, a staunch proponent of party controls on many aspects
of social and political life and takes strikingly dogmatic positions on
questions involving socialist morality and the need for ideological
education.
interviews with foreign journalists.
? Although usually portrayed as obsessed with facts and details, Hu
sometimes betrays only a rudimentary understanding of important
foreign and domestic policies and often makes "misstatements" in
iii Secret
EA 85-10146
August 1985
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On questions of foreign policy, Hu's views seem somewhat at odds with
those expressed by Deng and other senior reform leaders, and his tendency
to state them bluntly sharpens the sense that they are controversial:
? Hu appears less favorably disposed toward closer relations with the
United States and frequently disparages US policies, leaders, and social
trends.
? He seems to take a consistently hard line on the Taiwan question, and
particularly on the role of the United States as Taiwan's protector.
? Since he is a visceral nationalist conditioned by 50 years of Communist
activism, Hu's foreign policy framework seems more narrowly ideological
than Deng's, and he appears genuinely to favor equidistance in China's
relations with the United States and the Soviet Union.
? Hu may have fewer reservations about developing closer relations with
Moscow.
China's leadership picture is clouded by uncertainty as the party moves
toward a major Central Committee conclave in September, at which
personnel issues, including succession questions, will be addressed. Rumors
abound that the 70-year-old Hu may accede to Deng's position as
Chairman of the party's Military Commission, but that he will shortly be
replaced as General Secretary by his younger (56) protege, Hu Qili. At this
point, we do not know how these modified succession arrangements will
sort themselves out or what effect they will have on China's foreign and do-
mestic policies. Hu Yaobang continues to talk tough and act confidently,
and the reform programs he has pushed hardest are being implemented
steadily. He remains a formidable political figure.
In a post-Deng leadership in which Hu would play an important role, we
would expect relative continuity with most of Deng's policies:
? Organizational reform will continue, but perhaps more slowly, because of
the lack of Deng's mediating influence.
? Economic reform will proceed, but its pace and scope may be altered by
the persistence of practical problems and by the cast of a post-Deng
leadership, which probably will be more cautious and conservative. The
"open-door" approach to trade with the West and promotion of market-
style macroeconomic policies probably will be maintained.
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? Hu might be inclined to take a tougher position regarding the United
States in general, and his propensity to speak first and ask questions later
might complicate bilateral relations. Hu might, for example, be less
skilled than Deng has been at keeping troublesome issues such as textile
disagreements from adversely affecting larger interests. Nonetheless, the
importance of the US connection for China's economic development will
provide a firm foundation for the relationship.
? Hu may be more amenable to overtures from Moscow to improve
relations, but China would maintain its "independent and antihegemon-
ist" perspective. Hu is not pro-Soviet, but his tone, style, and what we
view as his relatively narrow perspective suggest that he, unlike Deng,
may steer China toward a truly independent foreign policy. Cooperation
with the Soviet Union against US interests in our view would be unlikely.
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Secret
From Out of Deng's Shadow:
The Policy Views of
China's Hu Yaobang
Hu Yaobang is an unconventional Chinese leader. In
sharp contrast to his colleagues on the Chinese Com-
munist Party's ruling Politburo, Hu eschews a dour,
reserved style in favor of a more animated, outspoken
approach. In command of a party filled with aloof,
privileged high officials, Hu-rough, bluff, and self-
educated-projects a genuine man-of-the-people im-
age. Although most of China's top leaders envelop
even routine political matters in obsessive secrecy, Hu
impulsively expresses himself to Chinese and foreign-
ers alike with remarkable candor and may then joke
about having divulged "top secret" material. When
seized with an idea, he may spontaneously run it out
to a point beyond either the party's official position or
his own previously expressed views. This pattern of
Hu's behavior has aroused considerable anger among
the party old guard.
Any attempt to take Hu's measure as a man and
leader is complicated by his cluttered public record.
We view him, as do many Chinese, as a bundle of
contradictions. Widely seen as a staunch reformer,
Hu nevertheless is capable of issuing starkly orthodox
ideological injunctions. He is often characterized in
the press as a man "on
top of things" and obsessed with facts and details, but
sometimes Hu betrays only a rudimentary under-
standing of important foreign and domestic policies.
Although he leads a party that prizes its image of
unity and collective decisionmaking, Hu impulsively
oversteps the boundaries that usually restrict leaders
from speaking their minds.
As General Secretary, Hu exercises greater day-to-
day influence over the lives of the Chinese people than
any other leader. One of the six members of the
Politburo Standing Committee, Hu plays a key role in
deliberating the broad guidelines for all party and
state policy. He operates from a formidable base
within the party, having installed a network of rela-
tively youthful supporters in key positions throughout
the apparatus. As the political heir of China's para-
mount leader, Deng Xiaoping, Hu has crisscrossed the
country selling Deng's policies, risked the political fire
Hu Yaobang, General Secre-
tary of the Communist Party of
of Deng's opponents by taking advanced positions on
reform, and has been a principal mover and shaker on
questions such as organizational reform and policy
toward intellectuals. After Deng, Hu is the party's
chief ideological spokesman.
In his public behavior, Hu seems aggressively confi-
dent of his place as party leader, but a growing body
of recent evidence indicates that the 70-year-old Hu,
beset by controversy and opposition during his tenure
as General Secretary, will soon surrender the post to
his younger protege, Hu Qili.
Hu will then succeed Deng as chairman of
the party's Military Commission. We have long ex-
pected that Hu would eventually head the commis-
sion, but losing his post as General Secretary would
diminish the significance of the appointment. As a
member of the Politburo Standing Committee, how-
ever, Hu probably will remain one of China's key
decisionmakers in the post-Deng era. Moreover, once
Deng departs, Hu may yet become, as Deng now is,
the weight that tips the scales in deliberations, a force
for policy continuity or policy reversal. Political condi-
tions altered by Deng's death, including the distribu-
tion of power in the leadership, may generate pressure
for change in domestic and foreign policy, and Hu's
views will be crucial in any post-Deng reassessment.
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 Political Superiors
Hu's policy preferences and political strategies are
directly shaped by those of Deng Xiaoping and, to a
lesser extent, other senior leaders. In a speech follow-
ing his elevation to party Chairman at the June 1981
Central Committee plenum, Hu deferred to the lead-
ing role of party elders Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian,
Chen Yun, and especially Deng Xiaoping, whom he
referred to as China's "primary decisionmaker.'~
As Hu has warmed to his role as party leader,
however, he has shown more and more impatience
with the accumulated wisdom of the elders and
greater willingness to strike out on his own. In a
recent interview, for example, he disputed Deng's
contention that China is capable of imposing a block-
ade on Taiwan. In late 1984, Hu told foreign journal-
ists that China's gerontocratic leadership had a "se-
nility problem."
Young Confidants
Hu's coterie of former Communist Youth League
(CYL) associates is well known.' Foremost among
these is his apparent successor, Hu Qili, permanent
secretary of the Secretariat and the man to whom Hu
delegates much of the daily work of running the party.
Hu Qili is constantly at his mentor's side at press
interviews, on domestic inspection tours, and on visits
abroad. Given the lean personal staffs of China's
leaders, Hu Qili seems to serve the General Secretary
much like a chief of staff-as executor, idea man, and
"lightning rod."
Over the past two years, Hu has pulled several other
young associates up from relative obscurity. Secretari-
at alternates Qiao Shi and Hao Jianxiu and party
department chiefs Wang Zhaoguo and Qian Liren are
frequent companions of Hu. Qiao, Wang, and Qian-
handling personnel, administrative affairs, and inter-
national party-to-party ties, respectively-are key
players in Hu's effort to consolidate his authority
within the party bureaucracy, as well as sources of
advice. Hao, a former textile worker, is the most
prominent political woman of the coming generation.
By showcasing younger, better educated leaders, Hu
personally puts policy on display-promoting "third
echelon" leaders is one of his frequent themes-while
implicitly suggesting that the advice he receives is not
warmed-over, 1950s-style Communist dogma.
Family
Like most Chinese leaders, Hu relies on his family to
perform political tasks and provide counsel. His wife,
Li Zhao, a retired textile ministry official, traveled to
Hong Kong in the wake of the Sino-British accord,
presumably to gather impressions and report to her
husband. According to a diplomatic source, his son
Hu Deping moves in intellectual circles and often
funnels unconventional advice and theoretical view-
points to his father. Another son, Hu Liu, is a chemist
and vice president of a corporation set up to import
Western technology.
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Secret
Inspection Tours
"Going deep into reality" for firsthand experience is a
party rite, and no national figure goes deeper than
Hu, China's most peripatetic leader. Hu frequently
draws on personal observations from his tours to make
a point or draw a conclusion in Beijing. Hu says he
wants to visit all of China's provinces, and his widely
reported travels implicitly contrast his personal vigor
to the sedentary style of the party elders. Hu made 13
trips during 1984, visiting 14 provinces and 102
counties and cities. Reports of Hu on site have him
peppering local officials, workers, and peasants with
sharp questions that, at the hands of the propagan-
dists, invariably demonstrate his familiarity with the
local situation. Since the plenum, Hu has especially
sought to meet, and focus national attention on,
innovative peasants who have cashed in on the
reforms.
Hu often acts as his own political troubleshooter, and,
as such, is blunt and decisive.
the West appears to be from books.
Books
Although he is basically a pragmatist, Hu appears to
be well grounded in Marxist-Leninist classics and
frequently cites the works of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and
Mao as acceptable guides to action. Hu also claims to
have read a wide variety of materials from both
Chinese and Western sources-history, political biog-
raphy, and, among other things, former President
Nixon's books (in private translation). Although he
has traveled outside China, most of Hu's knowledge of
Experience and Political Culture
Hu's views bear the deep imprint of Chinese party
institutions and history. He picked up organizational
skills as a young party cadre during the war with
Japan and in the subsequent Communist takeover of
China and became imbued with the same nationalism
that inspired the entire party leadership. Hu's Youth
League experience, apart from providing a political
base, fostered a reputed sensitivity to the impatience
and ambitions of young Chinese and a sympathetic
view of intellectuals.
after quitting."
For Hu and other Chinese officials, the Cultural
Revolution is a watershed for formulation of current
attitudes and policies. Much of what Deng and Hu
have sought to accomplish entails reversing and ne-
gating the radical politics of that era. Reflecting on
the violence and social chaos of that period, Hu has
said that the party "should never stir up another
internal disorder that causes us to suffer failures and
poverty." Hu is concerned that the "ultraleftist"
practices that characterized the Cultural Revolution
continue to act as an insidious force of habit among
Chinese, as he put it, "like reaching for cigarettes
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It is difficult to distinguish clearly the policy prefer-
ences of individual Chinese leaders. We receive few
accounts of deliberations within the inner circle of
leadership, and public statements, even in more spon-
taneous forms such as press interviews, generally
reflect collectively determined positions rather than
the personal views of the speaker. Other analytic
difficulties, such as differentiating between actual
policy views and posturing for effect, are hardly
unique to China.
The relative importance of a leader within Beijing's
political pecking order can often be determined by the
bluntness of his speech. The right of relatively unre-
stricted speech is enjoyed by only a handful of
Chinese leaders, and it is the privilege of the most
powerful to make policy on their feet and have others
accommodate themselves to the pronouncement. Few
leaders apart from Mao and Deng have been powerful
enough to make a habit of outspokenness.
Hu Yaobang, however, seems to have fewer reserva-
tions than other Chinese leaders about speaking out.
In our view, Hu's candor is partly the byproduct of a
voluble nature and partly an effort to assert his
leading role. We believe that Hu, like Deng, frequent-
ly uses unvarnished language for tactical purposes to
apply political pressure. Moreover, we view Hu's habit
of speaking out as itself a policy preference, part of an
effort to broaden the party's popular base and "demo-
cratize" inner party discussions. Recent practices
such as announcing national political conferences in
advance, openly disclosing items on the political agen-
da, and publishing lists of party and state appointees
reflect Hu's belief that the party should partially raise
the curtain of secrecy that traditionally has distanced
the rulers from the ruled in China.
Economic Reform
For the economy, Hu, like Deng, favors policies that
get results. He readily admits his general ignorance of
economics, a deficiency he shares with most of the top
leadership. Although he once seemed content to leave
the economy to government administration, he has
become more involved and insistent on questions of
economic reform. He appears keenly attuned to the
political imperatives that drive reform-especially the
need for success
Hu's public remarks on wage reform, an issue where
economic and political considerations overlap, are a
case in point. In a recent interview, Hu said he was
disappointed that the timetable for wage reform had
slipped from January to July 1985, and he hoped that
the reform could be undertaken in April (it was not).
Regarding individual incomes, Hu implicitly has criti-
cized conservatives such as Chen Yun-who has
argued that people should eat well, "but not too
well"-by asserting that, when production has been
developed, it is improper to require people to econo-
mize on food and clothing and to restrict consump-
tion.
Although the leadership disagrees on the utility of
establishing specific long-range goals that ultimately
could prove embarrassing, Hu has been among those
in the forefront calling for the quadrupling of China's
economic output by the year 2000. The recent perfor-
mance of the Chinese economy has led Hu to pro-
claim confidently that the quadrupling goal was as-
sured
Hu has favored doctrinally unorthodox formulations
in promoting economic reform. While on an inspec-
tion tour in Sichuan, Hu told a gathering that "the
party's criterion for assessing right or wrong (in
economic reform) is to see whether a thing helps
people get rich." Hu also told local leaders that
exploration, adventure, and competition, although
bourgeois ideas, are progressive and worth emulating.
Almost alone among his Politburo colleagues, Hu
frequently has allowed that changes in lifestyle can
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secret
promote economic change (he has advocated wearing
Western-style clothing and suggested that use of
knives and forks is a more sanitary way of dining).
"Even if reforms go a bit too far," he said late last
year, "they must be protected and remedied."
Organizational Reform
In his own statements, Hu reflects the dilemma of a
party in transition, seeking to shift the basis of its
legitimacy away from doctrine and coercion toward
practical demonstrations of its fitness to rule. Organi-
zational reform is an essential part of this task. Hu, a
member of the Communist Party for more than 50
years, clearly shares concerns of veteran revolutionar-
ies about corruption and "slackness" in the party. In
speeches from 1979 to the present, Hu has addressed
several key themes:
? Leadership: the party's vanguard role is absolute
and indispensable.
? Self-sacrifice: Hu is critical of those who put their
personal interests ahead of the party's and abuse the
trust implicit in party membership.
? Discipline: special vigilance is required against those
who resist the party line.
? The socialist system: its superiority must not be
doubted.
At the same time, Hu has pressed on issues that are
not nearly so dear to the hearts of the party elders,
and in fact has irritated many by raising sensitive
issues publicly:
? Habitual "leftism": the most serious adverse legacy
of the Cultural Revolution.
? The imperative of party reform: the basic lesson of
Poland was that the party betrayed the Polish
people-it was too dependent on the Soviet Union, it
stressed production goals over people, and its leaders
were corrupt.
? Rejuvenation: both the party and the state require
an infusion of younger leaders as sources of energy
and fresh ideas.
? Intellectuals: older party members must overcome
their reservations about entrusting educated offi-
cials with important duties.
Hu's ideas-on this score nearly indistinguishable
from Deng's-have prevailed completely on the ques-
tion of bureaucratic reforms. In our assessment, the
reform leadership, and Hu in particular, recognizes
that durable reform ultimately requires filling the
upper reaches of the bureaucracy with capable offi-
cials who are relatively free of outdated policy biases.
Hu has been a driving force behind bureaucratic
rejuvenation and efforts to use college-educated offi-
cials more efficiently. Moreover, Hu has goaded the
process along by placing bureaucratic rejuvenation on
the party's public agenda, announcing via press inter-
views, for example, that 70 percent of the leading
party and state officials would be replaced by June
1985.
The 12th Party Congress in September 1982 marked
a breakthrough-an unprecedented number of tech-
nocrats were named to the Central Committee, partic-
ularly to the rolls of alternate (nonvoting) members
who are being groomed for eventual membership.' Hu
once predicted that problems inside the party Central
Committee would be solved by expelling some mem-
bers and promoting others from the list of alternates,
a tactic that may be implemented in September at an
extraordinary party "conference of delegates.'
Hu chairs the party committee that oversees the
conduct of a rectification campaign, now in its second
of three years, to reform the party and purge political-
ly unreliable members. As early as 1979, Hu advocat-
ed lenience for Cultural Revolution era malefactors,
and, to date, the campaign has departed sharply from
the party's previous rectification procedures-gruel-
ing struggle sessions, public condemnations, and often
violent confrontations. The current "mild rain, gentle
breeze" approach to rectification is, above all, practi-
cal: Hu and his colleagues recognize that, because
millions of Chinese were involved in wrongdoing, a
' Of 210 members of the 12th Central Committee, more than half
were new or promoted from the list of 11th Central Committee
alternates. More than two-thirds of the new members were under
60 years old, and about a fifth of the entire committee were
functional specialists.
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public policy of forgiving and forgetting is politically
more suitable and creates fewer anxieties among
officials than an open settling of scores."
The Military
Hu's public remarks on the military generally do not
reflect an original viewpoint. Most often he confines
himself to standard exhortations on military policy
and generally echoes Deng's views. We presume that
Hu accepts the essentially derivative status of the
military in China's modernization scheme-the civil-
ian economy must improve before greater material
allocations can be directed toward Army moderniza-
tion.
Hu has been an active spokesman in the campaign to
convince soldiers of the reasonableness of Beijing's
military policies. Like Deng, Hu clearly favors the
professionalization of the armed forces and a reduced
role for senior soldier-politicians at the top level of
decisionmaking. He has strongly endorsed Deng's
sweeping plans to streamline and rejuvenate the mili-
tary, such as the 1-million-man reduction in troop
strength and the wholesale shakeup of military com-
mands announced in June 1985.
Hu apparently is concerned, however, about whether
veteran officers will continue to support the reform
program. Publicly, Hu asserts his confidence that the
People's Liberation Army is absolutely trustworthy
and loyal to the party
Hu appears to recognize that it may be helpful to
court the military. He seems at pains to express his
good intentions, such as in an interview last fall when
he conceded that, although the Army had a dispropor-
tionate number of problems left over from the Cultur-
al Revolution, these difficulties were being handled
Hu observes military maneuvers in 1981 with
Deng Xiaoping (left) and Beijing Military Region
without rancor. He implied that most Cultural Revo-
lution-era troublemakers in the military would simply
be retired at full pay rather than suffer additional
punishment because they had merely followed orders
and previously had been brave and loyal.
At the same time, Hu typically seems either confident
or intemperate enough to risk the ire of military
leaders by making provocative statements. For exam-
ple, while in New Zealand in April, Hu, without
apparent authorization, announced to a press confer-
ence the 1-million-man demobilization, which had not
yet been publicly disclosed in China. Shortly there-
after, he suggested in an interview that the chairman-
ship of the party Military Commission was a fitting
post for an old man such as Deng because, "to tell the
truth, there are not a lot of things to do in the army."
He then added, "We let Deng hold a concurrent post
(he is also Chairman of the Central Advisory Com-
mission) ... enabling us to attend to urgent matters."
Foreign Policy
From the time he joined the Politburo Standing
Committee in 1980 until about mid-1982, when he
had been party chairman for a year, Hu most often
addressed questions involving his areas of greatest
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Secret
competence-party policy and personnel. On those
few occasions that Hu spoke on the relatively unfamil-
iar topics of economics and foreign policy, he rarely
strayed from his talking points. Since approximately
mid-1982, however, this no longer seems the case.
Hu's willingness to speak out on China's foreign
relations is directly related to his growing involvement
in the formulation of foreign policy. Since late 1978,
Deng Xiaoping has always had pride of place within
the small circle of officials who deliberate China's
foreign policy. In 1981 Hu told visitors that foreign
affairs was the responsibility of Deng along with Zhao
and Li Xiannian.
IIn his
recent actions and statements, Hu, in our view, seems
fully to expect to inherit Deng's leading role in foreign
policy. Indeed, part of that reponsibility may already
have shifted: Hu now appears the leader most closely
associated with China's relations with Japan, North
Korea, and some East European countries.
Our examination of Hu's foreign policy record leads
us to conclude that:
? Compared with leaders such as Deng and Zhao, Hu
appears much less favorably disposed to closer
relations with the United States.
? He has taken a consistently harder line on the
Taiwan question and particularly the role of the
United States as Taiwan's protector.
? Hu may have fewer reservations about improving
relations with the Soviet Union.
? Hu's foreign policy views are more doctrinaire than
Deng's-his foreign policy outlook seems the com-
bined product of visceral nationalism and a relative-
ly narrow perspective conditioned by more than 50
years of Communist activism.
United States. Almost a year before China publicly
broke with the "united front against (Soviet) hege-
monism" line and invoked China's "independent for-
eign policy" at the 12th Party Congress, a diplomatic
source reported a divergence of opinion between Deng
and Hu over relations with the United States.' Ac-
cording to the source, Hu favored a more passive
foreign policy that was less closely identified with the
United States and more oriented toward Third World
interests. The two leaders agreed, however, that Chi-
na should seek no closer ties to the Soviet Union.
Although these differences appear mainly matters of
weight and degree, Hu's reported preferences were
fully represented at the 12th Party Congress and
given authoritative endorsement by the Central Com-
mittee.
Other diplomatic sources confirmed the differing
foreign policy slants of Deng and Hu. In accounts of a
top-level meeting held in March 1983, Deng defended
the foreign policy line of 1978-82, while Hu specifical-
ly reminded attendees of his personal reservations
about the previous attempt to forge a de facto alliance
with the United States.
Although we do not have a full picture of Hu's foreign
policy views, one point that appears incontrovertible is
his suspicion of the United States as a reliable foreign
policy partner. When providing foreign visitors or
journalists with a foreign policy tour d'horizon, Hu is
generally moderate and sticks to standard policy
formulations. When he departs from the standard
brief, however, Hu seldom fails to criticize US policy
more harshly than other Chinese leaders. Following
are examples from a sizable list of Hu's blasts:
? In early 1981, when Beijing was still seeking, in
Hu's words, "a kind of alliance" with the United
States against the Soviets, foreign policy guidance
quoted Hu's view of the Reagan administration as
"reactionary, anti-Communist, and pro-Taiwan."
? In mid-1983, Hu told foreign visitors that Washing-
ton does not honor its treaty commitments (specifi-
cally, the Shanghai Communique) and continues to
cherish a "one and a half Chinas" policy. There had
been no major improvement in Sino-US relations,
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Hu avowed, since the breakthrough 1972 talks.
(Around the same time, Deng was also questioning
the reliability of the United States.)
? According to the official Chinese press, Hu heaped
abuse on the United States before a Swedish Com-
munist Party delegation in April 1983. "The United
States has instituted a Taiwan Relations Act, per-
sisted in its arms sales to Taiwan, connived in the
enticement and coercion of Chinese athletes and
students in collusion with Taiwan agents, and even
granted `political asylum." These are all acts inter-
fering in China's internal affairs, injuring China's
sovereignty, and hurting the Chinese people's feel-
ings. This is hegemonistic behavior."
? In remarks made last year
echoed in his recent comments to the Hong Kong
journal Pai Hsing, Hu charged that the United
States keeps Taiwan "artificially alive" through
special "blood transfusions," and that, without US
interference, the problems of reunification would
have been solved "years ago."
? Speaking last year, Hu
characterized the United States bleakly as a nation
in decline that had not had a leader of vision since
the 1940s, that was disliked around the world, and
that had a stark and growing gap between rich and
poor.
Taiwan. Although Beijing has consistently maintained
that the Taiwan question is solely an internal affair,
neither Hu nor many other national leaders discuss it
outside the context of relations with the United
States. In our view, Hu appears to regard the Taiwan
question as more pressing than Deng, who seems to
have a better feel for the limits of the practical. Hu's
generally more xenophobic view of the West spills
over into the Taiwan question.
Hu has acted in a contradictory manner on the
Taiwan question, at one time acknowledging that
Beijing and Washington have an implicit understand-
ing and at another time apparently breaching that
understanding in a provocative way:
Hu acknowledged the delicacy of the
Taiwan connection in Sino-US relations and admit-
ted that most issues could be finessed if the US
Government would simply refrain from openly com-
menting on Taiwan-related questions. It was the US
Government continuing to comment on its commit-
ment, even its "alliance," with Taiwan, Hu argued,
that summoned forth harsh responses from Beijing.
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? Yet Hu himself focused the spotlight on Taiwan in 25X1
the Pai Hsing interview of May 1985. There Hu,
apparently in disregard of Deng's frequent asser-
tions that China could impose a naval blockade
around Taiwan, claimed that China was militarily
unable to undertake such an operation, but, that in
seven to 10 years, China would have the necessary
capability, and perhaps the will. "If the broad
masses of the Taiwan people wish (for reunification) 25X1
and a small number of people do not, it will be
necessary to use some force," Hu asserted.
Soviet Union. Available evidence does not suggest
that Hu is pro-Soviet. In our view, however, he is not
as vehemently anti-Soviet as Deng. As with his record 25X1
on other topics, Hu's statements on the Sino-Soviet
relationship combine aspects of the official line to-
gether with expressions that seem more personal.
Consequently, his remarks have little internal consis-
tency-he sometimes takes a position of exaggerated
hostility, sometimes of exaggerated magnanimity. We
are uncertain whether these inconsistencies reflect
Hu's personal views or are mere posturing for effect.
The record suggests, however, that Hu sees more
openings than other leaders for improved relations
with Moscow. For example, recent public references
to the Soviet Union as a "socialist" country-the first
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since the 1960s-reflect a view expressed by Hu since
at least the late 1970s.
___]Hu's personal diplomacy in Eastern Europe-
namely, his visit to Romania and Yugoslavia in
1983-may in part be an effort to ease gradually and
indirectly toward closer Soviet contacts.
Hu, however, sees little prospect of a return to the
halcyon days of Sino-Soviet alliance. In mid-1983, he
told Japanese reporters that complete normalization
of relations with the Soviets might take 20 or 30
years, and even then, there would be no return to the
alliance of the 1950s. Early the following year, diplo-
matic sources in Beijing learned that East European
callers on Hu found the Soviet portion of his foreign
policy briefing to be "embarrassingly negative and
sarcastic." Again in 1984, he noted that Moscow
(following the Andropov accession) was seeking to
create an impression that relations with Beijing are
improving without having to concede a thing. Howev-
er, Hu noted, their "chauvinism and ideological train-
ing" keep them from actually changing their ways.
Even though he may be moderately warmer toward
Moscow, we estimate that a Hu-inspired repositioning
within the Beijing-Moscow-Washington triangle
would not amount to a full-blown rapprochement, but
perhaps would incline Beijing toward an attempt to
achieve a position of equidistance between the two
great powers. Based on our assessment of the record,
we believe Hu may favor a less confrontational ap-
proach to China's relations with the Soviet Union
than Deng Xiaoping, whom Moscow considers the
most anti-Soviet of China's leaders. As a corollary to
this view, Hu may be willing to sacrifice aspects of the
US connection in the interests of improved relations
We are uncertain whether developments in Sino-
Soviet relations since last fall represent a leadership
consensus that Hu obeys rather than drives. These
recent events are suggestive but not conclusive:
? In his trip to the Mongolian border last fall, Hu
called for making the city of Erenhot an inland
special economic zone, implying that he favored a
major improvement in Sino-Soviet economic
relations.
? In March, through Vice Premier Li Peng, Hu
conveyed his congratulations to Mikhail Gorbachev
upon his accession to Soviet party leadership, term-
ing the Soviet leader "comrade."
? The following month, in a session with Hong Kong
journalists, Hu acknowledged that Sino-Soviet rela-
tions are abnormal but pointedly refrained from the
ritual recitation of the "three obstacles" to Sino-
Soviet normalization'-even claiming he did not
know precisely how many obstacles there were-
stating only as a general condition for improving
relations that Moscow must eliminate Beijing's feel-
ings of insecurity on its borders.
? In the Hong Kong interview, Hu added that there
were no obstacles to upgrading contacts between
Beijing and Moscow, even to the possible exchange
of visits by premiers.
Strategic Considerations. Deng is commonly credited
with the strategic vision to have seen that China's best
chance for realizing its domestic economic goals
called for continuity with the foreign policy of Mao
and Zhou Enlai-that is, an end to Chinese isolation-
ism and cooperation with the West and Japan both for
the economic benefits and as a strategic counter-
weight to the Soviet Union. Hu's vision appears to
differ in important respects, especially regarding the
relative distance between the two superpowers. In-
deed, some Soviet observers tend to view Hu as a man
' The three obstacles are that Moscow should end its support for
Vietnam in Kampuchea, withdraw from Afghanistan, and reduce
with the Soviets.
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A high-stakes bridge game: Hu
and an unidentified placer
against Deng (right) and Secre-
tariat memher Hu Qili. Politi-
huro member Wan Li (standing)
looks on
Moscow might be able to bargain with, and believe
that, with Hu in charge, there will be better prospects
for improved Sino-Soviet relations.
Ideology and Intellectual Freedom
llu .4s a "Liberal." Hu has taken controversial stands
on artistic freedom but has then bowed to party
traditionalists when political exigencies so dictated.
During the summer of 1981, Hu endorsed, then
criticized "Bitter Love," a screenplay by Bai Hua that
satirized Mao and the party and drew heavy fire from
Army conservatives. He subsequently attacked Bai's
critics, however, insisting that their hasty and unrea-
sonable reaction had actually generated support for
Bai. At the same time, Chinese writers believed that
Hu was forced to yield to conservative pressure but
held that he remained their advocate. According to a
diplomatic source, Bai Hua himself told a confidant,
"No matter what Hu feels compelled to say about me
and my writings, I know that in his heart he is a
liberal and supports me.1
The available evidence suggests that Bai's judgment is
apt. Hu's own interview style indicates a firm belief
that public discourse in China should be freer, and
that writers should have greater latitude. Neverthe-
less, IN above all is a political creature, leader of an
organization accustomed to exercising control by es-
tablishing limits. The current economic and political
trend, in which reforms proceed with only thin ideo-
logical justification, requires lipservice to some tradi-
tional Communist expressions, occasionall} followed
up by tougher sanctions against those who exceed
unspoken ideological boundaries
Hu as a Pragmatic Politician. As party chief, I lu
must attempt to bridge the perennial gap between the
party regulars' demands for ideological discipline and
orthodoxy and the intellectuals' desire for greater
expressive freedoms. He has been a leader in the
party's effort to woo intellectuals to the party pro-
gram, but at the same time is responsible as the
party's chief ideological spokesman-- for defining the
borderline between acceptable and unacceptable ide-
ology, tolerable and intolerable expression. Hu's w a-
vering on this question has provided critics on both
sides ample opportunity to find fault with his perfor-
mance.
Hu's speech of 8 February on party journalism neatly
underscores his dilemma." First of all, it is a tough,
A The speech was not published until 14 April, presunutbly berme
of its controversial contents, the corresponding need to acquire the
endorsement of senior leaders, and, probably, because earlier
publication would have appeared to negate the party's endorsement
of artistic freedom publicized at the December 1984 Januan I98~
Writers Conference. At that session, IN Yaobang's protege Hu
Qili, serving as spokesman for his mentor, pronounced a polie> of
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ideologically orthodox talk, almost certainly prompted
by conservative critics of the trend toward relaxed
restrictions in literature. At the outset, Hu noted that
the official press must serve as "the mouthpiece of the
party" and contrasted journalism to artistic creation,
saying that freedom of creation does not require
editors to publish any item a writer submits. In his
most dogmatic moment, Hu maintained that, in Chi-
na, it is unnatural for the press to speak in "different
voices" because all Chinese have the same opinions,
which are represented faithfully by the Central Com-
mittee and the State Council. When asked by a Hong
Kong journal to reconcile his speech to his relatively
"enlightened" public record on artistic freedoms, Hu
responded, "Being enlightened should not make me
the sagacious elder statesman. Most importantly,
Deng must believe that Hu will continue to support
the policies both have worked to set in place.
The designation of a political heir in China, however,
is risky." Named successors automatically become the
target of all who wish to try for power. Hu's rise under
Deng's tutelage and his willingness to stake out
extreme positions have drawn fire from numerous
critics. During his five years atop the party bureau-
cracy, Hu has absorbed much of the criticism and
little of the credit for China's policies, and he is
personally associated with the most controversial as-
pects of the reforms. Indeed, it falls to the party chief
to balance competing views, and this is a task for
which keenly partisan Hu seems particularly
lose principles!"
On economic questions, however, Hu permits few
principles to encumber him and has a well-deserved
reputation as a pragmatist. Combined with his often
ill-concealed contempt for China's "leftist" propagan-
da apparatus, Hu's approach to finding ideological
justifications for economic policy seems almost cyni-
cal
It was Hu Yaobang's speech to theoretical
workers in November 1984 that provided the key text
for a controversial People's Daily commentator of 7
December, which argued that, in light of contempo-
rary developments, "Marxism cannot solve China's
problems." (The following day, this was corrected to
read "Marxism cannot solve all China's problems.")
Will Hu Stay the Course?
Political Concerns
Several considerations must originally have motivated
Deng to choose Hu as his successor. Deng obviously
saw him as a pugnacious man who would goad the
party bureaucracy into action, work long hours at-
tending to necessary detail, staff important projects,
go on provincial tours, and thereby permit Deng to be
unsuited.
Partly because of his stylistic quirks, Hu has had
problems winning the full approbation of senior party
traditionalists.
leaders such as Standing Committee member Chen
Yun, Premier Zhao Ziyang, and even Deng Xiaoping,
have at one time or another been critical of Hu's
performance. Hu has never quite been able to shake
the perception that, because he jumps too easily to
conclusions and is too readily tempted to impetuous
action, he is not quite up to the job of party General
Secretary.
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 Hu Qili---rumored in line to
replace Hu Yaobang as General
Hu arouses strong emotions in both his supporters and
his detractors, and the pressures of high office per-
haps are beginning to tell. He is 70 years old and
perhaps slowing down---during his recent trip to
Australia and New Zealand, Hu canceled a day of
activities because of exhaustion. On several occasions
recently, Hu suggested to foreign reporters that he
will leave his post at the 13th Party Congress in 1987.
Whether or not Hu Qili ultimately accedes to IN
Yaobang's position, Hu remains the most prominent
party leader of his generation and the one best
positioned to try for Deng's authority once Deng dies
or becomes incapacitated. The looming question be-
fore both Chinese and foreign policymakers must be:
will IN Yaobang continue China's present policy
course when Deng is gone')
In our view, the answer is a guarded "yes.'' Our
revie~N of flu's record suggests that, on most issues,
Deng and Hu are like minded. Hu may be willing to
go a bit faster on economic reform, may have some
reservations on China's foreign policy, and may be
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more tentative in his relations with senior soldier-
politicians. He is certainly willing to go a bit farther
toward an ideological reformation and toward grant-
ing individual freedoms that would satisfy the de-
mands of Chinese intellectuals for a greater stake in
reform.
Yet without Deng, Hu will be subject to different
political pressures and may be less able to work his
own will. Deng presumably- has kept the party elders
at bay while gradually devolving greater authority to
Hu. In most instances, Hu's words gained additional
credibility because of his role as Deng's spokesman.
When Deng is gone, Hu will have to deal more
directly with Deng's generational peers, who are aged
and tired but still politically formidable. Even with
Deng's protection, Hu has been forced to concede to
the old guard on issues such as ideology, simply in the
interest of preserving a rough leadership consensus.
Both the issues and Hu's policy positions are complex
enough for Hu to be turned in a variety of directions,
according to political exigency:
? We expect Hu to continue to mind his party con-
cerns first: challenges to party control during the
course of reform, as when intellectuals attempt to
question the party's primacy, will be met decisive-
ly-the important political voices in Beijing are
unanimous on this score.
? Hu will continue to press for organizational changes
but may encounter greater resistance without
Deng's mediating influence. Exceptions to the re-
tirement rulings have already been allowed, and it
may be politic for Hu to allow several more in the
post-Deng period.
? If Hu accedes to the Military Commission chair-
manship, it will presumably be under institutional
arrangements set by Deng. The May-June 1985
meeting of the commission has established a series
of military reforms that probably can proceed with-
out Deng's direct attention.
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? Hu's economic views, because they are so imperfect-
ly formed, may be swung about by advisers' urgings,
but his record since 1978 indicates that he is
basically satisfied with-and proud of-China's
performance, and will generally remain an advocate
of current policies. Hu may curb his rhetorical
excesses to placate party elders, but he seems to
have no doubt that economic reform is vitally
important for China. The "open-door" approach to
trade with the West and promotion of market-style
macroeconomic policies probably will continue.
? Foreign policy seems an arena for greater give and
take after Deng's death, and Hu's position may be
particularly susceptible to political and emotional
influence.
? Although the record is clouded on his views toward
the Soviet Union, Hu may genuinely believe that
China would improve its position within the triangu-
lar relationship if it reaches some kind of accommo-
dation with Moscow. If so, in our view, this would
jeopardize Deng's more carefully crafted foreign
policy, which appears inextricably entwined with
the need to enlist Western participation in China's
economic development.
? Hu, however, is not pro-Soviet, and his critical views
of both the Soviet Union and the United States
generally are shared by all of China's leaders,
including Deng. Hu's tone and style along with his
much narrower perspective, however, suggest that
he, unlike Deng, might steer China to pursue a truly
independent foreign policy.
? Responding to domestic political pressures, Hu may
seek favor among more conservative leaders at the
Politburo level who
favor more rapid improvement of relations with the
Soviets and, perhaps, greater distance from the
United States.
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