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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000300350001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Burkina:
Pressures on Sankara
Secret
ALA 86-10036
August 1986
?py 2 9 4
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Burkina:
Pressures on Sankara
Directorate of Operations.
Office of African and Latin American Analysis, with
a contribution from Q Office of
Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated with the
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA
Secret
ALA 86-/ 0036
August 1986
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Burkina:
Pressures on Sankara
Key Judgments The populist regime of Burkina's President Thomas Sankara, which took
In/ormation available power in August 1983, appears to be firmly in control for the moment but
as 4f 24 July /986 is likely to face increasing challenges from both the extreme left and the
was used in this report.
military over the next year. As public frustration with the country's
economic plight grows, we estimate that radicals will have new opportuni-
ties to press their policies, which include a close alignment with Libya and
the Soviet Union.
In our view, Sankara's most serious threat comes from the Patriotic
League for Development (LIPAD), a small pro-Soviet party that helped
him come to power and has some support among students, civil servants,
trade unions, and certain sectors of the military. Although Sankara ousted
members of LIPAD from the government in 1984, he has reappointed a
few in the past year, apparently believing they have renounced their
revolutionary objectives, according to US Embassy reporting. We believe
they are probably attempting to redirect Burkina toward more radical
policies, while privately intensifying efforts to build support among dis-
gruntled urban dwellers, trade unionists, and military officers.
There are growing signs that the 7,600-man armed forces are dissatisfied
with what they view as Sankara's lackluster leadership and are likely to
challenge his policies over the next year.
indicates that both officers and enlisted men are frustrated with Sankara's
refusal to upgrade military capabilities, his frequent purges of the officer
corps, and the insertion of "political watchdogs" to spy on potential
military malcontents. Moreover, many officers remain angry over
Sankara's reluctance to avenge Burkina's military defeat by neighboring
Mali in the so-called Christmas war last December. Although a coup by
disgruntled officers is possible and pressure from the ranks is likely to
grow, we believe that Sankara's frequent purges and the control of key
military units by close advisers would work against a successful takeover in
the near term.
Burkina's economic decline also will continue to undermine Sankara's
ability to rule. According to the US Embassy, despite two years of
austerity and some positive social welfare programs, living standards in
Burkina remain among the lowest in the world, and unfulfilled public
expectations are further reducing the limited popular support Sankara now
enjoys. Two decades of drought and the continued spread of the desert have
Secret
ALA 86-10036
August 1986
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eroded any potential for a substantial increase in agricultural production
and have left unfulfilled the pledge Sankara made in 1983 to make
Burkina self-sufficient in food. Burkina's own swelling population, in-
creased by a rising pool of migrants from more severely affected Sahelian
nations, will further strain the country's limited resources over the longer
term.
Although Sankara is unhappy with the meager levels of Libyan and Soviet
economic aid, we believe that because of Sankara's obsession with security
matters Moscow and Tripoli could easily gain influence with offers of
much-needed military assistance. At the same time, we suspect that the
Libyans will work behind the scenes to undermine Sankara and replace
him with a more pliant leader who would more actively serve their
interests. If asked, Libya would almost certainly offer military and security
aid to replace the hardware lost during the Christmas war and to bolster
Sankara's personal security in exchange for the use of Burkina as a transit
point for aid to Ivorian and Togolese dissidents. We also expect that
Moscow will probably work behind the scenes to assist LIPAD in nudging
Burkina toward more radical policies.
Burkina's relations with the West are likely to fluctuate as Sankara
attempts to balance his need for Western economic assistance with his
desire to demonstrate his revolutionary credentials. Sankara probably will
continue to lash out against the United States and France on occasion,
while privately reassuring Paris-Burkina's largest aid donor and trading
partner-that his rhetoric is designed only for internal consumption.
France will probably tolerate Sankara's posturing as long as it believes he
is holding to his pledge not to export his "revolution" or permit the Libyans
or the Soviets to use Burkina as a base from which to subvert French
interests in the region, such as Burkina's moderate neighbors-Ivory
Coast, Togo, and Niger.
Should Sankara fall from power, we believe Burkina would enter a chaotic
period in which Tripoli and Moscow would probably benefit. Most
potential successors lack the leadership skills necessary to hold on to power
for long and probably would seek external assistance, from Libya or the
USSR, to ensure the security of their rule. We also believe any successor
would be vulnerable to pressures from LIPAD and its affiliated trade union
for a role in the government. Any new regime, moreover, would be hard
pressed to cope with the country's economic decline and with restlessness
among the military and the urban elite.
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Secret
Key Judgments
iii
Introduction
1
Managing the Revolution
1
Sankara's Brand of Populism
1
Maintaining Control
2
Challenges in the Wings
2
Narrow Base of Support
3
Pressures From the Extreme Left
3
Grumbling in the Military
6
Reversing Economic Decline
6
Opportunities for Libyan and Communist Gains
8
Libya
9
Soviet Union
10
Cuba
11
West African Concerns
11
Moderating Influences
11
France
11
Algeria
12
United States
12
Outlook and Implications for the United States
12
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Figure 1
Burkina
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers
t i i
r ~ ~ ~ 1 I
0 25 50 75 100 Miles
eoeeaary renresemauoo ~:
not nBC6aserily aut M1Oritat~ve
NIGER
Niemey
Blitt o `:
BENIN
STAT
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Secret
Burkina:
Pressures on Sankara
President Thomas Sankara faces serious political and
economic problems that we believe are gradually
undermining his rule and are likely to usher in a
period of instability. One of Sankara's major chal-
lenges comes from a group of hardcore, influential
Marxists who helped him seize power in 1983, but
most of whom now oppose his rule. The military also
is likely to pose a threat as the rank and file becomes
increasingly disenchanted with Sankara's perfor-
mance. Moreover, Sankara's support among the youth
and peasantry also will probably wane if he is unable,
as seems likely, to reverse Burkina's economic deterio-
ration. Foreign influences, especially French, Libyan,
and Soviet, have the potential to affect outcomes in
this economically dependent country. This paper ex-
amines Sankara's declining fortunes and assesses the
prospects for the regime's survival over the next two
years. In doing so, it factors in the role of external
actors and explores scenarios under which Libya or
the USSR might make significant advances in the
country.
Upon seizing power in 1983, Sankara launched a
populist revolution he claimed represented the inter-
ests of the "common man," but his erratic course as
President has made clear that he lacks a political
focus. Nonetheless, US Embassy reporting suggests
Sankara remains an appealing leader for many-he is
widely viewed as heroic and incorruptible=and his
efforts to improve living standards, as well as his
flamboyant nonaligned rhetoric, play to the crowd.
His sometimes feckless policies, however, and his
reliance on repression and violence to eliminate real
and imagined opponents have alienated the traditional
elite. Sankara's pretensions that his populist regime is
a new Third World model, his eccentric behavior
toward foreign benefactors, and his apparent paranoia
about subversion have all made him an object of
Sankara began his rise to power in November 1982,
when as an Army Captain and key garrison com-
mander he helped to install Maj. Jean-Baptise Oue-
draogo as President. In January 1983 Ouedraogo
appointed Sankara Prime Minister, but friction be-
tween the two developed quickly as Sankara sought
alliances with Libya and Ghana, while Ouedraogo
preferred to maintain traditional links to France and
Ivory Coast. In a desperate attempt to curb
Sankara's irtfluence, in May 1983 Ouedraogo placed
him under arrestfor a few weeks.
Backed by key military personnel, leftist trade union-
ists and intellectuals, Sankara toppled Ouedraogo in
August 1983. Troops loyal to Sankara, armed with
weapons provided by Libya, met little resistance from
disorganized government,/orces, according to the US
Embassy. According to press reports
widespread government corruption.
Sankara quickly consolidated his rule by purging the
civil service and o,~icer corps of suspected disloyal
members. Launching an ostensibly nonaligned foreign
policy, heforged close ties to Libya and established
diplomatic relations with Cuba. In 1983 and 1984, he
repeatedly accused France of plotting to engineer his
ouster. In August 1984, Sankara changed the name
of his country from Upper Volta to Burkina, as part
of the "decolonization"process. The name roughly
translates as "Land of Upright People. "
Sankara's Brand of Populism
Sankara's words and deeds reveal his unorthodox
national and world views. His proclaimed design for
Burkina envisions a society in which wealth is equita-
bly distributed, women have equal rights, and social
suspicion within the region and abroad.
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ALA 86-10036
August 1986
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justice prevails. The regime's sole theoretical tract-a
vague political document, "Treatise of Orientation,"
issued shortly after the coup-promises a "popular
democratic revolution" leading to a classless society,
and calls for economic self-sufficiency. Sankara's
vision for domestic change, however, appears to have
little substance beyond these captions. The US Em-
bassy reports that he is often impulsive and unpredict-
able, and gets carried away with his own rhetoric,
rarely considering the consequences of his acts. For
example, in 1984 he suspended for one year rent and
mortgage payments, which are taxable, failing to
realize the consequences of the loss in badly needed
government revenues.
Fiercely nationalistic, Sankara publicly rejects both
Eastern and Western political models and claims his
regime will become the new example of Third World
development, according to the US Embassy. Embassy
sources indicate that Sankara's world view is shaped
by his obsession with power and by irrational fears
that domestic and foreign opposition-including the
Vatican-are bent on toppling him. This mind-set
may account for his habit of publicly lashing out at
France, the United States, the USSR, and Libya for
their failure to provide substantial economic aid and
for their "imperialist" aggressions.
While Sankara's proclivity is to attack the West
verbally, he has nevertheless proved willing at times to
compromise his views to achieve practical results. In
an effort to generate additional Western foreign aid,
he has implemented a financial austerity program
established in 1985 and has made no effort to collec-
tivize or redistribute land or nationalize the private
sector. Although Sankara has publicly emphasized
solidarity with African and Third World movements,
such as the South-West Africa People's Organization
and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and has
established closer ties to such states as North Korea
and Cuba, the US Embassy reports that he also tries
privately to reassure traditional Western donors that
he values their friendship and assistance.
Maintaining Control
Despite his avowed idealistic principles, Sankara has
moved ruthlessly against real and imagined threats,
and, for the moment, appears to be firmly in control.
According to the US Embassy and international
human rights organizations, alleged coup plotters and
other opponents have been executed and regime oppo-
nents tortured and murdered. In 1984 the US Embas-
sy reported the execution of seven high-level military
officers and government officials for coup plotting,
despite lack of evidence, and in July 1985 it reported
that Sankara's security apparatus assassinated a lead-
ing dissident living in Ivory Coast.
Sankara's concern with his own safety is underscored
by his creation of an extensive security network. A
variety of US Embassy sources indicate that Sankara
depends on a security service of unknown size to
quash potential opposition. It is run, these sources
add, by a French expatriate trained in Cuba and
Czechoslovakia, and reportedly has ties to the French
terrorist group Direct Action. In addition, Commit-
tees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) '-
created shortly after Sankara took power to carry out
social action programs-serve as the regime's "eyes
and ears," according to US Embassy reporting, and
are present in almost all sectors of Burkinan society.
The Committees, often composed of uneducated
youths, act as local police and organize progovern-
ment rallies. According to the Embassy, the CDRs
have moved effectively against antiregime protests
and on at least two occasions-in 1983 and 1984-
dispersed trade union demonstrations. Embassy re-
porting indicates that the CDRs are viewed with
suspicion by most Burkinabe.
he is in command of
the situation and under no near-term threat. We
believe, however, that a resurgence of the extreme left
and grumbling in the Army will make him increasing-
ly vulnerable over the next year, particularly if he is
' The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution are modeled on
similar groups in Ethiopia, Cuba, Libya, and Ghana. They are
intended to build grassroots support for the central government and
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unable to cope with his main substantive challenge:
how to halt Burkina's economic decline. US Embassy
and defense attache reporting indicates that the ex-
treme left is working behind the scenes to build a base
of support amon civil servants and ossibly within
the militarv.
Narrow Base of Support
Although the US Embassy reports Sankara has the
support of the urban poor and probably of the peas-
antry, he has alienated Burkina's civilian elite, com-
posed of civil servants, trade unionists, and business-
men. The peasantry probably has benefited somewhat
from his emphasis on rural development, and the
urban poor realized some small gains from govern-
ment efforts to provide improved health care and
better housing. However, Sankara angered govern-
ment workers in 1984 by cutting wages and threaten-
ing to fire them if they did not work hard enough or
demanded higher salaries. Moreover, many business-
men complain about high taxes and lack of incentives
for the private sector, while many former government
managers have fled to Ivory Coast and France, ac-
cording to the US Embassy. Sankara has ruthlessly
repressed the traditionally powerful trade unions-
composed of more than 10,000 civil servants and
urban workers-which have played an instrumental
role in every change of government since indepen-
dence.Z According to US Embassy reporting, Sankara
has imprisoned some union leaders, intimidated most
others, and banned strikes.
Sankara's circle of advisers is even more narrow than
his constituency. He tries to foster the image of a
broad-based leadership by claiming that the National
Council for the Revolution (CNR) rules Burkina; but
its membership is a state secret, and, according to the
US Embassy, it is rumored to exist only on paper. The
Embassy also reports that in practice key decisions
are made by the President and three key officials:
Defense Minister Jean-Baptise Lingani, Minister of
' According to academic studies, massive strikes forced Burkina's
first president to abdicate in 1966; pressured the next ruler,
President Lamizana, to form a civilian government a decade later;
and weakened that government so drastically by 1980 that the
Economic Promotions Henri Zongo-both of whom
control key Army units in or near the capital-and
Minister of Justice Blaise Compaore. These men
helped Sankara engineer the coup in 1983 and remain
responsible for the regime's security.
We believe Sankara could be vulnerable to a coup
attempt by any of his three advisers, particularly if
they become convinced that his popularity is eroding.'
According to the US Embassy, rumors of conflict
between Compaore and Sankara surface occasionally,
but we have no corroborative evidence. Some uncon-
firmed US Embassy sources claim that Compaore
distrusts the extreme left and engineered its removal
from the government in 1984
~iJnconfirmed US
Embassy sources report that Zongo is pro-Soviet and
that he generally handles contacts with Moscow and
Tripoli.
Pressures From the Extreme Left
US Embassy and press reports suggest that the
Patriotic League for Development (LIPAD~a Marx-
ist party temporarily allied with Sankara in 1983-
hopes to regain its influence. LIPAD, whose members
Sankara purged from the regime in 1984 on suspicion
that they were trying to oust him, now considers
Sankara a military dictator who is not following a
true "revolutionary" path, according to US Embassy
reporting. Formed in the early 1970s, LIPAD-which
advocates aSoviet-style revolution-has some 400
members and supporters, principally among the coun-
try's students, intellectuals, and trade unions. US
Embassy reporting also indicates that LIPAD has
some support among civil servants and probably limit-
ed backing in the military. Moreover, Burkina's larg-
est trade union, the Confederation of Unions of
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Capt. Thomas Sankara regards himself as one ojAfrica's leading revolutionaries
and an example,for young African o,~cers to emulate. The US Embassy reports
that he admires Ghana's nationalist leader, Jerry Rawlings-with whom he
probably identifies-and the two maintain regular contact. According to Embassy
and press reporting, he is intelligent and charismatic, and prides himself as a hero
to African youth. He publicly stresses hard work, honesty, and discipline as the
most important qualities for his government and people.
Sankara, 38, received military training in Madagascar and France. He earned a
reputation as a war hero during the 1974 border conflict with Mali. During the
late 1970s he commanded the regiment at Po, served on the Army's General Stgf~;
and in 1981 served briefly as Minister for Information in the conservative Zerbo
Blaise Compaore. Although he is the Minister oI Justice and, according to US
Embassy reporting, the regime's second in command, Compaore spends most of
his time at the military garrison he commands at Po, near the Ghanaian border.
Reports o is erences wit Sankara surlace occasionally but remain unsub-
stantiated. Although Embassy sources claim that he was the Jorce behind
LIPAD's removal Jrom power in 1984, others depict him as a Marxist who
privately presses for the radicalization of the revolution.
commander of the commando training garrison at Po.
Compaore, 35, entered the Army in the early 1970s and subsequently received
military training in France, Morocco, and Cameroon. His instructors in Paris and
Yaoundelound him retiring but hardworking. He served in the 1970s in various
stgffpositions , in 1980 was appointed to the General Stc~; and in 1981 became
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Thomas Sankara and His Inner Circle (continued)
Henri Zongo, the Minister of Economic Promotions, probably is the third-most-
powerful o,~cial. Despite his portfolio, he appears to take little interest in
economic matters and rarely travels abroad to discuss Burkina's financial needs,
US Embassy reporting indicates. He is described as hard working0and 25X6
appears to be the most radical of Sankara's three advisers. Zongo spends most 4f
his time at Camp Komboise, a 400-man garrison he commands just north of the
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The US Embassy reports the 36 year-old career Army o.~cer received military
training in France and Cameroon in the 1970s. He played an active role in the
1982 coup and was one of the major participants of Sankara's 1983 coup.
Jean-Baptise Lingani. Lingani, who serves as Defense Minister and Commander
of the Defense Forces, is described by various Embassy sources as a relative
moderate, who allegedly views the United States favorably. According to
Embassy and a is a workaholic and commands the
respect of the enlisted men.
He reportedly is content in his present position and does
not seek to rule the country.
The 39 year-old Lingani entered the military in 1964 and received several years
of military training in France. In the 1970s he served as commander of the
military bases in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. Since assuming the Defense
portfolio, he has traveled to the USSR, North Korea, Cuba, and Libya, and has
visited Algeria several times. According to the US Embassy, he represented
Burkina at a Soviet Party Congress and had close contact with the Bulgarian
Prime Minister. He is married to the daughter of former President Lamizana.
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Burkina (CSB), is closely aligned with LIPAD, and its
president-imprisoned in January 1985 for organiz-
ing an antigovernment strike-is a key LIPAD theo-
retician, according to the US Embassy.
Sankara, apparently believing he has co-opted at least
some LIPAD members, has allowed them to regain a
limited role in the government. The US Embassy
reports that in the past year Sankara has reappointed
a few LIPAD members to government posts, probably
believing that they no longer pose a threat to him and
that he can exploit their radical impulses, especially in
foreign policy. US Embassy reporting indicates that
former Foreign Minister Diallo, a LIPAD leader who
was released from prison last year, serves as a foreign
affairs adviser. We suspect Diallo may try to use his
position to promote closer ties to the Soviet Union.
Grumbling in the Military
Recognizing that Burkina's 7,600-man military re-
mains the ultimate source of power, Sankara relies on
a carrot and stick approach to maintain its allegiance.
He periodically purges suspected opponents from its
ranks and has not hesitated to execute alleged coup
plotters, according to US Embassy reporting. Most
pro-Western officers fled to Ivory Coast following
Sankara's coup, and Sankara has assigned others of
questionable loyalty to remote posts in the far north,
The de-
fense attache also notes that Sankara awards special
financial bonuses to key officers, and the enlisted men
are well paid on a regular basis.
Nevertheless, we believe that several sources of dis-
content could eventually lead to coup plotting among
military personnel.
that officers are frustrate with the poor state o
equipment and chronic shortage of supplies. The
Army has few operational trucks, no tanks, and poor
communications facilities, and the Air Force is usual-
ly grounded as a result of maintenance problems and
a lack of spare parts. Sankara contends that Burkina
cannot afford to use its limited resources to improve
its military capabilities substantially, according to US
Embassy sources.
In our view, Sankara's ineffectual leadership during
the recent border war with Mali probably damaged
his standing with the armed forces. US Embassy and
defense attache reporting indicates that Sankara com-
mitted anumber of tactical errors, such as refusing to
mobilize key military units, failing to send reinforce-
ments to the north, and relying on armed civilians to
do some of the fighting. Some of his officers believe he
underestimated the scope of the Malian offensive and,
according to US Embassy reporting, they are now
criticizing him for not wanting to avenge Burkina's
defeat.
Still another source of discontent is the presence of
CDRs in the military's ranks, serving as political
"watchdogs."
every military unit contains such a committee, proba-
bly composed of no more than six persons led by a
junior or noncommissioned officer who oversees politi-
cal education and conformit to "revolutionary princi-
ples." that some
officers regard CDR personnel as government spies
who occasionally undercut the authority of command-
ing officers and ignore the military chain of com-
mand. We believe officers resent lower ranking per-
sonnel monitoring their activities and challenging
their orders.
Reversing Economic Decline
Sankara's political problems are compounded by Bur-
kina's precarious economic condition. A mix of chron-
ic poverty and ill-conceived government projects are
undermining Sankara's efforts to implement austerity
measures needed to stem Burkina's economic deterio-
ration. Sankara has introduced a number of pragmat-
ic economic reforms to help preserve scarce financial
resources. He imposed stiff austerity budgets and,
according to press reports, since 1983 workers' real
take-home pay has been slashed by some 40 percent
as a result of a wage freeze. The US Embassy reports
Sankara also reduced the overstaffed civil service to
cut the budget deficit.
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The six-day war, in which Mali seized a small strip
of the disputed northern frontier, stemmed from
Bamako's hope that the conflict would spark a coup
in Burkina. US Embassy reporting indicates that
Malian President Traore believed the conflict would
give Burkinan dissidents the opportunity to overthrow
Sankara, and that the new government would negoti-
ate aterritorial settlement favorable to his country.
Traore also probably hoped that a war would distract
public opinion away from Mali's unpopular economic
austerity measures.
The war underscored historicallrictions between the
two countries. Hostilities over the ill-defined border
.flared briefly in 1973 and 1974. Although both
parties submitted the dispute for World Court arbi-
tration in 1983, and delineated their long western
border in 1985, relations have been strained in the
past two years, according to the US Embassy. Malian
President Traore increasingly views Sankara as naive
and immature, while Sankara publicly depicts
Traore as "inept ", "senile ", and "corrupt. " More-
over, in late 1985 Sankara publicly commented that a
"revolution" would benefit the Malian people, ac-
cording to press reports.
Mali began mobilizing its forces in early December,
about the same time Burkina publicly announced
that census takers would visit four villages in the
disputed zone.
us
Embassy an that
Burkinan military units were neither mobilized nor
put on alert before Mali's attack on 25 December.
In the six days of fighting, Mali's Army overran the
poorly armed Burkinabe soldiers and civilians sta-
tioned in the north. According to sketchy Embassy
reporting, Sankara chose not to mobilize the regular
Army units based in the capital-some one-third of
the Army is deployed there-but preferred to have
the lightly armed Committees for the Defense of the
Revolution do some of the fighting. Moreover, San-
kara reinforced his southern Jiank, mistakenly be-
lieving that Mali would attempt to seize Burkina's
second-largest city, Bobo-Dioulasso. Burkina had no
defense against Malian air attacks on its northern
garrisons and airfields. According to a variety of
Embassy and press reports, about 300 Burkinan and
Malian soldiers died in the war.
Libya sought to exploit the war to expand its regional
influence, according to the US Embassy.
Although Tripoli was aware of Traore's inten-
tions, Qadhgfi chose not to inform Sankara, Embassy
reporting indicates. In our view, Qadhctfi probably
welcomed the war, believing that Sankara would
have no choice but to call in Libyan troops to prevent
his downfall. During the conRict, Qadhctfi unsuccess-
fully sought to send peacekeeping troops to the
disputed region, hoping to present himseUas a
neutral party probably to gain permanent access to
both countries. According to US Embassy reporting,
moderate neighboring states, led by Senegal and
Ivory Coast, launched a series of diplomatic initia-
tives to end the war because they leared a prolonged
conflict would result in Libyan military intervention
The war ended on 1 January 1986 with acease-fire
negotiated under the regional Nonaggression and
Defense Aid Agreement pact. Press reports indicated
that, under the provisions of this accord, the seven-
member organization dispatched observers to the
disputed zone, Mali withdrew itsforcesfrom the area
it had seized, and the two sides exchanged prisoners
of war. The observer force will remain in place until
the World Court makes its ruling, which is expected
later this year. According to academic studies and
press reports, Burkina has a much stronger case,
based on historic claims supported by French cola
nial maps. Both parties have agreed to abide by the
decision.
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Burkina's Economy
Burkina is categorized by the World Bank as one of
the 10 poorest countries in the world, with a per
capita income ojonly $160. The country relies almost
entirely on agricultural exports-mainly cotton-to
earn foreign exchange, and about 90 percent of the
work force eke out an existence as subsistence farm-
ers. Foreign aid from the West, crucial for govern-
ment operations, has averaged some $200 million a
year since 1979, while remittances from emigrant
workers in neighboring Ivory Coast provide at least
1 S percent of GDP. Burkina has few exploitable
natural resources. Although its mineral wealth in-
cludes high-grade manganese, zinc, silver, gold, and
limestone, the deposits are in isolated regions with
poor transport networks, and the government has
jailed to attract thejoreign capital necessary to make
large-scale exploitation feasible, according to the US
Embassy. Burkina has no known petroleum or gas
reserves. Some 95 percent ojthe population is illiter-
ate, and the average life expectancy is 42 years, well
below the averagelor Sub-Saharan Africa. According
to the World Health Organization, Burkina has one
of the highest child mortality rates in the world.
Nevertheless, the regime wastes scarce capital on
highly visible but ill-planned projects. According to
US Embassy and press reports, Sankara's plan to
build a railroad from Ouagadougou to the northern
city of Tambao, at a cost of some $70 million, has
faltered because of insufficient funding. Western do-
nors believe the railroad-designed to transport man-
ganese ore to the capital-is unnecessary and not cost
efficient. A similar problem exists with Sankara's
Bagre dam undertaking. Western donors believe that,
even if Burkina raises enough funds to complete the
dam, low water levels probably will leave it inopera-
ble. According to Embassy reporting, construction of
an international airport in Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina's
second-largest city, may also become a white elephant
if the government cannot secure the additional fund-
ing needed for its completion.
Drought is firmly entrenched in the north and contin-
ues to spread southward. Aid workers estimate that
only 20 percent of the land is arable. In the early
1970s, Burkina was ravaged by the Sahelian drought,
which caused the death of at least 200,000 people and
2 million cattle in the country. Although Burkina is
not now among the Sahelian countries most seriously
threatened by drought, some 500,000 Burkinabe are
c~fjected annually, according to US Embassy and
press reports. Burkina produces only about 10 per-
cent of its food needs and the L/S Embassy and relief
workers predict regional food deficits in the next one
to two years, with fairly regular surpluses in the
south but severe deficits in the north. Food produc-
tion cannot keep pace with Burkina's rapidly growing
population, which, according to academic studies,
will increaselrom the present 7 million to over 10
million by the year 2000. Moreover, migrants from
neighboring Mali and Niger, seeking to escape more
serious conditions in their countries, are likely to
increase Burkina'slood requirements and strain re-
liejeJjorts over the longer term.
Opportunities for Libyan and Communist Gains
We believe worsening economic conditions, coupled
with restiveness within the military and Sankara's
exaggerated fears of external aggression, will provide
opportunities for Libya, Cuba, and possibly the Soviet
Union to make new inroads over the next several
years. Although Burkina's ties to Moscow and Tripoli
have been limited by Sankara's disillusionment with
what he perceives as stingy Libyan and Communist
support for his populist revolution, Tripoli continues
to provide military assistance to Burkina while Cuba
assists the intelligence service, according to US Em-
bassy reporting. For its part, Libya probably views
Burkina as a potential base from which to subvert the
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Figure 2
Burkina: Total Foreign Public Debt,
1982-908
Figure 3
Official Development Assistance
to Burkina, 1978-83
Netherlands
United States
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
0 1978 79 80 81 82 83
pro-Western governments in neighboring Ivory Coast
and Togo, while Moscow, in its effort to bolster leftist
movements, probably sees LIPAD as a potential
source of significant domestic political support.
Libya
Libya provided military arms for Sankara's coup in
1983, but the close relationship this portended has not
developed. Relations have cooled, in part as a result of
Libya's failure to provide substantial economic aid,
according to the US Embassy. Over the past two
years Tripoli has made only token donations of food
and medical aid. In November 1984 Sankara accused
Tripoli of reneging on a promise to provide a $10
million loan to help finance construction of the Tam-
bao railway, despite denials by Libyan officials of any
such commitment, the US Embassy reports. Tripoli's
military aid since the coup has consisted of seven
Italian-made SF-260 light tatical support aircraft,
which are maintained by six Libyan Air Force person-
nel in Ouagadougou, and some small arms and am-
munition. Adding to Burkina's disenchantment, many
0
In 1984 Burkina withdrew its 45 military
cadets from Tripoli because of poor living conditions
and harsh treatment by Libyan instructors. Six Liby-
an instructors reportedly serve at the military garrison
at Po.
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Figure 4
Burkina: Debt Service and Export
Revenue, 1982-908
60
ao
20
Amortization
and interest
Export
revenue
Libya is probably equally unhappy with the way the
relationship has developed. Although Sankara agreed
in 1983 to allow Libya to convert its embassy into a
People's Bureau-currently staffed by about 20 Liby-
ans-he has rebuffed Libyan offers to provide funding
for mosques, and refused to allow the distribution of
Qadhafi's Green Book in Burkina. The US Embassy
reports the Libyans so far have unsuccessfully courted
the Muslim community, which constitutes some 30
percent of the population. Moreover, Sankara has
publicly criticized Libya's regional role, probably in
order to assert his independence and to dispel regional
fears that he is Qadhafi's pawn. He has rejected
Libyan pressures for a security pact, publicly depicted
the Libyan-Moroccan union as a betrayal of the
Saharan people, deplored the Libyan military pres-
ence in Chad, and belittled Libyan financial aid to
West Africa, according to US Embassy reporting.
Despite these strains, we judge that Sankara is likely
to turn to Libya for military and security aid, and
possibly Libyan troops, if he suspects that Mali, Togo,
Ivory Coast, or France is subverting his regime. He
might attract Tripoli's aid by allowing Burkina to be
used as a transit point for Libyan assistance to
dissidents in the region. Under such a scenario, we
think Sankara would be unlikely to request the kinds
of weapons, such as tanks and fighter aircraft, that
would draw attention to a "Libyan connection" and
jeopardize key Western donor aid. Rather, he would
be more likely to seek antitank and antiaircraft
weaponry to offset Mali's superior armored and air
capabilities.
Soviet Union
Although the USSR publicly welcomed Sankara's
ouster of the pro-Western Ouedrago government,
Moscow-probably doubtful about Sankara's reliabil-
ity and leftist credentials-limited its relations with
Burkina, providing only token economic aid. Accord-
ing to US Embassy reporting, Sankara remains disap-
pointed that he has failed to draw more Soviet aid.
Indeed, the Embassy reports that in 1984 Sankara
was so enraged by the small amount of Soviet food
relief-some 500 tons of grain-that he ordered its
return to Moscow. That same year Sankara expelled
the second-ranking diplomat from the 20-man Soviet
Embassy for maintaining contacts -Kith LIPAD, and
the US Embassy reports that ties were strained
further by Sankara's expulsion of LIPAD from the
government in 1984.
STAT
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Moscow's current involvement is limited to token
military training and educational assistance. The US
Embassy reports that since July 1985 the Soviets have
trained 11 Burkinan pilots in the USSR. Educational
links are limited to 20 Soviet high school teachers in
Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso and some 60 Bur-
kinabe attending school in the USSR. The Embassy
reports that nearly half of the 147 Soviet scholarships
available go unaccepted because most students who
can go abroad prefer to attend universities in Western
Europe.
Although Moscow is unlikely to increase aid to San-
kara, it probably will covertly assist LIPAD.
S
Embassy reporting indicates that Soviet diplomats
maintain some contact with LIPAD, and the Soviets
may offer them financial assistance and political
guidance. According to the US Embassy, Moscow
still mistrusts Sankara's mercurial style and personal
brand of populism, and fears any substantial Soviet
presence would jeopardize its longstanding and profit-
able ties to neighboring Mali.
Cuba
Burkina has not forged close ties to Cuba, but
Havana's access to the intelligence apparatus may
allow it some limited influence. For example, four
Cuban advisers, who the US Embassy reports are
attached to Sankara's intelligence service, may give
Havana the opportunity to recruit antiregime officers
and provide LIPAD with information on the regime's
strengths and weaknesses. Following his coup, San-
kara established diplomatic relations with Cuba and
visited Havana. The Embassy reports that in April
1986 Burkina agreed to send some 600 students to
Cuba, fulfilling a development agreement signed in
1984. According to US Embassy reporting, an un-
known number of Cuban construction workers arrived
in 1984 to help build the airport at Bobo-Dioulasso,
but we have no evidence that they are still in the
country.
According to a variety of US Embassy sources, most
conservative West African regimes privately revile
Sankara's populist rule and regard Burkina as a
potentially destabilizing regional force-a concern
that would only be reinforced if Moscow or Libya
gained a strong foothold in the country. As it is,
leaders of these regimes also worry that their own
junior officers may attempt to imitate Sankara, ac-
cording to US Embassy reporting.
~ is training Ivorian dissi-
dents. According to the US Embassy in Bamako,
Mali privately alleges that Burkina is aiding its
dissidents, alhough we have been unable to confirm its
claim.
Both the Ivorian and Togolese Governments could use
their economic leverage against Sankara should they
believe it necessary. Landlocked Burkina relies on a
railroad through Ivory Coast and a highway through
Togo to move virtually all its imports and exports,
according to US Embassy reporting. Moreover, about
one-third of Burkina's adult labor force-about 1
million-works in Ivory Coast.
The US Embassy reports that Burkina
would not be able to find work for large numbers of
returning citizens, who would probably blame San-
kara for their plight.
While Sankara regularly criticizes the West-pre-
sumably to demonstrate his nonaligned credentials-
he wants to avoid jeopardizing vital Western aid,
according to the US Embassy. In addition, both
France and Algeria have continued to encourage
Sankara to moderate his policies in exchange for their
coutinuing support.
France
Despite periodic strains in the relationship, Paris
continues to aid the Sankara regime in order to play a
moderating role and to protect substantial French
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interests in neighboring Ivory Coast, Niger, and Togo.
During a state visit to Paris last February, Sankara
pledged to pursue more balanced domestic and for-
eign policies.
Since 1983, Sankara has regularly
lashed out at French "imperialism" in Africa and
accused Paris of aiding Burkinan dissidents.
The US Embassy in Paris reports that French offi-
cials are dismayed by Sankara's repressive tactics and
unpredictable behavior, yet France remains Burkina's
largest aid donor. Paris provided some $55 million in
economic aid in 1984 and in 1985 some $43 million-
about 40 percent of Burkina's budget. Moreover,
France remains Burkina's largest trading partner,
taking some 44 percent of its exports and providing 33
percent of its imports last year. French commercial
investment in Burkina totals about $5 million and
some 4,000 French citizens reside in the country. The
Embassy reports that Paris may demand payment of
Burkina's debt of some $155 million to France as
leverage to influence Sankara toward more pragmatic
thinking and moderate his regional policies. French
officials pledge to end all financial aid, however, if
Sankara allows his country to be used as a base for
subversion of neighboring. regimes.
Algeria
In an effort to limit Libya's role in West Africa and to
develop its own sphere of influence, Algiers provides
Ouagadougou with some limited military and eco-
nomic aid.
has donated artillery, nine
armore cars, two helicopters, and a MIG-17, and has
trained a small number of Burkinan pilots. The
Embassy also reports that in 1985 Algiers provided
Ouagadougou with some $4 million in economic
assistance as well as an unknown amount of oil.
Algerian President Bendjedid is probably counseling
Sankara to modify his radical stance, distance himself
from Qadhafi, and seek greater cooperation with his
neighbors, according to Embassy reporting.
United States
The United States also has some aid ties to Burkina,
according to US statistics. Bilateral aid was $2 mil-
lion last year, and will total about $1 million for 1986.
In addition, the United States provides about one-
third of Burkina's drought relief assistance-some
66,000 metric tons last year-and Sankara publicly
praises US drought aid. We believe the limited mar-
ket potential for US investors-in 1983, the last year
of available data, private investment totaled less than
$3 million-and the possibility for continued political
instability are likely to deter any significant increase
in US private-sector trade and investment.
Outlook and Implications for the United States
While Sankara's position appears secure for now, we
believe his popularity will erode steadily over the next
year while his domestic opponents continue to build
their strength. In particular, we believe LIPAD-a
relatively well-educated and disciplined group-has a
good chance to cultivate support within military and
civilian elite and better position itself to pressure
Sankara or lobby for his ouster by a more radical and
steadfast leader. Moreover, the revolution's lack of
direction, Sankara's erratic behavior, and mounting
restiveness within the public and military sectors may
spur rivalries in the inner circle and possibly prompt
one of Sankara's key advisers to launch a preemptive
coup. Lingani, Zongo, and Compaore each command
military units capable of carrying out a successful
coup, in our judgment.
Meanwhile, consistent with his carrot and stick meth-
od of ensuring the military's loyalty, Sankara may
turn to Libya for equipment and supplies to halt
grumbling over the poor state of Burkinan military
capabilities. Although Burkina's relations with Libya
are strained, Sankara is an opportunist and probably
would choose a "low cost" source of military aid. In
return for Libyan assistance, we judge Sankara would
be willing to permit Libya quietly to channel some
assistance through Burkina to dissidents attempting to
undermine neighboring states. We also believe, how-
ever, that Tripoli would use its limited military ties to
work behind the scenes to cultivate particular officers,
possibly in the belief that over time it can install a
more compliant leader.
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In the event Lingani, Zongo, or Compaore seized
power, a new government would probably look to
Libya or possibly the Soviet Union for political sup-
port and for military equipment and training to
bolster their security apparatus. We note, however,
that all three appear to lack the leadership skills
necessary to maintain the loyalty of the military and
would be hard pressed to fend off pressures from
LIPAD to take a major role in government. Any new
leadership would also have serious difficulty meeting
public expectations for improved living standards and
would probably have to contend with outbreaks of
unrest, possibly led by the powerful trade unions.
Regardless of who rules Burkina, the country's des-
perate need for financial assistance will provide a
source of leverage for France and the West. The risk,
however, is that the Soviets and Libyans will provide
enough up-front money to move Ouagadougou down a
path unacceptable to Western donors. Alternatively,
Moscow and Tripoli could choose to mask their ties to
any new leadership and quietly develop Burkina as a
regional base while encouraging the government to
take the steps needed to avoid jeopardizing Western
aid.
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